Lupicinio Iiiiguez
Social psychology, and the social sciences in general, have changed enor
mously in the last few years. There is no doubt that we can talk about a new 'atmosphere' in social psychology which manifests itself through a plurality of perspectives, practices and directions. Some dissident positions are heeded now more than they were some years ago. This is particularly appreciable in the empirical analysis of social processes, where, for example, there is a progressive abandonment of experimental and correla
tional quantitative methods. The extensive presence of the 'discourse' of discourse analysis, of discursive and similar psychologies (pa/abreros, as they are called pejoratively in Castilian), supports this diagnosis.
Of course, this has its advantages for those who work in the same direction, which I am deliberately going to keep vague and call 'discursivist' by convention. The advantages are progressive disciplinary and academic recognition, the attention paid to this speciality by previously inaccessible journals, specific collections from major publishing houses, and so on.
However, criticisms have not ceased from the mainstream position. In fact, from the position of hegemonic social psychology, 'this type of work' is attributed with a series of traits, a position in the panorama of scientific orientations which is often inaccurate if not erroneous but above all stereotyped (subjectivity, invalidity, triviality, relativism, etc.), which is typical of cases where a target is aimed at without seeing its whole. The clarification of the different 'places' of debate, the definition of the dis
cussion coordinates, and above all a more attacking than defensive attitude will give rise to a creative and fruitful space for discussion.
The lines of any debate must be defined. In the academic context of this book, the framework for discussion could be that of a lecturerlresearcher within a university system who is 'obliged' or 'impelled' to do research and therefore researches into discourse using a special analytical tool, discourse analysis (OA). This gives rise to a discussion of the notion of discourse in use and of the kind of practices which fall within this semantic area.
There are a great variety of motivations for this type of practice: from those who hope to achieve something by doing OA, to the fulfilment of the the rules of competitivity set out by the university itself, or the secret
1 48 Critical Social Psychology
passion of a voyeur to see and observe everything that affects the people with whom we share our surroundings. Such motivations might also include, though perhaps less emphatically, the need to obtain the recog
nition of colleagues in the profession.
While this suggestion is possible, it would lead us to an excessively psychologistic debate. The alternative would be to present the practice of DA as a rational one in its own right, and in this way feed a minimally coherent discourse. A debate in this direction might be based on the answers to the classic questions about what we aim to achieve: an expla
nation? A description? An understanding? An interpretation? All these activities generate knowledge and make knowledge possible; however, not all are pertinent in work such as that suggested by a 'critical social psychology', which is the reason behind this book. My final suggestion would be to turn the notions of discourse and DA and some of the consequences of the various positions into problems.
Conceptions of the Discourse/s
Discourse is such a polysemic term that saying ' I am going to make the notion of discourse problematic' is equivalent to saying nothing at all. I am therefore going to limit this expose to the consideration of some notions of discourse that are used most commonly and appear in the disciplinary framework of social psychology, considering their characteristic disciplinary or theoretical traditions and avoiding the consideration of other notions of discourse which fall outside these limits. In particular, I am going to consider the notions of discourse founded mainly on the foIlowing three traditions: first, the linguistic philosophy associated with the Oxford School; second, the work of Michel Foucault; and, finally, French prag
matics and discourse analysis. This simplification only answers the need to make an equivalent interpretation of the terms possible in the discussion. I am not going to present an exhaustive revision but simply one from the additional viewpoint we could call the 'Spanish School of DA' (Delgado &
Gutierrez, 1 994; Ibanez, 1 979, 1 99 1 ; Lozano, Pena-Marin & Abril, 1 989).
Depending on the notion of discourse we work with, DA will mean very different things. Therefore, if we want to avoid a de facto definition such as 'discourse is what analysts analyse' or something similar, the exact definition of this term is a very pertinent task.
Without attempting a complete classification, the following brief typology summarizes some of the most usual conceptions of discourse, at least as they are expressed in common analytical practices in social psychology:
• any statement or set of statements produced by a speaker;
• a set of statements which construct an object;
Discourses, Structures and A nalysis 1 49
• a set of statements produced in a context of interaction, with special relevance given to the power of action of the discourse on the other person/s (subject speaking, moment, space, history . . . );
• a set of statements in a conversational (therefore normative) context;
• a set of constrictions that explain the production of a set of statements from a certain social or ideological position;
• a set of statements the production conditions of which can be defined.
The final conception can be clearly recognized in the French School of discourse analysis (Maingueneau, 1 984, 1 987, 1 99 1 ). This movement has been profoundly influenced by Foucault's work and it considers the distinction between statement and discourse. Statement is defined as the succession of phrases set out between two semantic blanks and discourse is the statement considered from the perspective of the conditioning discursive device. The term 'statement' is regarded in this context as a result, as something with memory.
