Literature to Research
3.1 Mapping this Research to Burrell and Morgan (1979) Frameworks
Burrell and Morgan (1979) classify social science research as to whether it tends towards objectivist or subjectivist views of society. This classification is done via the understanding and use of two frameworks that Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed and explain as “heuristic device[s] rather than a rigid set of definitions” (ibid:xii). The first framework (see Figure 3.1) outlines the subjective-objective dimension along axes of ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. The second framework (Figure 3.2) takes the first framework and adds one further dimension of radical change and regulation to develop four paradigms into which social theories can be placed. Prior to discussing these frameworks and how this research is placed
54During the viva of this thesis (8thDecember 2010) there was extensive discussion with the examiners
about whether this research might actually be interpretive rather than functionalist. To address this debate, a note of reflection has been added to Appendix 3, the appendix that supports this chapter, section A3.7.
within them it is worthwhile highlighting two aspects of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) work and how these aspects pertain to this research. The first aspect is with regard to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) discussion of social science theory and the social scientist. The frameworks offered by Burrell and Morgan (1979) are about the positioning of
different social science theories. However, Burrell and Morgan (1979) also make it clear that the positioning of social science theories is also a positioning of the scientist and as such there is not necessarily a clear line of demarcation between a theory and the researcher. For example, Burrell and Morgan (1979) highlight that analysing social theory against the frameworks brings social scientists not only “face to face with the nature
of the assumptions which underwrite different approaches to social science” (ibid:iix), but the frameworks also stress “the crucial role played by the scientist’s frame of reference in the generation of social theory” (ibid:iix). As whether social scientists “are aware of it or not,
they bring to their subject of study a frame of reference which reflects a whole series of assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in which it might be investigated” (ibid:x). Further, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the movement
Nominalism
Anti-positivism
Voluntarism
Ideographic
The subjectivist approach to social science
Realism
The objectivist approach to social science Positivism Determinism Nomothetic Ontology Epistemology Human Nature Methodology
Figure 3.1: The Subjective-Objective Dimension: A Scheme for Analysing the Assumptions about the
Nature of Social Science (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:3)
The Sociology of Radical Change
‘Radical Humanist’ (nominalist, antipositivist, voluntarism, ideographic)
Figure 3.2: Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979:22)
‘Interpretive’ (nominalist, antipositivist, voluntarism, ideographic) ‘Functionalist’ (realist, positivist, determinism, nomothetic) ‘Radical Structuralist’ (realist, positivist, determinism, nomothetic)
The Sociology of Regulation
of social scientists between paradigms (see Figure 3.2) is rare, as “for a theorist to switch paradigms calls for a change in meta-theoretical assumptions, something which, although manifestly possible, is often not achieved in practice”
48(ibid:24). This aspect of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) work is likely to be self-
evident to many, if not all, social science researchers. However, it is highlighted here to make clear that this narrative of social theory being closely wedded to or an extension of the researcher and not separate from the researcher runs through Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) work. Thus a note of caution arises, whereby, while this research can be mapped to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) frameworks, this mapping does not fully represent, for example, the ontology of this researcher. Thus it is important not to equate this research and its placement on the frameworks as being the equivalent of placing this researcher’s views on the frameworks. Particularly as through the conduct of this study, while the researcher has aimed to maintain a realist ontology he has also drifted towards a nominalist position. Similarly epistemologically he has moved from a positivist position towards a more anti- positivist stance. As mentioned in chapter one, this movement is apparent in the writing up of the study’s results and the caveating regarding subjectivity.49However,
while the movement may be apparent in the writing, as will be explained below, this research is realist and positivist.
The second aspect to highlight is that Burrell and Morgan (1979) are clear that their frameworks are about “the nature of the social world and the way it may be
investigated” (ibid:1). The important aspect to note here is that the focus is on the ‘social world’ and assumptions regarding society. In this regard the frameworks are not about the natural world50as Burrell and Morgan (1979) would describe it. This is
a point Burrell and Morgan (1979) make clear when discussing how, for example, sociological positivism “treats the social world as if it were the natural world”
(ibid:7). Whereas, in contrast “the German idealist tradition [holds] that there [is] a fundamental difference between nature and culture and that natural laws [are] inappropriate to the realm of human affairs” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:69). What is seen in both quotes is that Burrell and Morgan (1979) are inserting a clear line of
48Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify Marx as moving from a radical humanist paradigm to a radical
structuralist paradigm and Silverman moving from a functionalist paradigm to an interpretative paradigm.
49It is also apparent, to a degree, in the choice of ANT as a theoretical lens, albeit ANT aims to bypass
any realist and nominalist dichotomies.
