minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that
it cannot arise in any other situation. In the case of Salvaña v.
Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the
proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will. Rule 102 §1
makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Under Art. 213, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.
h. Beckett v. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 :
January 30, 2013 | VELASCO, JR., J.)
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. x x x in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment
involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
i. Magbaleta vs. Gonong (G.R. No. L-44903 April 22, 1977 |
BARREDO, J.)
x x x it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers x x x these considerations do not weigh enough
to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or
indispensable one. It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family Who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of
interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves.
j. Kua v IAC ???
k. Siochi vs. Gozon [G.R. No. 169900 : March 18, 2010 |
CARPIO, J.]
x x x among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership x x x
Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited x x x is the net
profits of the conjugal partnership property.
l. Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 |
VELASCO JR., J.)
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of
the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
m. Bugayong vs. Ginez [G.R. No. L-10033. December 28,
1956. | FELIX, J.]
ISSUE: Do the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or the “conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed”. ‘Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to a divorce. But it is on the condition, implied by the law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit the offense; also that he shall thereafter treat the other spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce. Condonation may be express or implied’. The legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
The act of x x x persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin x x x and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts
have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. This reconciliation occurred almost ten months
after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
“It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that a
single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially
as against the husband.
n. Brown v. Yambao [G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957 |
REYES, J. B. L., J.]
Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement, to defend divorce proceedings
The policy of x x x calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contact; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves.
Action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. (Note that this is a 1957 case)
22. ***
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)
1. Go- Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. (G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013 | CARPIO, J.)