with the Communist headers
98 United Front and allied with other classes against the external enemy.
In his article of late April 1938, Ch'in Pang-hsien enunciated the Communists’ support for the bourgeoisie in the national revolutionary struggle. Citing Lenin to support his arguments, Ch'in pointed out that in countries oppressed by feudalism and imperialism (as opposed to
capitalist countries) the bourgeois national revolution was a pro gressive movement. Therefore, the Communists would positively support the struggle for national independence, although they were at the same
97
time internationalists and fighters for socialism. This explanation was elaborated by Ch'en Shao-yil in an article written on June 15 in anticipation of the seventeenth anniversary of the CCP. Ch'en affirmed that in spite of the CCP’s ultimate objective of achieving communism, the struggle against imperialism was the primary task of the Party at the present stage because of Japan's threat to China'a inde pendence. This was because Communists, he claimed, "do not decide their strategy and tactics from their subjective point of view but according to the special national characteristics and the concrete political class relationships in the country". In the past, the CCP had launched the land revolution against both imperialism and feudalism because the
bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution and allied themselves with foreign imperialists. At present, however, it firmly supported the Anti-Japanese
98 United Front and allied with other classes against the external enemy.
Ch'en Po-ta, Lin P o-ch’U and Hsiang Ying propounded similar themes on the 99
occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the CCP. (It is worth not ing that in explaining the C C P 's support for the united front policy, Chang W e n - t ’ien also stated that "Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma but a guide for action", and that Communists took into consideration the national characteristics of each country and the concrete, conditions at each stage of development in deciding their policies. At the CC P ’s Sixth Plenum
shortly afterwards, Mao further expounded on this axiom. To contemporaries, therefore, it was unlikely that they would perceive any difference in the CCP lea
dership.) On June 24, the CCP Central Committee issued a Propaganda Outline which declared that the CCP was the "Marxist-Leninist Party of the
Chinese people". Its mission was to achieve the "liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people" and the ultimate realization of communism. At the present stage in this struggle, the primary task of' the Party was to establish a democratic republic based on national independence, democratic liberty and people’s welfare. In the past seventeen years of its development, the CCP had been pursuing these goals, and its policy had proven correct. The Party, it declared, would "stand firm in the Anti- Japanese United Front, steadfastly maintain its political and organizational independence, expand and reinforce its forces" as these were the best
guarantees for the final liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people. It is clear that the C C P 's propaganda was aimed at discredit ing both the Trotskyite charge that it had betrayed communism as well as the accusation from its critics that it did not support the KMT whole heartedly .
Interestingly, Mao's name was conspicuously absent in the above publication to celebrate the anniversary of the Party. Instead he published his speech entitled "On Protracted War", delivered earlier to the Yenan Study Group on the War of Resistance against Japan (Yen-an K'ang-Jih chan-
cheng yen-oh'lu hui) in May 1938. According to the recollection of M a o ’s
personal attendant, Mao had spent many days writing up the treatise, and as soon as it was completed he presented it to Chang W e n - t ’ien, Liu Shao- ch'i, K'ang Sheng and other Politburo members for c o m m e n t s . I t s final publication suggests that Mao had won their support for his views
In his article, Mao paid homage Lo the heroic efforts of all parties and classes in the War of Resistance, including the KMT and the bourgeoisie. He affirmed the correctness of the call for the greater development and consolidation of the alliance with the KMT, admitting that "the KMT, judging by its history, its leaders and its majority, would persist in the war". He condemned the view that now that the situation had changed for the better, it was time to create or intensify
friction" between the two parties. He also recognized the progressive role of the capitalist class in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country struggling against imperialistic invasion, claiming that the existence of a bourgeois political party with its strong armed forces was China’s
advantage over Abyssinia, which had easily fallen under foreign domination. In what appeared to be a direct rebuke of the Chinese Trotskyites' "war- revolution" thesis (i.e., Communists should turn against the ruling class even in a war against external agression and transform the war into a socialist revolution), he stated that there were two types of wars: the progressive and reactionary, or "righteous" and "non-righteous" , and that Communists resolutely supported the former. "in China" he asserted, "from the Government to the people, from the KMT to the CCP
... Lall] are participating in an anti-aggression national revolutionary war. Our war is sacred, progressive and righteous". Thus, in line with
the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist position, Mao renounced the Trotskyite view to overthrow a bourgeois government in the midst of an anti-imperialist
102 wa r .
