Modes of conversing about what is good

I think that in the section on Simonides’ poem there are two distinctions that clearly correspond to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about what is good. I will first discuss the more specific distinction and then the more general one.

Even though the makrologia/brachulogia debate has already been resolved in his favor before this section begins, Socrates cannot help putting in another good word for brachulogia. He praises Spartan brevity at 342de,1 and at 343b he explicitly says that a sort of Spartan

brachulogia (brachulogia tis Lakônikê) was the mode or style (tropos) of doing philosophy

chrêmatôn metron) in a sense far higher than any man could be, as the common saying affirms (kai polu mallon ê pou tis, hôs phasin, anthrôpos).” (Benjamin Jowett translation.) And the supreme elevation of god over man that

characterizes this passage also characterizes Simonides’ poem and Socrates’ interpretation of it (cf. the crucial line, quoted twice by Socrates, “God alone can have this privilege” [341e, 344c]). So might it actually be true that just as Socrates views Simonides’ poem as a “work of very elegant and elaborate art” whose “intention [is] assuredly to refute Pittacus’s saying, throughout the ode” (344b), so Plato views the Protagoras as a work of elaborate art whose intention is to refute Protagoras’s saying? The obvious objection is that Plato does indeed present an extended refutation of Protagoras’s ‘man-measure’ dictum in the Theaetetus, but that no such refutation is to be found in the

Protagoras. But although it is true that Protagoras’s radical relativism is conspicuously absent in the Protagoras

(not even at 333e-334c do we get a real example of it), his broadly ‘man-oriented’ approach to thinking and conversing about human goodness, as contrasted with Socrates’ ‘knowledge-oriented’ approach, is on display throughout the dialogue. In this sense the Protagoras might possibly be viewed as an extended indictment, not of the subtle metaphysical-epistemological theory that lies behind Protagoras’s famous dictum, but of its ‘manly’ or ‘man-oriented’ spirit. (I have benefited greatly from discussing this topic with Paul Muench.)

1

342d6-e4: “[I]f you choose to consort with the meanest of Spartans, at first you will find him making a poor show in the conversation; but soon, at some point or other in the discussion, he gets home with a notable remark, short and compressed (brachu kai sunestrammenon)—a deadly shot that makes his interlocutor seem like a helpless child (hôste phainesthai ton prosdialegomenon paidos mêden beltiô).”

favored by such men as the Seven Sages.1 Indeed, Socrates says that his description of Spartan brevity is meant to demonstrate that Spartans “have the best education in philosophy and

argument (pros philosophian kai logous arista pepaideumenai).”2 If, as I have argued, Socrates’ distinction between brachylogia and makrologia in the debate over dialectical ground rules (334c-338e) is essentially a distinction between an ‘epistemic’ and a ‘non-epistemic’ mode of conversing about what is good, then Socrates’ recollection of the same distinction here is one more example of a distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking about what is good.

Now for the more general distinction. When this section begins, the roles of questioner and answerer have been reversed and Protagoras is in the driver’s seat. But because of the agreement to stick to brachulogia and because the only person who can now give long, evasive answers is Socrates, there is good reason to expect a conversation in a broadly Socratic mode. Indeed, one might expect Protagoras to grill Socrates in just the same way in which Socrates had been grilling him. Instead, Protagoras turns what had been a direct investigation of virtue itself into a discussion of the compositional merits of a poem about virtue, thus shifting the

conversation—albeit still within the general mode of brachulogia—into a less Socratic ‘sub- mode’ more to his liking. As Protagoras puts it, his line of questioning will be about the same thing as before (peri tou autou men peri houper egô te kai su nun dialegometha), namely virtue (peri aretês); the “only difference” will be that the discussion will have been carried over into the field of poetry (metenênegmenon d’ eis poiêsin· tosouton monon dioisei).3 _{Protagoras thus}

1 _{343b3-5: “To what intent do I say this? To show how the ancient philosophy had this style of laconic brevity (hoti} houtos ho tropos ên tôn palaiôn tês philosophias, brachulogia tis Lakônikê) . . . .” Socrates mentions the Seven

Sages at 343a.

2

342d4-6.

3 _{339a3-6. This is not, of course, the “only difference.” Cf. Friedländer, p. 23: “[W]hen Protagoras claims that the}

poem deals with the subject under discussion, the obvious objection is that it does indeed deal with aretê but not with the questions of whether it is ‘teachable’ or whether it is ‘one’.”

comes close to saying: ‘The subject matter of our discourse will remain the same. The mode alone will change.’

If the whole discussion of Simonides’ poem may be seen as an exercise in a different mode of conversing about human goodness, is it a ‘non-epistemic’ mode? Recall the end of this section (347b-348a), where Socrates explicitly criticizes the mode of literary criticism itself. Socrates compares this way of conversing and the way in which he would prefer to converse to two different ways in which people might associate (suneinai, ‘be together’) at drinking-parties. Vulgar and uneducated people, he says, pay large sums of money to be diverted at their

gatherings by the alien voice of a flute, whereas noble and well-educated dinner guests associate directly with each other by means of their own voices.1 _{Socrates says that rather than distracting} themselves by conversing about what some poet meant, something which cannot be ‘put to the proof’ (ho adunatousi exelenxai),2 _{he and Protagoras should deal directly with each other, testing} each other in turn as they inquire into the truth of some matter.3 _{If the mode of poetic analysis is} better suited to impressing a sophisticated audience and testing how clever a student of poetry somebody is,4 Socrates’ preferred mode of conversing seems better suited to testing how well people’s characters square with their thoughts about human goodness, and to testing how well these thoughts measure up to the standard of knowledge.5 _{When viewed in these terms, the}

1

347cd.

2

347e6-7.

3 _{348a1-6: “[M]en of culture . . . prefer to converse directly with each other (autoi d’ heautois suneisin di’ heautôn),}

and to use their own way of speech in putting one another by turns to the test (en tois heautôn logois peiran allêlôn

lambanontes kai didontes). It is this sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate; putting the poets

aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons (autous di’ hêmôn autôn pros allêlous tous logous

poieisthai), making trial of the truth and of ourselves (tês alêtheias kai hêmôn autôn peiran lambanontas).”

4 _{Cf. 338e6-339a1: “I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man’s education (andri paideias megiston meros)}

is to be skilled in the matter of verses (peri epôn deinon einai) . . . .”; 341e8-342a2: “But I should like to tell you what I take to be Simonides’ intention in this ode, if you care to test my powers (ei boulei labein mou peiran hopôs

echô), as you put it, in the matter of verses (peri epôn) . . . .”

5 _{Cf. Laches, 187e-188c (Nicias speaking): “You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close}

entire section on Simonides’ poem, from Protagoras’s introduction of a literary-critical mode of conversing to Socrates’ harsh critique of this mode, looks like one long contrast between ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’ modes of thinking and conversing about what is good.1