Almost fourteen years have passed since the events of “Bloody May” forced the Thai military to retreat to the barracks. Since 1991, Thailand has not experienced an attempted or successful military coup. During this period the Thai military has experienced a historic change in its political role. The international and domestic pressures against military intervention have increased to the point to where the costs of a military coup exceed the costs of toleration of civilian control. As Thailand continues its transition to a liberal democracy, the mode of civilian military relations will continue to play a crucial role in the process of democratic stabilization and consolidation.
A major challenge faced by “third wave” democracies such as Thailand is the need to prevent the military, displaced from its once privileged position under dominant military rule from reasserting itself.61 Thus, so-called “civilian control” of the military becomes a core element in the process of establishing sustainable62 and viable democracy. In a recently published research note, Greg Foster has described the complex relationship between democracy and civilian control in the following way: “It is a fundamental premise of democratic civilian relations that civilian control of the military is clearly possible without democracy, but democracy isn’t possible without civilian control of the military.”63
In the study of democratic transitions in general and democratization in Thailand specifically, social scientists have tended to neglect systematic analysis of how politically
61 Harold Crouch, “Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia,” in L. Diamond et al., eds.,
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 207.
62 Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1999.
63 Gregory D. Foster, “Civil-Military Relations. The Postmodern Democratic Challenge,” World
Affairs, Vol. 167, no. 3, 2005, 91-100; Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, no. 2, 1999, 211-241; Felipe Agüero “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in
Southern Europe and South America,” in: Gunther, Richard et al., The Politics of Democratic
Consolidation Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press), 1995, 124-166; and Samuel J. Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1998.
powerful militaries can be placed under civilian control.64 However, especially in young democracies such as Thailand, which are established on the legacies and rudiments of long-lasting military rule, “keeping the military out of politics” and “keeping civilian authorities from drawing the military into politics” are major challenges.65
In order to analyze the prospects of the Thai military from intervening to assert its once dominant role I will focus on the events surrounding the “Bloody May” incident through current developments and how they have affected the military’s coercive force potential and presumably less-democratic predilections,
Thailand, following the events of 1992, was seen as in the second stage of democratic transition, having successfully passed through the first stage. The first stage, transition, aims at the installation of a democratic government. In analyzing Thailand this thesis is concerned mainly with the second stage of democratization, namely the consolidation of democracy. A democracy may be regarded as consolidated if its presence is accepted by the population (sustainable legitimacy) and if political actors assume institutions created in the first stage will last indefinitely.66 And as Thailand moves towards democratic consolidation issues such as civil-military relations require increased attention to ensure continued democratic advances. Recognizing the increased roles of both the business community and the monarchy will allow my research to focus on some of the changes that have occurred which forced the military to accept a reduced role in Thai politics and to adopt the concept of civilian control of the military by democratically elected civilian leaders.
In this chapter three prime causes accounting for the changing role of the military in Thai politics will be analyzed:
- socioeconomic development, particularly economic growth and subsequent social and economic structural changes
64 Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger. Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea,”
Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 30, no. 3, 2004, 357-382.
65 Philippe. C. Schmitter, “Forward,” in: Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds.), Civil-
Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, (Boulder: Westview Press), 1996, pp. ix-
xxi.
66 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, et al.,
- related to the first factor, the emergence of (provincial) business as a political force which, for the first time in post-1932 Thai politics, strengthened the formation of a viable counter-power to the military’s power – autonomous political parties
- the changing role of the institution of the monarchy and, as the human face of that institution, the ebbs and flows of political influence of King Bhumipol, the reigning monarch since 1946.
These external factors rather than military internal variables such as factionalism and intra-military power relations, account to a very significant degree for the course of events following the massacres in 1992. Internal military factors and other external factors were significant in forcing a changing role in the political role of the Thai military. However, the analysis conducted in this chapter is an exercise in ‘partial explanation’ of the causes of greater civilian control of the military following the 1992 massacres.
This chapter will attempt to explain three of the most important domestic factors in creating and supporting an environment able to support civilian control of the military. These three factors were chosen because – as most scholars of civil-military relations in Thailand seem to believe they are the most influential factors that shaped the necessary institutional arrangements for greater civilian control of the Thai military since 1992. Economic development caused the development of a business class in Thailand. This business class, which had become increasingly influential, was able to assume the dominant political role in Thailand with the assistance of another Thai institution, the monarchy. It wasn’t until 1992 that Thai business groups were willing to challenge the military vice co-opt them. This is where the monarchy and its legitimacy with the Thai people played a critical role. Without the monarchy, it is unlikely the military would have retreated to the barracks in 1992, and allowed a competing institution (civilian leadership representing business interests) to gain and maintain greater control of the military.