Rationale for Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

Because of the embodied nature of the research focus, I decided to take a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology refers to the study of phenomena (or the appearance of things) in order to clarify how the object world is humanly experienced and presents itself to our consciousness (Finlay, 2012). It is a philosophical system founded by Edmund Husserl that seeks to describe and understand lived experience rather than explain it. I decided not to focus on a traditional Husserlian form of phenomenology as this would have been at odds with my aim of focussing on in-depth descriptions of lived experience (Finlay, 2009).

Phenomenology incorporates an existential stance that focuses on the question of

‘being’ itself. In particular, I relate to Heidegger’s (1962) notion of being-in-the-world,

acknowledging that everything in the universe is connected and cannot be considered in isolation. In addition, it made sense to focus on a branch of phenomenology that is important when considering issues of ‘personal identity, meaning, choice, authenticity and relationship’ (Howard, 2000:p.328) all of which are fundamental within psychological therapies.

I considered several qualitative methodologies (detailed later) prior to choosing Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). IPA takes the epistemological position that psychological inquiry should seek to understand how individuals experience and make sense of life events and acknowledges that both participant and researcher will make interpretations of experiences in order to do this. Thus this methodology has hopefully captured the complexities of the subjective experience of hope. IPA derives its theoretical roots from three major areas of philosophy:

phenomenology (already covered), hermeneutics and idiography (Smith et al, 2009).

Hermeneutics is a philosophical endeavour, aligned with Heidegger’s view of phenomenology that is concerned with exploring the process of interpretation and the way our interpretations are shaped by our preconceptions and assumptions. It feels natural to me that interpretation is an inherent and inevitable element of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Finlay, 2009) and agree that it is not possible to access someone’s lifeworld directly or indeed understand phenomena without making interpretations (Eatough & Smith, 2006). This is evident in the double-hermeneutic (or hermeneutic circle) inherent in IPA, in which the researcher attempts to make sense of the participants’ sense-making (Smith, Flowers & Larkin 2009). I want to also highlight a second hermeneutic circle in which the researcher shifts between the hermeneutics of empathy and questioning, requiring different relational stances through the research process. In exploring different methodologies, this shifting felt intuitive to me and in line with my clinical practice, thereby making a more natural shift to the researcher-practitioner stance. With my personal investment in this subject matter, it has been especially important for me to make this shift and to step back from over-empathising with my participants to have the healthy scepticism of a proficient researcher, especially as Smith (2004) cited in Frost et al (2010) suggests that during analysis, empathic reading is likely to come first.

The final philosophical underpinning, idiography, stands in opposition to nomothetic approaches, highlighting the need to study individual experiences in detail: once gathered, these experiences can be compared and contrasted to discover divergence and convergence between them. For a minority participant group I feel that IPA is a sound choice due to this respect for subjective experiences.

IPA recognizes that the researcher’s own view of the world as well as the nature of the interaction between researcher and participant is implicated in the research (Willig, 2006). Bearing in mind the inevitability of the researcher’s role and influence in constructing meaning, it is important, in theory, when using this approach to bracket preconceptions as far as is possible, which seems to be an area of debate.

Smith Flowers and Larkin (2009) clarify use of a circular form of bracketing that can only be ‘partially achieved’ (p.25) whereas Finlay (2009) is concerned that researchers who claim to ‘bracket’ whilst using a hermeneutic approach are ‘naïve and confused’ (p.8). I decided to include myself as a participant in this research and will go on to explain my reasons in more depth: however, for the purpose of discussion on bracketing, the fact that I have offered my own data for analysis means that I have overtly broached this element of the methodology so accordingly I cover the ethical and procedural implications of this decision later in this section.

In making the choice of IPA, I considered using grounded theory (which is concerned with the development of theories and hypotheses) but I feel there are already a number of theories on hope and I want to bring hope to life rather than theorise about it. On practical note, I was also mindful that because of the minority group I have chosen there may be a limited supply of participants available for this research, which made IPA a better option, given its flexibility on smaller sample sizes. I also considered taking a narrative perspective (of which there are several), which doubtless would have been interesting in offering a view on how hope connects separate episodes in life to create a story that makes sense to us. However, even though there were experiences from outside therapy that affect experiences in therapy, I felt that IPA was more appropriate for focusing on the lived experience within therapy which is a more narrow focus than the broader experience of hope in life in general.

Finally, I considered using Heuristic Inquiry, HI, (Moustakas, 1990) a phenomenological approach, which brings to light not only the participants’ but also the researcher’s experiences and insights as it involves ‘self-search, self-dialogue and self-discovery’ (p.11). It could be argued that, given my ‘insider’ stance on the research area, this would have been an ideal methodology but I did not want my lived experience to be the main focus of the work. I find this an uncomfortable position and also felt that one of the key motivations for using myself as participant was to be alongside the other participants. I also noted that HI is known to be one of the less boundaried forms of research (Hiles, 2008) and, as a novice researcher I wanted a methodology that was structured, whilst meeting the needs of my research question.

Also when I considered HI, I found myself reflecting on the parallel process of

‘adapting’ to fit in with a preconceived notion of ‘normality’. I spent several months musing on this and one particularly poignant supervision session helped me to clarify my thoughts. I am very aware that when one belongs to a minority, there is often a temptation or expectation to adapt oneself to fit in with widely accepted norms and rather than replicate this behaviour in my desire to conform with research standards, I felt a strong pull to stand out and flex the original IPA methodology that I felt from the outset suited my research aim.