First of all we should remind that both the conceptions of society and person, as characterized in political constructivism, are normative conceptions. They are both political (moral) conceptions. Given the aims of justice as fairness, they are conceptions suitable for the basis of democratic citizenship. As normative conceptions, they have to be distinguished from accounts of human nature and society described by natural and social sciences (PL 18 n). For further explanations, I pick up the idea of society.
Political constructivism perceives society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next. This conception of society is incompatible with viewing “the
social order as a fixed natural order, or as institutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values” (PL15). The specific conception of society which is embedded in
constructivism is distinct from regarding society simply as a system of coordinated activity, for example, set by orders issued by some central authority. In addition, it is very important that
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cooperation be fair. Indeed this conception of society requires some specific standards that each party may accept, provided that others do the same. Two principles of justice as fairness characterize the fair terms of cooperation (PL 16). In other words, the two principles of justice, including the difference principle with its reference to the benchmark of equal division of advantages, formulate such standard.
This idea of society includes an idea of each participant’s good, or rational
advantage. The conception of good specifies what those who are engaged in cooperation, whether individuals, families, associations, or even a federation, are trying to achieve (As we will see this conception of good is part of each person, family or association’s comprehensive
doctrine).
The idea of society which exists in political constructivism includes the idea of reciprocity (As we will see in the next section, the idea of reciprocity is one of central element of reasonableness). “Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity: all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and procedure require, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison”(PL 16). The idea of
reciprocity lies between the idea of impartiality and the idea of mutual advantage. In other words, reciprocity is located between altruism and egoism (PL 50). The conception of society in political constructivism is a well-ordered society, defined as a society in which “everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles” (TJ 397). Reciprocity, as part of the ideal of society in political liberalism, is the assumed relation between individuals in a well- ordered society (PL 17).
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We mentioned that the second conception which the principles of practical reason work with is the idea of person. Because of the fact that justice as fairness conceives society as a fair system of cooperation over time between generations, political constructivism adopts a particular conception of person which goes with this idea. Following the ancient, modern, and even medieval traditions of philosophy and law, political constructivism embodies an idea of person who takes part, or plays a role, in social life. Thus, justice as fairness conceives a person as “someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society over
complete life” (PL 18). Furthermore, political constructivism thinks of citizens as free and equal. Since we begin from the idea of society as fair system of cooperation, Rawls assumes that “persons as citizens have all the capacities that enable them to be cooperating members of society” (PL 20). Conceiving of persons as full participants in a fair system of social
cooperation, political constructivism ascribes to them two moral powers connected with different elements of the fundamental idea of society: First a capacity for a sense of justice and second, a capacity for a conception of the good. A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice. It also expresses a willingness to act in relation to others on terms that they also publicly can endorse. The sense of justice is part of the idea of reasonableness. On the other hand, “the capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to
form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage or good” (PL 19). (Political constructivism also assumes that participants have the powers of reason (powers of judgment, thought, and inference) to a requisite minimum degree.)
Thus the original position models persons who at any time have a determinate conception of the good that they try to achieve. Such a conception covers an understanding of what is valuable in life. It also includes the scheme of final ends. The conception of good is part
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of a person’s comprehensive doctrine—religious, philosophical, or moral—by reference to which
the value of one person’s ends and attachments are understood. It is important to notice that in the political constructivism persons’ conception of the good are not fixed but develops as they mature, and may change even radically over one’s life-time (PL19-20). That is why, as we
argued in our answer to the Islamic orthodoxy objection (objection 5) in chapter I, Rawls defines reasonable comprehensive doctrines as not totally fixed during the time. All in all, in political liberalism “persons” are
regarded as free and equal persons in virtue if their possessing to the requisite degree the two moral powers of moral personality…. These powers we associated with two
main elements of the idea of cooperation, the idea of fair terms of cooperation, and the idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good (PL 34).
It needs to be emphasized the conception of person which is embedded in the political constructivism is a political conception of person (PL 29). This means that if we look at the presentation of justice as fairness and note how it is set up, no particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of persons——such as Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist, or materialist –, appear among its premises, or if metaphysical presuppositions are involved, they are so general that they would not distinguish between the metaphysical views which mentioned (PL 29 n.).
