Preferences Represented in Decision Distribution of Payoffs Symmetrical Asymmetrical
One Party's Concurrence (All own decision; see decision as final; move to other problems)
One Party's Position Prevails (Only one party owns decision; others monitor resulting action; push for reconsideration if feedback is negative)
Mixed Parties'
Mutual Compromise/Consensus (Members know got all possible at moment; monitor for change in political context; seek to return to decision if think can change outcome in their favor)
Lopsided Compromise (Some members own position, others do not; latter monitor resulting action and political context, agitating for reconsideration of decision)
No Party's Deadlock (Members know no one did better than others; seek to redefine the problem so solution or trade-offs are feasible)
Fragmented Symbolic Action (No members own decision; seek to change the political context in order to reconstitute decision unit)
Source: Margaret G. Hermann, 2001, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework," International Studies Review, Vol 3, No. 2, p. 72.
then Hypotheses #3 through #7 could indicate why there was a change in the decision unit.
unit, which potentially inhibit the decision process, determine the structure of subsequent decision units? Or does negative feedback influence successive units, to the extent that it creates friction or fragmentation within the decision unit?
Institutional structure, rules, and norms must also play a role in the construction of the decision unit. But, given crisis conditions, those rules and norms might be treated as flexible or fluid in order to deal with an untenable situation (Astorino- Courtois 1998). It is quite possible, and even likely, that two or more of these variables work together to act upon subsequent unit structures.
Summary
My research design is intended to isolate decisions made under crisis
conditions and during the crisis transitional period, enabling me to identify the actor or actors that make up the decision units involved in the decision process. The transitional period is identified as the time between the traditionally recognized end of the crisis (cease-fire agreement) and the conclusion of a military disengagement agreement. The disengagement agreement is viewed as an indicator that the
immediate crisis is indeed over and the potential for future hostilities is minimized.
A considerable amount of research has been published on the subject matter chosen for my study, including military analyses, intelligence studies, and decision- making in both the United States and Israel. It is important, therefore, to
differentiate between what those studies provide and what this research attempts to do. Some of the studies focus on individuals and their leadership style or
personality (Ambrose 1991; Benedikt 2005; Braun 1992; Dallek 2007; Haney 1994; Inbar 1999; Isaacson 1992; Kohl 1975; Martin 1988; Steinberg 2008; Thornton 2001), while others assess the war, its aftermath and effects (Allen 1982; Dunston 2007; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2004; Zeira 1993). Like my study, some of the research delves into the decision-making process conducted during the war (Astorino-Courtois 1995; Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008; Brecher 1980;
Brownstein 1977; Dowty 1984; Haney 1984; Maghroori 1981; Maoz and Astorino 1992; Quandt 1977). Most of the research on decision-making concludes their analysis with the end of the war. Brecher’s (1980) study extends beyond the war to the post-crisis period, but ends with the signing of the first disengagement
agreement on January 18, 1974. My study goes beyond the cessation of hostilities, the presumed end of the crisis, and concludes with the signing of the second disengagement settlement, the Sinai II Agreement. Furthermore, Brecher’s study compares the perceptions and attitudes of Israeli decision-makers in the 1967 Six Day War with those in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. While his study looks at particular decisions, my research applies a specific framework by which to compare decision units not only within governments but also between governments.
Of the studies mentioned above regarding decision-making, only one was published later than 1995. Therefore, in addition to the extended examination of the crisis and transition period, my study includes recently declassified documents of meetings, conversations, and correspondence. And, as Graham Allison (1969, 689) maintains, “[i]mproved understanding of...[crises] depends in part on more
additional information on the decision processes, bridging the time period between crisis and non-crisis, and examining how the authoritative decision unit(s) might change during that time are what distinguish my study from previous research.
Chapter Four presents a brief background regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship between the United States and Israel. It is not intended to be a comprehensive historical account, but rather strives to put the Yom Kippur War in its historical context and provide the reader with some foundational knowledge of U.S.-Israeli relations.
Notes: Chapter Three
1 Although Israel’s parliamentary system encourages cooperation and compromise between political
adversaries and tends to require coalitions to make policy decisions, foreign policy decisions are generally made within the Office of the Prime Minister and, under crisis conditions, are likely to be made by a small, elite group of actors. The decision unit may be classified as a coalition, however, if any one of the members of the decision group may withhold the resources of the state – essentially, veto any decision made.
2 For example, Franco of Spain was qualified to act as a ‘predominant leader’ yet had little interest in
foreign affairs and left much of Spain’s foreign policymaking to his foreign and economic ministers (M. Hermann et al 2001).