Theftost-Modern State
ORIGIN AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE FRAGILITY
In this study fragility is actually referred to as the 'w e ak pivot states;' like
others, w eak pivot states also potentially face the challenges o f state fragility or quasi
states in contrast to com pletely failed or collapsed ones. They are w eak and fragile
because th eir political institutions are fractured or ineffective to deliver political goods,
and th e ir societies are highly polarized by deep frag m en tatio n within th e n atio n h o o d .35
Significantly, they are 'pivot' due to th e geo-strategic and geopolitical im portance of
th e ir location or resources, which are lacking in m any o th er weak and fragile states. In
general, while the outcom e of state failure is the same, w h e th e r a w eak state is a pivot
or not, but the impact factor is significantly d ifferen t in both cases.
If w eak states w ere placed in a continuum and facing challenges of state
fragility, they could be dem oted to a "Fourth W orld" category from th e ir current
placem ent in the Third W orld grouping.36 The origin of fragile states is not new.
Throughout history states have faced dom estic challenges, regional issues, and
international pressures th a t eventually posed political deadlocks. In a fe w accounts,
35 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 180.
36 Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in th e New W orld Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 455.
nature driven factors, such as floods, earthquake, hurricanes, etc. beyond hum an
control, have also raised existential threats to various societies. Hence, societies have
suffered w ith both "m an-m ade" factors as w ell as "nature made" factors like ecocide
(polluting th e en viro n m en t).37 History dem onstrates the diverse experiences "of a
society's birth, grow th, peak, senescence, and death" th a t continues on a constant
basis.38
A w ea k state dem onstrates an inability to tackle th e duties and challenges of
statehood. Such a lack of ability causes cracks w ithin its political institutions and
subsequently weakens the state's political capacity to retain its authority. A n u m b er of
political historians, scholars, and analysts like Paul Kennedy (1987), Jared Diam ond
(2006), and Peter Turchin (2003) explain the rise and failure o f societies, governm ents,
and even stronger empires th a t have m et a similar fate. In recent tim es, specifically
during the post-Cold W ar, th e global com m unity has been exposed to non-traditional
and unpredictable challenges and security threats.
In a way, these non-traditional security threats e ith e r stem from non-state or
'stateless'39 actors (m ore likely residing in fragile states) or from th e contagious effects
o f state fragility itself th at pose threats to th e rest by creating "bad neighborhoods"40
th a t end up becoming "ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned"41 spaces. Alarming
situations em erge once territorial integrity becomes "politically disordered," gradually
37 Rotberg, S tate Failure and State Weakness in a Time o f Terror, 22; Diamond, Collapse : H ow Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, 7-8.
38 Collapse: H ow Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, 6.
39 Jakub Grygiel, "The Power of Statelessness," Policy Review, no. 154 (A p r/M ay 2009): 35.
40 Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," Dissent 49, no. 1 (W inter 2002): 117.
41 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and In ternatio n al Security, 5.
shattering th e bounding features o f statehood.42 Ungoverned social spaces are "social,
political, and economic arenas w h ere states do not exercise effective sovereignty or
w h ere state control is absent, w eak, or contested."43 Hence, the fragile statehood o f
w eak states provides fertile ground fo r non-state o r stateless actors to use
geographical spaces to thrive, reside, and act against host states vis-a-vis foreign
territories, because of the w eak states' "deficit in th e efficacious display o f state
pow er."44
Furtherm ore, the vulnerability and sensitivity o f fragile statehood potentially
triggers regional and domestic conflicts. Some of these conflicts are witnessed in Africa
stem m ing from ethno-nationalistic fervor, which led to mass genocides and human
rights violations during th e 1990s. The ethnic conflicts in M yanm ar, Rwanda, Bosnia,
and Afghanistan raised th e num ber o f internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee
issues which led to m ounting political and socio-economic burdens on neighboring
countries.
