SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF EMOTION LABELLING

The present study represents another demonstrat ion of the application of a theory-testing orient ation to t he

interpretat ion of MDS configurations. This study will consider the fairly infrequently researched area of emotion labelling.

The theoretical developments which will be drawn upon to guide t he reseach will include both that relating to the

empirical struct ure of emotion itself, and also t he more general linguistic considerations relating to the use of semantic labels rather than the stimulus objects themselves. As essentially private experiences emotions are clearly more susceptibre to linguistic ambiguities than physically realizable

object s.

While most studies of emotion have used emotion words, some

have at tempted to study the struct ure of the emotional state more direct ly by the use of facial expressions as the stimulus objects (e.g. Osgood 1966 ; Schlosberg 1952, 1954

) .

as Fillenbaum and Rapo port

(

isomorphism between the structures of expressed and labelled emot ion would be nice but by no means guaranteed or even c onceptually necessary. The language of emotion clearly

covers a much wider domain than simply effective feeling. This point is also made by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) in their classic review of the role of language in perception . They argue that this distinction has often been overlooked in many previous studies of this area. The language of emotion in fact Provides for a distinction between an emotion, the cause of an emotion and the object of an emotion.

Miller and Johnson-Laird argue that it is the semantic structure rather than that of the pure experience that acts as the main determinant of behaviour. While they do not at tempt any extensive analysis of the semantic structure of emotion labelling they endorse this as an import ant if imperfectly

understood aspect of humai1 behavioun They criticise information processing systems which do not provide any adequate way of representing the emotional forces which are such an important part of human life.

Dimensions of Emotion

A wide variety of concept ual schemes have been provided as possible bases for the classification of emotional phenomena. The problem was first considered by Wundt

(1897)

important contributions including Harlow and Stagner

(19JJ),

(Schachter and Wheeler, 1962 ; Schachter and Singer, 1962) and Young (196 1). While there are some differences in these

approaches many of t hem can be resolved in terms of varying emphases on the different aspects of emotional meaning referred

t o above.

An extensive review of all these Schemes by Davitz ( 1969) showed substantial agreement on three major dimensions of

emotion, denoted activation, relatedness and hedonic tone. A _{dimension of activation or affective intensity is mentioned}

by almost every writer, although under a variety of labels.

For example Wundt in his tri-dimensional theory of feeling

specifies excitement-quiescence as one major dimension. However as Arnold

₍₁₉₆₀₎

186 •.

to most psychological activity and therefore not an important distinguishing factor.

The term relatedness refers to the individuals tendency to approach or avoid the aspect in the environment which is the source of the emotional experience. A related concept considered by some theorists, notably Schachter, is that of competence. While Schachter did not specifically define this as a separate dimension his studies of emotion clearly demon­ strated the importance of cognitive-social factors in the

definition of emotional states. That is, the individual ' s perception of himself and the social situation is an important determinant of the way he interprets his emotional feelings. The term competence was suggested by Davitz

(1969)

Hedonic tone is the third primary dimension of emotion mentioned by almost every theorist, usually referred to as a bipolar pleasantness-unpleasantness scale. Thus there seems a reasonable degree of consensus on these three (or four) scales as primary dimensions of emotional meaning.

The attempts to match these theoretical dimensions with empirical structural representations have been only partially successful. Osgood

(1966)

structure seemed more to suggest a number of distinct clusters rather than three continuous dimensions. In another fairly comprehensive study by Davitz

(1969)

described using a protocol of 556 possible statements. A

cluster analysis performed on the basis of the overlap between the statements applied to different emotions produced 12 clusters. These were interpreted as three different levels on the four

primary dimensions distinguished above. Rather than a simple ordering on these scales Davitz interprets them as a partial order of one positive and two types of negative states. These

are denoted hyperactivation and hypoactivation corresponding t o active and passive type negative reactions.

Fillenbaum and Rapoport used a variety of formats to generate similarity data for a set of 15 emo tion names using

a combination of MDS and clustering methodology. They found no clear interpretation to the MDS configuration although the ubiquitous pleasantness, unpleasantness scale was in evidence. The clustering solution also did not offer any obvious inter­ pretation that did not present several inconsistencies, and the clusters were by no means compact. They conclude (p. 12J) that a spatial model does not appear appropriate in this

instance.

Thus while there is sufficient support for the conceptual schemes for the semantic structure of emotion discussed here for them to be considered as plausible approache� no adequate representation has been found for them in empirical structure. While this may mean asFillenbaum and Rapoport suggest that a spatial representation is inappropriate, these previous

evaluations have shown insufficient conceptual clarity and rigour for other conclusionsto be eliminated. Most previous studies have simply attempted to identify loosely defined

188.

dimensions or types in a fairly simple dimensional or

clustering representation. One clearly n eeds to formulate

the conceptual system more precisely in terms of a theory which leads to precise predictions of empirical structure . Davitz's typal scheme for example seems to involve some

confusion between dimensions and values on dimensions and does not adequately represent the expected relationships among the types.

