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offer of some 2 3 »6 million yen for technical assistance in Okinawa for the Japanese fiscal of 1959» Although

the Japanese G o v e r n m e n t had been appropriating some

amount of m o n ey for economic assistance to O ki na w a since the r e s t oration of full sovereignty by Japan, the case in 1959 set a n e w precedent in the sense that assistance was r e ndered on an explicit agreement w i t h the U ni t e d States. (See T a b l e i on the next page).

This trend continued in the following year. A new feature in the i960 programmes was what was called the

!Iriomote development p l a n 5. That was a programme under w h i c h a g r i c u l t u r a l s forestry and other industrial

developments were to be promoted in the island of Iriomote, which is the second largest island in the Ryukyus next

to the main island of Okinawa but remained at a v er y low stage of development. The American authorities in

Okinawa responded w ith considerable enthusiasm to a proposal made by the Japanese Government to explore the possibilities of the island by collective efforts. As a result of this, several survey teams were sent, separately or jointly, to Iriomote in I 9 6 O - 6 I . 5 The Iriomote

development p l a n 5 r e ceived much publicity in the O k inawan and Japanese press and was spoken of as a symbol of U.S.-

g

Japanese collaboration over Okinawa.

It would be desirable to turn our eyes for a while to what was ha p p e n i n g in Okinawa itself. In August 1958 when the final settlement of the land problem became merely a matter of t i m e , the U nited States authorities in Okinawa announced a series of important economic policies. In the first place, it was decided that U.S. dollars would be adopted in Okinawa in place of the existing Okinawan yen. (One Okinawan yen, which was

1 9 5 2 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 1 9 5 9 I 9 6 0 196. 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 6 jo u r c + R e c a p t u l a t i o n o f J a p a n e s e A p p r o p r i a t e d F u n d s f o r O k i n a w a FY 1 9 5 2 - FY 1 9 6 6 ( i n T h o u s a n d s o f Y e n ) E c o n o m i c A s s i s t a n c e A d m i n i s t r a - t i o n + A n n u t i e s , P e n s i o n s e t c T o t a l 2 ? l 6 0 1 1 , 4 5 6 0 1 3,6l 6 5 . 8 7 4 9 0 , 9 0 0 4 8 , 4 7 1 1 4 5 , 2 4 5 7 , 7 2 2 6 0 , 7 8 5 5 3 2 , 7 7 9 6 0 1 , 2 8 6 1 0 , 2 5 9 2 9 , 7 30 9 7 8 , 1 3 9 1 , 0 1 8 , 1 2 8 1 . 1 4 5 , 7 8 8 + + 7 4 , 0 7 0 2 , 1 4 1 , 3 6 0 3,3 6 1 , 2 1 8 1 9 , 9 7 7 7 4 , 5 7 6 2 , 6 7 4 , 0 1 0 2,7 6 8 , 5 6 3 3 3 . 5 7 6 7 7 , 3 4 2 2,6 5 6 , 4 9 6 2 , 7 6 7 , 4 1 4 1 0 4 , 9 9 3 5 0 , 6 4 3 3 , 0 0 7 , 7 9 9 3 , 1 6 3 , 4 3 5 8 1 , 0 9 5 5 7 , 7 0 2 3,6 8 7 , 9 6 0 3 , 8 2 6 , 7 5 7 3 1 1 , 8 2 4 6 7 , 7 4 9 3,8 8 1 , 6 5 4 4 , 4 6 1 , 2 7 7 1,0 1 2 , 8 3 1 6 1 , 2 7 1 2 , 7 1 4 , 4 5 5 3 , 8 1 5 , 5 5 7 1,8 3 0 , 6 7 1 1 5 2 , 8 6 0 3 , 0 7 0 , 2 0 3 5 , 0 5 3 , 7 3 4 1 , 8 7 4 , 7 8 4 1 3 5 , 9 5 8 3 , 0 7 0 , 2 7 7 5 , 0 4 1 , 0 1 9 2,8 6 5 , 6 3 0 1 2 9 , .162 2. 3 2 0 , 5 3 3 5 , 3 0 5 , 3 5 2 5,8 0 0 , 9 7 1 1 4 2 , 6 2 9 O k i n a w a S a n k o S h i r y o c o m p . S o r i f u T o k u b e t s u C h i i k i R e n r a k u - k y o k u , ( m i m e o . ) ( J a n u a r y 1 9 6 6) , p p , 4 5 6 - 7 . E x p e n d i t u r e s f o r v a r i o u s J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s i n c h a r g e o f O k i n a w a n a f f a i r s i n T o k y o a n d a t N a h a . T h e s p e c i a l e x p e n d i t u r e i n t h e n a m e o f ’ s o l a t i u m ’ t h a t a m o u n t e d t o 1 , 1 2 8 , 1 7 0 y e n a c c o u n t s f o r t h e u n u s u a l i n c r e a s e f o r 1 9 5 6 . S e e C h a p t e r 7 j p . 1 3 2 .

