Political System and Human Rights: A Wahhabi Perspective

The reform movement (da'wah)113 of Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab (1703-

1791) was primarily concerned with the purity of the Islamic faith and the eradication

of popular practices that are inconsistent with the established rituals clearly defined in

the Islamic texts.114 Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab focused on the Islamic principle

that there is only one God, and that God does not share his power with anyone. Thus,

popular practices, such as visiting shrines or recognizing power of an imam, are clearly

un-Islamic and strongly condemned in Wahhabi beliefs. From these Unitarian and

purity principles, Wahhabis sometimes refer to themselves as ahl al-tawhid (the people

of oneness), but prefer to be called simply Muslims. They label their movement as

da’wahat Ash-Sheikh (the call of sheikh Ibn Abdulwahhab) or

al-da'wah al-

salafiyah AS (the call for imitating the earliest generations of Muslims) while their

detractors referred to them as ‘Wahhabis’, which has pejorative and negative

connotations.116 Nevertheless, because the terms ‘Wahhabis’ and ‘Wahhabism’ are

commonly used in various literatures, in the works of Muslim and non-Muslim alike,

to identify the followers of Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab and his creed, both words

have been used throughout this thesis.

The significance of Wahhabism is not the idea of a unitary God because this

principle goes to the heart of Islam; it is rather enforcing a particular understanding of

this principle upon Muslim communities.

In 1744, Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud and

Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab swore a traditional oath in which they promised to work

together to establish a state run according to Islamic principles as interpreted in

Wahhabism. Waging wars to eradicate ritual malpractices became sanctioned under

Wahhabism.

Wahhabis are known for their literal interpretation of what constitutes right

behaviour according to the Qur’an and Sunnah. Critics of Wahhabism describe its

interpretation as exclusivist, intolerant and bigoted; Wahhabism therefore has become

a synonym for any intolerant movements, whether within the Islamic faith or in any

other faiths.117 Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab was greatly inspired by the work o f a Hanbali scholar, Ibn Taimiyah (1263-1328), whose perspectives are generally regarded as strict and conservative.118 Wahhabism has made the Hanbali School dominant in the Arabian Peninsula, after a successful military movement based on the Saudi- Wahhabi religio-political alliance. Following the Hanbali legal School,119 the Wahhabi conservative ulama accept the authority o f the Q u r’an and Sunnah.

Nonetheless, despite the important principle in Hanbali thought which indicates that things are assumed to be allowable unless first proved otherwise, Wahhabi ulama tend to restrict re-interpretation o f the Q u r’an and Sunnah in regard to issues clearly settled by the early jurists, given W ahhabism’s emphasis on the revival o f the Salafiyah creed, which calls for imitating the earliest Muslims in every aspect o f life.120 This makes Wahhabi tenets rigorous and leaves little room for ijtihad. By inclining to minimize re-interpretation, Wahhabism is at odds with the Muslim reformation movement o f the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which reinterpretation o f the Islamic sources was sought in order to conform with standards existing in the West, most notably standards relating to gender relations and participatory democracy. Whereas a wide scope for re-interpretation remains for Wahhabi jurists in areas not decided by the early jurists, many Saudi ulama tend to take conservative, culturally influenced positions in relation to new issues.

According to Wahhabi perspectives, the ruler’s primary role is to ensure that the Islamic community lives in conformity with the sh a ri’ah. Based on an orthodox

Sunni tradition, Wahhabism emphasized the importance o f respecting and supporting

the ruler, even if he is unjust and oppressive, as long as he does not reject Islam. In the Wahhabi idea o f the state, power is legitimate no matter how it may have been seized, and obedience to whoever is in power is obligatory.121 State-appointed ulama go further in addressing this issue by depicting any criticism o f the ruler as a sin that may lead to anarchy, turmoil and revolt.122 Like most Islamic movements, the Wahhabi instruction to obey the ruler, to respond to his call for war (jihad), and to pay him zakat

