Phase 1 – 1976-1983

This stage sees the first consistent outbursts of violence by and against the Tamil community. Numerous Tamil militant groups are established while the government uses both policy and military action in their attempt to suppress the impending civil war. India begins to interfere in the conflict. The cycle of violence motivated by retaliation culminates eventually in the escalation of violence in 1983 on Black July.

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Figure 8. Timeline phase 1

Economic liberalisation

Grievances among the Tamil population were further piqued by economic liberalisation policies. To understand the changing dynamics after economic liberalisation in Sri Lanka, a brief overview of the economic history of Sri Lanka is needed. After being a colony for more than 400 years, the political system of Ceylon was led by the British in the early 20th _century. The British had implemented a wide range of economic liberalisation policies. However, after the Great Depression and the Second World War, the British began to create a welfare state in Ceylon, including food subsidies and an expanded educational system. They reduced the level of economic liberalisation. Along with the creation of the welfare state, however, came the increasing power of the government. This enabled both Tamil and Sinhalese political entrepreneurs to use this increasing power to benefit their own ethnic group, by being their patron. Resource allocation was unequal, because the Sinhalese, as the majority population, had more political power. This led to inter-ethnic tensions (Biziouras, 2014a, p.55).

In 1977 the UNP won the elections. Their main political goal was to implement new economic liberalisation policies. Although the liberalisation policies succeeded only to an extent, and the UNP tried to create an inter-ethnic labour market, the policies were not beneficial for the Tamils. They were especially detrimental to the lower castes of the Tamil community. Tamil youth had decreased access to upward social and economic mobility and the rural poor suffered as agricultural subsidies were lowered and the agricultural market was liberalised. Additionally, political entrepreneurs from the UNP tried to stop every attempt at public investment in the Tamil area (Biziouras, 2014a, p.151-164).

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International and national politics

Although the economic liberalisation project would seem to be a domestic issue, it was influenced by international dynamics. In the second half of the 20th _{century, Sri Lanka’s} international politics were characterised by the non-alignment principle: the intention to not align with one of the big power blocks, but to find a middle way between the two superpowers. India, which had always shown a particularly high interest in the island located just off its southern borders, was a very prominent member of the non-alignment movement. When the Secretary General of the United States, William Pierce Rogers, visited Sri Lanka in 1972 to meet with Foreign Minister Bandaranaike, the Indians were very suspicious (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October 2015; Palmowski, 2008; US Department of State).

From 1970 until 1977, the SFLP had the political majority. The SFLP was a grassroots- orientated party with a Singala-Buddhist nationalist foundation. They saw themselves as protectors of the nation and were suspicious of international interference. The UNP, on the other hand, had its roots in the colonial period and was founded by those who benefitted from that system. That is why their orientation was international from the beginning. According to Interviewee B, the UNP saw the declining power of Russia and a shift in the balance of power towards the United States and responded to that. They maintained independence from international resources in the process of liberalising the economy. Additionally, the United States became involved in the intelligence system of Sri Lanka, so the shifting balance of power in the international political arena made it beneficial for Sri Lanka to engage with the United States to some extent. However, this increased the wariness of their non-alignment neighbouring country, India (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26October 2015).

Name of the party Founded Self-description Support base

United National Party (UNP)

1947 Nationalistic Pragmatic Entire population

Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SFLP)

1951 Socialist Nationalists Teachers, doctors, farmers, and workers

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Tamil militant groups

The Tamil rebels were organised into several militant groups. Just before the heyday of the LTTE, there were more than forty different youth movements and groups, each one having its own political language and composition. The five main groups were the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the LTTE. TELO was the oldest organisation, formed in 1967. In 1970, TSF was formed by Prabhakaran. Two years later the name was changed to the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), and in 1976 the TNT became the LTTE. PLOTE was formed in 1980 after splitting from the LTTE. In contrast to the LTTE, PLOTE was based on Marxist-Leninist principles and called for a social revolution on behalf of farmers and workers. In 1975, EROS was established in London with a strong Marxist ideology. In 1981, the EPRLF split from EROS. They also had a Marxist identity and their main objective was to fight a people’s war (Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.294-297).

