The REDD+ Taskforce

Seeking profits from extractive industries such as mining, logging and plantation development has been the dominant rationality governing Indonesian forests (see Chapter 4). This paradigm, tainted occasionally with rent seeking practices and backed by political gangsterism, continues to weaken forest governance and accumulate resources for the benefit of a small elite (Saich et al., 2010). Consequently, an abundance of problems such as conflicts over tenure, forest boundary disputes, concession overlaps and corruption, are typically found in the country’s forest management (Indarto et al., 2012). Taking the above issues into account and considering the complexities and claims of cross-sectoral bureaucracies, preparing REDD+ implementation in Indonesia is an unenviable task (Caldecott et al., 2013). Nevertheless, REDD+ is positioned as a key element in realizing Indonesia’s pledge to reduce emissions and has attracted plenty of donor attention (Indarto et al., 2012). The most significant offer was from Norway, which agreed to enter into a partnership worth US$1 billion aimed at developing Indonesia’s capacity to implement REDD+ (Government of Indonesia, 2010b). The LoI, discussed in Chapter 4, paved the way for the establishment of the REDD+ Taskforce through Presidential Decree Number 19/2010, which aims to accelerate

the national REDD+ readiness processes (Government of Indonesia, 2010b). The Decree mandates the Taskforce develop a REDD+ National Strategy, a policy document that outlines how the government can move towards improved carbon management (Government of Indonesia, 2010a). If the REDD+ Taskforce, and the REDD+ programme more generally, is successful, it will have widespread impacts on human - forest relations, forest politics and forest subjectivities in Indonesia.

This chapter approaches the REDD+ Taskforce from the perspective of governmentality, which, as described in Chapter 2, is an approach that directs attention to the techniques through which the state and non-state actors seek to direct the conduct of populations (for related work on climate governmentality see Paterson and Stripple, 2010; Lövbrand and Stripple, 2011, 2013; Gupta et al., 2012; Boer, 2013). This is achieved through calculative technologies, such as statistics and mapping technologies, to manage the health and productivity of populations by disposing people towards things in particular ways (Dean, 2009). Once disposed, populations self-govern their behaviours according to shared norms, rationalities and practices that are considered to be in the common good (see Chapter 2 Cruikshank, 1999; Lemke, 2001). With these insights in mind I now turn my attention to the REDD+ Taskforce and how it sought to govern forest carbon and transform forest politics through REDD+ in Indonesia.

Having strong Presidential support, the Taskforce was established within the UKP4. However its formation as an ad-hoc body was perceived as having little legitimacy or authority to orchestrate REDD+ governance among related ministries (Antara News, 2011; Adi, 2013). One of the Taskforce’s deputy stated in an interview,

It’s [REDD+ implementation] like trying to solve all the political economic problems of Indonesia’s development. On one hand, we [the Taskforce] have to convince diverse actors to support our intention to implement low carbon economy through REDD+ … On the other, we [the Taskforce] do not have enough legal legitimacy and political authority compared to other ministries that were already in the [government] system for decades. You know …

sometimes they [other ministries] might think that we [the Taskforce] are just a “new boy” with a stubborn will (Interview, Yamadhi, June 2013).

Luttrell et al (2012) highlight President Yudhoyono’s tendency during his leadership to create ad-hoc bodies and commissions to address bottlenecks in achieving government’s goals, instead of tackling the appointed ministries head on. This approach sparked tensions between the existing bureaucracies and the newly established institutions (Luttrell et al., 2012). Awkward relations exist between MOF and the Taskforce as there have been some instances in which the former’s bureaucrats have been undermining and questioning the latter’s capacity and authority in governing REDD+ as has been illustrated by the above quote. However strong the President’s support for the Taskforce, there remain bureaucracies and political constellations that have little interest in the REDD+ agenda (Luttrell et al., 2012).

