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t l e (New Rules of S o cio lo g ica l Method) can be read as being perhaps somewhat presumptious (in the sense of presupposing th at the

c la r ific a tio n of problems could be formulated in th is way) rather than as n aively attem pting to formulate procedures in the very causal terms (ie* generalised r u le s) which such an a n a ly tic a l en terp rise

/ must address*

Giddens* approach to the question of the d ifferen ce between under­ standing and explanation i s located in a c r it ic a l a n a ly sis of the work and w ritin gs of D ilth ey, Weber and Gadamer w ith resp ect to the attempt to e sta b lish an in teg ra tio n between understanding and

47

explanation conceived as d iffe re n t forms of knowledge; and w ith the

work of Abel and Habermas with resp ect to the construction of a

c r it ic a l theory which complements hermeneutic and nomonological so rts 48

o f endeavour* The hermeneutic task i s then formulated as one of in

some way penetrating the frames of meaning of lay members of so c ie ty thereby e lev a tin g the r o le of the s o c ia l s c ie n t is t to one of a second order using the same so r ts of s k ills as these lay members*

1 • • • • • the s o c ia l s c ie n t is t of n e c essity draws upon the same sorts of s k ills as those whose conduct he seeks to analyse in order to describe i t ; generating d escrip tion s of s o c ia l conduct depends upon the hermeneutic task of penetrating the frames of meaning which lay actors them­ se lv e s draw upon in c o n stitu tin g and

r ec o n stitu tin g the s o c ia l world*

The s c ie n t if ic enterprise of sociology i s therefore seen as in volvin g the constructing of a metalanguage with which to ex p lica te the form o f l i f e , and in doing th is i s faced with what Giddens terms a double hermeneutic•

, * . . . . Sociology, however, deals w ith a universe which i s already con stitu ted w ithin frames of meaning by s o c ia l actors them selves, and rein terp rets these w ithin i t s own th e o r e tic a l schemes, m ediating ordinary and tech n ical language. This double hermeneutic i s of considerable com plexity, since the connection i s not merely a one-way one (as Schutz seems to suggest); there i s a continual 1 slippage* of the concepts constructed in socio lo g y , whereby these are appropriated by those whose conduct they were o r ig in a lly coined to an alyse, and hence tend to become in teg r a l featu res of that conduct (thereby in f a c t p o te n tia lly compromising th e ir o rig in a l usage w ithin th e tech n ica l vocabulary of s o c ia l sc ie n c e )* r^Q

The compromising of the metalanguage of sociology i s thus posed as a fundamental problem in th e.p rocess of knowledge form ulation from s o c ia l enquiry. Such a problem however in being conceived in

negative terms (compromise must detract from the task of so cio lo g y ) seems to suggest th at lay actors and so c ia l s c ie n t is t s have

c o n siste n tly d iffe re n t purposes, whereas th is i s su rely not (always) th e ca se. Indeed the p o sitin g o f an innate a p r io r i element to knowledge a c q u isitio n would n e c e ssita te the su b stitu tio n

of the concept of exchange (a lb e it asymmetrical) fo r compromise* Further, neith er Giddens, Bauman or Outhwaite seem to en terta in the p o s s ib ility that the nature of being-in-the-w orld may be

ir re tr ie v a b ly bound up with the idea of reten tio n of ambiguity in s o c ia l l i f e , as e ss e n tia l fo r th e a b ility to in v est meaning. Thus the whole idea of second order constructs (Giddens), expansion of the form of l i f e by r ec a p itu la tio n (Bauman), and constructing a

purposeful s o c ia l science (Outhwaite) suggests a process of

form alisin g which in ev ita b ly in volves clearer d e fin itio n and can only therefore move towards removing ambiguity. Ambiguity to the extent th at i t c o n stitu te s the means of in v estin g meaning in s o c ia l l i f e i s conceived in e ffe c t as undesirable fo r the programme s e t , y e t th is i s to suggest d estruction of the essence of s o c ia l l i f e . There i s a r e a l sense in which d e fin itio n destroys meaning.

f

What then are the im p lications fo r procedure? I f we need to r e ta in ambiguity w h ilst form ulating and expanding upon experience, and that experience cannot be conceived sep arately from an innate ordering of experience, then what i s to be the sta tu s o f em pirical work in

procedure?

Sociology as E pistem ologically emerging S ocial Enquiry

I f the kinds of ways in which the problems of sociology are to be s e ttle d has indeed not been c la r ifie d , and the tremendous concern w ith c la r ific a tio n as illu s tr a te d in the foregoing underlines that th is i s so , then how i s i t p ossib le to se t about doing s o c ia l enquiry a t a ll? Does the problem of not knowing how to proceed n e c essa rily produce p aralysis in proceeding?

