It is notew orthy that fa m ily m em bers o f c itizen s in addition to this universal right have a right to adm ission as they are m em bers o f the com m unity from the w eak cosm op olitan p erspective (se e the com munitarian

plan. Families are in addition often also a crucial part of the support that individuals need to pursue their life plans (Gibney 1986: 129-130; Carens 1994:157-158).55

Economic migrants do not have a right to admission from a weak cosmopolitan perspective. This follows from the fact that it is not a basic right to seek or obtain better economic opportunities as such: individuals can live autonomous lives as long as they have adequate

opportunities available to them. It should be pointed out in this context, however, that a person who has no or virtually no economic opportunities open to her, and lacks the possibility of earning a livelihood, is deprived of her basic right to exercise autonomy (but such a person would have a right to be admitted as a refugee under the weak cosmopolitan perspective). Co-nationals are not seen as having a right to admittance on the strength of their

55 G allow ay argues that n on -citizen s d o not have a right to entry to join persons they have b eco m e em otion ally dependent on, i f the d ependency, at least partly, is a con sequ en ce o f a ch o ice the person w illin g ly m ade. G allow ay likens the c h o ic e o f d evelop in g em otional attachm ent to a ch oice o f pursuing a particular carrier w hich n ecessitates a ccess to a particular state, and argues that n on -citizen s cannot w illin g ly put th e m selv es in a position o f d ependency and then have a right to adm ittance. T his argument is based on that autonom y is seen as b ein g as m uch about liv in g w ith o n ce ch o ices as it is about b ein g bailed out (G allow ay: 1993: 2 9 8 ). T his argum ent is not com patible w ith strong cosm op olitanism as it w ill put a heavier burden on certain in d ivid u als on the m orally arbitrary ground that they have ch osen to marry outside their com m unity. N or d o es it hold as a w eak cosm opolitan argum ent in that, it cannot be deem ed a n on -b asic right due to its voluntary nature. A p erson, w h o c h o o se s to put h erself at risk for the thrill or the hell o f it, d o es not necessary have a basic right to assistance. There are, h ow ever, tw o fatal problem s w ith G a llo w a y ’s argument. It is, first o f all, doubtful i f d ev elo p in g em otional ties can be seen as a ch o ice in the sam e w a y as taking the risk o f clim b in g a m ounting or ev en the ch o ice to pursue a particular carrier. T his as the develop m en t o f em otional ties in v o lv e s a co m p lex w eb o f social and p h ysical factors that m ost people feel is beyond their control. It w ould be strange to upbraid a person for not finding lo v e in a w ay on e m ight blam e a person for not w orking hard enough to ach iev e n ecessary q u alification s needed in the labour market or for risking her life to clim b a high m ountain. T his is not to say that eco n o m ic d ecision s, for exam p le, are totally w ithin p e o p le s’ control and that question o f lo v e lie s totally beyon d it. P eo p le cannot be held fu lly responsible for the course their p rofessional liv e s take and p eop le can certainly, to som e extent, affect their em otional life , but the tw o spheres are qualitatively different. T h is m eans that the right to fam ily unity hardly can be dem oted from the status as a b asic right on the ground that it is a c h o ice that a person could have refrained from m aking. S eco n d ly , even i f p eo p le could be held m orally responsible f a - their em otional d ep en d en cies, there is a d ifferen ce, betw een the fa m ily spheres and m o st other c h o ices. T o freely ch oose to pursue the partner o f o n e ’s c h o ic e , w ithout consideration o f m em bership status i s an ab solu tely fundam ental right. T o freely ch o o se a carrier, for exam p le, is a lso an important part o f individual freed om , but it is p o ssib le to restrict this right w ithout encroaching on the core o f a persons’ autonom ous life , provided that som e eco n o m ic opportunities are available. There is a q ualitatively difference betw een state action that interferes w ith a person’s p rofessional life and a p erson ’s fam ily life . T o be d ism issed from o n e ’s p ost can sim p ly not be com pared to be separated from o n e’s fam ily.

G ibney a lso d en ies that all individuals have a universal right to fa m ily reunification. H e, h ow ever, con d ition s h is argument on the prem ise that the separation m ust have been voluntary in the first p lace, h old ing that admitted refugees but not gu est w orkers m ust have the right to bring their fam ilies (G ibney 1986: 142).

T his argum ent se em s to run up against the lim its o f w hen a ch o ice is free or w h en a free c h o ice carries moral w eigh t. I f the con d ition s for a ch oice is unreasonable then, at least, the part o f the agreem ent w h ich pertains to the unreasonable condition carries n o m oral w eig h t and is not m orally binding. T hus admittance cannot be m ade dependent on that the fa m ily cannot jo in the im m igrant since this right is a b asic right in the first p lace, or at least any such part o f the agreem ent w ill be invalid. I.e. it se em s questionable to argue that refu gees have a right to bring their relatives, even i f the relatives are not in danger, sin ce the right to fam ily reunification is a b asic right and at the sam e tim e hold that w a v in g this important right is a fair condition for ad m ission in general.

right to individual autonomy, as the desire to live with kith and kin (as opposed to family) is not connected to their ability to exercise autonomy.56