ON THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION

As we have proposed, the commonly available narrative structures in the society furnish important means by which the behavioral theorist makes intelligible comments. Without relying on such forms the theorist risks seeming incoherent, disorganized, or even absurd. To employ the forms with skill is to tell an agreeable story about human actions. Yet, it may be countered, although theorists may be pleased to tell good stories, they have traditionally been more concerned with telling true ones. What place does the concern with truth have in the present context? Is there not some sense in which the theorist’s narrative is either suggested or corrected by what is the case? And if the importance of observation for theory development is reduced, what criteria are to replace them? How are theories to be evaluated?

These are indeed complex issues, and there is no way they can be exhausted in the present context. However, it will be useful to consider the degree of latitude that the developmentalist does have in generating theoretical accounts, and several alternative criteria of evaluation suggested by such considerations.

Narrative Formation and Objectivity

Regarding the objective anchoring of theory, we have already touched on a number of reasons why philosophers of science now consider

scientific theories to be underdetermined by facts, and why many have turned their attention to the literary figuration of such theory. At this point, however, it is useful to consider the possibilities for objectively anchoring the narrative construction. For this purpose let us return to the three criteria of narrative construction offered earlier. As described, the initial task of a narrator is to develop an evaluative endpoint or goal of the story. As is readily apparent in this case, there is no means by which observation itself can determine what pursuits should count as valuable in human affairs. As has been maintained since Poincaré’s time, there is no means of deriving “ought” from “is” (Kohlberg’s theory notwithstanding). Of course, research can be useful in suggesting what people hold to be reasonable values or goals at a given time. Further, armed with such insights, scientists might develop theories of more broadly compelling means. For example, it is now common to view child development as a period of increasing maturity (a progressive narrative), middle adulthood as the stage of full maturity, and old age as decline (a regressive narrative). Indeed much developmental theory is based on just such a view. Yet, it must also be realized that such narratives are only sensible if one considers adult characteristics as more valuable, on one or more criteria, than the attributes of either the very young or very old. Common conceptions of development could be radically altered if societal values (or the values of the adult scientists constructing the theories) were different. Indeed, by selecting spontaneity as a major value or goal one might see child development as regressive; by middle adulthood we have virtually completed our downward course. Or, by counting wisdom or perspective as a major goal, the aging process could be reframed as ascendent. It is the very old who have finally reached developmental maturity. Public opinion can only suggest what people believe to be goals; it cannot furnish insight as to whether these goals are worthy or not. And, at least in the case of the aging process, one may well question the choice of many behavioral scientists to frame it as a decline.

If one abandons the possibility of objectively grounding narrative goals, what can be said about the second major component of the narrative, namely the temporal arrangement of events relevant to the goal? We find the objectively oriented theorist here faces additional difficulties. The observation of a person in motion over time furnishes the scientist with an immense array of potential facts. Each movement of every limb, each syllable, secretion, or silence could be recorded as a fact. Or, one may blend these microelements in a variety of ways – into gestures, phrases, sentences, speech acts, perseverance toward goals, and so on.

In effect, observation itself furnishes an immense array of opportunities for fact making. However, it does not furnish any directives as to how one is to go about selecting from the array. It is this task which is largely accomplished in developmental study by the narrative goal. Once one has selected the valuation endpoint of development it is possible to scan the array for relevant exemplars. By determining that adult rationality is a developmental goal, one can then turn to the array of preceding events to search out and construct events in such a way that they move toward this apex. The end of the story, in this sense, furnishes the major device by which the observer scans the world for relevant and related content. As Hayden White (1978) has characterized historical writing,

The process of fusing events . . . into a totality capable of serving as the object of representation is a poetic one. . . . These fragments have to be put together to make a whole . . . and they are put together in the same way that novelists put together figments of their imaginations to display an ordered world, a cosmos, where only disorder or chaos might appear. (P. 124)

Once the endpoint has been established, can the observer then let the relevant facts speak for themselves? Can the scientist simply observe in such a way that the developmental story tells itself? It would not appear so. Again, to quote White’s (1978) analysis of historical reporting, “The facts do not speak for themselves, but . . . the historian speaks on their behalf, and fashions the fragments of the past into a whole whose integrity is in its representation – a purely discursive one” (p. 124). For the behavioral scientist it is not the precise movements of the body through time and space that are critical. Each movement of concern must be given an interpretive label referring to the motive, disposition, or process underlying it. We don’t understand action in terms of precise body movements but in such terms as intelligent, friendly, helpful, angry, aggressive, and so on, all of which refer to internal states. In effect, the behavioral scientist must continuously make interpretive (hermeneutic) judgments for which the criteria are conventional rather than objective (Gergen, 1982).