The purpose of the present study is thus to attempt to formulate a more adequate theoretical structure to organise

this aspect of the semantic domain, and to develop an appropriate methodology by which one can evaluate it.

The combination of dimensional and typal information

contained in the classification schemes suggests that Guttman1_s

facet theory approach might represent an appropriate methodology to employ here. The theory to be evaluated was derived to be

consistent both with the theoretical considerations discussed

abov e , and the apparent structure obtained in the present study ,

and thus no claim is made for this to be an independent evaluat­

ion of a genuinely prior hypothesis. The intention is rather

at this stage limi ted to suggesting a possible line for conceptual development in this area, and a methodology by which structural constraints implied by such schemes can be empirically evaluated.

Method

A

systematic method of ensuring a representative selection

would have been preferred none of the classification schemes

described above were considered sufficientl y well defined for

this. The standard complete presentation paired comparisons design with pairs in randomised order and balanced for order within pairs, was again selected fer this study. While this offers the advant age of methodological simplicit y at this

early stage in this area of investigation some method enabling a substantially larger stinrulus set size would clearly

ul timately be required for any comprehensive evaluation of such a wide empirical domain.

Stimulus pairs were presented in the form of a writ ten questionnaire, each page containing two columns of 15 pairs with a space beside each pair to record the chosen reµ; onse from an 11 point magnitude estimation scale. This format enabled sul!jects to complete the 120 pairs in 20-JO minutes. The questionnaire was administered to a group of 22 first year psychology students at the Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education. The instructions printed on the front cover of the

questionnaire requested the subjects to assess the similarit y of the emotions referred to by each pair of words on a scale of O to 10. They were expressed in these general terms in order to encompass the whole semantic structure of emotional definition, without focussing at teri: ion on any specific aspect such as the nature of the feelings accompanying emotional

states, the sit uation they occur in, objects or causes of emotions etc. Appendix A, which contains a copy of the questionnaire, lists the actual instructions used.

190.

The sample size was reduced to 11 by discarding subjects with a substantial proportion of zeros in their similarity matrix. While not an inadmissible response a large proportion

of zero similarity assessments indicates that the response scale has been t runcat ed at one end, with no distinction made between distances over a certain size.

The 11 similarity matrices were then analysed by ALSCAL (Talcane et al 1977), after first being converted to dissimil­ arities, the preferred format for this procedure, by reversing the scale. As previously discussed the ALSCAL program does not allow for any direct test of the appropriateness of its basic subjective metrics assumption. However Young has commented

(personal comnrunication) that some indication of this can be obtained by comparing the fit measures obtained under a number of options t hat place differing emphases on this assumption .

For example by varying t he conditionality option from uncond±ional (i . e. treating t he subjects simply as replications) to matrix

conditional additional degrees of freedom are provided for the subject weights to account for the variance in the data.

Conversely a move from metric to ordinal scaling would place

less emphasis on variations in subject weights, as an al ternative source of freedom would be available to account for the data.

Resul ts

Ordinal matrix conditional scaling were carried out first to determine the dimensionality required to represent the

pooled data under the most unrest ricted model. Table 8 shows both goodness of fit criteria generated by this procedure, for each dimensionality from 2 to 4. The Stress value shown is the _average

(RMS)

Average Goodness of Fit by Dimensionality Weighted Ordinal Solution

Dimensionality Stress RSQ

2 . 289 . 516

3 . 2 00 . 599

192.

Formula 1 (1964). The RSQ value is the average squared data­ distance correlation.

The 4-dimensional solution appears somewhat sub-optimal, with quite large differences in individual stress values, producing the low mean RSQ value. However a more extensive search for a solution in a dimensionality as high as this would normally be justified only if three dimensions appeared cl early insufficient. The J-dimensional solution in this case shows an aQequate if not exceptional fit, but more importantly t o offer a regular systematic interpretation in terms of the expected theoretical structure.

Tab1e 9 shows the goodness of fit figures under four different scaling conditions; individual solutions, weighted ordinal, replicated ordinal and replicated metric. This shows that the main source in differences is in the allowances for different metrics. The ordinal solutions are substantially better than the metric solution. There is little difference between the weighted and replicated models, indicating that no significant contribution to fit for any individual is provided by variations in dimensions weights.

A comparison of individual and group scaling stress values shows that a few subjects (SJ, S4, S5, S6) _{are not}

very well fitted by any of the group solutions . This suggests that there is not compl ete homogeneity of the semantic structure of this group of subjects.

The J-D weighted ordinal solution however appears to

represent an adequate if not exceptional representation of the maj ority of subjects and thus this is the scaling for which an interpretation will be attempted .