157 would point out that they were fighting an undeclared war that was not of their

making. Thereupon the Netherlands proposed drafting an EU statement on the situation in Angola, which could replace the proposed EU démarche. However, no consensus could be reached on the Dutch proposal either. Finally it was agreed that the issue could best be addressed on a bilateral basis in the course of normal contacts at ministerial level. Subsequently the Netherlands seized the opportunity to voice its concern during the monthly meeting for humanitarian aid to Angola that was chaired by the Angolan Minister Malungo of Social Affairs and Reintegration. Minister Malungo responded to the initiative by declaring that the national security of the country naturally prevailed over the Ottawa Convention. Subsequently, on September 2000 at the Second Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, Angola publicly declared that it was using mines and that it would continue to use them.

Then, in 2000 and 2001, Landmine Monitor reported serious and credible allegations indicating a strong possibility of Ugandan use of anti-personnel mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani. The government denied such use, but at the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 said that it supported the ICBL’s suggestion that a full investigation be carried out. At the same meeting the Dutch delegation expressed its concern about the alarming situation that a growing number of States Parties, among which Angola and Uganda, were falling under the suspicion of using anti-personnel mines. Since the convention did not have a strong verification mechanism at its disposal, and such a mechanism would be too expensive and rather ineffective, the Netherlands voiced its preference for dialogue and persuasion above disgracing these countries in public.

Subsequently, Uganda informed the States Parties in February 2002 of its intentions to investigate the allegations of landmine use, in the spirit of openness and cooperation called for in the convention. However, no further public statements were forthcoming. At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003, ICBL expressed disappointment that Uganda had made no further public statements regarding the allegations or the investigation. Invoking the right of reply, Uganda told the States Parties: ‘You may appreciate the various initiatives that the involved countries have put in place to ease the tensions that had prevailed. In the interest of the established mechanisms to ease the tensions, it was deemed inopportune to continue with the process that would jeopardise the healing process. In the interest of both parties involved, the report of the commission has not been made public.’284

Impediments

Interventions by the Dutch government in the case of signatory Angola’s non- compliance with the convention were hindered in the first place by the

comprehensiveness of the Ottawa Convention. The countries that had participated in the Ottawa process in 1997 had negotiated a total ban, with no exceptions or

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transitional provisions for individual or groups of countries and with no negotiation topics being left on the table. This means that it is not a purpose of the convention to consider amendments to the treaty or negotiate new articles. Thus in cases of non- compliance, all that the Ottawa community can fall back on to verify suspected cases of non-compliance with the prohibitions is the modest Article 8 mechanism. In addition, the particular emphasis of the convention on cooperation ensures that the Article 8 procedures are only to be perceived as a last resource for extracting compliance. All in all, this leaves little room for States Parties to deal firmly with States Parties suspected of breaking the convention’s rules. From this perspective, the Dutch preference for dialogue and persuasion is the only pragmatic strategy available to the States Parties. A further impediment to the Dutch policy was the disagreement among the EU member states on joint action. In the absence of consensus, the effect of the Dutch intervention with regard to the widespread laying of landmines by the government troops and UNITA in Angola could not be anything else but limited.

7.5 Interpreting and implementing the Articles 1, 2 and 3

General course of events

Closely connected to the issue of compliance are matters of appropriate interpretation and implementation regarding Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Ottawa Convention. Since the conclusion of the Oslo negotiations in 1997, the ICBL and the ICRC repeatedly asked attention for the inconsistent and contradictory manner in which States Parties interpreted and implemented certain aspects of Article 1 (general obligations) Article 2 (definitions) and Article 3 (exceptions) of the convention. In particular these non-state actors expressed their concerns on the diverging interpretations or disagreement among States Parties on:

The meaning of ‘assist’ in Article 1: What acts are banned under the prohibition on •

assistance? Since 1999 the ICBL and ICRC raised questions about possible prohibited assistance of States Parties.285 _{The ICBL urged the States Parties to come to a common}

understanding of the term ‘assist’ (1c), especially in cases of joint military operations with non-States Parties and the stockpiling and transit of foreign anti-personnel mines.286

The definition of ‘anti-personnel mine’ in Article 2: What landmines are banned •

under the convention? Since the coming about of the convention the ICBL and the ICRC disputed the narrow definition of anti-personnel mines adopted by some States

285 Ottawa Convention, Intersessional Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Intervention by Stephen Goose, Head of Delegation, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), On Article 1, 16 May 2003.

286 Ottawa Convention, Intersessional Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Intervention of the ICRC, Article 1, 16 May 2003.

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