The approach formulated by .Berlin' concerning now to proceed wnen faced w ith a question which we do not know how to answer, is to attempt to conceptualise what kind of a question we are faced with* To the extent th at we do not know what i s to count as knowledge (at

le a s t ab solu tely) in s o c ia l enquiry, we are faced w ith an ep istem ological question which therefore we must approach ep istem o lo g ica lly . We must attempt to form ulate and reform ulate the kind o f qu estion which such a problem p resen ts, w ithin the doing of so c ia l enquiry*

The way to proceed must be an ep istem ologically based procedure in which the approach c o n stitu te s an attempt to form ulate the c r ite r ia o f knowledge. The actu a l method to be undertaken to s a t is f y the c r ite r ia of knowledge i s therefore problematic* In one way, scien ce and being s c ie n t if ic i s then much le s s o f an is s u e , in th a t the

development of scien ce i s seen simply as a certa in way of viewing the h isto r y of philosophy* Moreover in th is procedure i t i s a lso

debatable (as w ell as perhaps im m aterial!) whether th e way to proceed c o n stitu te s doing sociology or doing philosophy*

52

G ellnerfs programme of attem pting to formulate the c r ite r ia fo r

knowledge w ith in a sustained s o c ia l in v e stig a tio n has been expanded

53

in to a four point programme.

v

F ir s tly , there must be an em p iricist in siste n c e that fa it h s must stand ready to be judged by evidence which i s in some way independent of forces which might press fo r confirm ation of the fa it h i t s e l f . The argument th at experience i s never pure must not r e s u lt in n otion s of experience being of no consequence to knowledge form ulations on the grounds that i t i s corruptable and therefore not r elia b le * Experience

w ith due reverence must be retained*

Secondly, there must be an in siste n c e upon impersonal, stru ctu ra l explanations based on the idea th at we may be constrained to think so, rather than any certain ty that the world may be amenable to such

explanation. Such explanations w ill of course take on a v a r iety of form s, w ithin the confines of providing a means of public form ulation and r e p e a ta b ility which w ill contain a dehumanising price for such cogn itive e ffe c tiv e n e s s . Thus the price to be paid fo r r e a l knowledge i s a lo s s of in d iv id u a lity - a lo s s o f id e n tity .

T hirdly, the acceptance of forms of. l i f e which are indeed

in d iv id u a lis tic , id e n tifia b le and cu ltu ra lly n a t io n a lis tic , but

separate and d istin gu ish ab le from form ulations attem pting to e sta b lish r e a l knowledge about such accepted ( ie . not a ttrib u ted with any

absolute notions o f ex isten ce) examples o f m u ltifariou s forms o f l i f e .

Fourthly, a concern with the s p e c ific development of our own .

in d u str ia l c iv ilis a t io n and not with the developm ent of a l l th in g s* • This schema o f G ellner*s r e c a lls in many ways the programme put

forward by Comte (*examine the r e la tio n of sociology to th e natural sc ie n c e s1) a t le a s t in respect to Comte*s awareness o f th e problems of the programme s e t . Furthermore, Comters *vicious circ le * although so often declared * p o s itiv is t *, has more than a f e e l of the hermeneutic c ir c le to i t . The extent to which such a programme can be form ulated as science i s however another m atter. Science has been a lte r n a tiv e ly formulated as being; system atic; rigorous; based on natural sc ie n c e ;

bu ildin g laws; building second order constructs; reform ulating already possessed knowledge; givin g greater depth; etc* and one ta sk o f any s o c ia l a n a ly sis ought to be to formulate an o rien tation to th is p o sitio n . I t is apparent that a general programme of procedure i s fo reig n to the idea of form ulating an o rien tation to th is problem, and thus methodology and epistem ology can only be r e fle x iv e and

emergent with content, in any form ulation which seeks to address th is problem se r io u sly .

G ellnerfs in siste n c e on the reten tio n of a component o f knowledge

\

stemming from experience i s formulated as i t were, as a defence

again st becoming the victim of blind fa it h . Unfortunately the s o c ia l ' world i s entrenched in blind f a it h , in the shape of id eology and myth

as demonstrated in the substantive subject of th is th e s is . The extraction of some kind of e x tr a -te r r e s tia l (tr u th -o b je c tiv ity or whatever) which i s to be obtained by the reten tio n of an experience component i s fraught w ith d if f ic u lt y , since natu rally th at experience i s constructed w ithin a framework of such continual d is to r tio n . To the extent th at G ellner i s saying th a t th is i s a l l we have, so we had b etter r e ta in and use i t , a l l very w e ll, and the th e s is w ill indeed examine the distortion/know ledge problem on these dim ensions. There i s however a further underlying problem con stitu ted in the exten t of the a p r io r i component in knowledge. I f that i s indeed so , how do we d iffe r e n tia te between what i s innate reproduced as fa ith and innate reproduced as tru th , and does the G ellner programme stand up faced w ith th is kind of problem - and does i t need to? Does i t matter? I s a scien ce of so cie ty b u ilt upon th ose.kin d of d iffe r e n tia tio n s

p o ssib le given the nature of the being-in-the-w orld ex isten ce of humans as r e f lexive^y e x p e r ie n tia l. Can ambiguity be *harnessedf in

any way? -

/

The ten sion between the s p e c ific (not being concerned with a l l th in gs) in Gellner fs programme and the lo s s of in d iv id u a lity in the construction

of r e a l knowledge (cogn itive e ffe c tiv e n e s s ), i s perhaps an unnecessarily constructed ten sio n since i t seems a t le a s t p o ssib le (in fo r instance such form ulations as that of Bauman1 s) that the very 'form of lif e * < i s enriched by the (in ev ita b le) pursuit of such programme, as the essence of developing society# Indeed Gellner him self has argued that a science of so cie ty i s a featu re o f advancing so c ie ty p re cise ly

because such a featu re i s i t s e l f an expression of something which

(in ev ita b ly ) comes to be defined as an advance. ^ Deciding when an

advance i s not an advance i s again a part of the same !form of lif e * -

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