JUANITO G. ESPINO JR

G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012, SERENO, J.

There is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.

Facts:

A city ordinance Ordinance No. 15-2003 was passed granting the Vice Mayor of Malabon, Jay Jay Yambao, to negotiate and enter into contract for consultancy services for consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat tasked to function in their respective areas of concern. Later on, petitioner Arnold Vicencio was elected as Vice Mayor of Malabon, and he deemed it necessary to hire the services of consultants with the end view of augmenting and upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of the legislative machinery of the city. After the funds were appropriated, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (₱384,980) for being an improper disbursement. The Petitioner appealed to the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA, but the latter denied the petition.

The COA affirmed the decision of the ASB.

Issue:

Whether or not the contracts entered into by Vice Mayor Arnold Vicencio are valid.

Ruling:

No. Under Section 456 of the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the Vice- Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.

ROMEO J. GAMBOA JR. VS. MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., AND JUAN Y ARANETA

G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the

duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.

Facts:

Petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. was elected as the Vice Governor of Negros Occidental while respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected as Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) members. The governor had an official trip abroad and designated petitioner as acting governor until his return. However, during the regular session, the respondents questioned the authority of the petitioner and subsequently filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. The trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.

Issue:

Whether or not the Vice Governor has the authority to preside over SP sessions while he is exercising the powers and duties of the Office of the Governor.

Ruling:

No. It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is considered effectively absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latter’s absence. This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet this term should be reasonably construed to mean effective absence, that is, one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency.

Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office. This is so because in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.

Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a

temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.

BINAY, JR

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.

Facts:

A complaint for plunder and violation of RA 3019 was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City. Therafter, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order and copy of the preventive suspension order was received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. The CA issued a TRO he CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.

given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.

Issue:

Whether or not the condonation doctrine is applicable.

Ruling:

No. the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. Further, Nothing in Section 66 (b) of the Local Government Code states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, CORTES, J.

The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.

Facts:

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220 which created the Cordillera Administrative Region which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region” was enacted and signed into law. It recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of RA 6766.

Issue:

Whether or not the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

Ruling:

No. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, et al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, BRION, J.

RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM.

Facts:

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.

10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration assailing constitutionality of R.A. 10153 on the ground that the constitution gave ARMM a special status and is separate and distinct from the ordinary local government units.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections.

2. Whether or not by granting the President the power to appoint OICs

violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices.

3. Whether or not ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.

Ruling:

1. Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which states that the first elections of Members of the Congress

under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. The framers of the Constitution during the deliberation, through Davide could not have expressed their objective more clearly that there will be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.

Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.

2. No. Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which mandates the President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The above-quoted provision did not change the basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.

3. No. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. It is established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.

TALABONG, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, BRION, J.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law.

Facts:

Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. This prompted Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. Commission on Elections (Comelec) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term.

Issue:

Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under RA 7160, or the Local Government Code.

Ruling:

No.

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office and elective official must have involuntarily left his office. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, while on the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office. The office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.

In cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office since loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Thus. Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA

G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.

To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

Facts:

For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.

Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. Comelec First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a

Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. Comelec First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a