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Explanatory Framework I - Cartel Theory

2.4. Party Leadership and Representation

This section focuses on internal implications of Cartel Theory in terms of leadership and representation within the party. The aim is to provide a more detailed account of these characteristics and, most importantly, to identify which features are likely to apply to the Left Party in the western states. These aspects will subsequently be explored in the Bremen Case Study.

First, it is necessary to briefly revisit the model of party evolution developed by Katz and Mair and consider the internal organisation of the party types. Whereas the cadre parties' membership and leadership were essentially one and the same, the mass party developed a large membership base centred around the articulation of specific interests and shared ideology. The party elite was expected to act in the name of the grassroots party, while structures such as the party congress or conference made the leadership formally accountable to the mass organisation. Later, the catch-all party began to seek support from beyond its own organisational structure and, no longer maintained solely by the membership, was able to gradually shed its reliance upon, and therefore accountability to, the grassroots membership. With power concentrated among the leaders, the catch-all party became characterised by a top-down structure of authority. In the cartel model, while party membership of course continues to exist, its chief role is to lend formal support to the leadership. Furthermore, as supporters and experts outside the party participate in decision-making processes, the relationship of accountability changes and party activists find themselves ‘divorced’ from their leadership.

Kitschelt (2000) doubts there is a party of two ‘fronts’ consisting of the leadership together with moderate, inactive members on one side and the more radical activists on the other, and instead argues it is more plausible that the leadership will simply seek the support of the party median, regardless of whether those individuals happen to be activists or part of the larger grassroots organisation (Kitschelt, 2000, p.158). After all, if the leadership persistently represents an unpopular minority view within the party, those members dissatisfied with the situation have the option of leaving the party (or threatening to do so). In addition, party statutes provide mechanisms for the censure of the leadership: ‘Exit and voice mechanisms rarely permit national leadership levels to become entirely impervious to the control by a variety of external principals, be they

local activists, members or voters’ (Kitschelt, 2000, p.159). Parties are therefore faced with a network dilemma; how, on the one hand, to maintain freedom and networks for leaders to engage in policy making based on negotiation and compromise; and on the other hand, how to meet the activists' demands for influence in the policy making process. As a result, German parties have to juggle two types of organisational identity:

(T)hey are rational-efficient and professional service organisations focused on election campaigns and policy making as well as membership organisations focused on programmatic debates, social community and political participation. (Detterbeck, 2008, p.34)

How do parties reconcile their sometimes conflicting roles as policy makers and membership organisations? One explanation focuses on the structure and coordination within the party itself. In the case of the cartel party type, the concentration of power is reinforced by its organisation as a ‘stratarchy’. In this model, the local and regional office strata are maintained, manage their own affairs and are able to exercise independence concerning the issues that specifically affect them at sub-national level.

At first glance, this stratarchy strengthens these organisations by granting them a degree of autonomy from the national party leadership (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.21). But if a local party threatens to mobilise members in order to protest against or contradict official central party policy, the national leadership is able to bypass the troublesome local branch and appeal directly to the general (and less active) membership.

Nevertheless, given the increasing influence of national politics and public opinion of national politicians on the outcomes of regional and even local elections, leaders at sub-national level do of course have an obvious interest in shaping policy and leadership conduct at the central (national) party level. Koole (1996, p.518) therefore disputes the apparent readiness of local party leaders to accept the pre-eminence of the central organisation in return for autonomy over their own local matters. However, Katz and Mair (1996, p.532) argue that although it might indeed be feasible to imagine a challenge to the dominant central organisation if local party branches acted together, it is atypical to find a common initiative among party organisations at this level.

