Values and behaviour: interrelation and attributions

As someone’s values cannot be observed directly, they are inferred from the observable behaviour (which includes utterances) and subsequently

attributed to a person. The relation, however, between values and the outwardly visible ‘skin’ (Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 96) of someone’s conduct is problematic on several accounts.

First, this relation can be conceptualised in several ways. In Begley’s values syntax (figure 3) for instance it is seen as mediated by attitudes, where attitudes ‘can be formally defined as the predisposition to act specifically as a result of values or value system acquired previously and elsewhere’ (Begley, 2003, p. 6, cf. 2001, p. 9; Hodgkinson 1991, p. 94).

Figure 3. Begley’s onion model of a person’s value syntax (Begley 2001, p. 4; 2003, p. 5).

Values themselves, in this concept, rest on more fundamental understandings and motives. It seems to be difficult to verify this

empirically and in that case it is essentially an assumption. Furthermore, values may provide a motive for doing certain things, effectively reversing the order (see 2.1.1 and 2.1.3). The value of mercy, for instance, may be a motive for allowing a teacher to go home early to care for a sick child, even when he is not entitled to get leave. Finally, in Branson’s model of the Self (2004, p. 69; 2005, p. 19; 2007a, p. 230; 2007b, p. 477) the interstitial layer between values and behaviour is the layer of beliefs, which is rather different from a layer of attitudes in Begley’s model. There obviously is no consensus on models of the self. However, it is clear that behaviour is unanimously seen as the outwardly visible ‘outer self’ (Branson, 2007a, p. 230), and as an expression of values that lay more close to the core of the self of a person, which can be mediated by another variable.

That leads, however, to a second problematic point, which is how

attributions of values take place. From the perspective of a person himself, his natural inclination will be to enact his values. This does not mean that he is by definition aware of his values. The extent to which this is the case depends on self-knowledge and reflection (e.g. Branson, 2007a, 2007b; Begley, 2010), which implies that he may not be able to accurately give

words to what his values are (Branson, 2007a, p. 226; Erickson, 1986, p. 123; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998, p. 360). Thus, learning someone’s values cannot solely rely on what he says. Furthermore, from the point of view of outsiders, they normally make value attributions on the basis of someone’s behaviour and not merely his words. Attributions will be subject to a degree of uncertainty, for various reasons. Observers should take into account the possibility that more than one set of values matches a certain posture, as well as taking stock of the interference of mediating variables. The

uncertainty about which values underpin which behaviour is, of course, exacerbated by the existence of mediating, interstitial layers in the

personality of the observed, as mentioned before. Furthermore, the context also influences the availability and choice of action alternatives (see 2.1.6), thus adding another mediating variable. In other words, the line from values to behaviour and vice versa is not necessarily straightforward. In sum, the extent to which someone’s behaviour reflects his core values may vary.

Third, not only are attributions of values of one individual made by one other individual; in a school community, as in any community,

interpretations tend to be exchanged among the members of the

community. Interpretations are traditionally studied in the discipline of arts and literature and possibly cross-disciplinary borrowing might open up new perspectives here. A theory which explores the meaning of a text and the interpretive process in the context of a community is Reader Response Theory (RRT), which stems from the 1970’s. RRT addresses questions such as whether a text carries an inherent, immanent, meaning, and where and how the reader comes into the equation. Although it is difficult to describe premises, methodology, shared perspectives, techniques and beliefs of reader response approaches (Harding, 2014, p. 69), it can be said that the ‘text contains meaning only insofar as a reader engages with the text to interpret its meaning’ (Harding, 2014, p. 69). If the reader with his individual background is pivotal to the extent this quote suggests, this evokes the question how different readers with different biographies can apparently have the same interpretation of a text and find an identical meaning. In order to address this issue RRT uses the concept of the

of RRT, ‘the fact of agreement, rather than being a proof of the stability of objects, is a testimony to the power of an interpretive community to constitute the objects upon which its members (also and simultaneously constituted) can then agree.’ (Fish, 1980, p. 338). While leaving aside the alleged radically constructivist ontology of RRT (Cooling 2013; cf. however Gioia & Gwynn, 2006, pp. 897f), or necessarily accepting the

presuppositions of reader response approaches, the concept of the ‘interpretive community’ may be borrowed and applied to the extent of agreement between groups of respondents on value attributions of heads, as that will appear in the case studies.

Fourth, there is yet another factor which complicates the relation between values and behaviour as there may well exist a disparity between espoused values and values which are in use (Begley 1999a, p. 4; 1999b, p. 238; Lickona, 2013, p. 5; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998, p. 356; cf. Argyris & Schön, 1974; McLaughlin, 2005, p. 310). Hoy and Miskel summarise research findings by stating that ‘only a slight relationship exists between how leaders say they should behave and subordinates describe that they do behave’ (2013, p. 435). This may happen unintentionally, but also, as Carr asserts, that ‘the values that people often profess may be notional positions to which they may also pay little more than lip service’ (Carr, 2011, p. 172; cf. Begley, 2010, p. 40). Therefore, apart from the lack of awareness, and the mediating variables between values and behaviour mentioned in the previous paragraph, the potential gap between claimed values and ‘values in action’ (Lickona, 2013, p. 5) hamper straightforward attribution of value positions. This has obvious methodological implications concerning validity and reliability, which necessitate triangulation, for instance by using more sources of information or observing actual behaviour (Campbell, Gold & Lunt, 2003, pp. 207, 218).