50Where the natural world, although not defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979) could be surmised as being
demarcation between society and nature, where sociological positivism is about parallels between social and natural worlds and German idealism is about the rejection of parallels between the social and natural worlds. Again this aspect of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) work is likely to be self evident to most, if not all, social science researchers. However, this aspect is highlighted because in the previous chapter (chapter two) and the discussion of paradigms, for example ecocentrism and sustaincentrism (Gladwin, et al., 1995), it was highlighted that these paradigms remove lines of demarcation between humans and the environment or alternatively the social and the natural worlds (to use Burrell & Morgan’s (1979) phraseology). Consequently, although this research is clearly social science research, it is
investigating paradigms which would denote no separation. This aspect, although not significant to the programme of study that is this research and the classifying of it against the Burrell and Morgan (1979) frameworks, is highlighted because there is some element of incongruence between the paradigms to be investigated and Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) discussion of natural and social worlds within the context of their frameworks. This point is also made clear by Meima (1996) who outlines that the management scholars who discuss environmental paradigms such as: Devereaux Jennings and Zandbergen (1995), Gladwin, et al., (1995), Purser, et al., (1995) and Shrivastava (1995a) oscillate “between objectivism and subjectivism, and they end up mainly leaning toward the epistemology of the soft human factor in a hard world” (Meima, 1996: 916).
Turning away from these two, perhaps self evident aspects and back to this research study and how it is placed against the Burrell and Morgan (1979) frameworks, when considering the first of the four subjective-objective axes (see Figure 3.1) and assumptions of an ontological nature. Burrell and Morgan (1979) highlight that this axis pertains to a basic ontological question “whether the reality to be investigated is external to the individual...or the product of individual consciousness” (ibid: 1), the two extremes on this axis are realism and nominalism. The realist position posits that “the social world exists independently of an individual’s appreciation of it” and an individual is viewed “as being born into and living within a world which has a reality of its own” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:4).51 Thus in the realist position, reality
51As seen in the quote there is a focus on the social world within Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) frameworks.
This in effect is focusing the ontological question down to a specific area and is thus different to perhaps broader definitions of ontology such as that offered by Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (2000) who define an ontology as the “branch of philosophy or metaphysics [that] is concerned with the nature of existence.
is not created by the individual, it exists ‘out there’ and is ontologically “prior to the existence and consciousness of any single human being” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:4). In contrast the nominalist position “revolves around the assumption that the social world external to the individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:4). The second axis concerns assumptions of an epistemological nature: that is,
“assumptions about the grounds of knowledge [and]...how one might begin to understand the world and communicate this knowledge to fellow human beings” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:1). Burrell and Morgan (1979) highlight that
epistemological assumptions are predicated upon “whether it is possible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as being hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form, or whether knowledge is ...more subjective, based on experience and [of an]...essentially personal nature” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:2). In sum they explore if knowledge is “something which can be acquired...or something which has to be personally experienced” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:2). The extremes on this axis are positivism and anti-positivism. Positivism seeks “to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:5), with this knowledge being able to be transmitted by an observer. Anti-positivism, in contrast, is “set against the utility of a search for laws or underlying regularities in the world of social affairs” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:5) and the “social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied” (ibid:5). Thus anti-positivism rejects the
standpoint of the observer and “one has to understand from the inside rather than the outside” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:5).
The third axis concerns assumptions pertaining to human nature. Burrell and Morgan (1979) make it clear that assumptions regarding human nature are
“conceptually separate” (ibid: 2) from the previous two axes. They note, however, that all social science relies on an assumption regarding human nature. The
extremes on this axis are determinism and voluntarism. Where determinism regards humans and their activities as being “completely determined” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:6) by the situation in which they are located. Thus human nature is viewed as
[Where] ontological assumptions are those assumptions that underpin theories about what kind of entities can exist” (ibid:246).
being a product of the environment. At the other extreme is voluntarism where humans are viewed as being “completely autonomous and free-willed” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:6) and they are thus the creator of the environment in which they are located. These two positions are quite clearly extremes and Burrell and Morgan (1979) make it clear that many social science theories “incline implicitly or explicitly to one or other” (ibid:6) of these extremes “or adopt an intermediate standpoint which allows for the influence of both situational and voluntary factors in accounting for the activities of human beings” (ibid:6).
The fourth and final axis, methodology, results from the three previous axes, as the previous assumptions have “direct implications of a methodological nature” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:2). In this regard, a position on the fourth axis is implied or drawn out from the assumptions and positioning on the previous axes. The two extremes on this axis are nomothetic and ideographic. If the assumptions of the three
previous axes are towards the objective end then the “scientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relationships and regularities” (ibid:3). Thus the
methodology will be nomothetic and the focus will be on concepts and “their measurement and the identification of underlying themes” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:3). Consequently nomothetic methodologies emphasise the application of a “systematic protocol and technique” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:6), the testing of hypotheses and the conducting of, for example; large scale surveys. In contrast if the assumptions of the previous axes are towards the subjective end then scientific endeavour is likely to be concerned with the subjectivity of individuals and how they create modify and interpret their world (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Thus the
methodology will be ideographic and emphasise the importance of obtaining firsthand knowledge and “getting close to one’s subject and exploring its detailed background and life history” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:6). The focus being on “getting inside” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:6) the situation and analysing subjective accounts, be they with the subject or from “insights revealed in impressionistic accounts” (ibid:6).
