Objection #5: Constitutivity Light 60

Say  that  this  thesis  is  right,  and  knowledge  is  the  norm  of  assertion  in   virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  function  of  assertion  is  to  generate  knowledge   in   hearers.   Now,   one   legitimate   question   that   arises   goes   along   the   following  lines:  how  is  this  rationale  any  better  than  the  Williamsonian   constitutivity  line  when  it  comes  to  contingency  considerations?  Are  we   supposed  to  believe  that,  if  it  so  happened  that  assertion  had  served  a   different  epistemic  function,  it  would  have  been  governed  by  a  different   epistemic  norm?  Or  that  this  shift  can  happen  at  any  point?  Doesn’t  the   account  defended  here  leave  this  open,  and  therefore  make  KNA  into  a   mere  historical  contingency?  Second,  relatedly,  what  is  the  relation  –  if   any  -­‐  between  the  nature  of  assertion  and  its  normativity?  What  is  the   status  of  this  functionalist  norm  that  is  being  defended?  Is  it  a  merely   conventional   one,   subject   to   the   whims   of   societal   evolution?   This   sounds  less  than  plausible.    

  Recall   that   the   etiological   theory   of   function   aims   to   offer   a   naturalistically  friendly  explanation  of  the  existence  of  normativity.  As   such,   the   coming   into   being   of   the   respective   norms   is   hardly   an   accident:  it  is  sourced  in  evolutionary  considerations  pertaining  to  what   benefits  the  organism  and  what  does  not.    

  Note,  also,  that  what  this  amounts  to  is  but  a  different  sort  of  a   constitutivity  claim,  conceived  on  a  functionalist  model,  rather  than  on   the  model  of  games:  due  to  being  sourced  in  e-­‐functions,  which,  in  turn,   contribute   to   the   explanation   of   why   the   trait/artefact/action   in   question   continues   to   exist,   the   functionalist   norms   are   constitutively   associated   with   the   corresponding   trait/artefact/action:   they   are   constitutively   associated   with   its   continuous   existence.   When   functioning   properly   (i.e.   beating)   –   whether   in   normal   conditions   or   not   –   the   heart   will   meet   the   norm   constitutively   associated   with   its   continuous  existence.  Similarly,  when  functioning  properly  –  i.e.  being   knowledgeable   -­‐   whether   in   normal   conditions   or   not   –   assertion   will   meet  the  norm  constitutively  associated  with  generating  knowledge  in   hearers   and,   correspondingly,   with   its   continuous   existence;   it   will   work  the  way  it  is  supposed  to  work,  where  the  right  way  of  working  is   constituted  by  generating  knowledge  in  normal  conditions.    

  Now   here   is   the   worry:   going   domain-­‐specific   for   positive   feedback   seems,   at   first   glance,   to   rob   e-­‐functional   accounts   of   their   explanation   of   the   continued   existence   of   a   trait.   After   all,   if   asserting   knowledgeably  need  not  benefit  us  biologically  in  order  for  the  relevant   speech  act  to  have  the  corresponding  function,  nothing  seems  to  be  left   to  explain  the  continued  existence  of  the  trait  in  question.    

  Notice,   however,   that   etiological   theories   of   functions   are   intended   to   be   real-­‐nature   theories   (Millikan   1984).   And,   in   fact,   plausibly  enough,  knowledgeable  assertions  are,  most  likely,  beneficial   for   our   survival.   So   the   positive   biological   feedback   that   is,   in   fact,   at   play,   does   explain   the   continued   existence   of   the   relevant   practice.   It   explains  why  the  epistemic  functions  and  the  corresponding  epistemic   norms   are   there;   because   their   being   in   place   benefits   us.   But   notice   that  this  is  all  we  wanted  to  begin  with:  a  naturalistic  explanation  of  the   existence  of  such  oddities  as  norms  and  purposes.  As  such,  even  though   biological   benefit   does   not   affect   the   content   of   the   relevant   norms,   it   does   nicely   explain   how   and   why   the   purposes   and   the   norms   associated  with  them  arose  in  the  first  place.  

  Finally,   note   another   important   advantage   of   the   ‘light’   constitutivity  claim  defended  here:  it  also  vindicates  the  Williamsonian   intuition   that,   in   an   important   way,   assertion   lives   and   perishes   with   KNA.  

3.2.6  Objection  #6:  How  about  truth?    

Contra   the   account   defended   in   this   thesis,   Ruth   Millikan   (1984)   and   Peter   Graham   (2010)   take   the   function   of   assertion   to   be   generating   true   belief   rather   than   knowledge   in   one’s   audience.   If   they   are   right,   one  could  wonder,  would  it  not  be  reasonable  to  suppose  that  assertion   is  governed  by  a  corresponding  truth  norm?  

  A   few   things   about   this:   first   of   all,   I   take   it   to   be   fairly   implausible  that  the  function  of  assertion  is  generating  mere  true  belief   rather  than  knowledge.  Here  is  why:  recall  that  the  etiological  account   of  functions  is  a  historical  account.  The  thought  is  that  a  particular  trait   generated   some   benefit   and   that’s   how   it   acquired   its   function.   However,  mere   true   belief   is   a   fairly   rare   good,   while   knowledge   is   readily  available.  Again,  all  I  have  to  do  in  order  to  come  to  know  that   there’s   a   table   in   front   of   me   is   have   a   look.   For   me   to   get   a   non-­‐ knowledgeable   true   belief,   however,   the   world   needs   to   fail   to   cooperate  somehow  (like  in  Gettier  cases,  for  instance),  or  else  I  need  to   radically  change  my  epistemic  behaviour  (say,  start  forming  beliefs  on   coin  tosses).  Since  it  is  less  than  plausible,  historically,  that  any  of  this   was   the   case   when   assertion   acquired   its   function,   we   can   safely   assume  that  the  epistemic  benefit  generated  by  assertion  at  the  time  of   function  acquisition  was  knowledge.    

  Now,  of  course,  Millikan  and  Graham  could  argue,  the  function  at   stake   need   not   be  mere  true   belief.   After   all,   true   belief   is   implied   by   knowledge.   Take   the   heart:   it   pumps   blood   and,   at   the   same   time,   it   generates  a  beating  sound.  Plausibly,  it  always  has.  However,  we  would   not   want   to   say   that   the   function   of   the   heart   is   to   pump   blood   and   generate   a   beating   sound,   rather   than   just   to   pump   blood.   Why,   then,   think   that   the   function   of   assertion   is   generating   knowledgeable   true   belief  rather  than  just  true  belief?    

  Furthermore,  the  champion  of  the  truth  account  could  argue,  on   the  etiological  account,  one  easy  way  to  ascertain  whether  a  trait  T  has   a   function   F   is   by   checking   whether   doing   F   contributes   to   the   explanation  of  why  tokens  of  T  continue  to  exist.  The  fact  that  it  pumps   blood  in  our  circulatory  system  contributes  to  the  explanation  of  why   hearts  continue  to  exist:  if  they  stopped  doing  it,  plausibly,  they  would   cease  to  exist.50  _{The  fact  that  it  produces  a  beating  sound  fails  to  satisfy}   the   relevant   counterfactual.   Generating   true   belief   easily   meets   this   condition:   plausibly,   even   if   assertions   stopped   generating   knowledge   in  hearers  and  only  produced  true  belief,  we  would  not  discontinue  the