ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
Facts:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions for the conduct of an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal, a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”), because Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the Comelec Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project; (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. Neri did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions.
Ruling:
No. The three questions are not critical to the legislature’s function. In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. The burden to show this is
on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and
"punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
GRECO BELGICA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Facts:
Starting 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional and the likely source of the congressmen’s kickbacks. Unfortunately, for lack of “any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF has been a common exercise of unscrupulous members of the congress,” the petition was dismissed. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation began its probe into the allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel.” After criminal investigations were filed following the Napoles controversy, the Commission on Audit released its own results of a three-year audit covering the legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009. The total releases amounting to billions of pesos spurred several petitions to be lodged before the SC to declare the “Pork Barrel System” as unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the constitutional provision on the non-delegability of legislative power.
Ruling:
Yes. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress.That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in the Bengzon case, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO AQUINO III, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, J. Bersamin
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury.
Facts:
Responding to Senator Jinggoy Estrada’s revelation that some senators, including himself, had been allotted millions as an incentive for voting in favor of Chief Justice Renato Corona’s impeachment, Secretary Florencio Abad explained in a statement that the funds released to the senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to accelerate economic expansion. The DBM further listed the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings and that it had been sourced from savings generated by the government and from unprogrammed funds.
Issue:
Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Ruling:
No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act by which Congress designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to
“the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.”
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
NB: Notwithstanding the above discussion, certain DAP practices were declared unconstitutional based on other grounds.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. v. CESAR PURISIMA, et al.
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, J. Corona
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Facts:
The core of this issue is the enactment of R.A. 9335, a law optimizing the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. This law intends encourage the bureau officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue IRRs of R.A. 9335, which is to be approved by a congressional oversight committee created for the purpose. The ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. invoke their rights as taxpayers in filing this petition to challenge the validity of R.A. 9335, a tax reform legislation. Among other contentions, they assail the creation of the oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the committee’s creation permits legal participation in an otherwise executive function.
Issue:
Whether or not the creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers as its permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statuteand are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.