The party conference illustrates this point. The party executive presents a package of policies and amendments on which conference delegates are to vote. A delegation from the regional level can struggle to directly challenge a particular policy or strategy on the basis of its impact on local politics: it could be difficult to muster support among other regional delegations not similarly affected by the proposal, whereas the

leadership is able to draw support from the wider membership. Developments in technology have further supported this approach. Some parties (notably the Pirate Party) have either used or explored platforms such as Liquid Feedback to facilitate direct participation by ordinary members not attending conference in person; in 2011 the Left Party also launched a programme discussion using the Liquid Democracy platform. On the one hand, this formal empowerment of the grassroots membership naturally enhances democratic legitimacy. But on the other, it creates the means to circumvent organisations as well as activist groups at sub-national level, therefore securing the dominant role of the central leadership in the party (Katz and Mair, 1995, p.21).

The focus on layers of party organisation also has to include consideration of Germany’s decentralised, federal structure. Although the federal system facilitates

‘important channels of aggregating territorial interests and of resolving internal conflicts between the different party levels’ (Detterbeck, 2008, p.32), it can also give rise to conflict and debate. Hough et al. (2007, p.49) observe that while parties are often discussed as unitary actors, differences and conflict between the internal structures and streams can manifest themselves. This arises particularly if the national party leadership fails to (or chooses not to) exert authority over, and provide clear direction to, the structures and organisations at sub-national level. Chapter One has described how under the leadership of Gabi Zimmer the approach of the PDS national executive was based on informality and only sporadic coordination between the national and regional organisations within the party. As a result, there was greater autonomy among the Land organisations (Hough and Koß, 2008). This was particularly the case following the 2002 general election, when the then PDS failed to clear the five per cent hurdle. The result of this failure was the dissolution of the national parliamentary party

— the highest level of party in public office . Moreover, the national executive itself 40 was riddled with tensions and conflict between its members and the ‘party in central office’ was therefore weakened (ibid.). Furthermore, Hough et al. refer to the ongoing and unresolved debate concerning opposition vs. participation in regional governments as:

(E)vidence that the sub-national level does matter. This takes on even greater importance when the groups/units adopt radically different positions towards such issues as government participation — and there is

Only two deputies remained in parliament, and did not qualify for any group status.

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no issue that has proved as problematic for the Left Party in recent years as this one. (Hough et al., 2007, p.49)

The federal structure can therefore facilitate heterogeneity both vertically (between the federal party and regional organisations) and horizontally (among the regional associations), resulting in the ongoing existence of Streitkultur (culture of criticism and controversy) within the party. Nevertheless, even though German federalism has allowed leading regional politicians to adopt key positions and influence at national level, it is still the Ministerpräsidenten (Prime Ministers of the federal states) and other office holders who tend to dominate executive committees and policy making (Detterbeck, 2008, p.34). In other words, while federalisation plays an important role in determining power relationships within German parties, the ascendency of the party in public office is still evident (ibid., p.32).

The party leadership has a number of tools at its disposal with which to manage the coordination of the wider membership. In addition to recent conference technology, postal ballots are a further means of effectively dispersing the membership, since members act as individuals, rather than as an organised bloc. It may even be possible for members to ‘leapfrog’ the regional layer of the association and join the national party, a process which does not integrate the member into their local networks.

Germany’s federal structure means that members are formally registered in their respective regional association, but even at this level activists remain in the minority.

More recently, parties have also taken steps to involve non-members in decision-making. The SPD, for example, sought to involve non-members in candidate selection and to open up its working groups and policy forums to include sympathisers outside the party, albeit with limited rights (representative roles on committees would remain the reserve of party members) . All in all, an isolated and generally passive 41 membership provides the party in central office with a win-win situation: on the one hand the party can legitimately claim to have a large membership basis, and on the other it is unlikely to experience a united challenge to leadership or policies, thanks to the rather atomised and passive nature of the membership.

The membership referendum is a further instrument available to the leadership. The referendum could naturally be welcomed as a positive step towards increasing inner-party democracy, and indeed German parties have, since the 1990s, used the

See Vogt, R (2011) and Castellucci, L. (2011) for suggestions on membership organisation

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reform in the SPD.

plebiscite as a means of engaging local members in the candidate selection process.