However, Mao’s support for the united front was geared
towards the construction and development of rural guerrilla base areas as the principal strategy of the Chinese revolution. Mao clearly saw that the Japanese troops, because of their shortage of man-power, could not penetrate and establish effective control in the vast hinterland, and that it was most advisable to concentrate Communist activities on filling the vacuum created by the Japanese in the rural areas. From these base areas, the Communists could harass the enemy, wear down their military strength, and eventually defeat them through a protracted war of attrition. In May 1938, Mao had already defined his strategy in "Problem of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan":
communication lines, the guerrillas must do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare
from their
base areas as widely as possible and hem in all the enemy's strong holds, thus threatening his existence ;=igcj shaking his morale while expanding the base areas.In "On Protracted War", Mao further expounded the importance of guerrilla warfare. He envisaged a three-stage development of the war: 1. the
stage of strategic defence in which the main form of combat would be mobile warfare in coordination with guerrilla and positional warfare; 2. the stage of stalemate in which the main form of combat would be guerrilla warfare in coordination with mobile warfare; 3. the stage of counteroffensive in which the main form of combat would be mobile war fare in coordination with positional and guerrilla warfare. It is clear, however, that the logic implied in Mao's position was that mobile warfare should be reserved largely for the Nationalist troops, while
the Communists forces should concentrate on guerrilla warfare. He stated: "with regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary". (In an internal report delivered in November 1938, Mao was even more explicit: "The KMT and the CCP should adopt a policy of division of labour ... with the
KMT shouldering responsibility for regular warfare and the CCP shouldering 104
responsibility for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear".
Accordingly, Mao asserted that the tactics of the Eighth Route Army should be based on"guerrilla warfare, but not giving up any chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions". In practice, this
meant that the Communist forces should preserve their strength and avoid any large-scale and decisive confrontation with the enemy, even to the extent of abandoning the territory which the enemy wished to take. Mao defended his position by saying:
with the enemy is non-resistance and should not only be denounced but must never be tolerated .... But in order to avoid the enemy'6 deadly trap, it is absolutely
necessary that we should not allow our main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it diffi
cult to continue the War of Resistance.
To constrain the anxiety among Communist troops eager to fight the
Japanese, Mao dismissed the view that the guerrilla units "should regard their status as lower because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes". Citing a common Chinese saying
that "a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a man's heart" as an anology, he explained that "guerrilla warfare does not bring quick results or great renown as regular warfare", but in the long run it "will demonstrate its immense power". Thus, to Mao, avoidance of frontal combat with the Japanese and conservation of the strength of the Communist forces were not only compatible with but also necessary for the successful prosecution of the War of Resistance.
Apart from harassing and partially destroying the enemy, the basic function of the guerrilla units was, of course, to mobilize the masses. Mao advocated that "out of the millions of China's regular
troops, it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred
thousand to disperse throughout all enemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm themselves and together wage guerrilla warfare". This was because the mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and fulfill the prerequisites for winning the war".
Nevertheless, Mao did not neglect the importance of the Anti- Japanese United Front. In calling for greater attention to guerrilla warfare, Mao also warned that "without a political goal, guerrilla war fare must fail". Specifically, he explained:
War is the continuation of politics .... The Anti- Japanese War is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the political aim of the war - to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality - [andj
inseparable from ... the effective application of united front policy .... Any tendency among the anti- Japanese armed forces to belittle politics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea that ’war is every
thing’ is wrong and should be corrected.
