METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

More Accurate Approach

Being in tune with interactionism (Endler & Magnusson, 1976), the present approach has provided a method to measure directly this cognitive person-situation interaction process at the individual level. The implications o f this direct measuring can be summarized as follows.

First, the present approach has provide the method to explore how values and various representations o f the world (situations) are related through valuations.

Second, values research in Rokeach's approach has been carried out nomothetically (ZavaUoni, 1980), that is, to search those values that are relevant to an interested variable through statistically defined groups. Because in Rokeach's approach, the measurement is about the transituational importance o f values, there is no way to examine whether the relevant values found in an aggregate (sample o f individuals) are held at the individual level, therefore this casts doubt on the findings from the aggregate. In contrast, in the present approach, each individual's valuation on a given situation is measured directly in terms o f activated values, and the affective status and importance o f the activated values related to the given situation. When individual valuations are statistically aggregated across the sample, the results reveal what and how the collective values are held to evaluate a given situation. Also, when each individual's valuation is compared with the sample's general valuation, the results reveal the unique part o f the individual's valuation. The present approach provides a clearer understanding o f the limits o f the nomothetic approach for the study o f values.

Third, in some studies which try to explore how the relevant values influence behaviour, the relevant values were pre-selected by the researchers (e.g., Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988). However, there is no guarantee that their selections cover all the relevant values held by the subjects. This may be one o f the reasons that cause disappointing behavioural prediction fi'om values in Rokeach's approach (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 1981; Hughes, Rao, & Alker, 1976; Pitts & Woodside, 1983). In contrast, in the valuation measurement, the relevant values and their affective status and importance related to a given situation are decided by each individual, rather than pre-decided by the researchers. This allows the results to reflect more say o f subjects' views about the situation, some o f which might be pre-excluded by the researchers' selection o f the relevant values. The list o f values used in the valuation measurement is assumed to be comprehensive enough to represent all kinds o f standards that might be consulted by evaluators in various situations. I f the list o f values is found not to be comprehensive enough, the study o f valuations can also work to improve its comprehensiveness by adding necessary items.

Fourth, there was usually only one type o f cross-cultural values research in the previous approach, that is, to compare the transituational importance o f values between various cultural groups (e.g., Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Ng, 1982). The results o f this type o f study showed the cultural similarities and differences in transituational importance o f values. However, this type o f cross-cultural values research cannot reveal how these cultural similarities and differences are related to various situations. Because the present approach is closely linked with situations, this makes it possible to compare valuations on various

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situations between various cultural groups. As a result the cross-cultural study of values can study the universal and culture-unique aspects of valuation on a given situation.

In brie^ the present method reveals more accurate picture of each respondent's own subjective view, and thus the general views of the whole sample about a given situation. Also, the present %q)proach is congruent with the neoicHogrcphic approach urged by ZavaUoni (1980) which emphasized the importance of studying psychological processes as individual outcomes for discovering what is unique and what is general in psychology.

Comparison between Measurements o f Valuation and Attitude

When values are consulted as standards to evaluate a particular object, the measurement of valuation on the object can be seen as another form of measuring attitude toward the object. As suggested

the

in^Activated Value Model (see Figure 1.3), the final score resulting fi’om the difference between the importance of reward and cost values can serve as an index of attitude which shows attitudinal direction and intensity. The findings of Study 1 suggest that this index correlates highly positively with attitude measured by semantic differential method, one of the attitude-measurement techniques.

In the theory and measurement of attitudes, there is general agreement that a single attitude is caused by many values (Mueller, 1986). According to Mueller (1986), in the popularly used attitude scales, attitude is measured as the affect for or against a psychological object. Among these attitude scales, semantic differential scales just ask respondents how they fe e l about a particular psychological object, but the other attitude-measurement techniques including Thurstone, Likert, and Guttman scales also ask what they believe about the object. The belief statements in these attitude measures almost always contain an affective component. A belief stating that the object is associated with the fulfilment of a particular important value results in positive affect. Conversely, a belief stating that the object is associated with the impediment of a particular important value results in negative affect.

Several attitude theorists (e.g., Rosenberg, 1956; Fishbein, 1967) have developed mathematical equations to explain the relative contribution of each belief about an attitudinal object to attitude toward that object. The two m^or determinant elements in these equations are (1) the magnitude of the particular value associated with the attitudinal object in each belief statement, and (2) the extent to which the statement is believed (i.e., the extent to which the attitudinal object is believed to be associated with that

value). The two components of these attitude models are similar to those of the expectancy-valence theory, with the first element similar to the valence and the second element to the expectancy of a particular relevant value. Thus, the belief statements in attitude scales are equivalent to the measurement of valuation on a particular psychological object.

The m^or differences between attitude scales and measures of valuation are that the belief statements in attitude scales are concrete, and the relation between the attitudinal object and the value associated with each belief statement are predetermined by the persons vdio propose the statements, while measures of valuation use a list of values which are abstract and whose relations with the object are decided by respondents. These differences between attitude scales and measures of valuation imply that measures o f valuation have three advantages over attitude scales.

First, the procedure of constructing a valuation measure is ampler than that of attitude scale. Because a comprehensive enough list of values is assumed to represent the entire universe of the desirable standards that can be used to evaluate various situations, the list of values and a proper instruction make up directly a valuation measure to evaluate any given situation. In contrast, when building an attitude scale, researches have to collect or propose a pool of belief statements about the attitudinal object and select the proper statements through statistical and conceptual judgement.

Second, measures of valuation provide not only what respondents' affect is toward an object, but also why the affect arises in parsimonious terms of values. Attitude scales, on the other hand, usually focus on what affect is toward an attitudinal object. Although sometimes the most positively or negatively emphasized beliefs statements in an attitude scale may represent the reasons of a respondent's attitude, this may not always be the case. Sometimes it may be only positively emphasized beliefs statements that represent the partial reasons of a given attitude, because it cannot be sure whether the values within the negatively emphasized beliefs statements are regarded as not rdevant to the attitudinal object or being threatened by the attitudinal object.

Third, measures of valuation may reveal more say of subjects' views about the attitudinal object than attitude scales do, because it is respondents who determine which and how values associate with an attitudinal object in measurement of valuation, but in attitude scales these are pre-determined by the scale

their

168 On the other hand, the concrete statements in attitude scales may be easier for respondents to answer than the abstract values in measures of valuation are. However, the university students used as sample throughout this research showed no difficulty in identifying the relevant values and their relations to the given object from a list of abstract values More studies with other groups of samples are needed to examine the difficulty of measures o f valuation. If further studies show that most samples find measures of valuation easy to answer, the measurement of valuation will be an attractive alternative to attitude scales. If not, it at least can be used to induce concrete belief statements of attitude scales in the first place.