But aside from matters such as personnel selection, this democratic tool has rarely been utilised for actual policy decisions at national level. Its chief function, therefore, appears to be to serve ‘electoral and image-fed motives’ rather than to transform

‘internal power distribution’ (Detterbeck, 2008, p.32).

During the cooperation between the PDS and WASG, the respective memberships of both parties took part in a referendum on whether to proceed with the formal merger.

The proposed fusion did not enjoy universal support within the PDS, especially among those on the left of the party, and the vote gave ordinary members (beyond office holders and activists) the opportunity to participate in decision-making about their party’s future. However, despite the misgivings of some activists and groups in the PDS, by the time the referendum took place it was highly unlikely that members would have voted to reject the merger. Prominent leaders such as Gysi and Lafontaine had been instrumental in bringing together the two parties and both wielded considerable influence in the media and within the respective parties. With ninety-six per cent of the members voting in favour of the merger, the outcome of the referendum strengthened the position and legitimacy of the party leadership.

Certain methods and styles of communication can also reinforce centralised power within a party. Cartel Theory was formulated at a time when political campaigning was becoming increasingly professionalised (see Section One). The expense and coordination involved in producing campaigns for television or for the national media required access to the resources (professional and financial) available to the party in central office. In turn, these professionally produced campaigns were able to appeal directly to individuals, thus circumventing local party organisations or activist networks.

But as Blyth and Katz (2005) have pointed out, these professional channels of communication were also expensive, and were no longer able to deliver party success and stability, thus posing the leadership with a new network dilemma. Since then, however, technological advances have given rise to various forms of social media, such as YouTube, Facebook and the microblogging platform Twitter. The latter has proven particularly popular in the communication of political ideas. Furthermore, it has facilitated the coordination of activists and protests and allowed people to follow events as they unfold. At first glance, then, it appears that social media has shifted the focus away from political elites and has instead placed influence into the hands of activists and the electorate.

Yet there is some debate as to whether this technology actually promotes grassroots issue-based campaigns or whether it is in fact a tool by which prominent political figures are able to set their own agenda (Adi et al., 2014, p.3). A study into the use of Twitter during a general election campaign in Sweden identified three broad categories of communication — dissemination of facts, updates on daily activities and statements for the purpose of self-promotion — and noted that these neither provided genuine insights into political processes, nor enhanced transparency (Larssen and Moe, 2011, p.733). The study also revealed that use of Twitter spiked following televised debates or media coverage of political events (such as rallies), suggesting that although it clearly contributes to the overall volume of political communication, Twitter builds on the representation of events and issues in the traditional/established media (ibid., p.

741). Moreover, the timing of the peak in usage underlined the emphasis on parliamentary politics.

The use of this social media platform highlights some interesting questions that are relevant for Cartel Theory and specifically for the issue of party leadership and representation. For instance, Twitter allows people to follow (and therefore monitor) the activities of politicians. The other side of this coin is that it also offers politicians, very much aware of this audience, with a channel for augmenting the same messages already (or about to be) published in traditional media (Adi et al., 2014, p.7). Also, while activity might increase during parliamentary elections, communication is by no means confined to election coverage and politicians are therefore able to ‘circumvent traditional media and continuously campaign throughout the year’ (ibid., p.14). In addition, it facilitates the direct appeal to the broader membership whilst bypassing regional organisations and activists. What is more, Twitter’s brevity is ideally suited to the communication of catchy and sometimes emotive statements and soundbites (ibid., p.7). It therefore allows the poster to appeal to his or her followers frequently and on a very direct and personalised level — and not necessarily on strictly political issues. In short, although social media can be seen as a means of ‘democratising’ political communication, Twitter, as just one example of this type of technology, is also a powerful tool in the hands of party leaders that is ‘more akin to one-way, top-down communication’ than a means of ‘actually engaging with the citizenry’ (Larssen and Moe, 2011, p.733).