What Mao was saying, in effect, was that military preparation (or, in Communist parlance, armed struggle) alone would not be sufficient to build up the strength of the Communists; it had to be supplemented by the united front whose political objective was to liberate China from Japanese imperialism and build a new China based on the principles of the democratic republic. In the same treatise, Mao stressed that the "economic policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front" (i.e., concessions to landlord and capitalist elements) had to be strictly observed, and that "to win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war".105)
To facilitate the construction of guerrilla bases in the country side, Mao argued that local guerrilla forces had to be given considerable
106
freedom in dealing with the problems in local areas. What he meant, as Otto Bruan observes, was that the Eighth Route Army should carry out the strategy of "filling the vacuum in the Japanese rear by decentralized occupation, political mobilization and de facto seizure of power".10^ Subsequently, Mao's policy of unauthorized territorial expansion did create tension between the two parties. To Mao, however, the expansion was not only justified by the strategic requirements of the war, but also by the fact that the CCP had not violated the united front agreement with the KMT, i.e., the Communist had terminated all activities aimed at the direct overthrow of the Nationalist Government. (From the Nationalists’ point of view,of course, Mao's guerrilla tactics appear as evading responsibility for the war and his policy of constructing guerrilla bases was clearly for self-aggrandizement.)
who subsequently helped Mao to defeat Ch'en Shao-yH and "torpedoed 108
the Comintern line". This is partly corroborated by Chang Kuo-t’ao who recalls that prior to his own departure from Yenan in April 1938, Mao had been busy coordinating the work of the activists of the Eighth Route
109
Army at the front. A brief survey of the writings of military leaders and the Yenan Study Group shows that Mao's support came mainly from Lin Piao and Junior commanders such as Hsiao K'o, P'eng HsUeh-feng, Wang Shou-tao, Kuo Hua-jo, Hsiao Ching-kuang and Ch'en Po-chÜn, who advocated the
extensive application of guerrilla warfare and the construction of guerrilla bases as the basic task of the Communist forces.11^ In contrast, Chu Teh and Yeh Chien-ying continued to favour the application of mobile warfare
under favourable conditions" although they by no means neglected the importance of guerrilla warfare.111 Liu Shao-ch'i firmly endorsed the strategy of building guerrilla bases in North China, although he also stressed that in pursuing such an objective the Communist forces had to avoid creating conflicts with other allied armies.112 As far as the
highest level of Party leadership was concerned, it seems that Ch'en Shao- y ü's cooperative approach was still the order of the day.
In June 1938, the KMT-CCP collaboration was given a tremendous boost by the creation of the People's Political Consultative Assembly by
the Natioalist Government. It comprised one hundred and fifty delegates, most of whom were KMT members. At the same time, representatives from other parties such as the Chinese Youth Party beaded by Tso Shun-sheng, the National Socialist Party headed by Chang Chdn-mai (Carsun Chang) as well as noted educationists and national Salvationists were also appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the KMT. From the CCP, seven
members - Mao, Ch'en Shao-yd, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Lin Po-ch'U, Wu Yu-chang, Tung Pi—wu and Teng Ying—ch'ao (Madame Chou En—lai) — were given
representation in the Assembly. Although the Assembly was invested only with advisory power, it was greeted over the nation as an unprecedented and progressive step, symbolizing unity and respect for public opinion.113 Ch en Shao-yH (in line with Lenin and Stalin who approved Communist
participation in bourgeois—reformist parliaments) evidently considered the Assembly as fulfilling to a certain degree the function of an all- China parliament and the CCP should utilize the opportunity to propagate its political platform and expand its influence among the masses.21^ Mao, apparently lacking interest in a KMT--sponsored organ and primarily con-
cernecl with the construction of rural guerrilla bases, personally declined to attend,
At the first session of the Assembly which met between July 6 and 15, the Nationalist Government acknowledged that the CCP had faith fully observed the conditions for unity laid down by the K M T . ^ ^ In response, Ch'en Shao-yd proposed a resolution, which bore the signatures of sixth-seven delegates, calling for support for the KMT's Programme of National Resistance and National Construction. Nevertheless, he did not neglect to declare that while the CCP firmly supported the Programme,
it retained its own programme for the realization of communism. Towards the end of the session, Ch'en also vehemently opposed Wang Ching-wei's recommendations for improved relations with Germany and Italy on the grounds that they were allies of Japan; the Soviet Union, he declared,
116
was the natural ally of China. Inspite of his outspokenness, he was able to impress many delegates with his earnest attitude in support of unity and cooperation. Both Tso Shun-sheng and the Nationalist
117 educationist T'ao Hsi-sheng spoke favourably of Ch'en in their memoirs.
Since early 1938, various national Salvationist bodies and military commanders, including Yeh Chien-ying, had been calling for the
118