full Japanese sovereignty.
His refusal of the Okinawan
demands for ’autonomy’ could mean, therefore, another
way of denial of their hope of political reunion w ith the rest of the Japanese community. This tough line of
policy on the part of the High Com m i s s i o n e r caused some friction in relations w i t h the Öta regime and also w it h the J apanese Government,
U n de r these circumstances U .S .-Japanese nego t i a t i o n s for creation of some kind of inter-governmental m a c h i n er y through which the two governments were to co-ordinate their aid programmes to Okinawa made but little progress. It took nearly two years from the time K e n n ed y announced
that his government was prepared to enter into
discussions w i t h the Japanese Government for that purpose to the final agreement w h i ch was reached b et we e n them in April 1964. It was decided by this agreement that a U.S.- Japan Consultative Committee and a U .S ,-J ap an -R y uk yu a n Technical Committee should be set up in Tokyo and at
39 Naha respectively.
In spite of these major obstacles to the
implementation of K e n n e d y ’s new O k i nawa policy in its every important a s p e c t , a trend towards a steady increase in J a p a n ’s economic assistance to Okinawa occurred
throughout the whole period of the Ikeda Government.
E s pecially its increase in the 1961 budget was significant because in this year began two new items in Japan's
economic assistance, n a m el y that for the promotion of industrial developments and that for the improvement of social security services in Okinawa. These two items account largely for the m arked increase of Japanese
assistance in the subsequent years. (See Table 2 on the next p a g e ).
of Yen) Fiscal Y ear T o t a l + Education + + Technical Assistance Industrial Development Social Security 1952 2,160 2,160 0 0 0 195 3 5,874
5,874
0 0 01954
7,722 7,722 0 0 0 195 5 10,259 10,259 0 0 01956
1
,145,788
14,4.18 0 0 0 1957 19,977 16,174 0 0 01958
33,576
18,326
0 0 0 1959 104,99330,544
12,296
0 0 I96081,095
39,320 21,880 0 01961
511,824 58,71719,954
13,893
9,2081962
1,012,831 77,882 29,285526,117
78,097
19631
,830,671
106,120 29,505 1,229,764237,798
1964 1,864,358 183,478 32,329 1,123,253371,265
1965 2,861,630 4 8 8,609
49,445 1,473,527621,426
1966
5,800,971 2,870,035 69,730 1,275,8841
,078,216
Source: Okinawa Sanko Shiryo comp» Sorifu Tolcubetsu ChiikiR e n r a k u - k y o k u (mimeo.) (January I
966
), p p . 456-7 + The difference b e t w e e n the total and the sum of four figures in the other columns in that year is the m i s c ellaneous items w h i c h includeexpenditure for N a m po Doho E n g o k a i , solatium (from time to time) and others.
Increase in the expenditure on education in recent years is due to the programme for the free d i s t r i b u t i o n of textbooks for school c h i l d r e n «,
N o t only that but also an important change in the n at u r e of such financial assistance was taking place b e c a u s e these new items of assistance, unlike those in
the previous stages were to be transferred d irectly to the general account of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. In other words such economic assistance has b ecome now c l o sely comparable to subsidies from the
central government to a local government wi t h i n a single political community. (See Table 3 on the next page)«
It seems that the changes of leaders in Tokyo and in W a s h i n gt o n in 1963-64 have not added new decisive
factors to the hitherto described development of the U.S. J apanese relations concerning Okinawa. B ot h J o h ns on and Sato both of w h o m succeeded in an u n expected wa y their
respective predecessors, have been following the policies established by their predecessors. The joint communique of Johnson and Sato which was issued after their