Of these conceptions of discourse the most appropriate, from my point of view, is the last. This does not intend to discredit other common concep
tions of social psychology; they are not, in fact, incompatible but can be superimposed. One first superimposition consists of the different levels of analysis, from the purely inter-individual to the clearly structural. In fact, they reproduce the sequence going from the more typical naive definition to the consequences of speech act theory, passing through the ethnomethodo
logical tradition - which is the closest to conversation analysis - and the common ones in the post-structural tradition. They are not mutually exclusive either; we often find aspects of several of them in notions or in practices of discourse analysis (e.g. Antaki, Parker, Potter or Walkerdine, to name but contributors to this book, wholly or partially combine aspects of these conceptions).
My preference for the last conception is because I believe it allows three essential operations: the differentiation between text and discourse, the distinction between announcer and enunciator, and the operationalization of the corpus.
The Text
The first problem we find once we define discourse is the type of texts which comprise it. The main difference is in the consideration of the text as a set of transcribed statements, irrespective of their origin, or as a wider specifi
cation of what texts really are. In other words: is any text a discourse?
From our position the answer is no. For a text to be a discourse, a set of conditions should be fulfilled. Statements can be considered discourse if they are produced in an institutional framework which restricts the state
ment itself, in other words, those statements enunciated from defined posi
tions, registered in a specific inter-discursive context and revealing historical, social and intellectual conditions.
1 50 Cririml Social Psychology
Not every set of statements fulfils these conditions, only those which carry a specific value for a collective unit, which imply shared beliefs and convictions, that is, texts which have a clear position in a discursive network. In Foucauldian terms ( 1 978), text is considered not in isolation, but as a part of a recognized institution which 'defines for a given social, economic, geographical or linguistic area the conditions for the fulfilment of the enunciative function' ( p. 1 98). The relationship with the place of enunciation enables what Foucault defines as discursive formation to be identified:
. . . a complex series of relationships working as rules; it prescribes what has had to be related in a discursive practice in order that it might refer to this or that object, bring this or that statement into play, use this or that set, organize this or that strategy. The defInition of a system of formation in its singular individuality is therefore the characterization of a discourse or set of statements by the regularity of a practice.
Briefly, what transforms a specific text into a discourse is the fact that it defines the social space of an identity or enunciating identity with a spatial and historical circumscription.
Subject ( Enunciator)
From this perspective there is another important consequence, which is what kind of subject is created. The origin of the statement, who enounces, is not necessarily considered a form of subjectivity but rather as a place where the enunciators are replaceable and interchangeable. In Foucault's ( 1 978) words again
describing a formulation from the viewpoint of statement does not consist of analysing the relations bctween the author [sic] and what he says (or wanted to say, or said unconsciously), but rather the identification of what the position is that any individual can and mList occupy to become the subject.
The subject assumes the status of enunciator that defines the discursive formation where he or she is located. Nevertheless, each discursive forma
tion has more than a single enunciative position; in fact, different sets of statements referring to the same position can be distributed over many discursive genres. The genre heterogeneity of a discursive formation contributes to the definition of its identity.
There is a distinction between the speaker (locutor) - material source -and enunciator _. textual author. The former is logically different from the latter as it is an empirical reality, while the latter is a construction; he or she is the logical author and is responsible for the text, but, simultaneously, he or she is constructed by it, and both aspects are inseparable.
Enunciative locations imply the existence of certain institutions involved in the production and diffusion of specific discourses. Nevertheless, the term 'institution' should not only suggest formal structures like, for example, the church, justice, education, and so on. We should consider as an institution any device that limits the production of enunciative functions, the status of
Discourses, Structures and Analysis 1 5 1 enunciators and receivers, acceptable content type and the legitimate enun
ciative circumstances for such positioning. The so-called 'Spanish School' claims that the understanding of this aspect enormously facilitates the analysis of the social processes of construction and intersubjectivity, of power, social order and social transformation.
' Materi(/Ii�ation ' of the Text: The Corpus
As the French School has emphasized, a corpus can be constructed from any discursive production, even if different practices stress different aspects.
There is the possibility, considering the means of transmission, that any graphic or transcribed statement may be constructed, even though it has not been graphically produced. Productions may be more or less context
dependent; in other words, the statements can be directed at a subject present in the enunciative situation or at other subjects located in other contexts. Finally, the statements can also be embedded in a specific structure. For example, standardized, ritualized discourse requires a specific institutional context, with a strong thematic restriction and great formulaic stability, and so on.
This description can include, therefore, transcribed interviews and insti
tutional conversations, that is, both oral statements and previously written texts such as articles, documents, reports, declarations, studies, forms, and so on.
Some Implications for Discourse Analysis as Analytics
Discourse A nalysis as Practice
Until now we have been given an image of the discourse, the discursive practice and discourse analysis. This vision is intended not to replace others but rather, as has already been said, to define the boundaries of the position from which the debate is supposed to be established. One of the most important consequences of the vision is precisely the role of the analyst. As Michael and Condor ( 1 990) say:
The idea that we wish to emphasize is that there are numerous contexts which are suitable for a certain piece of discourse, and how one gives sense to a discursive function is a reflex of context or a configuration of contexts already analytically (and politically) presupposed. ( pp. 389-390)
We are no longer afraid to recognize that any scientific practice is influenced by the social conditions under which it occurs, such as the social, political or ideological context. One relevant concern here is how to adapt my political commitment to my professional activity as a social scientist.
