PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA

G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 SERENO, C.J.

As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law.

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan found Reynaldo Jaylo, Edgardo Castro, William Valenzona, and Antonio Habalo (petitioners) guilty of homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment, none of the accused appeared despite notice. Counsel for the three petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the three urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to and resolve the Motion for Partial Reconsideration but to no avail. They argued that the right to file a Motion for Reconsideration is a statutory grant and not merely a remedy available in the Rules, as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for reconsideration.

Ruling:

Yes. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO, DATA AND KALIKASAN MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity

as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial

Office, Ilocos Norte

GR No. 193636 July 24, 2012 SERENO, J.

The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.

Facts:

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), creating a body which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission. It was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the

10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. It was broadcasted that Marynette R. Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, was one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, she filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

She alleged, among others, that the PNP Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report. The RTC dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Whether the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data must be granted.

Ruling:

No. Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.

The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA v. MAGTANGGOL B.

GATDULA

G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 LEONEN, J.

The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.

Facts:

Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo against Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.

Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the NBI (DE LIMA, ET AL.

for brevity) in the RTC of Manila. The judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer and also set the case for hearing. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after hearing. Later, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and the interim reliefs prayed for. The MR filed by De Lima, et al was denied. Thus, they filed before the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.

Issue:

Whether Rule 45 is the proper remedy.

Ruling:

No. The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time. This “Decision” pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The

"Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.

The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated as “Decision” dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited.Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

Thus, the Court nullified all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo; and directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.

CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM v. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D.

ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.

The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of

“extralegal killings”and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.

Facts:

Ma. Christina Yusay Caram gave birth to Baby Julian out of an amorous relationship without the benefit of marriage. Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD in order to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son. Christina changed her mind about the adoption and filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City. RTC issued a Writ of Amparo commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled and to file their verified written return to the writ. In one of its orders, it acknowledged that Baby Julian was brought before the court and the Christina was allowed to see him and take photographs of him. RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court since Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.

Issue:

Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

Ruling:

No. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings”and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.

“Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,

“enforced disappearances” are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

In this case, DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts.

In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.