Operationalization of the variables

As mentioned earlier, this research into the EAW cooperation network includes four explanatory variables (corruption, cultural dimensions of Hofstede, network coordination and centralization) and organizational performance as the dependent variable. A multi-method case study design will be utilized in order to study these variables. The research will analyze the relationships between several Member States in the EAW system and Eurojust. As such the units of analysis can be defined as the relationships between judicial actors. This paragraph is devoted to the way in which these variables will be measured and analyzed in the remainder of this research. A schematic representation of the different variables and how they are measured is included in Annex 1 of the report.

1. Cultural Dimensions of Hofstede

While a new measurement of the cultural dimensions of Hofstede is not possible within the scope of this research, the database provided by the Hofstede Centre lists the data gathered by Hofstede and his team, thus providing a valuable resource for this report. The dataset provides the values on the four original cultural dimensions as first proposed by Hofstede after the IBM study surveys, and currently includes data for 76 countries. This includes all the Member States of the European Union with the exception of Cyprus. Scores are partially based on the IBM surveys and partially on subsequent replications of Hofstede’s original research (Hofstede Centre, n.b.). The scores of the different Member States are included in Annex 1, table 1 of this report.

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2. Corruption

Corruption is the second explanatory variable included in the research design. Several indices of corruption have been created, most of these relying on perceptions of the populace or experts, or a combination thereof (Rohwer, 2009). Measurement of perceived corruption often faces several drawbacks, including that data is difficult, if not impossible to extrapolate to the ‘true’ amount of corruption in any given setting and that different survey populations may provide different results (Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010, p.19; Rohwer, 2009). For this reason, several indices should be used for a proper case selection on this variable. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Eurobarometers provide two studies of perceived corruption that include data for European Member States. The first is a composite measure of data sources which rates control of corruption on a scale ranging from -2,5 to 2,5. Countries perceived to be excelling at combating corruption will receive a score close to 2,5, while the inverse is true for countries perceived as performing poorly (Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010, p.4). The scores presented in this index include a standard error, which cautions against any statement on one country scoring higher or lower than another if their standard errors overlap (Kaufman, Kraay, Mastruzzi, p.10).

The Special Eurobarometer 374 Corruption (held by TNS Opinion and Social, 2012) provides the additional benefit of including measures directed specifically at perceived corruption of the judiciary. Two questions are especially relevant for current purposes, the scores for which have been included in Annex 2 tables 2 and 3. The first considers the perceived level of corruption in the judiciary directly, while the second question ascertains the trust of a country’s populace in the judicial system were an individual faced with a corruption case.

3. Centralization

Analysis of the variable centralization will be performed using content analysis of the country reports on the implementation of the Framework Decision on the EAW drafted by several institutes. The fourth round of mutual evaluations by the European Council considered the implementation of the EAW in the various Member Sates in-depth, making these reports an important data source. The country reports managed by the Jagiellonian University in Poland also provide a wealth of information on the implementation of the Framework Decision in different Member States.56 _{This includes questions on the friendly stance of}

national courts on the EAW surrender system, who is competent to issue warrants for what purposes, which courts are competent, whether procedures before national constitutional courts have been held etc. In addition, several reports exist examining a selection of countries, similar to this study, which may prove to be a supplementary source of information. An example is a study performed by JUSTICE, the British section of the International Commission of Jurists NGO, which includes elaborate country reports on ten Member States (JUSTICE, 2012).

4. Network coordination

While the impact of centralization, culture and corruption will be studied on the basis of a selection of countries that vary on these variables, such an operationalization is not possible for the network coordination provided by Eurojust and the EJN. Instead, the impact of network coordination will be measured through a semi-structured in-depth interview with two respondents at Eurojust. The semi- structured nature of the interview allows for some deviation from the original questionnaire. This is conducive to the validity of the operationalization as a lack of previous research on the impact of Eurojust

38 and EJN coordination on the performance of national authorities makes it difficult to predetermine exactly which interview questions are appropriate to ask. A more open structure based on the characteristics of an NAO as described in the chapter 3, but that allows for deviation if respondents indicate other important elements, is therefore preferable.

5. Organizational performance

The dependent variable in this research is organizational performance. Performance in the EAW context can be approached by performing content analysis of a sample of EAW surrender cases executed by the Dutch judges with regard to the nine other Member States. Such a sample has the advantage of allowing a comparison between the Member States, to ascertain whether cooperation in one of these situations operates more fluently than in others. However, this operationalization admittedly also introduces several limitations and disadvantages. The first disadvantage of such an operationalization is that only the executing role of judges is assessed. The second disadvantage of this set-up is that reciprocity is hard to measure, and that the performance of for instance foreign judges in their executing role is left unmeasured.

The Rechtsorde.nl portal contains results from several of the most sources of published cases in the Netherlands, making it one of the most expansive resources for publicly available Dutch EAW data. This portal, as elaborated upon in paragraph 4.4, will be used to draw random samples per Member State of about 5-20 surrender cases, which will then be coded to allow for generalizations across cases. Attaching a performance score to an extradition or surrender case is no straightforward matter, however. As will be recalled from chapter 3, several goals have to be taken into account, including on the operational level the automaticity of surrender, speed and appropriate judicial control. Surrender speed can be measured through the turnover time of the Amsterdam court. Although time limits are 60 and 90 from the day of arrest, the beginning date of a court procedure is openly accessible while arrest dates are not. Moreover, the quick procedures of the EAW mean that normally the arrest date will not be substantially far from the date on which the court procedure starts, making the measure somewhat valid.

Automaticity of surrender is the second aspect of an EAW case performance. Automaticity entails the trust in counterpart legal systems, and thus the non-application of substantive analyses of the alleged infringement. After all, the proportionality test and criminal law procedure of the issuing country should be trusted by the executing authorities under the EAW scheme, with every country ideally abiding by the minimum rules set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.57 _{In such a situation, the executing country would no longer need to apply a}

substantive test of the facts of the case in the hearing held before the final decision to surrender is made. Therefore, a higher amount of paragraphs devoted to an in-depth analysis should be detrimental to the effectiveness of the application of the EAW instrument. Three types of in-depth analysis will be included as measures: content analysis of the case, analysis of a foreign legal system and analysis of the adequacy of the received arrest warrant. The details of these indicators will be elaborated upon in the next paragraph. A series of statistical tests will be used to discern whether differences between Member States exist. While the main facet of the automaticity analysis will be done through quantitative analysis, a supporting content analysis of several cases should be utilized to achieve greater depth. For this reason, each case analyzed will be provided with a description of the main problem(s) and every country will receive a short legal analysis on their performance with regard to the automaticity aspect of effectiveness.

39 Other supporting measures to be used in interpreting the extent to which surrender occurred automatically are the indicators on guarantees and their sufficiency and the indicator measuring whether a case was postponed.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of to control for, however, is whether an appropriate amount of judicial control is applied by judges in surrender cases. Since an appropriate judicial control inevitably entails a normative judgment on the performance of the Amsterdam court, a quantification is particularly difficult with regard to this facet of EAW effectiveness. For this reason, a legal analysis will be used to ascertain the extent to which the Amsterdam court seems to apply an appropriate amount of controls. In this process, the analysis will specifically focus on issues such as whether the intensity of the court’s scrutiny has differed over the years, whether the amount of scrutiny seems to differ between the different countries studied, etc.