Figure 10. Tamil militant groups.

The emergence of so many different militant groups can be explained by the fact that the Tamil community was extremely divided. At first glance, the main division appears to be between the elder and more moderate politicians on the one side, and the impatient, violent youth on the other side. The young militants believed the Satyagraha style to be ineffective (Hashim, 2013, p.82). The militant groups contested the power of the elderly statesmen of the TULF, who were not committed to the use of violence. The groups mainly consisted of young, lower caste Tamils who wanted to rebel against the caste system (Biziouras, 2014b, p.61). They claimed that the moderate, upper-caste members of the federate party did not go far enough in their demands for the Tamil community. Here we begin to see a deeper cause of the

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division: the caste system that created the hierarchy within the Tamil community. The TULF party members all came from the Vellalar caste, the upper caste in Jaffna. These high-caste Tamils were often highly educated and rhetorically persuasive. The rebelling youth groups came mostly from the lower castes. These hierarchical divisions within the community resulted in complicated intra-Tamil dynamics. For the lower caste Tamils, this conflict started partially as a battle to gain legitimacy (N. K. Wickramasinghe, personal communication, 6 October).

Figure 11. Factors leading to Tamil mobilisation

Although all these groups wanted a separate Tamil state and saw no political solution available, personal rivalries and clashes arising from minor disagreements led to a high level of inter-communal violence. There was a further division between eastern and northern Tamils. The party leaders of the TULF consisted mainly of Jaffna elites. Therefore, the support of the TULF came mainly from northern Tamils. Eastern Tamils tended to vote for the UNP. Later in the conflict, this geographical division would be a major driver in the factionalisation of the LTTE (Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.294-297).

The birth of the LTTE

On 5 May 1976, the TNT officially became the LTTE. The newly formed group proclaimed that political debate and negotiations would not lead to the future they had in mind for the Tamil community. Although there had already been some outbursts of violence, such as the assassination of a former mayor of Jaffna by the TNT, the LTTE now openly declared their

Tamil mobilisation

Inter- community revolution against the caste system Social/political grievances Economic grievances

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willingness to use violence. The constitution of the LTTE stated that members of the LTTE were willing to fight in order to establish the total independence of the Tamil Eelam. Other goals were the abolishment of all forms of exploitation and the establishment of a socialist mode of production. To achieve these goals, the LTTE would expand the political struggle with an armed revolutionary struggle. The revolution would start as a guerrilla warfare and would transform into a people’s war of liberation (Biziouras, 2014b, p.65; Richards, 2014, p.13).

The LTTE started as one of the many militant movements. Most of their supporters came from an middle caste of fishermen, the Karaiyar. Prabhakaran was among these. Other castes supporting the LTTE were the Koviyar, domestic servants, and the Mukkuvar, also a fishermen caste. By the end of the 1980s the LTTE had become the largest militant group by using a tremendous amount of intra-Tamil violence. They started this strategy of violence by assassinating the leaders of the federal party, the TULF. Additionally, they also eliminated the leaders of the other Tamil groups and forced their members to become part of the LTTE (N. K. Wickramasinghe, personal communication, 6 October, 2015; Richards, 2014, p.19). Their establishment was a significant factor in the onset of the civil war. It induced a shift in leadership concerning Tamil nationalism, since the young and violent generation now held the leading position (Uyangoda, 2015, p.116). The Tamil political elites were elected to parliament, but they were always part of the opposition. They did not share political power and were almost never able to influence government policies. This de facto exclusion from the political arena convinced the youth that secession was the only alternative (Uyangoda, 2015, p.106).

