Redefining the Organism

Another possible objection could be that while there are organism-level properties that seem to be units in natural selection, it is still not clear what an organism is (or whether it exists: Ruse 1989) and this lack of clarity could also undermine the view that health and disease are only properties of whole organisms. If the organism is better defined, it might further support the claim that the organism is a primary unit of selection. Where can we look for such a definition and is Canguilhem’s ‘outdated’ biology (Debru 1998) still relevant to it?

In a recent essay, philosopher of biology Thomas Pradeu has argued that there is a way to define an organism such that it is not understood as merely one type of biological individual within the hierarchy of individuals, but is actually ‘the most clearly individuated of all biological individuals’ (2010, p. 248). In other words, this definition gets around the tendency to define individuals simply in terms of what natural selection acts on and shows that organisms are better individuated than genes or groups. The general theory that Pradeu finds more promising than that of evolution by natural selection comes from physiology, according to which organisms are individuals because they are functionally integrated wholes (2010, p.

252). However, what physiology on its own fails to specify are the criteria for why organisms, rather than merely any functional unit, should be considered individuals. To provide that criteria, Pradeu uses ideas from immunology where it is argued that as immune systems define what will be accepted or rejected as part of the organism, they constitute the organism as a functional unit (2010, p. 253). Moreover, it is now believed that immunity is not simply a property of higher vertebrates, but is ubiquitous throughout living beings, making it a good candidate to individuate organisms⁹². Immunology suggests that functional integration can be best seen on the biochemical level (particularly in protein-protein interactions) and that immune interactions ‘are fundamentally organismic (i.e. they concern the whole organism), because they are systemic (2010, p. 258). This allows Pradeu to address the issue of how some

92 As I mentioned in the first chapter, Canguilhem uses the example of immunity and anaphylaxis to clarify what he means by propulsive and repulsive biological norms. While he certainly was not making the argument that all organisms have immune systems, the fact that he used an example from immunology to illustrate universal properties of living beings brings him rather close to Pradeu’s concerns.

organisms are heterogeneous, e.g. humans living with bacteria, or colonial, e.g. the star ascidian, but are still individuals since they are functionally integrated through immune reactions (2010, pp. 259-261). Such organisms appear to be heterogeneous ‘unified wholes’ with their parts dialectically related on the level of immunity. All of this leads him to define an organism as ‘a functionally integrated whole, made up of heterogeneous constituents that are locally interconnected by strong biochemical interactions and controlled by systemic immune interactions that repeat constantly at the same medium intensity’ (2010, p. 258). With this definition it is possible to specify what is meant by the vague expression of the ‘organism as a whole’, providing yet another argument for not only why but how the organism is central to biological theories.

In a recent lecture describing many of the new advances in contemporary biology and their philosophical and scientific implications, philosopher John Dupré (2007) argues that while the pluralistic approach to selection is still reasonable, one can also see the organism as the primary unit of selection if more recent findings are considered. First, he also argues that organisms are better understood as heterogeneous functional wholes. For example, many animals, from arthropods and plants to mammals are covered with or have a necessary symbiotic relationship to indigenous bacteria. In humans, the bacteria and microbes that cover every surface of our body and appear to constitute roughly 99% of the genes on our external surface play a role in digestion, development, reproduction, in training our immune system, and helping the nervous system (2007, p. 36). Moreover, colonial organisms such as the Portuguese man o’ war also illustrate this functionally integrated ‘communal’ aspect (whose individuation can be clarified in terms of Pradeu’s immunological account). Second, as we saw with niche construction, organisms are no longer viewed as passive recipients of their environment due to the complex feedback loop between organismic physiology and their constructed environment.

Human constructions such as schools, hospitals, buildings and even farming practices are all clear examples of niche construction. Third, building on the insights of developmental biology, the organism is not a static entity with fixed properties, but a dynamic process involving interacting cycles (Dupré 2007, p. 54). Together, these criteria allow Dupré to describe the organism as:

a process – a life cycle – rather than a thing; it may be a community of distinct kinds of organisms rather than a monogenomic individual; and it must be understood as conceptually and of course causally linked to its particular environment, or niche, which

both contributes to the construction of the organism in development, and is constructed by the organism through its behavior (2007, p. 54).

If these qualifications are taken into account, Dupré claims, then some issues within the units of selection debate may need to be reconsidered. While this would have to be determined empirically, it at least suggests that the organism may be the primary unit of selection. It seems likely that coupling these aspects with Pradeu’s account would further strengthen this argument.

