TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (252)

(1) The persons who inflicted serious physical injury upon the victim;

(2) If they could not be known, then anyone who may have employed violence on that person will answer for his death.

(3) If nobody could still be traced to have employed violence upon the victim, nobody will answer. The crimes committed might be disturbance of public order, or if participants are armed, it could be tumultuous disturbance, or if property was destroyed, it could be malicious mischief.

The fight must be tumultuous. The participants must not be members of an organized group. This is different from a rumble which involves organized groups composed of persons who are to attack others. If the fight is between such groups, even if you cannot identify who, in particular, committed the killing, the adverse party composing the organized group will be collectively charged for the death of that person.

Illustration:

If a fight ensued between 20 Sigue-Sigue Gang men and 20 Bahala-Na- Gang men, and in the course thereof, one from each group was killed, the crime would be homicide or murder; there will be collective responsibility on both sides. Note that the person killed need not be a participant in the fight.

5. PHYSICAL INJURIES CAUSED IN

TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (252)

Elements

1. There is a tumultuous affray;

2. A participant or some participants thereof suffered serious physical injuries or physical injuries of a less serious nature only;

3. The person responsible thereof can not be identified;

4. All those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the offended party are known.

If in the course of the tumultuous affray, only serious or less serious physical injuries are inflicted upon a participant, those who used violence upon the person of the offended party shall be held liable.

Note that only those who used violence are punished, because if the one who caused the physical injuries is known, he will be liable for the physical injuries actually committed, and not under this article.

In physical injuries caused in a tumultuous affray, the conditions are also the same. But you do not have a crime of physical injuries resulting from a tumultuous affray if the physical injury is only slight. The physical injury should be serious or less serious and resulting from a tumultuous affray. So anyone who may have employed violence will answer for such serious or less serious physical injury.

If the physical injury sustained is only slight, this is considered as inherent in a tumultuous affray. The offended party cannot complain if he cannot identify who inflicted the slight physical injuries on him.

6. GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE (253)

Acts punished

1. Assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is consummated or not;

2. Lending his assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of doing the killing himself. Giving assistance to suicide means giving means (arms, poison, etc.) or whatever manner of positive and direct cooperation (intellectual aid, suggestions regarding the mode of committing suicide, etc.).

In this crime, the intention must be for the person who is asking the assistance of another to commit suicide.

If the intention is not to commit suicide, as when he just wanted to have a picture taken of him to impress upon the world that he is committing suicide because he is not satisfied with the government, the crime is held to be inciting to sedition.

He becomes a co-conspirator in the crime of inciting to sedition, but not of giving assistance to suicide because the assistance must be given to one who is really determined to commit suicide.

If the person does the killing himself, the penalty is similar to that of homicide, which is reclusion temporal. There can be no qualifying circumstance because the determination to die must come from the victim. This does not contemplate euthanasia or mercy killing where the crime is homicide (if without consent; with

consent, covered by Article 253).

The following are holdings of the Supreme Court with respect to this crime:

(1) The crime is frustrated if the offender gives the assistance by doing the killing himself as firing upon the head of the victim but who did not die due to medical assistance.

(2) The person attempting to commit suicide is not liable if he survives. The accused is liable if he kills the victim, his sweetheart, because of a suicide pact.

In other penal codes, if the person who wanted to die did not die, there is liability on his part because there is public disturbance committed by him. Our Revised Penal Code is silent but there is no bar against accusing the person of disturbance of public order if indeed serious disturbance of public peace occurred due to his attempt to commit suicide. If he is not prosecuted, this is out of pity and not because he has not violated the Revised Penal Code.

Is assistance to suicide identical with euthanasia (mercy killing)?

No. Euthanasia which is termed for mercy killing is the practice of painlessly putting to death a person suffering from some incurable disease. Euthanasia is not lending assistance to suicide. In euthanasia, the victim is not in a position to commit suicide. Whoever would heed his advice is not really giving assistance to suicide but doing the killing himself. In giving assistance to suicide, the principal actor is the person committing the suicide. A doctor who resorts to mercy-killing of his patient may be liable for murder.

7. DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES (247)

Elements

1. A legally married person, or a parent, surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person;

2. He or she kills any or both of them, or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter;

3. He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. The requisites of Art. 247 must be established by the evidence of the defense, because the prosecution will have to charge the defendant with parricide and/or homicide, in case death results; or serious physical injuries in the other case.

To Art. 247 to apply (death under exceptional circumstances), the offender must prove that he actually surprised his wife and [her paramour] in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man

during or immediately thereafter. Evidence of the victim’s promiscuity, is inconsequential to the killing. (People vs. Puedan, GR No. 139576, September 2, 2002)

Justification for Art. 247:

The law considers the spouse or parent as acting in a justified burst of passion.

Two stages contemplated before the article will apply:

(1) When the offender surprised the other spouse with a paramour or mistress. The attack must take place while the sexual intercourse is going on. If the surprise was before or after the intercourse, no matter how immediate it may be, Article 247 does not apply. The offender in this situation only gets the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, that is, sufficient provocation immediately preceding the act. (2) When the offender kills or inflicts serious

physical injury upon the other spouse and/or paramour while in the act of intercourse, or immediately thereafter, that is, after surprising.

You have to divide the stages because as far as the first stage is concerned, it does not admit of any situation less than sexual intercourse. So if the surprising took place before any actual sexual intercourse could be done because the parties are only in their preliminaries, the article cannot be invoked anymore.

If the surprising took place after the actual sexual intercourse was finished, even if the act being performed indicates no other conclusion but that sexual intercourse was had, the article does not apply.

As long as the surprising took place while the sexual intercourse was going on, the second stage becomes immaterial.

It is either killing or inflicting physical injuries while in that act or immediately thereafter. If the killing was done while in that act, no problem. If the killing was done when sexual intercourse is finished, a problem arises. First, were they surprised in actual sexual intercourse? Second, were they killed immediately thereafter?

The phrase “immediately thereafter” has been interpreted to mean that between the surprising and the killing of the inflicting of the physical injury, there should be no break of time. In other words, it must be a continuous process.

The article presumes that a legally married person who surprises his or her better half in actual sexual intercourse would be overcome by the obfuscation he felt when he saw them in the act that he lost his head. The law, thus, affords protection to a spouse who is considered to

have acted in a justified outburst of passion or a state of mental disequilibrium. The offended spouse has no time to regain his self-control. If there was already a break of time between the sexual act and the killing or inflicting of the injury, the law presupposes that the offender regained his reason and therefore, the article will not apply anymore.

As long as the act is continuous, the article still applies.

Where the accused surprised his wife and his paramour in the act of illicit intercourse, as a result of which he went out to kill the paramour in a fit of passionate outburst. Although about one hour had passed between the time the accused discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually killed, it was held in