PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F.

ZAMORA, G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994, J. PADILLA

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200.

Facts:

Rafael Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on the ground of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Issue:

Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

No. RA 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping andOther Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200.

CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996. Mendoza, J.

The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

Facts:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. One time, she entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in the case filed against her husband.

Ruling:

No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al.

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, Puno, J.

Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance.

Various guarantees in our Constitution and laws create zones of privacy.

Facts:

Senator Blas Ople assailed the constitutionality of the AO 308 entitled

“Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System” on the following grounds: (1) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make laws; and (2) It impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.

Issue:

Whether or not AO 308 is constitutional.

Ruling:

No. The Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. It also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means. Thus, AO 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.

308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an inerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006, Carpio, J.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

Facts:

President Arroyo issued EO 420 that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and GOCCs in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and others assailed this executive order for being a “usurpation of legislative powers by the president” and it infringes the citizens’ right to privacy.

Issue:

Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy

Ruling:

No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data.

With the exception of eight specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Sec. 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN

DOES

G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J.

A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself. (US v. Gines-Perez)

Facts:

Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. The photos

reached the STC administration who found Tan and her classmates to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from the graduation ceremonies. The parents of the girls filed a petition for the issuance of habeas data. They also prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

Issue:

Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Ruling:

No. The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy;

and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.

Thus,

Thus, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.

Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at “Only Me” or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this safety measures were not utilized.

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Facts:

Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee are common law partners. When Ilagan visited Lee at her condominium unit, he accidentally left his digital camera therein. As Lee found the said camera, she discovered that a sex video of Ilagan with another woman was recorded therein, hence she confronted Ilagan about it which the latter denied. Lee further alleged that during the their confrontation, Ilagan slammed her head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Thereafter, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing criminal and administrative complaints against Ilagan. Thereafter, Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data on the ground that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.

Ruling:

No. In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor

are vague and doubtful.

In this case, that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.