With these two rather recent approaches to redefining the organism, I want to now mention a few key aspects of Canguilhem’s position so as to counter the claim that his biology is outdated. In an essay on the relation between parts and wholes in biology written in the 1960s, Canguilhem argues that while viewing organisms as ‘societies’ is a problematic metaphor imported from political theories, one idea that has persisted since the 19^th century is that the organization of parts in organisms entails a kind of regulation whereby competition is converted into a form of compatibility (1994, p. 302). As such, the organism is a ‘regulative totality controlling developments and functions’ (1994, p. 302). As I specified in the previous chapter, the concept of organism, for Canguilhem, implies ‘organic regulation’ or the systemic control ‘by a totality over its parts (2012, p. 73), as is shown in physiology. While this remains somewhat imprecise, his ‘holism’ lends itself perfectly to viewing the organism as a genomically diverse community, or heterogeneous individual, which acts as a functional whole because regulated by organismic (immunological) properties. This also has implications for the previous chapter’s discussion regarding populations and individuals. The theories mentioned by Dupré and Pradeu imply that organisms are composites, but it is their functional integration, e.g. by means of biochemical and immune reactions, that seems to support Canguilhem’s criticisms of seeing human societies as organisms. As such, Giroux’s extension of health to ‘populations’

would seem justified for those populations that are also organisms, but not for any population.

It is one thing to see human populations as individuals, but another to see them as organisms, and only for the latter do the concepts of health and disease seem to apply.

The second qualification mentioned by Dupré concerning the organism’s active involvement in shaping the dynamics of evolution is possibly the clearest place where the issues of interest to Canguilhem are still with us. Similar to the examples mentioned above in relation to niche construction, Canguilhem, too, stresses the significance of the activity of living beings.

For example, he argues that while medicine was not a necessary consequence of biological or

human evolution, its emergence as a cultural practice is better understood as part of the active way in which living beings respond to and shape their environment (1989, p. 130). It is this emphasis on biological non-indifference that allows Canguilhem to develop a position that is nearly identical to that of niche construction⁹³:

if the organism-environment relation is considered as the effect of a really biological activity, as the search for a situation in which the living being receives, instead of submits to, influences and qualities which meet its demands, then the environments in which the living beings find themselves are carved out by them, centered on them. In this sense the organism is not thrown into an environment to which he must submit, but it structures its environment at the same time as it develops its capacities as an organism (1989, p. 283f).

While many other examples could be given, this should suffice to demonstrate that Dupré’s second qualification is clearly presaged in Canguilhem’s writings.

Contained within these ideas, we can also find the means to account for the third qualification that the organism is not a static entity, but a dynamic process. While organisms are functionally integrated wholes dynamically interacting with their environments, they are constantly undergoing changes on various levels – from metabolism to morphology – in relation to changing internal and external demands (Canguilhem 2012, p. 72). The idea that organisms are temporally defined by their changing habits, by their polarized relation with their milieu, fits within Canguilhem’s view of life as an ‘organization of forces and a hierarchy of functions whose stability is necessarily precarious, for it is the solution to a problem of equilibrium, compensation, and compromise between different and competing powers’ (2008, p.

125). Similarly, Dupré argues that life is no longer understood as a hierarchy of static things, but a ‘hierarchy of dynamic and constantly changing processes’ (2007, p. 35).

Thus, it would seem that on all accounts Canguilhem’s position is in alignment with Dupré’s three qualifications regarding a rethinking of the organism, and could easily be made more precise by using Pradeu’s physiological/immunological definition. Whatever the future outcome concerning whether these definitions will adequately account for what is observed in nature, what is clear is that what could be called Canguilhem’s ‘feeling for the organism’⁹⁴ is far

93 Morange (2008b, p. 161) also mentions Canguilhem’s similarity to niche construction, but goes on to lament the proximity of Canguilhem’s ideas with Lamarckism. For a recent ‘defence’ of Lamarckian ideas see Jablonka and Lamb (2004).

94 This phrase comes from the title of Evelyn Fox Keller’s 1983 biography of Barbara McClintock.

from outdated and far from being eclipsed by recent advances in biology. As more research seems to further support these theories regarding the nature of organisms, it might very well be the case that it is now more possible than ever to defend an organism-centered biology.