The constitution written to establish the LTTE clearly showed the structure of the organisation. The Tigers’4 army was divided into three divisions and specific responsibilities were formulated for each division. These responsibilities included the elimination of Tamils with other loyalties than to the LTTE, the assassination of employees of the Sri Lankan intelligence service, the elimination of the administrative system of the government and the destruction of the army’s military camps. State-building processes of the Tamil Eelam had already started with the creation of an administrative structure that was to function within a few years

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(Richards, 2014, p.13). These explicitly stated ambitions presaged of what later became a strong and persistent insurgent group.

Political reforms and political consequences

Since Ceylon became independent, the government had tried to establish political legitimacy in the eyes of its people. The diverse and hierarchical society made this difficult, leading to the uncompromising and rigid nature of the political parties (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October 2015). In 1978, a constitutional reform was implemented. The laws that protected minorities were removed and Buddhism became the only recognised religion (Hashim, 2013, p.82). Comparing policy reforms in Sri Lanka after independence gives an overview of the deteriorating conditions for the Tamils. The political system was also changed. A semi-presidential system was implemented, meaning that a prime minister and a president shared responsibility for drafting legislation and ruling the country – a dual executive. This differed from the previous situation, a parliamentary republic in which the position of president was purely ceremonial. The new system enabled a situation known as

cohabitation, wherein the president and the prime minister could be from different political parties (Kesselman & Krieger, 2009). Before 1978, the Tamils had repeatedly asked for regional autonomy. They tried to address this issue during the debates on the constitutional reforms, but the government did not consider it. Instead, the emphasis of the new constitution was again on the idea of a united Sri Lanka (Uyangoda, 2015, p.106-107).

A law passed in 1978 prohibited the existence of the LTTE and similar organisations and legalised the use of force against them (Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.298; Ganuly, 2004, p.909- 910). In 1979 the government implemented the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) (Gunasingam, 1999, p.17). This act enumerates various crimes to be punished. The PTA also increased the rights of police officers and the armed forces (PTA, 1979). It resulted in thousands of arrests of Tamils, who were often mistreated and tortured in prison (HRW, 2006, p.7). The PTA was one of the steps the government took to strengthen its non-democratic elements of governance to prevent an insurgent conflict.

The Sinhalese government decided to implement a policy of population redistribution in the 1980s. This effectively meant that they designated land in the northern Tamil area for the settlement of 30,000 Sinhalese peasants. These so-called land colonisation schemes piqued Tamil ire. The LTTE distributed pamphlets with statements about these events, and a further

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step in the direction of violent struggle was taken during the 1982 presidential elections (Hashim, 2013, p.73). The TULF decided to boycott the elections because of the constitutional reforms that enhanced the power of the presidency at expense of the Tamils. Additionally, the Tamil extremists encouraged the community not to vote, which resulted in a relatively low turnout in Jaffna (Hashim, 2013, p.82). In 1983, everyone working for the civil service or in parliament had to take an oath of allegiance to a unified state of Sri Lanka according to the sixth amendment of the new constitution (Moorcraft, 2012, p.13; Dissanayaka, 2005, p.89). When the TULF members in parliament refused to take this oath after the elections, the government dismissed the TULF from parliament. They returned to the political arena during the peace negotiations led by India. This decision changed the illusion of Tamil political power to an avowed lack of influence thus enhancing the urge for a violent struggle even more. This legimitised the violent struggle in the eyes of the Tamils (Hashim, 2013, p.82; Kanapathipillai, 2005, p.196).

The beginning of Indian interference

In 1979 a counterinsurgency operation was organised after the proclamation of a state of emergency in Jaffna. After this, Tamil guerrilla groups left Sri Lanka for the Southern Tamil Nadu province in India (Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.298). The Tamils succeeded in securing the assistance of the government of India’s Tamil Nadu state. Indira Ghandi’s government provided tacit support and allowed the training. Tamil militants from several militant groups attended training camps in Tamil Nadu. They were trained by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the secret intelligence service of the Indian army (Hashim, 2013, p.83). Not only did India train the Tamil Tigers, but they also funded them and contributed to the creation of the LTTE (De Silva, 2012, p.64).

