Security and regionalisation: a deterministic link

Security issues are conceptualised in West Africa and South America as a direct causal factor of regionalisation. It is taken for granted that these issues are increasingly transnational, in particular the so-called ‘new threats’ including drug and other illegal trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. States are depicted as interdependent for their security and stability and thus compelled to take joint action to ensure their own security.

This argument is particularly strong in the case of West Africa. The situation there is envisaged in terms of security interdependence and the transnationalisation of security threats in a regional (in)security complex (Keller 1997, 300; Bah 2005, 78; Kaplan 2006, 81-82; Arthur 2010, 3; Iwilade and Agbo 2012, 362; Thonke and Spliid 2012, 44). On the one hand, the civil wars in Liberia (1989-1996) and Sierra

Leone (1991-2002) are recurrently cited as illustrating the risk of the spill over of conflicts spreading across the region and endangering its stability (Keller 1997, 130; Bah 2005, 78; Francis 2006, 14; 2009, 91; Arthur 2010, 14). On the other hand, transnational threats, including drug, human and small arms and light weapons (SALW) trafficking, terrorism and piracy are described as destabilising already weak states and threatening democracy in the region (Kaplan 2006, 81-82; Bolaji 2011, 185-186; Jackson 2012, 119-120). Hence, most authors conclude that common action in the framework of ECOWAS is the natural and necessary answer to deal with this security environment (Keller 1997, 308; Arthur 2010, 3, 14; Terwase Sampson 2011, 507; Thonke and Spliid 2012, 48). The assumption, therefore, is that common security issues lead to common security perceptions, which provides a basis for joint action.62 _{In this way, Ilheduru (2012, 218) argues that transnational security} challenges have resulted in a shared security culture and forced an unplanned evolution of ECOWAS towards a security dimension. Bolaji (2011, 186) also emphasises that these transnational security flows compel each state to conceive of its stability and security as being linked to its neighbours, which informs the idea of a regional security dynamic.

The academic arguments on regional security in South America are similar. Most authors highlight the ‘new threats’ that South American countries are facing, in particular drug trafficking, organised criminality and terrorism. They insist on the transnational, cross border nature of these security issues, mostly at the Triple Border between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay and in Amazonia (Buzan and Waever 2003, 309-310; Show 2003, 124-126; Pion Berlin 2005, 216-217; Flemes and Radseck

62 _{This is a common argument used by scholars to stress the positive development of ECOWAS’} security dimension. By contrast, and as discussed in the first section of this chapter, some argue that West African states are too weak to develop and implement this dimension in ECOWAS – the only consensual security perception being regime survival – which shows again the contradictions of this literature.

2012, 160; Marcella 2013, 70). Authors present this interdependence as weakening the nation-states and endangering regional stability and democracy (Pion-Berlin 2005, 216-217; Flemes and Radseck 2012, 156; Marcella 2013, 69). Marcella (2013, 71), for instance depicts Latin America as one of the most dangerous regions in the world. From there he stresses the need for a redefinition of security and common action, and argues that a consensus for collective action is emerging. This argument is widely shared in the literature. Buzan and Waever (2003, 338) observe that patterns of securitisation reinforce cooperation. These patterns are assumed to be particularly strong in the Southern Cone, which can be called a security community, whereas South America has supposedly reached the stage of a security regime. According to Pion Berlin (2005, 213) these challenges have led to security cooperation and a collective understanding of security as an indivisible good. For Oelsner (2011, 93) Mercosur is a (informal) security actor reflecting these regional security dynamics. In all these accounts, regional securitisation and desecuritisation processes are seen to have led to convergence and the development of shared perceptions driving regional governance. When authors occasionally stress the difference of threat perceptions between the states of the region it is to underline their non-responsiveness to the realities of their security environment, which explains the weakness of regional security projects (Diamint 2010, 664; Flemes and Radseck 2012, 177)

Hence, in both regions the literature presents regional security governance, the emergence of a security community or any other type of regional project as a direct outcome of the increasing transnational nature of security issues and the consequent interdependence of states, which fosters common threat perceptions. However, this tells us little about the differences between the regionalisation processes on going in the two regions. Why and how are states in West Africa constructing a common

understanding of security issues, elaborating regional plans and strategies and launching joint interventions; while South American states are only committed to limited cooperation?63 _{One could argue that security issues are more pressing in West} Africa. However, in the IR literature transnational security issues in South America, in particular drug trafficking, are also presented as endangering the nation states, their governance capacities and democracy in general. Moreover, if one looks at regionalisation processes in other African sub-regions with similar security problems, such a major qualitative shift in regionalisation cannot be witnessed.64 _{I am not} arguing here that security issues are not a key factor in these regional developments; they provide a context to the regionalisation process, as we will see particularly in the case of West Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to stress again that they cannot be reduced to a causal factor with a direct effect on the process, since this effect depends on the meaning given to them by the relevant actors of the regionalisation process; in particular via their articulation of nation, region and security. The representations of these actors condition the way they are responding to these security issues through their foreign and security policies – they constitute these ‘facts’ as pressing security issues that require either national or regional action – and thus frame the regionalisation process. Illustratively, Brazilian officials have an understanding of drug trafficking and organised crime as public security issues that should be tackled

63 _{This is not to say that there are no problems in the elaboration and implementation of these actions} in West Africa, neither that there are no efficient cooperative actions in South America. However, there is a qualitative difference in the way they handle these security issues regionally: whereas West African government do not hesitate to discuss and address these issues at a regional level, South American governments engage restrictively and occasionally at the regional level. This contrast will be the object of the next empirical chapters.

64 _{ECOWAS is one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) integrated into the African Union} (AU) framework along with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), etc. These RECs are the central elements of the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and are supposed to develop their own standby forces (among other things) under the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF). ECOWAS is by far the REC with the most developed security dimension.

by their police forces guided by national policies. Border cooperation is seen as occasionally useful but should not be institutionalised, which restricts the regionalisation process.