(Islamic tax) provided the conditions for state formation under Saudi leadership. Such tradition has provided a theoretical basis for absolutism “whereby the seizure o f power is purported to be sanctioned by Allah and disobedience is almost equivalent to heresy.” 123

The objective o f the Wahhabi-Saudi state is to revive the ritual and conceptual clarity of Islam, focusing on the elimination o f ritual malpractices relating to the oneness o f Allah. In today’s Saudi Arabia, religion and the state still need each other. Religion, as interpreted by Wahhabis, needs the support o f state power for its spread

and maintenance, and the state is in need of religion to socially bolster its power.124

However, the influence of traditional Wahhabism, as opposed to mainstream Islam, in

running the Saudi state is evidently in decline. Unlike the previous Wahhabi-Saudi

jihadi state, military campaigns under the leadership of King Abdulaziz (1902-1953),

the founder of modem Saudi Arabia, were not aimed at spreading Wahhabism, despite

using Wahhabi slogans, but rather at re-establishing the Al-Sa’ud rule.

The transition from an expansionist, revolutionary Wahhabi movement that ran

the state, to an official Wahhabism controlled by the state, has weakened the role of

the ulama, as indicated briefly in chapter one. King Abdulaziz’s renunciation of the

title of imam to proclaim himself as King, the first ever in the Saudi dynasty, was a

sign of moving away from Islamic, Wahhabi leadership patterns. By abandoning the

Wahhabi religio-political title of imam, the Saudi mle has moved towards a more

official secularization at least in the title.125 Nevertheless, Saudi mlers esteem their

Islamic credentials as custodians of the two mosques and they consider the support of

the ulama critical; consequently the ulama remain an important component of the

ruling class.

In today’s Saudi Arabia, it is incorrect to put all ulama and activists, in relation

to their views on the structure of the political system or on human rights, in one basket

as conservative, traditionalist or fundamentalist Wahhabis. They rather represent

views within a wide spectrum: from both the Sunni and Shiite traditions, inside and

outside the government, and traditionalists, fundamentalists, reformists and liberals.

Nevertheless, the majority of ulama are conservative traditionalists, and their views on

human rights are based on literal and textual understanding of the shari'ah sources.

The ulama within the official religious establishment are mostly conservatives not only

religiously but also socially and politically, and their interpretations of the shari’ah

sources have been in harmony with government views on all political questions and on

most social issues. In the name of preserving Islam and maintaining the security of the

state, the official ulama strongly opposed constitutionalism and some human rights,

particularly those rights related to women.126 The ulama believe that Muslims do not

need international human rights since they already have the shari’ah\ they do however

accept international human rights as long as those rights are not in conflict with the

shari’ah}21

Human rights trends in Saudi Arabia are not limited to those of the official

ulama.

There are growing opinions expressed by Saudi activists who advocate

reformist views on politics and human rights. These groups mostly adopt an Islamic

framework for reform and, directly or indirectly, criticize some official policies and

social practices including those related to human rights.128 While members of these groups seemingly have many things in common, particularly their reference to Islam and the need for reform, they stand between sharply opposed positions within the Islamic spectrum, from conservatives and reformists to modernists. In recent years, there are indications that reformist voices are gaining greater acceptance by many segments in society, as argued in chapter four. Finally, there is a growing trend in which secular and liberal views on human, particularly women’s, rights are expressed. The majority o f this group work in the media, universities and high public positions and are typically highly educated ‘W esternized’ people. Their positions and qualifications give them the potential to influence and reshape the current understanding o f politics and human rights.

W ahhabism’s interpretations o f the Q u r’an and Sunnah have been influenced by the surrounding political and social environment. Local traditions regulate the behaviour o f individuals and o f society as a whole. In the heart o f the Arabian Peninsula where Wahhabism originated, familial obligations and social traditions have been influential, affecting perspectives on issues like the political system’s structure and human rights norms. Wahhabism has sanctioned several traditional practices related to the hegemony o f dynasties and patriarchies in society, as will be discussed later in chapters four and seven.