them can be seen as proceeding independently. This means creativity should not be regarded as a general skill and that creative performance in one of these domains of mind do not necessarily mean there is the ability for creative performance in another. This position however, is hotly contested. Plucker (1998) argues that content specific theories are, in part based upon theories of situated cognition and that these theories are problematic. He claims research supporting context specificity is not producing sustainable conclusions due to theoretical and methodological problems.
Unfortunately, the terms of this debate are often confused and this leads to claims that creativity is entirely context specific (e.g. Abuhamdeh & Csikszentmihalyi 2006). So whereas theories refer to domains of mind, studies explore creativity within very specific contexts and argue that generalisations are not possible. W hat this means is performing creatively in one
context does not necessarily mean the potential to perform in another exists. Clearly, crucial to this debate (and therefore the ability to conduct cross-contextual research) is a sophisticated understanding of creative potential. This includes a sustainable definition, consistent with the meta-theoretical presuppositions used to conduct research. Without such clarity, the ability to explore how creative potential develops and moves between domains and contexts may well remain elusive. Regrettably, as we have already seen, such a definition is lacking.
This has not prevented research. Baer (1994) infers potential within his research, even if he does not develop a full definition. He claims the influence of any skill on actual performance involves at least two conceptually distinct factors: availability and production. Suggesting that one must have a skill for that skill to be produced but that it is also possible not to produce the skill in a given situation, even though that skill is available, he claims this could lead to the skill falsely being assumed to be lacking. (Ibid: 16) He uses the example of divergent thinking and divergent thinking training to exemplify his point. He claims that in the case of divergent thinking, ju st because subjects are trained in the use of divergent thinking, may not mean they can apply these ‘thinking skills’ in the relevant situations as they might not recognise the need for them to be used.
In arguing this, Baer recognises the difference between a possessed skill and a performed one, and this implicitly presupposes a form of creative potential. However, there is also a requirement within his reasoning to rely only on empirical data in developing this argument because the existence of the potential is inferred from the subject’s participation in divergent thinking training. A further category, that of the potential to possess a skill, exists in addition to the presupposition he holds, but is ignored. Three levels to creative performance are therefore suggested as possible through this reasoning: (i) the potential to possess skill (ii)
possessed skill and (iii) performed skill. In order to understand how potential can move between these levels, and therefore between domains and contexts, an explanation of (i) and (ii) need to be included in any explanation of (iii). Unfortunately, as (i) and (ii) are not always available to empirical research and (iii) is, there is a dearth of explanations of (i) and (ii) especially when compared to (iii). Conceptions of creative potential within the existing conceptual framework therefore range from no conception whatsoever, through conceptions that are only implicit, to explicit conceptions that rely entirely on empirical performance for their justification.
For Kaufman and Baer (2006) the generality of creativity potential remains difficult to prove, as they claim it is difficult to assess whether one’s skills, successfully creative in one context, would be equally successful in another context. They use genius level33 creativity as their barometer of the ability for creativity in more than one domain and argue that genius level creativity appears to be domain specific, and that the evidence seems to support this. Therefore, unless one can prove that everyday creativity is different to genius level, then everyday creativity must also be assumed to be domain specific.
However, the actual performance of genius level creative people and their potential for performance have been collapsed as one, into empirical evidence, and as such serves as another example of how the existing meta-theory obstructs understanding. Strangely, in arguing this they also seem to ignore other empirical evidence available to them which suggests that a ‘ten year rule’ is in operation with regards to historical contributions to a domain (e.g. Hayes 1989). For example, in mathematics it would take ten years of post graduate study, on average, for someone to make a contribution that is regarded as historically important. With this in mind to dismiss the creative potential in other domains (say music) of someone that achieved a historical contribution in mathematics, solely because this is not observed in genius level creative people seems folly, as this observation says nothing of what might be for that person with ten years of work.
The issue of cross-contextual research and understanding creative potential are inextricably linked and both currently suffer from a lack of meta-theoretical clarity. To argue that creativity is domain specific is to argue that the potential for creativity is also domain specific. If one argues that creativity is domain general, then one can also argue that the potential for creativity is domain general34.
33 This is defined in a similar way to the historical creativity Boden proposes in Chapter Two.
34 The debate in the existing conceptual framework is significantly more sophisticated and complex than this,