The origin o f the concept and the acute nature o f th e political problem of a
state's fragility in today's w orld can be linked to original w o rk of Gerald B. Helm an and
Steven R. Ratner. Gerald Helm an and Steven Ratner coined fo r the first tim e the
term inology "failed states" in th eir article "Saving Failed States," published in late 1992.
The article emphasized th a t many o f the newly independent states which colonization
had left w ith "no tradition of statehood or practice in self-governm ent" ... showed a
42 Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces : Alternatives to State A uthority in an Era o f Softened Sovereignty (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 17.
43 Ibid.
44 Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in th e New W orld Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia,Rwanda and Haiti," 458.
"lack of experience in governm ent, w eak civic institutions, lim ited econom ic prospects,
and ethnic strife," making th em fragile and possibly failed societies.45 Over th e years, in
m ost cases th e ir co m m itm en t to govern them selves gradually decayed, and th ey
becam e 'client states'46 to look for th e ir day-to-day survivability and to resist any m ove
tow ards de-recognition of statehood. Interestingly, in some cases like M yan m ar, if a
w ea k state holds a pivotal geostrategic location, and retains client state status, then
geography becomes a burden. In contrast, if a w eak state gradually improves its status
th en the state can enjoy th e "pow er of the w eak" as leverage over o th er influential
states.47 For exam ple, the Cold W ar, the V ietnam W a r, and th e Afghan W a r
dem onstrated th a t the "p o w er of th e w eak" developed a harsh, but negotiated order
betw een w eak states and superpowers.48
Early works by Arnold W olfers (1962), Robert Rothstein (1968, 1977), Thomas
Franck (1968), Marshall Singer (1 972), M ichael Handel (1 981), Robert H. Jackson and
Carl G. Rosberg (1986), and Joel M igdal (1 988) help conceptualize the phenom ena of
fragility and fracturedness w ithin th e fram ew ork o f w eak and fragile states. These early
academic contributions fu rth e r noted the dom estic problem s of w eak states and also
th e weak diplom atic positioning o f these states in th e international system. M o reo ver,
in later years, the significant contributions by Robert Jackson (1987, 1990), I. W illiam
45 Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States," 5.
46 Handel, W eak States in the In ternatio n al System, 4 1 ,1 3 2 -3 3 .
47 Arnold Wolfers emphasized th a t most likely the weak but geo-strategically im po rtant countries enjoy some political leverage in world politics, e.g. during Cold W a r period, Cuba and Albania retained an advantage over great powers; therefore, th e "pow er of the w eak stems from th e relationships among th e great powers themselves". See, W olfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on In ternatio n al Politics, 111.
48 Serfaty, A World R ecast: An American M o m e n t in a Post-Western Order, 21.
Zartm an (1995), Jean-Germain Gros (1 996), Jeffrey Ira Herbst (2000), A ntony G.
Hopkins (2000), Robert I. Rotberg (2003, 200 4 ), and Seth D. Kaplan (2008) significantly
provided an intellectual base th a t has outlined the basic indicators required for
effectively perform ing states. The literatu re helps to categorize and develop taxonom y
o f troubling states and puts forw ard lessons learned from these w eak societies to seek
viable solutions.
From th e outset, it has rem ained a daunting challenge to define, categorize, and
draw a clear distinction b etw een various categories o f w eak states. Similarly, in
retrospect and broadly speaking, th e m ajor and small powers phenom ena or
categorization rem ain in usage instead o f strong and w eak states. Small powers w ere
considered relatively w eaker com pared to m ajor powers due to insufficient capabilities
in retaining social cohesion and in deterring m ajor external threats. Robert L. Rothstein
(1968) developed an acceptable definition fo r small powers that in m any ways can be
applicable to today's w eak or fragile states too. The author defines small p o w er as:
"... a state which recognizes th a t it cannot obtain security prim arily by use o f its own capabilities, and th a t it must rely fundam entally on the aid of o th e r states, institutions, processes, or developm ents to do so; th e small pow er's belief in its inability to rely on its own must be recognized by th e other states involved in international politics."49
Similarly, th e literature shows th a t the small states also share some
com m onalities w ith small powers. Prim ary among them is being insufficient in pow er
capabilities, which frequently encounters a small state w ith a sense of inferiority at the
systemic level. Am ry Vandenbosch (1964) portrays small states w ith follow ing quote:
49 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Sm all Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29.