But even though policy making and communication remain to a large extent the domain of the leadership, parties cannot completely ignore the demands among members and activists for participation in this process, and the leadership would presumably not wish

to see a sizeable exit from the party (Kitschelt, 2000, p.158). Credibility issues would also arise, possibly even triggering a leadership crisis. Dissent and the threat of exit are therefore important weapons in the hands of the party membership wishing to exert influence on the leadership. The PDS/Left Party itself is no stranger to inner-party discord. Disputes over policy and strategy have indeed prompted resignations from the party (notably concerning the perennial conflict over government participation but also the question of support for UN-mandated military action). However, the culture within the party itself also plays an important role. Olsen (2002a, p.207) observes, for example, that eastern members in particular had a strong sense of loyalty to the PDS, and likens the prospect of their leaving the PDS to that of leaving the Church. In addition, there are also sections of the membership (for instance in the Communist Platform) who despite their opposition to pragmatic reforms and participation in coalitions are convinced they still have a more realistic chance of achieving political goals from within the party. The threat of defection also assumes there is an alternative political Heimat (home) ready to welcome ex-members. Some PDS members, including office holders, have indeed defected to the SPD over what they perceived as ideological rigidity and lack of pragmatism . However, for those fundamentally 42 opposed to or critical of capitalism and policies such as Hartz IV, it is not clear to which party they might defect. The other parliamentary parties offer variations on the very policies opposed, while alternative leftist movements do not offer a parliamentary platform for opposition. As such, leaving the Left Party would lead to ‘political irrelevance’ (ibid.). Moreover, members can be reluctant to surrender ‘their’ party to an unpopular leadership, and therefore resolve to remain as a ‘corrective’ force, to steer the party back onto the right path . 43

Cartel Theory points out that in spite of the tendency for decision-making to take place at leadership level, activists are not completely superfluous. After all, an active membership reinforces the party's democratic image and lends legitimacy to the claim of societal representation (Detterbeck, 2008, p.34). Secondly, it is likely that leaders begin their own political involvement as activists; consequently, the party on the ground continues to fulfil the important function of nurturing and developing talent (ibid.). Yet

Examples of PDS/Linke office holders at various levels who are now members of the SPD

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include Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (MEP), Angela Marquardt (former national executive and Bundestag member) and Sirvan Cakici (former Bremen Bürgerschaft member).

For example, the Communist Platform has stated: ‘We shouldn’t leave the party to those who

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would misrepresent history for the sake of government participation today, or vote for military deployment of the Bundeswehr tomorrow (…) Let’s not do anyone the favour of allowing ourselves to be forced out of the party.’ (Kommunistische Plattform der Partei DIE LINKE, 2014)

activists, who actually constitute a minority of the overall membership, can still find themselves sidelined. Open party lists, for example, can mean that the most promising list positions are allocated to candidates who are likely to appeal to the public, but who are not even necessarily members of the party and maybe have little experience of grassroots campaigning or knowledge of local issues. Another practice is that of

‘parachuting’ a central office-approved and often high profile candidate in need of a safe seat into the regional branch at the expense of the constituency’s own candidate.

Despite a degree of autonomy among sub-national organisations, central office is able to exert influence on the focus of regional election campaigns. The political work of the regional association includes activism regarding certain issues that specifically affect the area, such as local industry, environmental impact or housing. Political work is also likely to involve collaboration with related local interest groups. In the absence of an existing cultural and electoral base in the western states, the PDS strategy for western expansion was a long term one that focused on cultivating ties to various social movements. Only then could the party hope to establish a significant and sustainable voter base in the West. However, the sudden emergence of the WASG and the

Despite a degree of autonomy among sub-national organisations, central office is able to exert influence on the focus of regional election campaigns. The political work of the regional association includes activism regarding certain issues that specifically affect the area, such as local industry, environmental impact or housing. Political work is also likely to involve collaboration with related local interest groups. In the absence of an existing cultural and electoral base in the western states, the PDS strategy for western expansion was a long term one that focused on cultivating ties to various social movements. Only then could the party hope to establish a significant and sustainable voter base in the West. However, the sudden emergence of the WASG and the