Jaspers, Plotinus and Timelessness

Plotinus’ influence on Jaspers’ thought is evident in two fundamental conceptions that are essential for both thinkers in their philosophising:

• the distinction between the two aspects of reality, namely the tran- scendent realm and the empirical world; and

• multiple modes of Being including different aspects of the self. Both Jaspers and Plotinus maintain that the transcendent realm is not another world separate from this one. Transcendence is to be consid- ered as a non-objective mode of Being. They also defend the view that the relationship between the two orders of reality is dialectical. Each realm requires the other and despite their opposition they are indi- visible. In their explanation of the transcendent realm there is no denial of the phenomenal world; in fact, there is a definite recognition of it. They hold that the sensible world has its own proper reality. For both thinkers it is important to link eternity with Transcendence and objective time with the empirical world.

As far as the multiple modes of Being is concerned, the distinction between the two aspects of the self is central to both Jaspers’ and Plotinus’ philosophy. They both make a clear distinction between an empirical aspect of the self and a true self that does not perish. Although Jaspers does not talk about the immortality of the soul, he shares some elements of the eternal aspect of self with Plotinus. Jaspers endeavours not to associate his views in this respect with the religious framework of his predecessor. Nevertheless, in Jaspers’ explanations of the concept of one’s ‘deathlessness’, some of his asser- tions, due to his terminology, remain open to a religious interpret- ation. Both Jaspers and Plotinus discuss the areas of the authentic existence of the self and the timeless experience of the attainment of selfhood. What Plotinus says about these concepts is very similar to Jaspers’ concept of one’s existential experience of eternity in the

Augenblick.

For Plotinus, the realisation of one’s true self, one’s experience of eternity in the here and now, and authentic existence are intimately linked. There are clear parallels between Plotinus’ notion of authen- ticity and its connection with eternity, and what Jaspers says in this regard. For both Jaspers and Plotinus, achieving selfhood is inti- mately linked with an eternal moment that can be experienced in the world. This link between eternity and the self seems to arise from Plotinus’ belief that ‘we have a share in eternity’.2_{But how can we}

have a share in eternity if we are in time? The same question arises with regard to Jaspers’ assertions. How can one have a share in eter- nity as Existenz? The answer is closely connected with their notions of the true self and its attainment in a transcendent experience of the

eternal, namely authenticity. For both Jaspers and Plotinus, there is a significant distinction between the eternal and the temporal self. Plotinus says that every human being is of two-fold character. As we noted, Jaspers follows the same line of thinking. One difference between the two thinkers is that Plotinus gives a detailed and systematically thought-out account of eternity and Being, while Jaspers’ system is not explicit. For both Jaspers and Plotinus, the attainment of one’s true self and a momentary experience of eternity are inseparably connected. What Plotinus says about one’s true self and achieving selfhood is almost identical to Jaspers’ assertions regarding Existenz. In this context, there is no denial of Plato’s influ- ence on their philosophy. For example, in Plato’s Phaedo the real- isation of the true self is conditional upon the individual’s rise, through contemplation, to the eternal. Accordingly, one’s experience may occur only for a moment as an eternal idea which is unique and timeless.

The way Jaspers conceived of eternity was influenced not only by Plotinus, but also by some medieval scholars. The reliance on time to divide the structure of reality into two orders gained more promin- ence in medieval metaphysics. God’s mode of existence meant being eternal and any other entity in the world existed only to the extent that it imitated the eternal mode of Being. It seems it was Plotinus who laid the foundation of a particular philosophical theology based on the ‘Idea of Being as the One’. We shall say more about the medieval exegesis of eternity later in this chapter.

2. NON-TEMPORALDURATION ASTIMELESSNESS

One definition of the non-temporal duration interpretation of eternity states that this duration is not temporal because it is simultaneous with all instances.3 _{A problem immediately confronting us here is that it}

contains what seem to be paradoxical statements. For example, how can duration have no beginning and no end but be simultaneous with all instances? How can past, present and future be simultaneous? Some argue that these statements are incoherent because the events that happened in the past, this particular moment now and future events that have not yet happened cannot possibly be simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Another strong objection to simultaneity of durationless instants might be that time cannot be composed of durationless instants since a stack of such instants cannot produce a non-zero duration.4

What should we make of these objections? In response to such objections one might wish to reply as Jaspers would, by pointing out that these objections are formulated within the confines of object- language. The difficulty lies in the lack of full understanding and the ineffability of such a metaphysical concept as eternity. The statements regarding eternity seem contradictory because reference is made to such terms as ‘instant’ and ‘duration’, both of which are associated with objective time. An instant, for example, is a fraction of time, and duration indicates lasting through time. If the definition of eternity is thought of within the framework of objective time, then any state- ment in this regard will remain contradictory. This is an unavoidable consequence of the lack of appropriate terminology in one’s language regarding certain metaphysical concepts such as eternity. Although duration means persistence through time, here it has a wider meaning which accommodates the concept of duration in the eternal sense. What is this eternal sense? Although it is difficult to say what precisely the eternal sense is, it is considered as duration which lacks past, present and future. Furthermore, there are no temporally successive parts, but an eternal durationless moment is thought to be all at once an indivisible whole.

