3-153. The primary function for MLRS in stability operations is in the resolution of conflict phase. MLRS units may also participate in a noncombat support role as a show of force/resolve or in a direct action role by attacking HPTs.
N
ONCOMBATR
OLES3-154. In a noncombat support role, the MLRS unit may use its organic communication capability to support the supported commander’s command and control structure. The unit's resupply vehicles offer unique logistical support capabilities.
3-155. As a show of force/resolve, the presence of the MLRS system in support of peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions demonstrates the nation's commitment to the mission.
C
OMBATR
OLES3-156. Supporting peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in a direct action role, the MLRS system can engage HPTs at extended range. When working with the Firefinder radar system, MLRS can effectively neutralize mortar and artillery firing positions in accordance with rules of engagement (ROE) established by the joint task force.
3-157. The Army conducts attacks and raids to create situations that permit seizing and maintaining political and military initiative. Normally, the United States executes attacks and raids to achieve specific objectives other than gaining or holding terrain. Attacks by conventional ground, air, or special operations forces, acting independently or in concert, are used to damage or destroy high value targets (HVTs) or to demonstrate U.S. capability and resolve to achieve a favorable result. The following are tactics, techniques, and procedures specific to stability operations.
Minimize Movement
3-158. During stability operations, the greatest threat to the force will usually be from small groups and terrorists conducting raids and ambushes. Occupation of a defensible firing position affords the MLRS unit greater survivability than does standard MLRS tactics of hide, shoot, and move.
Collocate with Other Units
3-159. Occupying positions in conjunction with other task force units provides the MLRS unit with an increased degree of protection against enemy small unit attacks. Coordination is the key to success.
Harden Positions
3-160. Using engineer assets to harden the MLRS position will improve survivability. Weather and terrain will dictate whether the unit builds berms or digs in. In either case, the key to success is prior planning and coordination with the supporting engineer unit.
Direct Link with Firefinder Radar
3-161. When supporting the task force with countermortar/counterbattery fires, a direct link may be established between the MLRS unit and the Firefinder radar to improve reaction time. A positive method of clearing fires must be established and enforced.
Command and Control
3-162. Command and control is another major concern during support and sustainment operations;
friendly forces must engage only hostile forces. Killing noncombatants can turn survivors into enemies instead of neutrals or friends. Tight control, based on ROE, is the norm. MLRS responsiveness is often degraded because a time lag is inevitable after a provocation while a determination is made if the ROE warrant a fire mission. The ROE must clearly specify when the use of fire support is appropriate and justified. Clearance of fires is infinitely more complicated when operating in urban areas.
Precision Guided-Munitions
3-163. The MLRS can deliver fires that employ guided munitions such as GMLRS or ATACMS.
Unguided munitions are suitable for area fires but may not be the best choice to attack a point target. For
example, the MLRS unguided M26 rocket may not be the best weapon to attack mortars. In certain circumstances, the collateral damage of MLRS may be too great. Dud submunitions present an additional concern about using MLRS in this situation. Dud DPICM and APAM bomblets are a threat to personnel, whether Soldiers or civilians. The low collateral damage from the M31 Guided MLRS Unitary makes it an excellent munitions’ for urban environments.
Operations/Firebase
3-164. MLRS platoons may choose to occupy some type of operations base or firebase, just as most other units do in support and sustainment operations. Depending on the situation, platoons may share operating firebases with other units or occupy one by themselves. Another major consideration for unit leaders in deciding the type and location of operating base to establish is the positioning of firing points. Firing points may be inside or outside the firebase. (When selecting firing points inside the firebase, the commander must consider launcher danger areas when firing.) Consider the following when determining whether to occupy an operating base with another unit:
• Location. As in every situation, the potential locations of targets should determine where the platoons should emplace. Therefore, the required location of the launchers may impact the decision to collocate or not (for example, are other units in the immediate vicinity of where the platoons are required to position?).
• Coordination. Alarms, warnings, and protective positions must be coordinated with all parties on the base, especially when launchers are intended to fire from inside the base, and engineer support to adequately protect soldiers and equipment is not available. Firing points outside the operating base make coordination of these activities with another unit easier.
