The System of the Modes

We have now looked at each mode individually; let us consider how they are meant to work together. On my interpretation, suspension of judgment is the result of two steps. First, the skeptic offers an opposition to the dogmatic position which presents a dispute to be resolved. Typically, the dogmatist will attempt to resolve the question by offering his reasons. Second, the skeptic requests that the dogmatist support the reasons, which pushes the discussion further back in the chain of justification. The suspension is created by delaying the initial decision, that is, by putting off the resolution.

When we dogmatists discuss a philosophical issue, the debate is typically resolved (if it is resolved) when we reach common ground. If you and I both agree on a certain point and we both agree that that point ultimately entails one side of the debate, then we have resolved the question, and we assent to one conclusion over the other. The skeptic need not grant anything as common ground, so suspension is the result of continued skeptical questioning. The modes provide the skeptic basic ways to avoid dialectical resolution, and thus, they serve as a kind of skeptical guidebook.²⁹⁴

294I should add that I do not think the five modes exhaust the skeptical resources; there are many ways to oppose arguments and appearances. The skeptics had a variety of collection of modes, and I think that different collections operate in different ways. But, I think that the five modes were unique in the way that they operate in conjunction with each other. I also think that they can tell us something interesting about the way that the skeptics reached epochē.

Let us consider an example from Sextus to illustrate how it works. One of the few examples that illustrate all five modes working together occurs when Sextus describes the general arguments against causal theorists. I'll quote the passage in full and then discuss how the modes are meant to operate in this context:

Perhaps even the five modes of epochē would be sufficient against causal

explanations. For someone will offer an explanation that is either in harmony with all the philosophical schools and with skepticism and the phainomena, or it is not.

And it is probably not possible that it is in harmony; for all of the phainomena and the unclear things have been disputed. But if it is discordant, then he will be asked also about the explanation for this. And if he accepts the phainomena as the explanation of the phainomena or the unclear as the explanation of the unclear, then he will fall out ad infinitum. If he accounts for one in terms of the other, then he will fall into the reciprocal mode. But if he makes a stand somewhere, either he will say that the explanation is secure to the extent that it is based on things already said, and he introduces the relative mode, destroying what is relative to nature. Or he will be suspended when he accepts something from hypothesis. So it is likely possible to confound the rashness of the dogmatists who give causal explanations through these [modes] too. (PH I 185-186)²⁹⁵

The first thing to note about this passage is that Sextus obviously thinks the modes will be used together in a debate where the explanatory dogmatist might make any number of moves. This dogmatist is someone [tis] who offers an explanation, and Sextus at least mentions the possibility that the explanation harmonizes with every possible philosophy as well as with the appearances.²⁹⁶ 296There is no indication, contrary to what Morison (forthcoming, 15) suggests, that the dogmatist

provides an argument for the explanation at first. Thus, the mode from disagreement cannot involve opposing an argument from authority by another argument from authority because there is no argument;

there is only the initial dogmatic explanation.

Sextus thinks it likely that there will be a dispute, and if there is, then the skeptic will request an explanation of this. What is “this”? The feminine tautēs clearly refers to the original aitia. However, the ambiguity of the term aitia creates a puzzle. If aitia here means the efficient cause, as it sometimes does, then Sextus is saying the skeptic will point out that each cause must have a previous cause which will itself have another previous cause. But, why should the fact that there is a dispute raise the question of prior causation?²⁹⁷ The status of what caused a given putative cause has no obvious bearing on whether it is the cause or not. This suggests that aitia in this context must mean

“explanation” and that the request for an explanation of the explanation is meant to allow the dogmatist to offer an explanation that decides the dispute. That is, the skeptic is requesting an explanation of why the first explanation is the correct one, and why it should be preferred over competing explanations.²⁹⁸

An example might be useful here. Let us assume that the dogmatic doctor explains the appearance of sweat by appealing to intelligible pores. The skeptic might point to a competing explanation that sweat condenses from the surrounding moist air.

Since there is a dispute over the correct explanation for sweat, the dogmatist should feel motivated to explain why the dispute exists and why his explanation is the correct one.

This explanation, which is meant to be decisive for the first explanation, must either appeal to things that are obvious (such as the appearance of moisture on the skin) or it must appeal to things which are unclear (like holes in the flesh). But if it appeals to

297See Thorsrud (2009) for a good discussion puzzling about a infinite causal chains (152).