This preoccupation was difficult to resolve within the scientific ideology in which many social scientists were instructed, the modern ideology. The 'crisis' of social psychology opened the way for a critical social psychology to be constituted which now seems to be consolidating itself. Referring once
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more especially to Foucault, other processes in parallel disciplines have also had emancipatory effects in this sense.
Discourses are social practices. If we follow Foucault, we should talk more about discursive practices than about discourses. Discursive practices are anonymous, historical rules, always determined in time and space, which define the conditions for any enunciation for a specific period and for a specific community. Nevertheless, analysis is also a practice, not only used to reveal or identify other discursive practices but also and especially to transform them.
Context
By the historical character of the statement, any discourse analysis must consider the analysis of enunciation (the process the subject applies to convert certain language into discourse). The enunciation is the immanent context of enunciation. As is proposed in the discourse analysis of the Spanish tradition ( Ibanez, 1 99 1 ), the analysis of enunciation allows us to relate language structures with social structures and make social under
standing possible from the analysis and interpretation of discourse. At this point, however, we have an unanswered question: what is the role of linguistic analysis in discourse analysis? There is no lack of people who see this analysis as a way to apprehend what is social, but a similar number of analysts do not consider linguistic analysis to provide a sufficient basis for such work.
On Discourse and Social Structure
I t is possible to agree that if discourse and/or discourse analysis are unable to connect theoretically in some way with the social structure, they lack importance, or, in somewhat stronger terms, they are trivial actions. This is the last topic I would like to discuss.
Any practice, including discourse analysis, would be drab if we accepted a conception of social structure in only institutional/political or institutional/
economic terms, or if we took any other reified version in which discursive, l inguistic and meaningful aspects are external to social structure. This is because discourse analysis would have rid itself of any ability to produce social transformation. For this it is essential to lay the exclusive grounds for what an intention and a desire primarily are, even though they are still somewhat unclear and provisional.
To be able to establish any relation between discourse and social struc
ture, it is necessary to define, in the same way as with discourse, a provisional notion of the structure in use.
Within the framework of an interesting polemical issue (Turner, 1 988), Porpora ( 1 989) refers to at least four traditions in the notion of 'social structure':
D iscourses, Structures and A nalysis 1 53
• as patterns of behaviour grouped in periods of time (from H omans);
• as human relation systems between social positions (Marxist);
• as regularities that govern social behaviour (structural sociology);
• as collective rules that structure behaviour (ethnomethodology, sym
bolic interactionism, etc.) .
N o doubt we could talk about more traditions, even within the four we have indicated. Even if it seems simplistic, I consider it appropriate at this point to assume, even if only strategically and 'theatrically', a position comprising all these topics: structure, social practice and discourse. This position seems to relate best to the last tradition, as we can tentatively add certain of Giddens's and Foucault's contributions with connotations from Wittgenstein to - why not? - certain M arxists. The initial approach could be more or less the following:
I think Giddens appropriately distinguishes between structure, system and structuring. Structure refers to the rules and/or the set of transforma
tive relationships organized as properties of social systems. System refers to relations reproduced by actors or collectives organized as regular social practices. Structuring refers to the conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures and the reproduction of social systems.
It is not easy to place discourse in this plan. It is easier to locate language but only if we use the concept of agency. It is essential, therefore, to accept the contributions I referred to above in order to locate discourse adequately. The work of Fairclough ( 1 989, 1 992) shed much light on this work when he analysed the connection between discourse and macro-social variables.
We should, in the first place, distinguish acceptably between language and discourse. Discourse is language as social practice determined by social structures (rules and/or sets of transformative relationships organized as properties of social systems). Thus, the social structure detennines the productive conditions of the discourse. On the other hand, socially con
structed discursive orders constrain discourse. I understand by discursive orders, sets of conventions associated with social institutions (discursive orders, for example, are ideologically fonned by power relations in social institutions and in society as a whole).
By virtue of the duality of structure, in Giddens's terms, discourse has effects on social structures and is detennined by them. Therefore, discourse contributes simultaneously to the maintenance and transfonna
tion of the social order. The analysis of discourse and of discursive practice thus informs us of the construction and reconstruction of social structure, as well as of the forming of subjects (where structural duality also operates).
To consider this proposal positively it is necessary to define certain l imitations. In the first place, the fact that discourse is language as a social practice caused by social structures means that: first, language is a part of society and not something outside it; second, language is a social process;
1 54 Critical Social Psychology
and, finally, language is a socially and historically conditioned process in the same way as other parts of society or non-linguistic processes. Actually, there is no external relationship 'between' language and society but an internal one of structural duality. Language is one part of society; linguistic phenomena are social phenomena and social phenomena are to a large extent linguistic phenomena.
The second limitation is more direct. By sustaining that social structure is a set of rules and relations, we do not necessarily share the descriptive hypothesis of methodological situationism (it is possible to obtain adequate
The second limitation is more direct. By sustaining that social structure is a set of rules and relations, we do not necessarily share the descriptive hypothesis of methodological situationism (it is possible to obtain adequate