Moving to the second framework (see Figure 3.2), this framework consists of four paradigms for the analysis of social theory. This framework builds upon the first framework (see Figure 3.1) but adds to it notions about society and change: the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical change. The sociology of
regulation is used to refer to theorists whose primary concern is to “provide explanations of society in terms which emphasise its underlying unity and
cohesiveness” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:17). As such, theorists ask questions which “tend to focus upon the need to understand why society is maintained as an entity” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:17), where the theorists tend to provide explanations of society as an “actuality” rather than a “potentiality” or alternatively “what is” rather than “what is possible” (ibid:17). The sociology of radical change “stands in stark contrast to the sociology of regulation” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:17) in that its focus is upon “deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination and structural
contradiction” (ibid:17). It is a sociology whose theorists focus upon the “deprivation of man” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:17) and it is often “visionary and utopian” (ibid:17) in that it looks towards “potentiality as much as actuality” (ibid:17) and “what is possible rather than with what is” (ibid:17).52
By applying notions of society and change (sociology of regulation, sociology of radical change) to the four subjective-objective axes (see Figure 3.1), the four paradigms that Burrell and Morgan (1979) derive are: Functionalist, Interpretive, Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist. These four paradigms “define
fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis of social phenomena” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:23). By way of overview, the Functionalist paradigm is rooted in the sociology of regulation and approaches social science from an objective point of view. The Interpretive paradigm is again rooted in the sociology of regulation but seeks explanations of the social world at the level of the subjective experience of the participant as opposed to the observer. The Radical Humanist paradigm similarly to the interpretive paradigm seeks explanations of the social world at the level of subjective experience. However the Radical Humanist paradigm differs in that it “emphasises the importance of overthrowing or transcending the limitations of existing social arrangements” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:32). The fourth and final paradigm, Radical Structuralist, is concerned with radical change but from an
objectivist standpoint. Having outlined the two frameworks, how this research study is mapped against them is now outlined.
52With regard to the sociology of regulation and the sociology of radical change, Burrell and Morgan
(1979) make it clear that however much a theorist may view themselves as being in the middle ground between radical change and regulation, a theorist “must always be committed to one side more than another” (ibid:19).
In considering the first framework (Figure 3.1) and the subjective-objective
dimension, this research study treats the social world as if it exists and is prior to an individual’s cognition of it; hence it is realist in its position. Further the research is positivist in that it is viewing knowledge as something that cannot only be acquired and transmitted by an observer, but it is also searching for regularities and testing research questions. With regard to human nature, the research is deterministic in that it arises from a problematic of the environment and how this impacts a subject’s actions. However, it is not totally deterministic regarding human nature. As in aiming to understand the paradigms of subjects it accounts for voluntaristic elements of human nature. Consequently, as Burrell and Morgan (1979) highlight, many theorists adopt an intermediate standpoint, and this research would tend towards this intermediate standpoint as well, although from a deterministic start. This is perhaps not unusual because as Meima (1996) highlighted this investigation of paradigms is focused upon soft human factors in a hard world, or more simplistically beliefs, assumptions and values and how these are both determined and determining of an individual’s actions. Finally with regard to methodological assumptions this research study is nomothetical, as it is focused on the application of a systematic protocol and technique (semi-structured interviews) with subjects, the testing of a set of research questions and the identification of underlying themes.
Turning to the second framework (Figure 3.2) and given the assumptions of this research against the first framework, this research is either within the Radical Structuralist or Functionalist paradigms. As this research is focused upon questions about what is rather than what is possible, the research is aligned with the sociology of regulation and is within the Functionalist paradigm.53
The placement of this research within the Functionalist paradigm is perhaps not surprising when considering the research questions and their phraseology (see Figure 3.3).54 The questions use of the term ‘organisations’ as their subject, clearly 53During the viva of this thesis (8thDecember 2010) there was extensive discussion with the examiners
about whether this research might actually be interpretive rather than functionalist. To address this debate, a note of reflection has been added to Appendix 3, the appendix that supports this chapter, section A3.7.
54The research questions are developed in chapter two. As outlined in chapter 2, section 2.3.2; given this research is motivated from a perspective of environmental concern, research questions five and six do carry with them some assumptions of what may be found with the researched organisations, these assumptions are highlighted in the bracketed text. Please note that when interviewing the organisations, the bracketed text was not asked as is, rather the bracketed question if asked was asked in an open manner that allowed the interviewees to outline their views without being ‘led’ by the researcher.
places this research within an objective space regarding assumptions of the social world. As they (the questions) treat
organisations as if they exist as entities that can be identified, an aspect that would be questioned if, for example, an Interpretative stance was taken. Further in asking whether organisations are either sustaincentric or ecocentric, the research is looking to identify regularities and themes within its subjects and relay this information, hence it is not only positivist but in applying these questions
consistently to the subjects it is nomothetical.
Turning away from the questions,
that this research is within the Functionalist paradigm is again likely to be
unsurprising given the choice of open systems theory, as an organisational theory (see previous chapter). This is because Burrell and Morgan (1979) outline where particular organisational theories sit within the paradigm framework and they identify open systems theory as being within the Functionalist paradigm.55 In identifying
that open systems theory sits within the Functionalist paradigm, Burrell and Morgan