298Here again, we see that the skeptics like to build regresses out of epistemologically similar types (in this case, explanations of explanations).

something obvious, there will still be a problem because the skeptic can point out that the alternate theory agrees about what is obvious, yet disagrees about the first explanation; so the dogmatist still owes the skeptic an explanation for why there is a disagreement if everyone agrees about the appearances. This can continue forever as long as the dogmatist appeals to observable phenomena; the skeptic will say, “yes, we all agree to that, but why does that explain the dispute?” If, on the other hand, the dogmatist appeals to something that is not clear; for example, if the dogmatist tries to explain the dispute in terms of a corpuscular theory, then the skeptic can point out that such a theory is not at all obvious and so requires something further to explain why it explains the difference. This can keep the explanations going forever.²⁹⁹ Assuming the dogmatist is persistent in offering explanations, the result is suspension of judgment insofar as the dogmatist never fully explains, and so does not resolve, the original dispute.

The reciprocal mode is the first in this passage to attempt to stop the regress.

Having set up the contrast between the phainomena and the unclear, Sextus says that if the dogmatist attempts to explain one in terms of the other, then the reciprocal mode is invoked. Because the text here is so compressed, we cannot say exactly what Sextus has

299Consider what the alternative interpretative accounts must say here. Morison (forthcoming, 30-31) claims that the skeptic opposes the dogmatist's regressive argument with his own. But in the passage we are considering, the object is not an argument but an explanation, an aitia. The dogmatist clearly offers a single explanation at first and is then asked to offer a (single) explanation of that. It is only at that point that Sextus mentions the regressive mode. The picture here is clearly one of building a regressive chain link by link rather than bringing the whole argument down at once. Barnes thinks that the skeptic uses the mode as an objection to a particular argument that is regressive. Again, there seems to be no such argument here. Moreover, even if Barnes is right, there is still the puzzle about why Sextus presents the regression as one of like kinds: Couldn't there also be an infinite regression that mixes appearances and unclear things? Barnes (1990) himself discusses this in his chapter on reciprocal arguments (61-63). Clearly, there must be something about the type of explanation which contributes to the regression in Sextus' view. If the mode is simply appealing to the formal features of regressive explanation, we cannot explain the text here.

in mind about the reciprocal mode except that it is clearly meant to stop the regress.

Again, I take it that the dogmatist will claim that he simply affirms “There are pores if and only if out-flows happen.” The skeptic will grant this as a conceptual point and then ask why we should think that this explains the dispute about the original explanation.³⁰⁰

The next part of the passage makes it clear that the mode of relativity is meant to work in conjunction with the mode of hypothesis when the dogmatist attempts to stop the regress. If the dogmatist makes a stand, saying that some explanation is basic; and there need be no other explanation of an earlier explanation, the skeptic attempts to ferret out what sort of stand this is. If the dogmatist thinks that he can escape the need for an explanation by posit, the use of a mere hypothesis will cause the skeptic to posit a

contrary claim, thereby generating an opposition which is no less credible. The dogmatist might object that the opposite hypothesis ought not be believed, but then the discussion is shifted to the status of bare assertions, and the original dispute is unresolved.

Alternatively, the dogmatist might assert that the previous explanation(s) were good enough and that he has sufficiently explained what needed to be explained. But Sextus says that in this case, the dogmatist will only have explained things relatively speaking;

so he has not gotten at the nature of things.³⁰¹ The skeptic can then move the discussion to a debate about our (in)ability to get at absolute reality through relative observations and

300Hankinson (1998) says that “the Reciprocal Mode exposes circularities where the supposed explanans itself relies on the explanandum for confirmation, making neither well-founded” (286). I think this is right with the caveat that the skeptic does not assert that neither is well-founded. Rather, she simply asks what grounds the two of them together, and lets the dogmatist do the difficult work of answering.

