What is True and What is Valid?

In this section I discuss epistemological foundations of relativism (interpretivism) and realism (objectivism). Knowing what is true and what is not is undeniably impossible. I have considered the competing paths to search for truth.

A relativist position provides no criteria of validity that establishes a direct relationship with actual social reality, knowledge claims and experience (Woolgar 1988). The assumption of this position is that there are multiple truths that are all valid and equal and are produced within different ways of knowing, which provides ways of rationalising the social world. This position denies that general rules can be applied across all stories, therefore allowing each story to be unique. Rather than attempting to remove them from the research process, reflexivity is an on-going process of self-awareness and is used as a tool by relativists to provide validity to their claims. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. A disadvantage for relativists is that their position makes them

unable to connect different accounts of reality with some actual reality, as no account is viewed as being truer than the other. This leads to further problems as relativists reject the right to judge between cultures, this becomes a direct challenge to modern feminism (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2009). I agree with Ramazanoglu and Holland (2009) when they argue that feminism is politically dismembered by relativism, which makes me nervous about moving totally away from realism, as I feel I am disregarding the roots I align myself to.

Objectivity has long been used in connection with Cartesian dualisms at the opposite end to subjectivity and implies that the researcher is able to control the research process to ensure neutral knowledge is produced. Objectivity is generally viewed as a realist approach. Subjectivity is at the opposite end of the pole within a relativist approach. In the past subjectivity has been viewed as not being able to be controlled and contaminating the truth. It has been seen as introducing bias to the scientific process, but objectivity is not as pure as it may seem.

Ramazanoglu and Holland (2009) discuss how the supposed objectivity, neutrality and rationality of scientific method allow the production of patriarchal knowledge, which work against the knowledge of gender relations. This aspect is blinkered by objectivity as it sees only one truth existing, depending on the position you view the world from. This enables loaded terms to be used and interpreted as being applied to the population as a whole. Difference is then blanketed, as only one way of viewing the world is acceptable. Harding (1993) sees some version of objectivity as essential for establishing the validity and authority of feminist knowledge through connecting this knowledge with social reality.

“ Knowledge that is strongly objective is less partial and distorted than existing (male centred) knowledge”

(Harding 1993:68).

Therefore, she calls on feminists not to give up on objectivity but to use it differently, including the use of reflexivity. She suggests steps to making this a reality, these are: the researcher discusses how the knowledge production process is included in the research (reflexivity); the agendas for research questions should be grounded in the experiences of those who are ignored

through dominant beliefs and activities; to be aware strong objectivity resists relativism; strong objectivity means treating the researcher and the subjects of knowledge as visible and embodied (Harding 1993).

Haraway (1991,1997) recognises Harding’s concern with objectivity, but shifts concern away from validity in scientific method to that of politics instead. She escapes the shackles of objectivity by moving to a concept of ‘situated knowledges’ and the privilege of ‘partial perspective’. Haraway (1991) calls for researchers to resonate with women’s situations, as well as our own situation. Therefore, we must recognise the complex view from her body, as well as acknowledging the complex view from our own. She recognises that no epistemological perspective is privileged.

“I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims. These are complex, contradictory, structuring and structured body, versus the view from above, from nowhere.”

(Haraway 1991:195)

This different way of looking at validity and truth is further supplemented by her concept of diffraction. She argues that researchers should move away from reflexivity for the reason of moving beyond self-vision as the cure for self- invisibility (Haraway 1997). It can shift the focus away from the research being studied and overshadow the voices of the participants within it. She says (Haraway 1997) that if what we are searching for is a new kind of world and worldliness that we should look towards diffraction. She describes this as:

“Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals, unlike reflections. Diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere in more or less distorted form, thereby giving rise to metaphysics”

(Haraway 1997:273).

I choose to hang onto some of the trustworthiness and credibility concerns of not letting go of feminism, whilst also considering the new opportunities of the future, so embrace the concepts of Haraway to use in my study.