The appointment of Kuntoro Mangkusubroto as the Taskforce’s leader, while well received by donors due to his acclaimed role in post-tsunami work, contributed to further tensions. Ministries were reluctant to engage too openly due to his dual role as head of UKP4, the body authorized by the President to review how ministries performed rather than to execute government’s programmes. One of the informants in the MOF highlights her disappointment by saying,

We [Ministry of Forestry] have done our best to prepare REDD+ inclusion as part of the Bali outcomes … and now someone else wants to take over the result from us. I don’t even know how come a government institution [UKP4] that has no mandate to execute a program suddenly wants to be in charge for the works that suppose to be in the authority of this ministry… that is just ridiculous! (Interview, Yusliana, July 2013, emphasis added)

On the other hand, strong support for the Taskforce’s work comes from some NGOs (both national and international NGOs), which welcome opportunities for wider and direct engagements in shaping the development of REDD+ policies and broader forest governance. Supportive NGOs indicated in interviews that the formation of an

independent Taskforce was essential in ensuring the process was participatory, something that would not have happened if it were led by an existing ministry. Hence, the President’s decision to establish the Taskforce was considered by many to be a bold statement of a “business not-as-usual approach in forest governance reform” (Interview, Yandiman, May 2013). However, it is also seen as potentially creating confusion and overlap with MOF responsibilities (Luttrell et al., 2012).

The REDD+ Taskforce originally had six Working Groups focused on: the REDD+ National Strategy; REDD+ Institutions, Funding Instruments; Measurement Reporting and Verification (MRV) and Moratorium Implementation; Pilot Provinces; and Communication and Multi-stakeholder Engagement (Satgas REDD+, 2012). Members of the Working Groups were representatives from technical ministries and state agencies including the MOF, Ministry of Development Planning (Bappenas), National Land Agency (NLA), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, MOE, National Council on Climate Change, Ministry of State Secretary, and UKP4 (Satgas REDD+, 2012). Members were also drawn from environmental NGOs and Indigenous community organisations, such as AMAN, ICEL (Indonesia Centre for Environmental Law), WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature) Programme Indonesia, and HUMA (Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform) (Satgas REDD+, 2012). Supported by a US$30 million start-up fund as part of the Norway- Indonesia partnership (Caldecott et al., 2013), the Working Groups were formed as technical teams within the Taskforce, responsible for delivering the preparatory work required for enabling REDD+ implementation.

Due to slow progress in completing its mandates, the Taskforce had its nine- month appointment initially extended until December 2012. An additional four Working Groups were formed on Legal Review and Law Enforcement, REDD+ Mainstreaming, Knowledge Management, and the Moratorium was separated from MRV to form Working Groups of their own (Satgas REDD+, 2012). A third version of the Taskforce maintained the 10 WGs and finished its mandate in June 2013 (Satgas REDD+, 2012) (Satgas REDD+, 2013a) (see Table 5.1). The breadth of issues addressed by the Working Groups emphasises complexity and effort involved in implementing REDD+

in Indonesia and the challenge of introducing carbon rationalities to existing forest politics.

Table 5.1 Working Groups of the REDD+ Taskforce

Taskforce version 1 Taskforce version 2 Taskforce version 3

Formation Based on the Presidential Decree No 19/2010 Based on the Presidential Decree No 25/2011 Based on the Presidential Decree No 5/2013 Duration September 2010 – June 2011 July 2011 – December 2012 January 2013 – June 2013 Working Groups

REDD+ National Strategy REDD+ National Strategy REDD+ National Strategy

REDD+ Institution REDD+ Institution REDD+ Institution

MRV Strategy and Moratorium Implementation MRV Strategy and institution MRV Strategy and Institution

Pilot Provinces Pilot Provinces Pilot Provinces

Communication and Stakeholder Engagement Communication and Stakeholder Engagement Communication and Stakeholder Engagement

Funding Instruments Funding Instruments Funding Instruments

Moratorium Monitoring Moratorium Monitoring Legal Review and Law Enforcement Legal Review and Law Enforcement REDD+ Mainstreaming REDD+ Mainstreaming Knowledge Management Knowledge Management During the three years of its appointment, the Taskforce published 387 documents, developed a REDD+ National Strategy, finalised the draft of MRV National Strategy5_,

appointed pilot provinces – where REDD+ activities will be trialled out, and prepared the architecture of the REDD+ Agency - which continued the Taskforce’s work from 2014. The National Strategy outlines five main pillars that have to be completed to set high quality standards for forest carbon mitigation activities (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012). One of the pillars highlights the need to change forest governance by mainstreaming REDD+ in Indonesia. The formation and themes of the Working Groups (particularly those on REDD+ Mainstreaming and Communication and Multi-stakeholder Engagement) reflect the embedded political and structural challenges that the Taskforce are facing to change the conduct of forest stakeholders in ways that are oriented towards carbon conservation. The following section details three of the influential governmental strategies adopted.