u s ua l l y called 5B y e n 5 , was roughly equivalent to three Japa n e s e yen)» In connection with this, they introduced

successive new measures, most important among w h i c h were the establishment of free trade area at N ah a port and the amendment of the regulations governing i n t roduction of foreign capital so as to attract more foreign investment

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into Okinawa» These steps were obviously taken for the purpose of guiding Okinawa towards economic vi a b i l i t y and thereby securing continued control of the island by the U n i t e d States» In spite of a considerable number of hostile views at the outset against such measures, these

economic policies, together w ith a timely inflow of substantial amount of money from the U ni t e d States and from J a p a n . ^ contributed to the creation of a seemingly prosperous economy in O k i n a w a within a few years«'*''*'

Backed by this success in economic field, the U nited S tates also succeeded in restoring political stability

in Okinawa» A conspicuous sign of this success was a sweeping v i c tory for the conservatives in the i960

elections for the legislative body where they now w o n 22 out of the total 29 seats as compared w i t h l4 before the e l e c t i o n s .^^

A n important characteristic of the new leadership in Okinawa, generally known as the Öta regime, was its

pro-American and at the same time pro-Japanese orientation. In other words, Öta, leader of the new l y united Okinawa Liveral Democratic Parpy ( O L D P ) , advocated a policy of

C .Ü ~ 01—Ci i VY"

U . S » - Jap an-Ryukyu .The promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Okinawa. In more concrete terms, he

J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t s » T h i s policy, he argued, could s e r v e the p u r p o s e o f p r e v e n t i n g a n t i - A m e r i c a n e l e m e n t s f r o m e x p l o i t i n g the O k i n a w a p r o b l e m in t h eir o w n

i n t e r e s t s a n d c o u l d p r o v i d e the f o u n d a t i o n for the

u l t i m a t e r e t u r n of the i s l a n d to J a p a n in a w e l l - p l a n n e d a n d o r d e r l y way» H e d e s c r i b e d this p o l i c y as a ’s t e p -

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b y - s t e p r e t u r n to Japan' ( t s u m i k a s a n e f u k k i ) • „

C o l l a b o r a t i o n was, however, o n l y one asp e c t of the p o l i c y of U » S » - J a p a n p a r t n e r s h i p a bout Okina w a ,

c o m p e t i t i o n w a s an o t h e r . Not only p e c u n i a r y m a t t e r s but a l s o p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s w o u l d b e c o m e i n v o l v e d in this c o m p e t i t i o n . A l t h o u g h it w a s only at a l a t e r stage of the d e v e l o p m e n t of this p o l i c y that its c o m p e t i t i v e a s p e c t i m p o s e d some d i p l o m a t i c p r o b l e m for the two c o u n t r i e s , t h e r e w e r e a l r e a d y some s i g n s of r i v a l r y at this stage. F o r example, one of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t

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p u r p o s e s b e h i n d the l e g i s l a t i o n of the P r i c e A c t in the U.S. C o n g r e s s w a s to give the R y u k y u a n m a n on the s t r e e t a ’s e nse of b e l o n g i n g w h i c h he d o e s n o t n o w have, a f e e l i n g that the U n i t e d S t a t e s is i n t e r e s t e d in his w e l f a r e and w e l l - b e i n g and that the p e o p l e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s are w i l l i n g to p l e d g e c o n t i n u a t i o n of that

i n t e r e s t s as long as the p r e s e n t a r r a n g e m e n t of c o n t r o l 15