How, then, can one explain the experience of an eternal moment in terms of non-temporal duration without reference to objective time? In approaching this question, it is important to emphasise its underlying presupposition, in that the term ‘duration’ does not carry the ordinary sense when used of the eternal. In the eternal sense, a single instant or moment should not be conceived as a fragment of time in the world of the senses. In order to follow this line of think- ing, one must assume that eternity is represented, in the absence of an adequate metaphysical vocabulary, by ‘presentness’ and ‘simultane- ity’, both of which seem to be the closest terms to non-temporal dura- tion one can offer. Eternity, then, is conceived as a non-temporal mode of Being (i.e. timelessness) characterised by both absence of suc- cession and simultaneity. When re-read in the light of this assump- tion, then assertions regarding timelessness as non-temporal duration will not be assessed in terms of objective time. It seems that only from this perspective of simultaneity and absence of succession can one rec- oncile apparent contradictions in Jaspers’ assertions. In turn, this con- ception of timelessness will enable one to present an explanation of the experience of the eternal in objective time.

In the classical sense, the concept of non-temporal duration is con- ceived as timelessness in a religious context. Eternity in this sense has

been used to characterise God’s mode of existence. Plotinus, Boethius and St Augustine are among those who defend this form of eternity as a single moment in connection with God’s mode of Being. They present eternity as the basis of ‘unlimited life’. Boethius’ definition of eternity is:

. . . the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life, all at once . . . 5

Boethius explains that by everlasting life he means the whole of ever- lasting life in one simultaneous present. Although he uses temporal terms (e.g. everlasting and present) in his definition, the meaning of the term eternity points to timelessness. According to Boethius, then, God’s eternity involves no temporally successive parts but all exist equally. God’s eternal attributes are such that eternity exists all at once and there is no distinction between past, present and future, and no succession of ‘before’ or ‘after’ in temporal terms. This is a com- monly accepted medieval view of God’s mode of Being and eternity. Such a description of God as timeless, however, attracts controversy. Some philosophers regard this assertion as self-contradictory. If God possesses life all at once, that means He possesses all of it simultane- ously. So no one part of His life is later, or earlier, than any other part of His life. This suggests that His life is confined to a single instant, which has no duration at all. Therefore, the argument goes, God cannot create, move or act in any way, and so cannot be divine Providence.6

So far we have looked at some ideas of eternity as non-temporality in the classical sense. We have seen that Plotinus’ views on eternity, the transcendent realm and one’s inner self, which are all interlinked, are similar to Jaspers’. We have pointed out that both thinkers acknowledge the inadequacy of ordinary language to provide a comprehensive definition of this transcendent realm. We have also reflected on the medieval exegesis of eternity as non-temporal dura- tion. We noted that ‘non-temporal duration’ and ‘timeless presence’ seem contradictory metaphors employed to express the notion of eter- nity. What emerges at the end of this section is that we cannot think of, or talk about, eternity without appealing to objective time. We are told by Plotinus that reasoning, in the general sense, will not ade- quately explain the nature of eternity and its relationship to Being, and that we must employ the eternal in us since we have a share in eternity ourselves. But what is ‘the eternal in us’ and how does one experience it? In order to address this question, one has to look into

the nature of what is experienced as a timeless moment of eternity in the here and now. This is made clear in the next section.

One of the questions we started with was whether the theological context was a necessary condition for the clarification of the concept of timelessness. Does eternity have to relate to a Divine Being in one’s elucidation of the concept of non-temporality as timelessness? It may have been appropriate to hold on to a theological framework when Jaspers’ predecessors presented their views, but it now seems to many a redundant idea to support a philosophical argument. Although it seems conceptually difficult to present a secular version of eternity as non-temporal duration, I shall argue that it is possible to do so as a rationally coherent concept. If a secular approach is adopted, then perhaps Jaspers’ statements regarding the notion of the timeless moment may become more comprehensible and not as ambiguous as they first appear. This does not mean, however, that the position we are considering is without its difficulties. I now turn to the non- temporal duration interpretation of eternity and present it in a secular context.

