Operationalising the concepts of values and interests

Operationalising the concepts of values and interests proved to be one of the most challenging aspects of this research. In Chapter two I concluded that ‘values’ and

‘interests’ have been operationalised by different researchers in different ways. The approach I have adopted is to consider the values and interests as presented in each case and in their own context. This case-by-case approach to the concept of values has theoretical support, for example, Smith (1986) suggests that rather than values having generic meanings they can be situation specific. This approach to values involves recognising values in their own, differing domains (e.g. religious, aesthetic, legal, economic and political) as concepts of the good with the special features associated with these specific contexts (e.g. the intrinsic worth of persons or the values of commodities in exchange). By adopting this understanding of values, it is reasonable to consider a set of pertinent values within the context of the situation and case study being considered rather than adopt some set of values that transcends the particular situations.

The approach I have adopted is contextual reflecting the focus of this research on the role of values and interests in disputes rather than treating them as philosophical concepts.

Thus, the focus is on identifying two types of argument that have different characteristics in ways that are salient to disputes. The operationalisation of the concepts of values and interests is informed by ethics but is not bound by any particular theoretical ethical framework (such as deontological, utilitarian, rights, dignitarian, communitarian, virtue etc.).

In Chapter two, we saw that Burton (1990) defined values in the context of specific communities and included their ideas, habits, customs and beliefs in his definition. I have conceptualised values in the common-sense understanding of something having worth.

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-‘Worth’ or value can be expressed in many different units and not just a purely imonetary one. Values may have a moral attribution such as the intrinsic value of humans or animals or desirable relationships, such as ones based on justice. Values may be expressed as a desirable quality, such as freedom. Values may express a desirable outcome, such as increasing knowledge or economic growth.

For the purposes of this research, values-based arguments are inferred from explicit reference to values or normative judgements or appeals to any underlying principles. The intention here is not to engage with normative arguments around values but to accept them as authentic accounts of people’s perspectives. Thus, values expressed by individuals do not need to be widely shared in order to be identifiable as values-based arguments made by these individuals. Values-based arguments are here accepted as social phenomena and I do not seek to explain them by consideration of, for example, institutional cultures. Values-based arguments are however closely associated with ethical concepts of deontology and with cultural ideas about the rightness of specific actions.

Values may be underpinned by concepts of barriers that should not be broken or absolute goods that should be sought.

In Chapter two we saw that Burton (1990) defined interests to include occupational, social, political and economic aspirations. Therefore, I have conceptualised interests-based arguments as involving balancing between the ‘good’ of different groups or protecting the interests of specific groups. They ask questions about who wins and who loses? Interests- based arguments are inferred from reference to risk:benefit or cost:benefit implying some degree of calculability. Instrumental approaches to issues convey the use of interests- based arguments. Interests are not here restricted to self-interest or to purely economic interests. They may be supporting the interests of others (e.g. marginalised or vulnerable groups) or may reflect the interests of animals. The critical element is the way in which arguments are made. If they could in principle be satisfied by adjusting the context then I consider them to be amenable to negotiation and thus categorised as an interests-based argument.

Interests may be underpinned by broader values such as justice, forming the basis on which to evaluate an appropriate balance of interests. Where interests-based arguments were made but implied an underlying value-basis, both were included in the analysis.

Two or more values may be in opposition to each other. In arguing for the primacy of one value over another, different interests will also be preferred. Again, in this circumstance both the values and the interests were included in the analysis.

As already noted in Chapter two, a number of different explanations have been advanced for the development of a disputed situation in the context of technological developments.

A dispute may be more about the power relationships associated with technological developments than with the characteristics of the technology (e.g. Nelkin 1992). Similarly, institutions have been viewed as critical in terms of imposing structures that ‘disapprove’

of the behaviour collectively disapproved of (Tansey, 2004) or in terms of how disputes can be expressed and who is empowered to express them (Weiss, 1995). Furthermore, historical aspects can be important as recognised in the GM crops dispute where the experience of BSE has engendered a lack of trust in authorities (e.g. Horlick-Jones etal.

2007). Controversies are complex and multi-faceted and it seems unlikely that any one of the explanations advanced (including the values-interests approach) will be able to explain fully the causes of a dispute in specific circumstances for all possible stakeholders.

In this research, institutional aspects, whilst recognised as important, have not been investigated specifically as the study of institutions would only be possible when studying a smaller number of institutions in detail. An alternative approach to this research would have been to consider smaller cases where one instance of interactions between stakeholders was studied in more detail. I have rejected this as being inappropriate to answer the research questions which require an examination of a whole range of

stakeholder views over a period of time that might not be apparent in a single incidence.

As noted in section 3.4.7,1 included a research question in my in-depth interviews in the stem cells case study seeking to elicit whether the case could be considered one of powerful groups imposing their views on society. Although one question is inadequate to

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-elucidate power structures fully, the confusing nature of responses suggests that there was no general awareness of a power struggle taking place. Although from responses to other questions, it seemed apparent that some stakeholders viewed the arguments around embryonic stem cell research as beginning to embody wider arguments around scientific freedom and the influence of religion on society. These aspects may come to the fore in the future, but at the time of the field work there did appear to be genuine

differences in values among stakeholders. Finally, the historical context of disputes was taken into account in this research where this was identified as respondents as being important, for example in the GM and cloned animals case study, the history of criticism of animal breeding and husbandry practices provide some of the wider context to the values- interests dimensions of the dispute which were more examined in more detail. I conclude that whilst alternative explanations as to why controversies arise are plausible, they are complementary to the values-interests approach.

The approach taken for this thesis is one of critical realism. Even if the premise that values are merely social constructions is accepted, values still appear to serve a function in societal debates. No attempt has been made in this research to identify how people construct values and resolve tensions between them nor is data presented on how people’s values and interests are influenced by how they perceive the values and interests of protagonists. Nor have I attempted to examine how ‘values’ are used

strategically in specific circumstances. Examples are given in the stem cell research case study (section 6.4.2) where respondents’ values appear to act against their own physical interests such that individual patients indicate their opposition to embryonic stem cell research. Instead I seek to understand how the disputed situation is constructed by participants and to identify patterns in those constructions. I treat values and interests as heuristic devices that represent something about reality. Since societies behave as though these concepts exist, and indeed develop whole disciplinary, research and policy areas including ethical frameworks based on such an understanding, I find it plausible to work on this basis.

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-My approach therefore has been to examine each case, to look at what arguments are being made and derive values and interests inductively from examining the arguments made in the case in hand, considering a range of issues that include but also move beyond risk.