"A small state is a vacuum in a high pressure area. It does not live because o f its strength but because nobody w ants its te rrito ry , o r because its preservation as a buffer state or as a w eight in th e balance o f pow er is of interest to a stronger nation. W h en th e balance disappears, th e small state usually disappears w ith it."50
In these circumstances, w eak positioned small powers or states ideally look fo r
"neutrality" or "non-aligned m ovem ent," as th e y are arguably incapable o f resisting
any coercive a tte m p t by much pow erful states.51 As an instance, before W orld W a r II,
Belgium ensured its neutrality from th en great powers. W h ile, India during its early
years of independence preferred to join the non-aligned m ovem ent as a m ore
attractive policy to secure its survivability. Those w eak states, which realized neutrality
is an inexpedient option in Realpolitik and "wish to survive," dare to com e out of
neutrality because the w eak states "are m ore preoccupied w ith survival."52 In most
cases, the decision to say farew ell to neutrality forced small states or powers to
bandwagon w ith great powers in order to accrue th e ir relative power capabilities
against th eir archrivals. M any w eak states enjoyed the support of m ajo r powers w hile
balancing th e ir archrivals, and it is a w in -w in situation for both w eaker and stronger
states. Note, th e dynamics of w eak and strong states in global political systems
revolves around balancing, buffering and bandwagoning.
The established relationship b etw een w eak or fragile states and strong states is
usually an asymmetrical power relationship. The general understanding about w eak
and fragile states is th a t they opt to bandwagon, because th e anarchic n ature of
50 Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," 2 9 4 -9 5 . 51 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 243.
52 Kenneth W altz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54;
M iriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies o f Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard," British Journal o f Political Science 25, no. 2 (1995): 175.
systemic pressure prom pts them to do so. In contrast, w e a k e r states are rational actors
too; despite fragile and w eak conditions, w eaker states rationally calculate th e
available options to m aximize th e gains. In this regard, w ea k er states also try best to
exploit the interests o f great powers and develop bargaining options. These
bandwagoning bargains become "bandwagoning fo r profits," as the stronger states,
driven by the desire to avoid losses, are m ore interested in balancing, w h ile th e w eaker
states are com fortable w ith bandwagoning, which provides maxim um o p p o rtu n ity fo r
gain.53
It is witnessed during the Cold W a r period th a t Pakistan allied w ith th e United
States, which helped Pakistan to balance India through acquiring m ilitary and economic
support. In a way, Pakistan's status as a w eak state during its tim e o f birth m axim ized
its gains w hile offering to protect U.S interests to contain communism in th e region.
Observing these historical guidelines, w ith o u t external support and alliances for
security arrangem ents, a w eak state trying to exert pow er is like "the mouse th a t
roared" in real world scenarios.54 Finally, th ere are few states advocating fo r liberal-
institutionalism to safeguard th e ir interests under systemic pressures. These
institutionalists heavily rely on th e support o f a "super-leviathan" or take shelter under
th e umbrella of international organizations, e.g. UN, NATO, Warsaw Pact, EU, AU,
53 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing th e Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 74.
54 Marshall R. Singer, W eak States in a W orld o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships (N ew York,: Free Press, 1972), 368.
