Theory of value as theory of knowledge and of power

At the core of valuation is the idea of purpose and knowledge because what ought to be is defined by the knowledge frontier. The big question is whose knowledge defines the knowledge frontier? A theory of power begins with knowledge and a theory of knowledge might begin with Dewey’s (1939, p.34) assertion that

“valuation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack, or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions. This fact in turn proves that there is present an intellectual factor – a factor of inquiry – whenever there is valuation…” (emphasis added).

The thrust of Dewey’s argument is that problem resolution is a process of knowledge creation. Peirce (1878) argued that a problem confronts society as a surprise, which in turn

93 | P a g e induces doubt in the minds of the members of society about the existing truths concerning the evolving problem thereby putting epistemic communities to work in search of new truth. According to Dewey (1939), society evaluates both means and ends in a means-consequence-means-consequence continuum. The consequences are the expected outcomes of a contemplated course of action. The consequences of the action become the means in the next iteration. The consequence is the end-in-view that equivalently is the reasonable/instrumental value.

Bromley (2004b; 2006; 2008d; 2012) characterises the Deweyan process in the formulation of new institutions in a democratic society. Bromley (2010, p.40) calls the first effects of the surprise on the minds of the members of society “impressions”. Democratic beings with some epistemic capacity evaluate the surprise guided by their individual impressions leading to “individualized expressions” (Bromley 2012, p.17). Relative to an individual’s social situatedness in life, the individualised expressions summarise the perceived nature of the problem, the perceived scale of the problem, the perceived cause of the problem and the perceived group(s) responsible for the problem (Bromley 2007). The individualised expressions become “the stories we tell to ourselves and to others” about the situation (Bromley 2010, p.41). The expressions (data) are “the mental stage on which we live”

(Bromley 2010, p.41). This stage constitutes the individually perceived and constructed reality. Similarly, individuals with epistemic capacity begin to create a mental future (end-in-view) as a function of the expressions (the data/means). The created future is a “set of created imaginings” (Bromley 2008d, p.6). As this process suggests, knowledge is being created at the individual level and its power is far from being felt at this stage.

Once investigators socialised to the same epistemic community discursively evaluate their individualised expressions and imaginings and converge on a particular expression and a particular imagining, they have a set of “warranted assertions” (Bromley 2008d, p.7). The theoretical claims of a particular scientific community are warranted but not necessarily valuable. Inasmuch as policy is to be formulated and implemented democratically in a democratic society, warranted assertions are data into the second hypotheses testing phase, the “process of working out an emergent consensus” (Bromley 2004b, p.93), by the national political leadership in legislatures and courts. This is the “realm of reasons”

94 | P a g e (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, p.106, emphasis in original). The outcome of such a valuation might be a draft policy, draft regulations or some such policy-related product.

At this stage, a third phase of hypotheses testing brings the emergent consensus that defines the contents of the proposed institution into democratic valuation by the broader political community. This is the realm of justification, which involves the “actual practices of giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom 1995, p.899). The warranted assertions making up the emergent consensus that survives this stage become “valuable assertions” (Bromley 2004b, p.91), which constitute new habits, new laws, new directives or new regulations – simply new institutions – because they represent the implementable democratic will.

Valuableness is a function of justification and informed reasoning (Price 2013). This somewhat linear account of knowledge production in democratic policymaking processes that lead to new institutions is actually non-linear. Bromley (2004b, p.82) emphasises that the divergent individual/group expressions and imaginings have to be reconciled in such a way that the emergent consensus satisfies two properties: feasibility and reasonableness. It is precisely for this reason that policy problems are mostly wicked. Warranted assertions can become new institutions before they are tested for valuableness whenever epistemic violence is prevalent in institutional change processes.

Following Foster’s (1981c) conceptualisation of a problem, it follows that what ought to be is rooted in existing and emerging knowledge that as yet has not been incorporated into the bloodstream of the current institutional systems. What ought to be is defined by a stochastic knowledge frontier of multiple imaginings from multiple epistemic communities.

This suggests that the theory of social value is a theory of knowledge. But not all knowledge can define what ought to be. Ceremonial systems are entrenched in the status quo and are presumably backward-looking. The institutionalist account of institutional change across the three schools so far is that knowledge producers are separable from knowledge users in policymaking processes. However, there is a possibility that knowledge producers might be entrenched insiders in the policymaking networks leading to a convergence of ceremonial/instrumental interests of the newly admitted insiders and the incumbents. This means ceremonial systems become forward-looking in addition to being backward looking.

95 | P a g e It is the claim of the thesis that producers of knowledge have power to shape the course, and, sometimes, the speed and extent of institutional adjustment. It is also claimed that, as the value frontier is defined by knowledge (technological process), the generators of knowledge define society’s future course of institutional adjustment, notwithstanding the presence of ceremonial encapsulation. This means that communicable knowledge (the social imaginary) is a source of discursive power in shaping imaginings and emergent expressions. While the power of scarcity and bargaining power (Commons 1942) have been enduring avenues of participation in the determination of the sovereign will and action, knowledge is foundational to defining who participates in the determination of the sovereign will.

The thesis claims that producers of knowledge who also belong to the community of policymakers in a society undoubtedly have the best opportunity of shaping the sovereign will and power. Epistemic communities whose membership finds itself in the community of policymakers stand greater chances of defining the value frontier, deciding which imaginings to implement, which, most likely, are the warranted assertions of their epistemic communities, leading to epistemic violence. Ayres (1996, not paged) similarly argued that

“the strength of those particular forces … is indeed entrenchment, physical and ideological, that counts and not the power which … accrues to ideas because they are right.”

Physical entrenchment implies that the epistemic community has physical seats in the decision-making body and not just being advisors. Ideological entrenchment, on the other hand, implies that the epistemic community has intellectual seats in the decision-making body such that its instituted social imaginary (ideology, beliefs, metaphors, concepts and mental models) controls the thought processes in that policymaking body. The epistemic community becomes the “invisible governors” who govern through “their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure” (Bernays 1928, p.9). Either case is a manifestation of epistemic violence because “institutionally and ideologically entrenched authority prevails” (Ayres 1996, not paged). The inherent danger is one in which the warranted assertions of one epistemic community find their way into new public policy, regulations or law before the gestation period to qualify for valuableness is over. This then generates a series of bitter controversies over the newly created institution. Therefore, this

96 | P a g e would be a manifestation of institutional hegemony (Dugger 1980) through the sanction of ignorance.

3.5. Conclusion

The major hypothesis emerging from the review is that knowledge is indispensable to progressive institutional change, but it is inseparable from the ideologies of the epistemic communities producing the knowledge. Thus, most epistemic claims combine ideology and ideas. Ideology is the source of epistemic violence especially when an epistemic community gains ascendency into a policymaking body. The ascendancy might be ideological or physical, but in each case it facilitates the epistemic community to appropriate sovereign power, to maintain it by epistemic violence and to participate jointly with the state in monopolising violence. In terms of the emerging social order, it would be the coexistence of an open access policymaking order and limited access policymaking order. The prediction in such cases is that regressive institutional change is the likely outcome, and will be contested, sometimes violently, which would be a wicked problem.

Chapter 4 reviews the methodology and the research methods used in this thesis to answer the question of whether institutional isolation, as perceived, really existed; the mechanisms by which it was transmitted and its potential economic effects on isolated sectors. The Chapter sets out the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study. Since the study employs a mixed methods methodology adapted to suit the needs for institutional analysis, the Chapter presents both qualitative and quantitative methods used in the study.

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Chapter 4