Assuming the Relations Thesis understood, what might be said in its favour other than that it seems obvious to the point of being trivial? To begin with, I’d like to make the case for the plausibility of the following restricted version of the Relations Thesis:
The Contingently Existing Actual Relations Thesis – The pertaining of any contingently existing actual122 relation between contingently existing actual things involves123
aspects of reality sufficient for the being of each related thing.
The plausibility of this claim can be brought into view by considering the closest possible situation to the actual situation in which some such relation pertains that lacks counterparts for whatever makes for the actual existence of one of the relata, i.e. a situation identical except that one of the relata doesn’t exist. I am less than five meters from my piano at present. Plausibly, the closest possible situation to the actual situation that makes this so and that lacks my piano is one qualitatively identical in all respects but that it lacks counterparts for the constituents of my piano. My counterpart in that situation most definitely wouldn’t be five meters from his piano. He might be five meters from some Meinongian non-existent piano, but that is a relation of an altogether different kind. At present, I am only concerned with relations the pertaining of which might be said to supervene solely upon contingent actuality. There are many such relations, infinitely many perhaps, and in every case, simple modal considerations of the foregoing kind suffice to demonstrate the role the being of their relata plays in their pertaining. The closest situation to any actual situation in which such a relation pertains that lacks a counterpart for one of the actual relata is a situation in which the
122 The intended contrast class for ‘actual’ is ‘possible’. What actually exists is what categorically exists in the
world, i.e. universe, in which we exist. This usage originates with Lewis (1970 pp. 184, 185).
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relation doesn’t pertain. This is surely testament to the difference making power of the being of the relata.
Working outwards from this result, consider a theory of fictional objects according to which the being of actual fictional objects, the objects of the contingently existing fictional lore of the actual world, is sustained solely by the contingent being of that fictional lore. Given such a theory, the same means of demonstration could be used to show that contingently existing actual relations between actual fictional objects and contingently existing actual objects, or other actual fictional objects for that matter, always implicate what makes for the being of each relata. It is contingently the case that John Lennon did less detective work than Sherlock Holmes. That such an asymmetric relation pertains between Lennon and Holmes is true, assuming the foregoing theory, solely on account of how contingent actuality is. Presumably, in a world with identical fictional lore about Holmes but in which Lennon’s counterpart does more detective work than is attributed to Holmes in that lore, or one where Lennon remain the same but the counterpart lore about Holmes has it that he never managed to secure a case, this is not so. Given such an account of actual fictional objects, the same modal
considerations as above suffice to demonstrate that what makes for the being of Lennon and Holmes is involved in the pertaining of the relation. Note that the fictional nature of actual fictional objects isn’t doing any special work here. The result clearly generalises so as to apply to things of any kind so long as their being is solely sustained by aspects of contingent actuality. Assuming an actualist constructivism about propositions, according to which the being of propositions is sustained by the contingencies of actual linguistic practices, or an actualist constructivism regarding numbers, according to which the being of numbers is sustained by the contingencies of actual mathematical practices, or perhaps even an actualist Meinongianism, according to which facts about non-existent objects are sustained by the
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contingencies of naturalised and nominalistic intentional facts, the same would be true of contingent actual relations between and with them.
Moving further outwards again, the same counterfactual considerations suffice to show that all non-actual contingent relations between non-actual contingent existents, fictions, constructively-sustained-abstracta etc, non-necessary relations between non-necessary existents, fictions, constructively-sustained-abstracta etc in merely possible worlds, are such that their pertaining involves what makes for the being of their relata. One merely need consider the closest possible situations to the possible situation in which any such relation pertains bereft of counterparts for what makes for the being of any one of its relata. In every such case, the relation will not pertain. The upshot of all this is that in every possible world, all contingent relations between contingent existents, fictions, constructively-sustained- abstracta etc involve what makes for the being of their relata, and if something is true in all possible worlds, it is necessary. We have regained our logical ‘must’, thereby establishing the following thesis:
The Contingent Relations Between Contingents Thesis – All contingent relations
between contingent things of any kind must involve something sufficient for it to be the case there are such things.