Interview of Prof. dr. Jan-‐Bart GEWALD, Leiden University Institute for History. Interview was conducted in person in Leiden, the Netherlands, on 12.11.2015.
Different levels, national, regional and international, seems to be very interwoven in the Namibia´s independence struggle. How much was it about the Cold War dynamics?
The crucial defeat of the SADF happened already in 1988, in the battle of the Cuito Guinavale, so
before the end of the Cold War. South Africa´s war in Angola had become increasing economical
burden, and the defeat was the crucial moment when the raising cost of war reached its limits. The whole war was bad for SA´s economical interests. Already in 1985 South Africa had declared the ´state of emergency´, and had deployed the army in Angola and Namibian territory, overstretching its capabilities. Also the economical sanctions against the South Africa where hurting its economy. Therefore the final process for Namibia´s independence was finally able to start in 1989. Nelson Mandela, on his speech made during his visit to Cuba in 1991, also referred to SADF´s defeat in Cuito Cuanavale as a crucial moment for Namibia´s independence409.
Which other events you see having crucial impact to the SWAPO´s independence struggle dynamics? The 1978 battle of Cassinga, as part of SADF´s ´Operation Reindeer´, which was a South African air force attack against the SWAPO´s refugee camp in Cassinga [southern Angola], resulting a massacre of hundreds of civilians, mostly women and children, which started a new phase of the conflict. SWAPO retaliated heavily against SADF´s bases and international opinion turned more against South Africa.
This was preceded by the 1977 murder of the South Africa´s Prime Minister, who was succeeded by P.W. Botha in 1978. As an ex-‐defence minister, he started a new, violent approach towards SWAPO. What were the relations between SWAPO and ANC? They were fighting against the same government, but did they co-‐operate?
No. As SWAPO´s members were mostly not educated and ANC´s were, there seems to be a ´cultural division´ between these organizations and no natural communication. SWAPO was much closer with other regional liberation movements, namely Zimbabwe’s ZANU (Mugabe) and with Zambia’s government, where SWAPO´s troops moved to Angola in 1974.
Are there any statistics of the level of violence and casualties of SWAPO´s armed struggle? I have seen a figure of 1 million casualties mentioned in the literature.
No. The existence of statistics requires naturally that some entity would systematically collect the information, and in this case, South Africa did not do so. I would say that 1 million casualties is a modest estimation of what SADF´s operations caused in whole South Africa.
409The exact quotation from Mandela´s speech in Cuba on 38th anniversary of the start of the Cuban revolution
Date, July 26, 1991: ”The defeat of the racist army allowed the struggling people of Namibia to finally win their independence.” Transcript retrieved from: http://www.walterlippmann.com/docs3733.html, (1.12.2015).
What is your opinion of SWAPO´s role in the Namibia´s liberation struggle? Some sources (SWAPO´s) emphasize the importance and Westerns researchers emphasize more of regional and international factors.
Referring to Sam Nujoma´s [SWAPO´s leader, later Namibia´s president] ´memoirs´ published in 2001, I would call it propaganda. The book, which obviously had several ghost-‐writers, glorifies the SWAPO´s armed resistance and dismisses external factors.
Appendix II: Namibia – Interview of Lalli Metsola
Interview of Lalli METSOLA, researcher, University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies, Development Studies.
Interview was conducted via Skype on 20.11.2015 (Translated from Finnish by the author)
What were the relations between SWAPO and ANC? They were fighting against the same government, but did they co-‐operate?
SWAPO was more of a nationalistic liberation movement and had more co-‐operation and contacts with Angolan and Tanzanian movements, then with ANC, in which the South African Communist Party had acquire increasing influence. Both organizations had co-‐operation with Soviet Union. But they had different culture, due their different backgrounds. SWAPO´s leadership had to run into exile abroad, received their education through the ´life´s experience´.
What kind of impact did the SWAPO´s division to its external [exile] and internal fractions had to SWAPO´s resistance and to the process in whole?
It was the SWAPO´s leadership in exile who organized the armed resistance, but from Angola, from where since 1974 SWAPO/PLAN guerrillas were infiltrated to Namibia. SWAPO had moved there from Zambia. SWAPO´s ´old guard´ remained in Namibia. Actually many of them had received their education in Finnish missionary schools in Ovamboland [northern part of Namibia bordering Angola]. SWAPO´s exile leadership´s importance and role can be seen also after the independence, as it formed the leadership of the newly independent Namibia. This can be seen partly because SWAPO´s internal leadership´s position inside the country was extremely difficult, because of the constant persecution by South Africans, as they were either convicted to prison or forced into exile, preventing the consolidation of their action or personal role/reputation.
How important at the end was SWAPO´s armed struggle in gaining the independence?
SWAPO´s own armed action had modest impact to the final independence. Angola´s and Cuba´s roles were crucial. SWAPO´s armed resistance had more of a symbolic meaning, which its leadership has used ever since for its own political gains. When evaluating SWAPO´s military action in northern Namibia, it was never able to create freed areas there.
On the other hand, SWAPO had special acknowledgement by the United Nations as the ´sole and authentic representative of Namibian people´, giving it a unique position. Therefore its diplomatic action became important.
How much and in which ways Namibia´s independence struggle was about regional dynamics? South African administration had no wish to change regional power politics. Therefore SA emphasized its joining the US Reagans administration´s fight against communism in the 1980´s. It was the Western Contact Group, which started to negotiate the implementation of the UNSC resolution for Namibia´s independence. SWAPO was not included in these negotiations. It was finally