Values influence what causes empathy (i.e they are triggering causes)

triggering causes)

Another agent in the environment or a “target”, is commonly the triggering cause of empathy (Dretske 1991). I am following Dretske here in distinguishing between triggering and structuring causes (Dretske 1991, ch. 2). Targets are what trigger the activation of empathy’s component processes. Which targets are taken by an agent as a potential target of empathy is the result of a confluence of factors. In some sense, the entirety of an agent’s history, environment, and psychology can be understood as contributing to which targets an agent empathizes with. This is because an agent’s psychological development generally will contribute to explaining this phenomenon of selection. Also, an agent’s interactions with a particular target often vary over time, and will thus influence whether that particular target is taken as a potential target of empathy. In modeling these interactions I will examine several factors, which along with values, influence which targets become triggers of empathy. Values influence which targets will be taken as potential targets of empathy [PTE]. But their influence is indirect. There is no immediate causal connection between an agent’s values and which targets an agent takes

to be PTE. I will argue that it is more accurate to describe what determines which targets are selected as PTE as a system of reciprocal causal relationships between an agent’s terminal values, goals, motivational orientations, environments, and instrumental values. In this section I will address the first four of these factors. In the next section on values as structuring causes of empathy, the role instrumental values will be described.

As discussed above, terminal values are an agent’s beliefs about a desirable end-state of existence. Examples of terminal values are “freedom”, “equality”, and “a comfortable life” (Rokeach 1973, p 252; Curhan et al. 2006). Insofar as an agent values “freedom” that agent will assign value to an outcome in which freedom is present and promoted. That agent will feel positive emotions when freedom is promoted and negative ones when it is challenged. And that agent will strive for or behave in such as a way as to achieve an end state which that agent describes as “free”. This brings us to the second factor: goals. Agents engage in goal-directed behaviour (Adams and Enç 1992; Barker 2008). And terminal values influence these goals. Usually, behaviours will not be directed at

attaining a particular valued end-state. Rather, an agent’s goals are influenced by terminal values in that the latter affect which goals an agent chooses to pursue. For example, an agent who values “a comfortable life” will not go about aiming to achieve a comfortable life in all contexts. At any moment, the goal of agent’s behaviours will not usually be to realize a terminal value. Rather, terminal values influence an agent’s choice of goals. That is, the goals an agent chooses to pursue will be influenced by their belief that a comfortable life is desirable.

We are now beginning to approach the indirect influence of values on an agent’s

selection of PETs. Terminal values influence an agent’s choice of goals. These goals, in turn, will affect an agent’s motivational orientations. When interacting with targets, agents have different social motives or orientations. In game theory, these orientations play an important role in determining the way in which agents interact with targets, and the strategies they use in order to achieve goal-directed outcomes (McClintock 1972; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman et al. 1986; McClintock and Liebrand 1988). Four motivational orientations are distinguished:

1) Individualism (maximization of agent’s own gain)

2) Competition (maximization of difference between agent and target’s gain) 3) Cooperation (maximization of joint gain)

4) Altruism (maximization of other’s gain)

The goals that an agent pursues will shape the motivational orientations that an agent is in when interacting with PETs. And these goals will, of course, vary according to

environmental context. For example, an agent who values “profit” may be working at a very profitable company. While at work, that agent will pursue a variety of work-related goals such as: impressing a client at a meeting with competitors; discussing the budget at a staff meeting; visiting a construction site. A change in goal can affect the motivational orientation that an agent is in when interacting with targets that the agent encounters. For example, when pursuing the goal of impressing a client, the agent may be in a

competitive motivational orientation towards other salespeople. When pursuing the goal of negotiating a budget at the staff meeting, the agent may be in a cooperative

motivational orientation towards co-workers. Accordingly, changes in goals can involve changes in the motivational orientations, which in turn determine the behavioural

strategies that an agent employs when interacting with targets (Ibid.). The significance of motivational orientations for which targets are taken as PETs is that changes in

motivational orientations will involve changes in which targets an agent cares for. On this model, I predict that motivational orientations will be importantly related to the value ofcare that agents assign to targets. It is more likely that an agent will care for a target when in the cooperative or altruistic orientations (as opposed to the individualistic or competitive orientations). Because an agent is interested in maximizing joint gain when in a cooperative orientation this indicates that the agent may value the well-being of the target insofar as that target’s well-being is compatible with that of the agent’s well- being. The strategy of “joint gain” that is at work in the cooperative orientation implies that the agent, at the very least, is concerned (in Prinz and Darwall’s third-person sense) for the well-being of the target. Furthermore, I think that in the cooperative orientation it

is likely that an agent’s concern may cause or be accompanied by attempts at like-me perspective-taking resulting in a first-person awareness of a target’s concerns and a motivation to help that target with their concerns. As we have seen, valuing the well- being of a target is typical of like-me perspective taking. In the altruistic motivational orientation, that an agent care for the target is all but guaranteed. In an altruistic

orientation, an agent is both more likely to care for a target and more likely to attempt to empathize with that target. This prediction is supported by evidence of the high

correlation between empathy and altruistic behaviour. I have argued that what explains this altruistic behaviour as a result of empathy is that care is constitutive of empathy. Thus, I predict that in the altruistic motivational orientation, agents will likely take targets as PETs and engage in like-other perspective-taking. The role of care in like-other perspective-taking explains the selection of PETs in an altruistic motivational orientation.

Figure 1: Motivational orientations and terminal values

I have been arguing that values (terminal values and“care”) will play a crucial role in determining which targets are taken by agents as potential targets of empathy. An agent will be in a particular context as a result of terminal values. In this context, that agent will pursue goals which will be met by adopting motivational orientations of interaction towards targets. I have predicted that in motivational orientations of cooperation and altruism, an agent is more likely to assign value to the well-being of a target. This is because care plays important roles in causing an agent to empathize with a target. And with greater reason, because care is constitutive of empathy, an orientation in which an agent is likely to care for a target is one in which an agent is likely to empathize with that target.

2.13.2

Values influence why empathy occurs (i.e. they are