Marx, Ideology and Criticism

Much theorising on ideology refers to two particular pieces of writing: the first being The German Ideology, written by Marx and Engels around 1846; and the second being the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, written by Marx in 1859 (McLellan 2000). Firstly, the German Ideology sees Marx and Engels develop and set out their critique of philosophical thought:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. (Marx & Engels [1846] 2000:192)

The failure to realise these ‘ideal expressions’ of a dominant class results in the camera obscura - an upside down version of reality - in which concrete social relations become abstracted into ideology, working over and against those subjected to it. It is perhaps this particular statement that encourages one of the more general and narrow interpretations of ideology – that of: illusion, false ideas, or false consciousness that, in turn, helps to legitimate a dominant political power or class (Williams 1983). Abercrombie and Turner (1978) in The Dominant Ideology Thesis argue that this particular exposition has been traditionally interpreted as one class, i.e. the class owning the means of mental and material production, imposing their ideology on the subordinate class. The adoption of this same ruling ideology by the subordinated class then works to inhibit any revolutionary consciousness

developments, whilst simultaneously maintaining and reproducing the existing conditions (ibid).

One of the main problems with The German Ideology and this particular exposition, according to Eagleton (1991), is that the ‘camera obscura’ merely inverts empiricism:

Instead of deriving ideas from reality, it derives reality from ideas. But this is surely a caricature of philosophical idealism, one partly determined by the image in question. (ibid: 76)

Indeed, this could be seen as caricaturing the very same thinkers that Marx relies on to build his theory of human consciousness - that is consciousness as an active and dynamic force. Unfortunately, this works to inhibit and constrain the overall reading of the theory. For example, ‘consciousness’ and ‘practical activity’ can be seen as a stark duality, with ‘illusory’ thought disconnected from practical existence, but which serves the dominant interest. Or, consciousness may mean ‘mental life’ in general, but it could also refer to specific historical sets of beliefs, i.e. political, religious, judicial and so on. In any event, for Eagleton it is difficult, in this context, to see consciousness as an active social force (ibid).

In the Preface To A Critique Of Political Economy, however, references to ‘illusion’ have ‘disappeared’, so to speak. Here, Marx gives a brief autobiography setting out a summary of his earlier materialist conception of history (historical materialism) developed in the German Ideology, and introduces the concept of ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’. The following quote from the Preface is, again, often used as the ‘orthodox’ exposition of this idea:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite state of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on

the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Marx [1957] 2000:425)

Marx appears to locate ideology within the superstructure and creates a base-superstructure theory. This theory has been extensively criticised for its appearance as mechanistic, hierarchical, static and dualistic. In this sense, it does not set itself apart in any general way from the problems inherent in The German Ideology. Indeed, Abercrombie and Turner (1978) see little difference between the base-superstructure theory and the passage quoted previously from The German Ideology. This may have some bearing; however, a note of caution should also be exercised as Abercrombie and Turner’s argument rests on the assumption that in the Preface ‘social being’ determining ‘consciousness’ actually means, and therefore should read as ‘class’.

Dorothy Smith (2004) takes issue with the interpretations that many theorists have concerning Marx's theory of ideology, and thus her methodological approach involves a re-reading of Marx’s work. Smith shares the sentiments of scholars, such as philosopher Tom Rockmore (2002), who argues that, in the main, Marx tends to be read in relation to Marxism and the

Marxist movement of intellectual thought. This is a mistake for a number of reasons. Marx and Engels tend to be viewed as a unity or a two headed thinker and this causes interpretational problems. For example, Rockmore asserts that both Marx and Engels shared a political outlook, but not a philosophical one. According to Rockmore, it is very difficult to trace any serious philosophical thought in Engels’ own work, but philosophical thought is woven throughout much of Marx’s work. Moreover, many students are routinely taught that Marx inverts Hegel’s own philosophical thought, yet some scholars, including Rockmore and Smith (2004), insist that Marx furthers

Hegel’s core ideas, thus making Marx a Hegelian. Debates around interpretation and the different periods of Marx’s life and thought remain current; however for the purpose of this research it is not necessary to detail them any further. The main point here is one that Smith shares and, again, details in K is Mentally Ill, and that is that we are instructed to read Marx in a particularly Marxist way. The next section will explore Smith’s own interpretation and her utilisation of Marx’s method.