What emerges from the clinical practice with sufferers of disorders of agency shows that while their participation in responsibility practices—i.e., being considered as responsible agents and
39 To be sure, the distinction between causal, or explanatory, responsibility and moral responsibility is a
customary one in debates on responsibility. For a “structured taxonomy of responsibility concepts” (STRC) see Vincent (2011). See del Corral (2015) for a characterization of ‘agential responsibility’ as explanatory responsibility.
40 Pickard’s notion of ‘affective’ blame is similar to, but differs under important respects from, Angela
42 held in relations of accountability—is indeed a necessary condition for them to effectively be accountable and take responsibility for their actions, thereby exercising agential capacities, moral evaluation is not essential to it, and could actually be a hindrance. I therefore side with Pickard in maintaining that these concepts should be best understood in morally neutral terms. Getting back to the assessment of Korsgaard’s proposal, this consideration seems to pose a serious challenge to the Moral Evaluation Claim—that is, morally evaluative reactive attitudes are not necessary for the practice of holding someone responsible. My suggestion is therefore that the Moral Evaluation Claim be turned into the Agential Responsibility Claim. While this move constitutes a seemingly minor adjustment to Korsgaard’s theory, it is one with big repercussions, in that a more nuanced account of agency—in particular, one that clearly distinguishes between moral responsibility and agential responsibility—would thereby broaden the scope of humans we can consider, and who can understandably consider themselves, as agents.
Elaborating on the elements pinpointed by Pickard as central to the presumption of treatment in clinical contexts,41 I will regard as agential those capacities in virtue of which an agent is responsible (without blame), or can take responsibility for, her behavior. Agential capacities include: i) conscious knowledge of what one is doing,42 ii) choice, and iii) a degree of control over one’s behavior. Accordingly, I propose the following claim:
Agential Responsibility Claim: treating someone as an agent is to treat her
as accountable/answerable for her actions, which presupposes that she has knowledge of what she is doing, can exercise choice and a degree of control over her behavior.
It is this presupposition’s structuring of the interpersonal attitudes and reactions to one’s behavior that proves to be a necessary condition for exercising agency. In other words, it is not just the agent’s individual psychological arrangement that matters for agency, but rather the fact any such capacity of the individual agent is actually acknowledged/recognized, and
41 Here I draw on Pickard’s characterization of what is presupposed by effective clinical treatment. (Ivi, p.
1141).
42 Pickard’s understanding of this notion is admittedly an intuitive one. By ‘conscious knowledge’ of
behavior she refers to “the way we normally know what we are doing when we are doing when we do it. […] Normally, we have some knowledge of why we are acting, some knowledge of how we are acting, some knowledge of what we intend in acting, and some knowledge of what effects our actions have on the world” (ivi, p. 1136 n. 5).
43 interacted with, within an interpersonal relation. What will be involved in actually treating someone as responsible will vary depending on the context, the nature of the relationship with her, along with a consideration of her past personal history. In any case, it will involve some concrete effects in terms of re-action/response, to the agent’s actions.
While corroborating the relevance of Korsgaard’s approach to responsibility as a practical relation for the notion of agency, treatment of disorders of agency indicates that those who in Korsgaard’s terms would be ‘mere heaps,’ (and therefore less of fully unified agents) (cf. supra, section 3.1) would rather seem to be always already agents, and never cease to be such (see also Millgram, 2014). The process of recovery for people with disorders of agency—whose actions/omissions would, according to Korsgaard, consistently fall short of making them
unified agents—shows that any degree of realization of one’s agential capacities, as manifested
in her actions, is sufficient to hold her accountable for her behavior, and for her to effectively take responsibility for those actions. A ‘disorder of agency’ does not make the person who is diagnosed with it defective qua agent. The defect, then, would not be in her agency. Rather, it would be in the dysfunctional dynamics of the agent’s proximal relational environment, and in those resulting from her past history (including the complex, overlapping influence of many different structural societal factors).
Overall, disorders of agency and their treatments point to the relational, interactional character of agency and responsibility, as well as their social dimension. The discussion in the present chapter is meant to challenge the very idea of defectiveness attached to the term ‘disorder,’ stemming from the placement of moral blame on an individual.
Alternately, we should consider agency as a complex and interactive capacity, the exercise of which crucially depends on interpersonal relationships and contextual factors—at any degree or stage of actualization. A characterization of agency in these terms would imply not just that a lack of appropriate interpersonal relationships and material opportunities might importantly impact on the development and exercise of the capacity of agency—which Korsgaard herself would certainly concede (cf. supra, section 2.2)—but eventually lead to the following stronger claim:
44
Interaction Claim: agency itself is constitutively a function of one’s location
within a network of social and interpersonal relationships,43 as well as of the quality of these relationships, as perceived by the agent.44
The hypothesis central to the reframing of constitutivism as a theory of agency that I pursue in this work intends therefore to build upon and strengthen Korsgaard’s practical approach to agency and responsibility. On the other hand, it carries with it important differences, that will be illustrated in due course.