Traditional Perceptions of Power and the Evolution of NPE

According to Max Weber (1946), power is “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Weber, 1946, p.180). Many scholars provide different variations of power, however, reflecting the essence of Weber’s definition. One variation focuses on power and exchange, with power being defined as “the ability of persons or groups to impose their will

103 on others despite resistance or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction” (Blau, 1964, p.117). The concepts of exchange and power are kept apart despite the fact that exchange can lead to a certain type of power relation. Initially, exchange of services or goods is reciprocal and based on voluntary actions, while power is related to opposition. However, if a person is not able to provide equal services, he has to comply with the other person’s wishes to achieve the balance between the two traders.

While for Blau this is part of the exchange, Baldwin argues that every exchange can be described by power relations (Baldwin, 1978). According to Baldwin’s example of person A buying bread at person B’s shop, even this exchange is based on power since person A had the choice between using violence, threatening person B or begging for bread. It was A’s choice to pay with money which makes it look like exchange, but essentially A influenced B in such a way that B does what A wants. Yet another definition relates power to change of behavior:

‘A gets B to do what B would not have done without the influence of A’ (Dahl, 1957). Yet another definition adds the dimension of resistance and choice. In that sense, slavery does not show any power relation since the slave does not have any alternatives. Power becomes visible only in cases where a variety of options is available (Foucault, 1983). The reaction on the exercised power plays important roles and subsequently, the reversal of power becomes a possibility in power relations. While the examples above point out different facets of power, they all represent Weber’s core aspect of “realiz[ing] their own will in a communal action”

(Weber, 1946, p.180).

Evolution of Normative Power Europe

Contrary to traditional definitions of power in which one actor tries to make another actor do what they otherwise would not do (Dahl, 1957), others consign more importance to an actor’s self-representation (Ringmar, 2012). “That is, what matters is not what A can make B do but instead how such arm-twisting is interpreted by other actors and by the members of the audience. Their reaction is far more important than the action itself and their reaction is what the exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence. To be powerful is less important than to appear to be powerful” (Ringmar, 2012, p.19). Self-representation is a prominent feature in Normative Power Europe debates as NPE is defined by “what the EU is” more than “what it does” (Manners, 2002).

“Normative Power Europe” has recently developed into a widely accepted term for the

104 European Union. Ian Manners (2002) provides an extensive analysis of the EU as a normative power, in which a normative power is an actor that can “shape what can be ‘normal’ in international life”. It could be argued that every state has its own norms and consequently can be labeled a normative power, however, to be considered a normative power a state or organization needs to have the position to influence others in a way that the other actors will consider these external habits as normal. In other words, a normative power is able to set the outline of what is acceptable in international and national arenas. Three aspects are linked to normative power. First, the underlying principles of the normative power should be legitimate. Second, every action taken by the normative power should be seen as convincing by the target state. Third, the effectiveness of the power should arise from socialization (Manners, 2010).

The concept of normative power Europe arose from the discussions around whether Europe can be seen as a civilian or a military power (see Maull, 1990). Maull (1990) defines civilian power as a state that bases its foreign policies on certain values and principles, but uses special forms of influence and power. This distinction resembles Nye’s (1990) observation of soft power after the end of the Cold War vis-à-vis military power competitions between East and West during the Cold War. Both scholars bring forward a new type of power in contrast to military power, but Nye emphasizes economic traits such as technology and education (Nye, 1990), whereas Maull emphasizes values, such as solidarity, on which the economies are based (Maull, 1990).

Bull (1982) does not identify the Western European states as civilian powers due to their lack of military power. He argues that a state can have civilian power solely as long as other states with the capacity of military power do not use their power. Thus, once a third country decides to show its military power civilian power is non-existent. Therefore, civilian power can be exercised under the condition that the necessary military capacity is in place to back up the economic position. Specifically with regard to the Cold War and Europe’s dependence on the US after the Second World War, Bull outlines the importance of increasing Europe’s military power. In contrast, Maull suggests three features defining the EU as a civilian power: economic power, diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems, and the willingness to use supra-national institutions.

Similarly, a distinction can be made between economic power, military power and power over opinion (Carr, 1942). A state is generally built out of conflicting issues and acts upon those.