Further, as the present analysis indicates, not just any arrangement of facts will tell a proper or acceptable story. We would not accept a developmental account in which the child showed continuous decline until the age of six and then demonstrated miraculous recovery at the age of seven. Or, a developmental story in which odd years of development were progressive while even years were regressive would be equally

untenable – not because such accounts are manifestly false, but because the narrative forms are not constituents of current intelligibility norms.

Toward Alternative Criteria for Theory Assessment

This analysis essentially contends that scientific theory is governed in substantial degree by what are essentially aesthetic forms (see also Kelly- Byrne & Sutton-Smith, 1983; Sutton-Smith, 1983). In this case the familiar forms of storytelling furnish the literary figures for establishing theories of child development. Yet, the present analysis furnishes the behavioral theorist an immense latitude for theoretical development. Observation need furnish only minimal constraints over the range of developmental stories that may be told. It is the selection of narrative form that largely determines what is to count as fact, and not fact which determines the developmental story. Narrative form is critical; observational grounding thereafter operates most importantly as a rhetorical device. Much as a news story often gains in vividness, credibility, and emotional impact as details are discussed, so may systematic observations aid the theorist in fashioning compelling theory. If this argument can be sustained, one is moved to reconsider the criteria typically employed in evaluating behavioral theory. Thus far we have found that the case for objective warrant is a tenuous one; the traditionally honored criterion of verisimilitude must be considered secondary in relevance. Other traditional criteria such as logical consistency, agreement with accepted theory, parsimony, and so on must also be reassessed (compare Feyerabend, 1975). Rather than viewing these as absolute or superordinate criteria, one may regard them in their rhetorical capacity. In what degree, it may be asked, do they aid the theorist in formulating a powerful and compelling account of human functioning? There is more to be said on this matter, but this must be postponed for another occasion.

We must finally ask about the particular criteria for theoretical evaluation implied by the present analysis. As we find, developmental theories in the sciences seem to approximate and to derive their sense- making capacity largely from existing narrative structures. To the extent that this is so, it is legitimate to evaluate such theories in the degree to which they fulfill the demands, or extend the possibilities, for good narrative form. In what degree does a theory approximate the mature or sophisticated narrative, and in what degree does it open new frontiers for

human accounting? Let us briefly consider our earlier criteria in this light along with exemplary theory.

Establishment of Developmental Goal

At the most basic level, the narrative theorist must specify or imply an evaluative endpoint for the account. Without this initial step, indeed, the concept of development is rendered meaningless. To the extent that there is no point to the account it may thus be considered a decomposed form of narrative. In this sense, Piagetian theory is to be highly regarded. Piaget clearly articulates his beliefs about higher mental processes, and their place in both science and human adaptation more generally. Freud is somewhat less clear in this respect, and largely relies on an implicit, but unarticulated concept of the fully developed human being. This reluctance should largely be attributed to Freud’s belief that the viability of society largely depends on the repression of its members. Thus, a person lacking all neurosis would constitute a social threat. Of the three theories considered, learning theory is perhaps the least mature in its narrative form. The implicit (and only occasionally explicit) assumption is that humans become increasingly adaptive. However, precisely what constitutes adaptation in the culture is left open. In this sense, learning theories are thus the least mature of the available orientations.

In another place (Gergen, 1982) an aleatory view of the life course has been proposed. From this perspective, development depends on the particular confluence of sociohistorical circumstances. Life trajectories may thus be of many different varieties, and there is little reason to suspect strong transhistorical or cross-cultural generality in developmental pattern. While this view does not saddle the individual with a necessary and predetermined life pattern, it fails to provide a functioning endpoint or developmental goal. In this sense it possesses little narrative structure and fails as a compelling story.

Organization of Events Relevant to Endpoints

A valuational endpoint without events leading toward or away is a conclusion without a story. The greater the number of salient points demonstrating how one proceeded from beginning to end, the more mature or well-developed the story. In this sense, a theory such as Piaget’s is formidable. The theory accounts for virtually all periods

preceding mental maturity. Even within developmental phases Piaget provides elaborate accounts of the particular mental accomplishments (for example, conservation) and the order of their development (for example, decalage). Freudian theory is less well-developed in this regard. The first six years of development are richly described, but between this period and young adulthood, the person enters a sparsely detailed period of latency. It is as if the story’s end is simply postponed for a period of years – an awkward hiatus for which several theorists have since attempted to compensate (including Anna Freud and Erik Erikson). Learning theory is the least developed narrative in terms of its articulation of relevant events. This problem stems in important degree from the above-noted lack of an elaborated endpoint. Adaptation in itself furnishes an insufficient goal against which to assess progress or its lack. Without articulating the story’s end, there is little way of selecting preceding events of relevance. Further, the theory is constructed in such a way that, in principle, a learning experience at any given point may cancel the effect of previous reinforcement. A child who is making increasing strides toward social adaptiveness may be set back at any point through a traumatic learning experience. In effect, the learning theorist offers no continuous or orderly trajectory but the potential for a chaotic juxtaposition of events across time.