• Defense. A base established by a larger unit provides a platoon greater defensive strength and logistical support. However, an operating base with a large number of units faces a tremendous challenge in maintaining a viable perimeter as individual units leave and reenter the perimeter for patrolling, resupply, or other duties. However, if a platoon occupies an operating firebase by itself, it has little self-defensive capability.
3-165. If the unit decides to collocate with others, it may consider occupying bases established by a maneuver battalion, a brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), or the brigade support area, predominantly consisting of a forward support battalion. Table 3-5 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each position option.
Table 3- 5. Comparison of MLRS Operating Base Techniques Type of Base Advantages Disadvantages Maneuver Unit Good perimeter defense.
Consolidated life and equipment support possible.
Deepest fires.
Difficulty adjusting the perimeter when units leave.
Firing points outside a protected area.
Brigade Headquarters Better perimeter defense than an MLRS platoon alone.
Consolidated life and equipment support possible.
Ease of command and control.
Firing points outside a protected area.
BSA Better perimeter defense than MLRS
platoon alone.
Ease of logistical support.
Firing points outside a protected area.
Longer distance to likely targets, depending on the BSA location.
Table 3- 5. Comparison of MLRS Operating Base Techniques Type of Base Advantages Disadvantages MLRS Platoon/
Battery Firing points in a protected area.
No perimeter adjustments required.
Less coordination with adjacent units in the same operating base.
Limited perimeter defense.
Longer travel time/distance to additional logistical support.
Firing Points Inside
3-166. When determining whether to locate firing points inside or outside the operating firebase, consider—
• Firing from inside the perimeter provides the best security for the launchers, especially when engineer support is available. Figure 3-1 portrays a platoon-operating base with internal firing points.
• Burms protect vehicles, equipment, ammunition, and launchers not on firing points.
• Launchers can be in single or consolidated hide positions.
3-167. Fighting positions protect the perimeter. Burms inside the perimeter act as backstops for the back blast. The three burms forming a "Y" in figure 3-1 facilitate 6,400-mil firing. The "Y" has three firing points, 1 in each corner. The launcher occupies the firing point that best allows target attack.
Figure 3-1. Example: MLRS Platoon Operating Base with Internal Firing Points
3-168. Just as in other OPAREAs, the launcher remains in a hide position (burmed for protection) until it receives a fire mission. It then occupies a firing point (burmed to deflect back blast) long enough to fire.
After the fire mission, the launcher moves to a hide position.
Note: The “stay hot, shoot fast” technique discussed in chapter 6 may also be applicable in support and sustainment operations when platoons are using operating bases (such as the one described above) and extremely responsive fires are required for fleeting targets.
3-169. Firing from inside an operating firebase requires engineer support to ensure that the flame and smoke and the flying dirt, rocks, and blast panels do not injure people or damage equipment. Even with the firing point burms, for individual safety, soldiers inside the base must occupy launchers or fighting positions during fire missions. A warning device or signal to alert soldiers of a fire mission is a must.
Soldiers within 50 meters of the launcher should mask, even if in a protected position, for protection from smoke inhalation.
Firing Points Outside
3-170. This option for firing points eliminates the impact of rocket back blasts inside the operating base.
However, security of the launcher becomes a major issue. A launcher cannot defend itself. It has no defensive armament, and the three-man crew is fully employed operating the system. Additional personnel (such as military police [MP], infantrymen in personnel carriers, or an ad hoc group of MLRS personnel riding in other vehicles) must accompany a launcher if it is to have any protection. Just as in an operating base, these security elements must protect themselves from rocket back blasts. Positioning to the side of the launcher outside the danger area is the easiest solution.
3-171. The BOC, POC, and fire mission requester must remember that the response time for a fire mission also increases if the firing point is outside the operating base. The travel time to the firing point makes successfully engaging a fleeting target less likely. The controlling BOC or POC must determine the travel times and ensure that its higher HQ understands this additional factor.
3-172. Care is also necessary to ensure that such a fire mission does not become an ambush opportunity for the threat. If a pattern develops for provocations resulting in MLRS firings, and the firing points are marked so an enemy can predict a route, an enemy could easily set a trap. It does not take a great deal of enemy firepower to destroy a HMMWV and a launcher.