105

“Utopia and reality, the ideal and the institution, morality and power, are from the outset inextricably blended in” (Carr, 1942, p.124). “Morality and power” is the conflict most relevant to this thesis. Out of this conflict a state decides which actions to take and, therefore, which type of power to use. Put differently, “[p]olitical action must be based on a co-ordination of morality and power” (Carr, 1942, p.125). The actions that can be taken are of civilian, military or normative nature. Military power relates to the size of the military, military equipment and its effectiveness with the final goal of fighting and ultimately winning a war if necessary (Carr, 1942). Consequently, a country’s foreign policy is largely dependent on its military capacity.

Pushing the national agenda in international affairs becomes rather challenging without the supporting military capacity. As a result, throughout history, economic power and military power have been closely linked since wealthy states were able to finance a strong military.

However, with the emergence of modern states industry and trade became a symbol of power.

The so-called mercantilist approach defines power relations based on the assumption that increased national production and a low volume of imports would turn a country into a great power, which implies that economic power is just as important as military power. As a result, the government is expected to take on the role of a facilitator of wealth. Once prosperity is established, it can be used as an instrument in international policy-making through various mechanisms as foreign direct investment, regulation of the internal market or trade opportunities and embargos.

The third type of power is the power over opinion. Rhetoric and persuasion are just as vital to political strength as the previous two types of power. Accordingly, an actor with strong power over opinion is able to spread specific opinions among politically relevant individuals as well as large numbers of people. Especially with the broadening of the electorate, the opinion of the masses becomes politically important. While democracies are assumed to take public opinion into account, totalitarian regimes set standards for society.

However, as both systems use education and mass media for spreading ideas and opinions, this distinction cannot be upheld in reality. Regardless of the regime type, it is necessary for the government to shape general perceptions, because strong oppositions can lead to unwanted revolutions and, thus, to a loss of power. “The issue is no longer whether men shall be politically free to express their opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but subjection to the influence of innumerable forms of propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another” (Carr, 1942, p.171). Table 9

106 summarizes the academic interpretations of three types of power: military, soft, civilian and normative power.

Table 9: Different Types of Power

Authors Hard/Military Power Other forms of power

Nye

As Tocci (2008) points out, normative power from a neutral point of view simply implies the ability to shape what is normal in the international arena, independent of any moral considerations. This in turn means that any country, especially regional hegemons, could be considered as normative powers (Tocci, 2008). However, in most of the literature, the NPE concept implies a normative dimension. Practically speaking normative power is the use and communication of ideas and opinions (Diez, 2005). This makes this type of power dependent on its context, thus the arena in which it can be used. The effectiveness of normative power strongly depends on the subjective understanding of the other actors involved in the relationship (Wolf, 2011). Respect and mutual trust relevant factors to establish cooperation between actors and this respect arises from virtues, qualities, rights, values and interests accepted by the actors involved (Wolf, 2011). Hence, “shaping what is normal” (Manners, 2002), the prerequisite for normative power, in international relations requires acceptance by other actors. Actors whose cultural background varies greatly from the EU’s will be less likely to simply accept the EU as a normative power. The costs of adaptation are too high in this

107 case. On the other hand, countries that are culturally close to the EU will have less resistance to EU ideas as the mindset resembles to a great extent. It is exactly this acceptance that a normative power seeks to achieve.

The former Communist states in Eastern Europe are a prominent example of this interrelation. While the EU wanted to foster democratic rights and freedoms, the Eastern European countries were willing to adapt to EU standards in order to increase the chances for future accession to the EU. At the same time the unsuccessful Communist regime was something that needed to be changed. Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc created favoring circumstances for the EU to become a normative power. But is the EU also a normative power outside geographical Europe? Kavalski (2013) argues that “Brussels does not seem capable of formulating relations with countries beyond the realm of membership and privileged partnership that would sustain the socializing influence of its normative power” (p.251). While conditionality is the main policy tool for transferring norms and values to prospective member states, on a global scale the EU needs to build relations with third actors to be able to convey its ideas successfully.

As can be seen, defining the EU exclusively as one of the three mentioned powers is practically impossible. While the EU intervenes in countries where human security is endangered, hence acts as a military power, it does not overemphasize its military capacity (Diez, 2013). In contrast, military intervention is rather limited (Youngs, 2004) and remains limited under the Lisbon Treaty. To overcome this divide between the EU’s different roles, normative policy coherence creates a link between the EU’s normative dimensions, i.e. its normative power, and other policy areas. This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s commitment to norms and its efforts to implement norms across policy areas.