The issues that will drive development of HSR in the US are different from those in Europe and Asia. Intercity travelers benefit from the well developed interstate highway system and mainly experience congestion close to their origin and destination cities. Areas like the Northeast Corridor, where several urban areas lie close together along an extensive stretch, are the exception. Due to the large area encompassed by the US, and long distances between major population centers (compared to Europe), most roadway congestion in the US is experienced by commuters making short trips (less than 100 miles) during the morning and evening peak periods50 rather than long distance trips in the 100- to 500- mile range where HSR has the highest payoff. Hence, the case for implementing HSR to reduce current congestion levels on the road network is weak.
In fact, extensive investment in the interstate highway and airport system in the US has made it harder to build a competitive case for additional investment in HSR.
The ownership structure of the rail network in the US is the opposite of most of the countries reviewed. In the US, freight companies own most of the rail network and Amtrak, the passenger train operator, has to negotiate with them for use of their lines. Hence, there is no pressing need to free up capacity for freight companies. Amtrak owns the Northeast Corridor tracks from Washington, DC to New York and from New Haven to the Massachusetts.
Unlike airports and roads that are built in all states, HSR systems perform best along corridors passing through clusters of high-density-population centers with significant economic activity. An examination of Figure 2 shows that several US states do not have designated HSR corridors because they do not have these high-density, economically active population centers. This has implications when HSR policy and funding is debated at the federal level. Representatives from states that will not have HSR lines may adopt stances ranging from lukewarm to opposing HSR projects. Some level of negotiation will be needed to iron out the HSR funding level and source.
We believe one of the reasons why the US continues to lack a firm HSR policy framework is that advocates have not developed a few key, compelling arguments that politicians can coalesce behind to push for HSR development. HSR advocates in the US tend to tout the environmental benefits, job creation potential, safety and high travel time reliability of HSR. The job creation benefit, though appealing in the current recessionary environment, may not sound very attractive to policymakers (legislators) once the recession turns around and the economy is on the mend. ARRA is a typical example. It was easy to set aside $8 billion for HSR in the bill based on its job creation potential; however, James Oberstar’s follow-up proposal for $50 billion did not materialize. Job creation is a benefit that will be realized as HSR projects are built, but it is not a good justification for investing in HSR because, inter alia, the same jobs would be created from any transportation infrastructure of other investment programs.
The environmental impact benefits, though acceptable, are much harder for the average everyday traveler to perceive. Most travelers make their daily choice of transportation modes based on economic/cost constraints rather than environmental considerations; hence, there is limited pressure on legislators from constituents to invest in HSR for its environmental benefits. It is also worth mentioning that other researchers question the environmental benefits of HSR, arguing that the benefits change based on whether emissions from the construction are included, and also on the no-build case used in each context.51
The on-time reliability, improved speeds (shorter travel times), and safety of HSR may be the strongest selling point for HSR in the US. The challenge is that these benefits are best seen when one rides or experiences an HSR system. Most travelers in the US currently have no conventional rail service available, and there is no HSR train for them to ride either. This makes it hard to rally enthusiasm among the current populace to push for HSR investment.
Though congestion levels on intercity highways are not at unbearable levels, most legislators are aware they need to develop additional capacity to support the growth in demand that will come with population growth in the future. HSR will definitely be a strong contender in meeting some of the future capacity needs. The challenge in solving future congestion problems is lower on the totem pole for many local public agencies that have their hands full grappling with rush-hour gridlock within and on the periphery of their jurisdictions. Dealing with HSR intercity, travel-related issues that span multiple regions and, in some cases, states is not high on the list of most transportation agencies and legislators and, is no simple matter in the context of the US Constitution which requires Congressional approval for interstate compacts.*
Until HSR advocates can agree on a coherent and focused rationale, or congestion becomes a problem on intercity routes, it appears that most HSR initiatives in the US will face an uphill battle.
* Interstate compacts are agreements between two or more states of the United States of America. They are regulated by Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution which states that no state shall “enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power” without the consent of Congress.