There are several reasons for tensions between India and Sri Lanka. However, the most important reason for India to allow and facilitate the support of the Tamil militant groups was the fear of a spill-over effect. The Indian government feared that the separatist movement in Sri Lanka would contaminate minorities in India, such as the Tamil community in Tamil Nadu, with the desire for secession. This was a logical thought, since India was struggling with insurgencies in their own country as well, including the Punjab conflict. Tamil Nadu had approximately 60 million Tamils, all of whom followed the Sri Lankan conflict closely. This geographical and demographic situation in South-India and North-Sri Lanka impacted the conflict significantly. In addition to the practical advantages it provided for the Tamils such as

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smuggling routes and training locations, it also created political pressure on the governments of both India and Sri Lanka. The countries shared a breeding ground for a separatist movement. India’s policy towards the Tamil insurgency changed over the conflict, although the intention - preventing an insurgency in Tamil Nadu - stayed the same. At first, they thought supporting the militants would satisfy the Tamil Nadu population. Later, after the LTTE started fighting the IPKF, the support would change into an opposite approach, in which the government of Sri Lanka did not support the Tamil insurgents anymore. Nevertheless, this approach was not supported by the population of Tamil Nadu (Lecamwasam, 2014, p.12; Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October, 2015).

Underlying reasons that created tensions between Sri Lanka and India contributed to India’s intervention and interest in what happened in Sri Lanka. One reason is the economic prosperity of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was the first country in South Asia to introduce an open economy, which was an incentive for growing wealth. Additionally, Sri Lanka was situated in a strategically vital location in which the United States had a large interest due to their containment policy against the expansion of communism. Therefore, the Sri Lankan intelligence officers received training from American intelligence officers. Due to its non- alignment policy, India was suspicious of Sri Lanka’s cooperation with the United States as a major power bloc (Lecamwasam, 2014, p.12; Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October, 2015). Finally, during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, Sri Lanka covertly supported Pakistan by allowing them access to their ports and refuelling their ships (Moorcraft, 2012, p.19). This all enhanced tensions between India and Sri Lanka. In 1983, the Sinhalese massacred thousands of Tamils and the international community reacted disapprovingly to this act of ethnic cleansing. For now, this was the perfect legitimation of India’s support of the LTTE (Lecamwasam, 2014, p.12; De Silva, 2012, p.25).

Although India supported the Tamil militants, the government of Sri Lanka tried to keep India close and even win them over, rather than distancing themselves from India. In 1986, for instance, the United States wanted to place a radio transmitter on Sri Lankan soil for the Voice of America. This radio station broadcast American radio throughout the world, and was looked at with suspicion because of the Cold War dynamics. Sri Lanka was willing to cancel the building of the radio transmitter to improve the relations with India (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October 2015; Hashim, 2013, p.45-46; Los Angeles Times, 1986).

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Increasing violence and political assassinations

The general elections in 1977 were followed by anti-Tamil riots, which resulted in the death of 127 Tamils. The riots took place in Colombo, Kandy and Jaffna and caused the displacement of thousands of Tamils. No direct motive for the riots has ever been confirmed (Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.297). In the years 1981-1983, the violence and rebellion gradually escalated. The Tigers killed not only Sinhalese, but also Tamils that did not support Tamil Eelam. Tamil policemen, informers and supporters of the government became targets of the Tamil rebels. Nira Wickramasinghe, who at this time worked for the University of Colombo, was also a member of an NGO called the International Centre for Ethnic Studies. She experienced how violence silenced the moderate voices:

The leader of the NGO was also a member of parliament. He was shot dead in front of the office. That was quite dramatic for all of us. It was a centre that was promoting a

In document Tigers vs. Lions. Conflict dynamics of the Sri Lankan Civil War (Page 75-87)