301This is why I think that Hankinson (1998) is wrong when he says that we might counter the modes by denying “that any and every fundamental, non-derived proposition needs to be a mere hypothesis, a simple unsupported assumption” (286). Any such fundamental claim will be made relative to some perspective, under certain conditions, with all sorts of relativity built in. Whether such a claim is an Aristotelian first principle or an empirically supported hypothesis of modern science makes no difference.

claims.³⁰² In each of these cases, the question of the original explanation remains

unresolved, so the skeptic and the dogmatist will have suspended judgment indefinitely, at least from the standpoint of the current debate.

The modes are a sort of skeptical guidebook. They tell the skeptic how to generate epochē by creating the necessary opposition and then driving the question of support back further and further. Any time the dogmatic interlocutor attempts to ground the discussion, the modes give the skeptic a move to make which shifts the question of justification again. By questioning the grounds for the grounds, the debate continues. If the dogmatist is never allowed to cease the process of offering support, then he cannot claim to have decided the original question. The original question is suspended, pending resolution. This means that the dogmatist and the skeptic both suspend judgment from a dialectical standpoint.

Perhaps the dogmatist insists that the question is ultimately decidable and so does not suspend judgment from a personal, psychological standpoint. But notice that if the skeptic uses the modes properly, the dogmatist cannot insist that the question is decided in the context of the dialectic, so any dogmatic belief on his part will be ungrounded in the sense of not having ultimately justified his support. Notice too that there is no assumption made on the part of the skeptic about what constitutes rational justification.

The modes are possible dialectical moves that guide the skeptic about what to say and

302As I said before, most scholars who write about the five modes don't give any substantial place to relativity in their discussion. On the view of Morison (forthcoming, 15-17), however, the skeptic will use this mode when the dogmatist offers an argument from the appearances. In this context, I think he's basically right although I think he fails to explain how this operates within the dialectic. The sense in which the dogmatist is “making a stand” when he offers such an explanation is not at all clear on Morison's view.

what questions she should ask, but they do not make any assumption about what constitutes adequate grounds. If the dogmatist thinks that beliefs are only justified rationally, the modes guide the skeptic to handle that. If the dogmatist thinks that empirical observations can ground his beliefs, the modes tell the skeptic how to handle that. In this way, the modes can be used effectively by the skeptic to generate epochē, both for herself and for the dogmatist, no matter what subject they debate. Importantly, the pragmatic interpretation helps explain why all five modes are necessary. One general problem with past interpretations is that they fail to show how all five modes work together.

The pragmatic interpretation also offers a picture of skeptical investigation, and this is one of the primary reasons to consider the Agrippan modes while trying to understand the notion of a skeptical science. Recent scholars have wrestled with the notion that the skeptic can claim both to suspend judgment and to continue investigating.

As the modes show us, the suspension of judgment is not the final step at the end of a process of investigation. Instead, it occurs once the skeptic and her interlocutor realize that there is a decision to be made, and they begin the process of investigating what can be said in support of both sides.³⁰³

303Most of my presentation of the pragmatic interpretation has focused on the way that the modes operate on one side of the debate. That is, once the mode of disagreement raises a question that requires decision, the remaining modes are used to engage the dogmatic arguments for one side or the other. But, of course, if the disagreement is between two or more dogmatic schools, then these modes can be used to investigate each dogmatic position. This helps us make sense of the idea that the skeptic always finds each position in a debate equally credible. If the skeptic suspends judgment on, for example, whether the Stoics or the Epicureans have a better account of the happy life, she will use the modes to investigate the Stoic position and never reach secure grounds upon which to trust that the Stoics are correct. But she may, then, suspend that investigation in order to look into what the Epicureans say. By using the modes to investigate the Epicurean position, she finds again that she never reaches secure grounds. Even though the support that the two schools offer is quite different (and therefore may seem more or less plausible to different people), the investigation shows them to be on equal footing in this

Past interpretations see the modes themselves as a challenge to the rational

justification for our beliefs. I think this dilutes the power of the modes, if it ties the modes to a particular view of reason and justification. A dogmatist has merely to “refute” the modes as an antidote to their poison.³⁰⁴ The power of the modes, in my view, is that they make no such assumptions, which means that, whatever view of support you hold, the modes can drive you to the endless chore of trying to establish your beliefs. Moreover, because the modes are meant to be practical guides, they can have a therapeutic effect on anyone with dogmatic tendencies. That is, once you learn the techniques, you can use them to suspend your own beliefs, and this is where the true challenge of the modes lie.