3. NON-TEMPORALDURATION ASTIMELESSNESSREVISITED– ETERNITY

AS THE‘POINT’

In order to put forward a non-religious interpretation of non- temporal duration as timelessness within the Jaspersian philosophy, we need to return to the definition of non-temporal duration:

Eternity is a non-temporal duration that has no limits, no beginning and end. To say this duration is not a temporal duration is to say that the duration has no parts that succeed one another. There is no part of the duration that is later than any other part. To say that it has duration means that it does not last for one instant only, but is simul-

taneous with all instances.7

This passage is important for two reasons: first, because it reinforces the metaphysical compatibility of eternity as non-temporal duration with objective time; and second, what is offered here does not neces- sarily imply a divine eternal Being. Furthermore, it seems to support Jaspers’ assertions regarding one’s experience of a moment of eternity. Now let us consider eternity as a single whole. Accordingly, eter- nity is the overall totality, that is, an indivisible whole which is taken to mean timeless presence and durationless, or simultaneity. Let us now suppose that eternity is timeless duration represented by a single

moment that is outside the temporal order of events and let us refer to this single moment as the ‘point’ in order to avoid misunderstand- ing.8_{Let us further suppose that this ‘point’ is in such a position that}

potentially it can have connections with any instant in temporal time (i.e. moments of t1, t2, t3, and so on) and with any part of the tem- poral order (i.e. past, present and future). This does not mean, however, that eternity, as the ‘point’ as it were, exists as different instants in the temporal order of events. It is not itself an instant that constitutes a part of earlier or later moments of objective time; it is rather a timeless point. Thus, eternity as the ‘point’ has no temporal properties of pastness, presentness or futurity.

The term ‘presentness’ in its eternal sense as the ‘point’ must not be assumed to be a part of the temporal order of events. It is more like the ‘present now’ or ‘standing now’, the nunc stans as the medieval scholars called it, rather than ‘moving now’ in objective time-series. Given that eternity is taken to mean presentness and timeless dura- tion, each instant of temporal time can be simultaneous with the eternal ‘point’, although not with each other. In order to grasp the notion of eternity that I am presenting here, it might be useful to employ a geometrical model even though eternity is not spatial. At the risk of excessive schematisation, it can be said that eternity is analo- gous to the centre of a circle or a sphere, where the circumference rep- resents the temporal order of events and the centre represents eternity as a singular ‘point’. Being outside of the temporal order, this eternal ‘point’ is not in any temporal instant but in a timeless singularity. In other words, the eternal ‘point’ stands only in relation to instants in the temporal order. From the eternal ‘point’ perspective, any instant in objective time can be in touch with eternity, or rather with the eternal ‘point’, depending on the degree of human awareness of the transcendent realm.

Although this eternal ‘point’ is limitless and infinite, duration in the temporal sense is not involved here. It is possible to conceive of ‘unlimitedness’ of the eternal ‘point’ in the sense that there is no other part before and after the ‘point’ itself which can be described as ‘nothing’ and ‘everything’ just as Plotinus describes it. It can be con- sidered as Being in its entirety, and as the totality. Does this totality have to be connected with a Divine Being? There does not seem to be a necessary connection here. In order to assess whether there is a need to ascribe eternal attributes to the ‘point’, let us first consider the fol- lowing passage, which exemplifies God’s eternity as timelessness. Then we can try to express timelessness without the concept of God,

and see whether the absence of God will change the explanation of non-temporality:

Every instant of time in the created universe is present to God. It is as if God is on top of a mountain and sees all creation spread out below him; he sees all of it at once.9

It seems that in this passage God is occupying the top of a metaphys- ical mountain as it were. He is in such a position that He can see all at once, past, present and future, in terms of the temporal order of events. If the peak of the mountain is above every instant of objective time, then it can be considered as equivalent to the single eternal ‘point’ in the geometrical model previously presented. A similar rela- tionship between the eternal ‘point’ and the temporal order of events within the confines of the circumference of the circle is consistent. Granted, the geometrical model here is metaphorical, but the princi- ples involved are reasonably clear. In the above passage ‘presentness’, or ‘present eternity’, is described in terms of the existence of a Divine Being in a permanently present instant. Nevertheless, there is nothing contradictory here to suggest that the notion of ‘presentness’ can be articulated without involving God, that is, within a non-religious framework. If one were to exclude the presence of God from the explanation of eternal presentness, or from the mountain top as it were, then the eternal moment as a single ‘point’ would still remain as eternal presentness with or without the divine characteristic of the ‘point’. And this would not change, in a functional sense, the rela- tionship between the order of temporal events and eternity repre- sented as a singular ‘point’. Indeed, there is no plausible reason to suppose that the relationship between temporality and eternity would not function without the presence of God.

Seen from this perspective, there is no need for the eternal ‘point’ to have any connection with divinity. It is conceivable that eternity as a singular ‘point’ can exist without cause or purpose. It might well be that it simply is. Based on this assumption, one can argue that this interpretative model of eternity does not necessarily imply Divine Being, or divine attributes. Furthermore, there is nothing in this concept of timelessness that contradicts or negates the reality of objective time. Nor does this assumption indicate in any way that temporal experiences of a moment of eternity are illusions. The pro- posed geometrical configuration of eternity as a single ‘point’ is a metaphor that can indeed function effectively without recourse to God. Unlike the Divine Being explanation, there is only the single

‘point’ or the mountain top so to speak. The geometrical model thus expresses a representation of eternity as the ‘point’ with greater