conference in J a n u a r y 1965, was, as far as the O k i n a w a pr o b l e m was concerned, little more than r e petition and rea f f i r m a t i o n of what had b e e n said in the K e n n e dy -I k ed a joint statement in June 1961 or in the K en n e d y statement in M ar c h 1962. The only notewo r t h y progress was seen in that 5 they agreed in principle to broaden the functions of the existing Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee so as to enable the committee to conduct consultations not only on economic assistance to the R yu k y u Islands but also on other matters on w h i c h the two countries can co-operate in co n t i n u i n g to promote the w el l- b e i n g of
40 the inhabitants of the i s l a n d s . 3
T a b 1 e 3 S b a r e o f J a p a n e s e U , S . a n d R y u k y u a n F u n d s i n t h e _ G e n e r a l A c c o u n t _ o_f_ t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e R y u k y u I s l a n d s FY 1 9 5 7 - FY 1 9 6 5 ( i n J a p a n e s e s y s t e m ) ( i n M i l l i o n s o f Y e n ) FY J a p a n U 0 S 0 GRI T o t a l 1 9 5 7 0 2 9 4 ( 3 . 3 $ ) 8 , 5 6 1 ( 9 6 . 7 $ ) 8 , 8 5 . 5 ( 1 0 0 $ ) 1 9 5 8 0 8 5 0(9 .8$ ) 7 , 7 9 5 ( 9 0 . 2 $ ) 8 , 6 4 5 ( 1 0 0 $ ) 1 9 5 9 0 8 8 4 ( 9 = 6 $ ) 8 , 2 7 9 ( 9 0 . 4 $ ) 9 ,1 6 3( 1 0 0$ ) I 9 6 0 0 1 , 1 1 8 ( 1 1 . 2 $ ) 8 , 8 2 2 ( 8 8 . 8 $ ) 9 , 9 4 0 ( 1 0 0 $ ) 1 9 6 1 2 0 ( 0 . 2 # ) 1 , 7 3 5 (1 3. 6 $ )1 0,7 5 7(8 6.2$ ) 1 2,7 1 2(1 0 0$ ) 1 9 6 2 1 5 0( l 0 2 $ ) 2 ,3 8 3(1 4.9$ ) 1 3.4 6 5(8 3.9$ ) 1 5,9 9 8( 1 0 0$ ) 1 9 6 3 9 5 4(5.2$ ) 1 , 8 7 9 ( 1 0 . 1 $ ) 1 5 , 6 9 6 ( 8 4 . 7 $ ) 1 8 , 5 2 9 ( 1 0 0 $ ) 1 9 6 4 1 ,4 5 0(7 .2$ ) 2 ,5 8 1(1 2. 8 $ ) 1.6 ,0 7 5(8 0.0$ ) 2 0 , 1 0 6 ( 1 0 0 $ ) 1 9 6 5 2, 3 5 4(9.9$ ) 3 , 0 4 6 ( 1 2 . 8 $ ) 1 8 , 3 1 9 ( 7 7 . 3 $ ) 2 3,7 1 9(1 0 0$ ) S o u r c e :
Si
i • = ! 1 ^ 0 i S a n k o S h i r y o c o m p . S o r i f u T o k u b e t s u C h i i k i R e n r a k u - k y o k u , ( m i m e o . ) ( J a n u a r y 1 9 6 6 ) , p p . 4 2 6 - 7 . F o r t h e s a k e o f c o n v e n i e n c e o f c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r t a b l e s , t h e J a p a n e s e s y s t e m o f f i s c a l y e a r i s u s e d i n t h e a b o v e t a b l e . I n f a c t , h o w e v e r , t h e R y u k y u a n s y s t e m i s s a m e a s t h e A m e r i c a n a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e f i g u r e s i n t h e b o t t o m l i n e , f o r e x a m p l e , r e p r e s e n t t h o s e i n t h e 1 9 6 6 R y u k y u a n f i s c a l y e a r .It was generally u n d er s t o o d that this agreement removed the o utstanding difference between the two governments about the nature and functions of the
Consult a t i v e Committee in favour of the Japanese opinion that not only economic but also ’political' matters,
such as the extention of autonomy, the method of choosing Chief E x e c ut i ve and the like, could be discussed through
4l this committee.
The replacement of the High Commissioner for Okinawa General C a r aw a y by General W a t s o n (in August 1964) was, however, perhaps more important than the changes of top level leaders in the sense that the r e latively flexible approach of the new High Commiss i o n e r to various aspects of the Okinawa problem h elped largely the people
concerned to deal with the mat t e r in a more co-operative 42
frame of mind than before.
The ne w H i g h Commiss i o n e r Watson also m a n a g ed to avoid any action worsening the political crisis over the
leadership of the conservative party w hi c h had led to the split of the OLDP and the r e s i gnation of Ota from the post of Chief Executive in the last days of his
predecessor. The merger of the two groups of the
conservative politicians und e r the new leader of M a tsuoka put an end to the political confusion in Okinawa caused