Laws and Causation

The themes of laws and causation are related to explanation in various ways.¹¹ First of all, the notion of law is a central (but problematic) element of Hempel’s covering law model. However, laws are typically elusive in higher-level

natural sciences (Bea y 1995; Kleinhans et al. 2005), and even more problem-atic in the human sciences (Dray 2000). Later philosophers of explanation have made a empts to solve these problems by proposing radically diff erent accounts of laws. Kitcher (1989, p. 447) characterizes laws as universal premises in explanatory pa erns, thereby reversing the relation between explanation and laws: the la er derives from the former, instead of the other way around. Woodward (2003, pp. 239–314) introduces the weaker idea of

‘invariance’ as an alternative for law. Invariance comes in degrees, and it applies to many generalizations that are used in scientifi c practice but do not qualify as laws (because they are not exceptionless, for example). Woodward’s account is especially congenial to the life sciences and social sciences.

Debates about the nature of causation are, of course, specifi cally relevant to the causal models of explanation discussed in Section 3. A prerequisite for developing a causal theory of explanation is having a satisfactory analysis of causation. Salmon devoted much eff ort to formulating an account of causal processes and interactions that would support his causal-mechanical theory.

Central to Salmon’s analysis is a distinction between causal processes and pseudo-processes, on the basis of the criterion of mark transmission (Salmon 1984, pp. 139–57). Salmon later abandoned this account of causation and opted instead for a ‘conserved quantity’ theory (see Section 3.1). A quite diff erent analysis of causation is Woodward’s manipulability theory, according to which manipulation and intervention are central to causation (see Section 3.2).

Woodward’s theory is motivated by the intuition that the use of the concept of causation is rooted in the practical values of manipulation and control.

Moreover, it relates causation to experimentation and is applicable in a variety of scientifi c disciplines and contexts.

8. Directions for Future Research

The philosophy of scientifi c explanation is, and will continue to be, a fl ourish-ing research fi eld. While important progress has been made in the last decade, much work remains to be done. The new mechanist approach is currently very popular, but faces a number of challenges. For example, there is still no consensus about the precise characterization of mechanisms, about their ontological status and about the normative power of mechanistic analyses.

Moreover, while due a ention has been paid to mechanistic explanation in molecular biology and neuroscience, application to other domains and disciplines is in its infancy. The mechanist approach to functional explanation nicely complements Salmon’s causal-mechanical model. An important open question is whether it is also compatible with alternative causal models, such as Woodward’s or Strevens’. More generally, an interesting question concerns

the scope of causal models. Answers should be found via application of these models to case studies of actual explanatory practices in various scientifi c disciplines. Furthermore, the future of causal models will depend on whether consensus will emerge regarding the analysis of causation.

Meanwhile, explanation by unifi cation has received less a ention in the last decade. The objections that have been raised against it have not yet been adequately answered by its proponents. Also, they should demonstrate that unifi cation is, in fact, part of the explanatory practice of scientists, a thesis that has recently been denied (Morrison 2000, p. 63). Finally, as I have argued above, the current diversity of models of explanation is not a problem, but is, in fact, a sign of progress. In addition, however, to further developing detailed models of scientifi c explanation for diff erent domains and contexts, we need a general philosophical framework that accounts for this diversity. The pragmatic approaches discussed in Section 6 can prove to be well suited for this purpose.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Petry Kievit for helpful suggestions and discussion. This chapter was completed during a research leave at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS).

Notes

1 See Chapter 8, ‘Reduction, Multiple Realizability and Levels of Reality’, on the notion of ‘level’.

2 Mechanistic explanation in neuroscience is covered in detail in Chapter 14, ‘Towards a Mechanistic Philosophy of Neuroscience’.

3 This idea goes back to the nineteenth century, when Wilhelm Dilthey argued that the human sciences (GeisteswissenschaĞ en) aim at understanding (Verstehen), while natu-ral science aims at explanation (Erklären).

4 Narrative explanation is sometimes used in natural science as well, especially in cosmology and geology (Kleinhans et al. 2005).

5 For the social sciences, classic a empts to formulate distinctive models of explana-tion are Winch (1958), who emphasized the need for inside knowledge of rules in social practices, and Geertz (1973), who argued that human actions can be under-stood only by ‘thick description’, which includes the context of the behaviour.

6 See Chapter 5, ‘Scientifi c Realism with a Humean Face’ on scientifi c realism in general.

7 See Psillos (1999, pp. 78–97) for an overview of the debate and an ‘explanationist’

defence of realism. Hitchcock (1992), by contrast, argues that (the theory of) explana-tion is irrelevant to the realism debate.

8 See the chapter ‘Scientifi c Models and Representation’ for further discussion on these and related issues.

 9 This applies to reduction of higher-level theories and laws in terms of lower-level theories and laws (inter-level reduction; for example, thermodynamics to statistical mechanics) and to reduction of theories at the same level (intra-level reduction, for example, Newtonian mechanics to relativity theory).

10 The problems of Nagel’s model are reviewed in Chapter 8, ‘Reduction, Multiple Realizability and Levels of Reality’. Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010) defend the Nagelian account.

11 See Chapter 6, ‘Causation and the Sciences’ for discussion of these themes.

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