ASEAN, etc., fo r legal protections provided through a "negotiated order, bargaining
order, or imposed order" o f "international regim es."55
Recent studies have led to overlaps w hen analyzing the weak states category
because the notion of w eak states itself is discussed under a num ber o f titles, such as
small states, fragile states, quasi-states, failing states, failed states, and so forth. In
some cases, m alfunctioning and human rights-abusing w eak states are considered
rogue states, praetorian states, garrison states, or predatory states as w ell. Th erefo re,
th e re is a blurred distinction betw een vaguely used phenom ena in th e literatu re. In
addition, each study undertakes d iffe re n t param eters to judge the strength and
capacity of a state. On the one hand, th e procedure provides m ultiple criteria to
understand and evaluate diverse cases o f contem porary w eak states, but on th e o th er
hand, it fails to develop an agreeable path to tackle the problems of w ea k states or
generalize the issue area. Similarly, it is hard to suggest any generalized description fo r
all fragile states, because th e re are m any factors th a t contribute to determ ining
fragility, and each case study has its ow n uniqueness. However, this study inculcates
various distinctive explanations into one com prehensive study for an in-depth
understanding and prescribes some fu n d am en tal guidelines to im prove th e fragile
conditions o f w eak states.
55 Hoffmann explains th a t there is no super p ow er above states due to the absence o f a super-leviathan, which means th e absence o f form alized international norms and values, which may retain anarchic realities of world politics. See, Stanley H offm ann, Chaos and Violence : W hat Globalization, Failed States, and Terrorism M ean fo r U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, M d.: Rowman & Littlefield 20 0 6 ), 43; Oran R.
Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall o f International Regimes," in International Regimes, ed.
Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 99-101; Stephen D. Krasner, In ternatio n al Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 36-39.
Despite the variation in titling th e subject m atter, it is understandable th a t
w eak states can be distinct from strong or successful states on the basis o f
psychological and m aterial grounds. On th a t note, most o f th e explanations on the
subject affirm th a t the weakness of states means a substantial lack o f effectiveness in
mobilizing its tangible and intangible factors of pow er in contrast to stable ones. This
means th e "m ajor components (tangible) of p ow er w ere considered to be w ealth,
organization, and status," w hile w eak states considerably lack them or are not fully
capable of harnessing th e m .56 According to Kenneth W altz, th e differentiations
betw een strong and weak are based on "p o w er capabilities," which require every state
to behave under anarchic conditions to follow "self-help or decline and perish."57
Subsequently, a state's lack of economic, m ilitary and diplom atic p o w er also weakens
its international posture among global m em bers as an effective unit to enforce its
persuasive diplom atic agenda.58
Similarly, at the domestic level, the "scope" of state em pow ers state institutions
to enforce the rule of law in order to retain a legitim ate m onopoly of p o w e r.59 The
rationale of the state's legitimacy is linked to "the state's unique ability to provide a
territorially-centralised form o f organization."60 Therefore it becomes possible through
56 Singer, W eak States in a W orld o f Powers: The Dynamics o f In ternatio n al Relationships, 368.
57 John M . Hobson, The State and In ternatio n al Relations (Cambridge England; N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 23.
58 Singer, W eak States in a W orld o f Powers: The Dynamics o f International Relationships, 73;
Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," 302.
59 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance an d W orld Order in th e 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2004), 6.
60 M ichael M ann, "The Autonomous Power of th e State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," European Journal o f Sociology 25, no. 2 (Novem ber 1984): 185.
th e m onopoly o f violence was achieved through "despotic powers" w hich m ean t "the
range of actions w ith w hich the e lite is em pow ered to undertake w ith o u t routine,
institutionalised negotiation w ith civil society groups."62 W ith o u t much surprise, the
com parable type of despotic p o w er mechanism is also practiced and w ield ed in many
o f th e authoritarian systems in contem porary political settings. In fact, in th e case of
w ea k and fragile states, it rather holds "an inability to m aintain a m onopoly of the
internal means o f violence," proving to be a more fractured political system .63 In
contrast, in m odern democracies, th e legitimacy of pow er is retained through
"infrastructural power" o f state institutions.64