The original position models persons who think of themselves as free in three respects. In the first sense of freedom the original position regards individuals as having the moral power to form, revise and rationally pursue a conception of good. For example, when a
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person converts from one religion to another, or no longer affirm an established religious faith, political constructivism does not regard the converted individual as losing some of its constitutional rights. The converted person is regarded as still having the same basic rights and duties, owning the same property and is able to make the same claims as before, except in the case of those claims that are connected with her previous religious faith. (PL 30) A society “in which basic rights and recognized claims depend on religious affiliation and social class….has a different political conception of the person.” Such conception of society, from which history has
many examples, lacks a conception of free and equal citizenship.53 (PL 30), and as we will see later, in the extreme cases like the slave system, might lack any idea of the person.
The second respect in which political constructivism conceives persons as free is regarding them as self-authenticating sources of valid claims. Constructivism respects persons “as being entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their conception of the good” (PL 32). This sense of freedom becomes more understandable if we compare it with the
contrast view, the concept of person in slave system. Slaves are not counted as sources of claims. They are not counted as capable of having moral duties and obligations. Slavery lacks
53 Rawls emphasized that one should avoid confusing non-institutional or moral identity, with the political or
institutional identity. Citizens usually have both political and non-political commitments and identities. In political liberalism, the freedom is only concerned with the former rather than the latter. Indeed, political liberalism is totally compatible worth the fact that some individuals, as part of their non-political identity, “may regard it as simply unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain religious, philosophical, and moral convictions, or from certain enduring attachments and loyalties.” However, these two aspects of individuals’ moral identity must reconcile. “On
the road to Damascus Saul of Tarsus becomes Paul the Apostle. Yet such a conversion implies no change in our public or institutional identity” (PL 31).
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any idea of the person. “Slaves are, so to speak, socially dead: they are not recognized as persons at all” (PL 33 emphasis added).
Finally, the third aspect in which persons are viewed as free is to regard them “as capable of taking responsibility for their ends” (PL 33). Political constructivism thinks of persons
as capable of restricting their claims to the kinds of things the principles of justice allow. In our understanding, this idea of responsibility for ends is implicit in the idea of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. A political conception of the person articulates this idea of persons as responsible agents and “fits it into the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation” (PL 34).
So far we argued that political constructivism is developed from (1) the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation over generations in conjunction with (2) the idea of citizens as free and equal persons, and (3) the idea of a well-ordered society. We argued that these three ideas are parts of the particular conceptions of society and person which are taken for granted in the construction of the original position. Here we need to explain the link between the idea of a well-ordered society and two aforementioned ideas. Indeed, the idea of a well-ordered society seems to be a specific reformulation of what mentioned so far as the liberal democratic conceptions of society and person. In other words, the idea of the well-ordered society adds nothing new to political liberalism’s conceptions of society and person. As Rawls defines it from
the beginning (TJ) a well-ordered society is one “designed to advance the good of its members and effectively regulated by a public conception of justice” (TJ 397). In PL Rawls asserts that to say a society is well-ordered means that that society has three features: “first …it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of
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justice; and second… its basic structure54…..is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to
satisfy these principles. And third, its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they regard as just” (PL 35). These
three aspects of the idea of a well-ordered society in fact seem to be different aspects of the specific conceptions of society and person which political constructivism adopts. Rawls sounds clear regarding this when he says a well-ordered society is “a fair system of cooperation between reasonable and rational citizens regarded as free and equal” (PL 103).
From what argued so far it concludes that political constructivism seems to model only those individuals who endorse the fundamental conception of society as a fair system of cooperation and persons as free and equal citizens. Thus, political liberalism seems to be persuading only for those individuals who share these ideas. In the next section I will argue that only reasonable religious, moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrines share these understandings of society and person. I will clarify this point via analyzing the central role of the notions of reasonable and rational in justification of political liberalism. The argument is that these two moral powers cover the fundamental ideas of society and person which are modeled in political constructivism.
4- Reasonableness and Inclusion of Democratic Conceptions of Society and Person