Logical Connection of Developmental Events

The third criterion of a mature narrative form is its capacity to tie events together in a dependent or causal fashion. As we have seen, both learning theory and Piagetian theory do make strides in this direction. Neither is entirely successful. Learning theory does posit an interdependency among learned dispositions across time. However, there is no account given of why one particular experience should follow another. Thus the child may learn to be aggressive in one hour, altruistic in the next, and fearful in the next, with no connective tissue relating these separate experiences. Piaget does offer an account of stage shifts largely in terms of equilibration. However, equilibration itself appears to be an organismic-centered form of explanation. At certain points the child simply begins the process by which mental development progresses. Humans are genetically programmed to do so. Freudian theory is similarly organismic in its explanation for the shift in zones of id gratification (that is, oral, anal, and phallic) and thus the sequences of stages. Further, little is said about how experiences at one stage modify

or influence events at the next. The one important way in which the theory makes use of causal links is in its account of the etiology of nervous disorders. In all cases, the explanation of adult neuroses is traced back to some preceding event(s), typically in the first six years of development. Early dynamics cause later disorder.

Dramatic Impact

Although sense of drama is a derivative rather than a component of narrative composition, it is useful to consider its relevance to behavioral theory. Such theory need not possess dramatic potential in order to make sense of the world. However, dramatic appeal generates interest or concern in the story, it invites the audience into one’s theoretical edifice, and thereby increases understanding and the ultimate utility of the theory. In this respect one must view Freudian theory as far superior to either the Piagetian or learning frameworks. In the case of Piagetian theory, the slope line is steadily (with the exception of stage shifts) in the ascending direction. Years are also required to reach maturity, and thus neither alternation nor acceleration in the narrative slope can be achieved. Further, because the theory offers no means of cognitive regression, one never confronts the possibility of a sudden shift in the downward direction. Because of its lack of content, learning theory offers no definitive story line; in its abstract form it thus lacks any inherent drama. A specific life history could, in a learning theorist’s hands, be rendered dramatic by the present criteria. However, the general model itself offers little in this regard.

Freudian theory does share with the Piagetian perspective a relatively steady developmental trajectory, and the amount of time required to the story’s end is approximately two decades. Yet, the theory also possesses three special moments of dramatic impact. The first is derived from the possibility of a reversal in the slope line, and particularly a reversal that would shift the story’s end from the dismal to the happy ending. This possibility is furnished through the vehicle of psychoanalytic treatment. This treatment is the only means provided by the theory through which the individual can alleviate repressed energy and thus the need for mechanisms of defense. The second moment of potential drama derives from the fact that, unlike Piagetian theory, regression to earlier stages of development is always possible. Momentary stress at any point may, within the Freudian perspective, catapult one into the past, seeking means

of renewed psychic defense. Yet, the negative effects of development can be alleviated. Psychoanalytic treatment does furnish a means of reversing the slope line. Finally, the theory itself stands as a marked contrast to the popular conception of development – namely, the view that it is a progressive narrative. Thus, as the slope line steadily descends within the Freudian perspective, it increasingly deviates from normative expectations. “When,” the reader might ask, “does the reversal occur; development is continuously unfolding, and we only move further away from the goals we know we seem to have achieved.” Thus, the theory gains dramatic impact through its catalytic relationship with existing expectations. One can scarcely locate a more dramatic device in the annals of developmental theory.

This is not to conclude that scientific theories should only be evaluated with regard to their rhetorical power. Elsewhere a case has been made for assessing the generative potential (Gergen, 1982) of behavioral theories, that is, their potential to throw into question the acceptable or sedimented mores of the culture and to offer fresh alternatives for action. And too, one can no longer afford to construct theory without regard for its ideological, political, and social implications (compare Sampson, 1977; Gilligan, 1982; Wexler, 1983). However, it does seem apparent from the present analysis that critical attention must be given to the literary qualities of theoretical renderings, and in this case to their narrative components.

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