Soon after the second world war India emerged as the
most significant Asian actor on the world stage, with a keen
desire to give a lead to Asia and to bring other Asian countries
closer together politically as well as economically.
Of the
international organisations in Asia, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) has the largest
membership and is mainly concerned with promotion of economic
co-operation both among its members and with other countries of
the world. Many Indian nationals occupy key positions in the ECAFE
secretariat, Bangkok. All these factors make a study of the
political interaction of ECAFE and India in the field of
intra-Asian economic co-operation worth pursuing.
The establishment of ECAFE was a tangible recognition
by the United Nations of Asiarsemergence on the world scene.
Though initially reluctant, the major Western powers agreed to
India’s demand, backed by China and the Philippines, that Asia
must be given equal consideration if the United Nations were to
establish a Commission for the economic reconstruction of the
devastated areasjof Europe. At the U.N. headquarters, however,
China had far more status at the time (194
6) than India.
From the very beginning ECAFE was an arena for the forces
of colonialism and anti-colonialism and for the opposing blocs
in the Cold War.
India has played a significant role in these
K r * 'struggles inside ECAFE.
In fact, she aspired in vain to^a
dominant political influence over the Commission.
It was largely
on her initiative that the non-self-governing territories in the
ECAFE region were accorded associate membership in the Commission.
But on issues of wider international politics such as full
membership for the Non-United Nations members in ECAFE and the
representation of China, Korea and Vietnam the United States
controlled the Commission’s decisions as she enjoyed the
support of thirteen countries.
India and her non-aligned
friends in ECAFE number only seven.
India, however, has been able to exercise a considerable
influence on other matters with which ECAFE has been concerned.
The chiefs of the ECAFE secretariat til 1959 were Indians.
The
present Burmese chief is liked and supported by India and
Indian nationals occupy key positions in the secretariat.
They
Yhave bought Indian experiences and traditions of administration
and diplomacy into ECAFE.
This is, however, not to suggest that
they carry out India’s policies, although one must admit that
they cannot rid themselves of their upbringing and training in an
Indian setting.
ECAFE owes more to India than to any other single member
state for the widening scope of its activities and for its
expanding organizational structure.
The Commission was established
merely to help the reconstruction of the war devastated areas.
Today it is concerned with long-term economic development and
co-ordinated economic planning in its region and has assumed
operational functions in the field of technical assistance
and intra-regional projects.
The powerful Western powers viewed
ECAFE as merely a research institution.
But a persistent
effort on the part of India, together with the changing character
of the nited Nations economic activities and the changing
attituc
of the powerful donors, has enabled ECAFE to assume
a different role.
Both ECAFE and India have sought to promote regional
economic co-operation and integration for reasons of their own.
The ECAFE secretariat has been eager to see that the countries of
the region base their policies on strict-economic principles
in order to avoid waste of scarce resources, skills and time, and
to ensure a speedy and integrated development of the region as
a whole.
India has been interested in regional integration
primarily to facilitate her exports to the region and not because
of any concern for the integrated development of the region as a
whole.
The ECAFE region lacks traditionsjof co-operation, common
political and ideological outlook, and commonly experienced needs
(in view of the uneven economic development of the countries
of the region) which are basic prerequisites of far-reaching
economic co-operation and integration.
The smaller countries
fear that in any scheme of regional co-operation involving giants
like India and Japan their interests would suffer and they
might remain perpetually under-developed.
The prevailing political
mistrust among the Asian countries, particularly the fear of
domination in smaller countries, is the greatest obstacle to
regional economic co-operation in the ECAFE region.
India is conscious of such limitations on her initiatives.
During recent years she has taken no initiative herself but has
lent her quiet but firm support to the ECAFE secretariat in its
attempts to bring about some regional integration.
The secretariat
has now found it profitable to work through smaller Asian
countries.
This represents not a decline in India’s position and
prestige in Asia, but the rise of new centres of power (such as
Peking) or, at least, of aspiration (such as Djakarta and Manila).
The attitudes of the smaller Asian countries are changing somewhat
because of difficulties in exporting their primary products.
Except on vital economic matters and political issues
with Cold War content, Indiafs influence on ECAFE has been second
to none.
There has, however, been no significant corresponding
influence of ECAFE ON India.
A Study in the Politics of
Economic Co-operation and Initiative in Asia.
t»y
Lalita Prasad Singh
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University.
This thesis is entirely my own original work and has not been
submitted for the award of a degree at any other University.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This study was made possible by the award of a scholarship and
a generous fieldwork grant by the Australian National University, Canberra.
I am especially grateful to Professor J.D.B. Miller for his invaluable and ungrudging supervision at the final stages of the thesis. I am
also grateful to Dr George Modelski for guidance at the early stages of the thesis.
My sincere thanks are due to those senior officials of the ECAFE
Secretariat, the Mekong Office, and the Governments of India, Australia, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia, Republic of Vietnam and the Philippines, and the liaison officers to ECAFE in various Embassies in Bangkok (mentioned in Appendiz B) who supplied me with confidential material and answered patiently numerous questions, some of them
awkward. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Australian National University, Menzies Library, the National Library of Australia, Canberra,
and the ECAFE Library, Bangkok, and to Mrs D.M. Smith and Mrs F.T. Johnson for typing the final version of the thesis.
L
(L.P. Singh)
INTRODUCTION
The growth of regionalism has been one of the most conspicuous
political facts of recent times* The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Warsaw Pact, the Central Treaty Organisation, the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation, the Organisation of the American States, and the Organisation of African Unity are well-known instances of the regional
approach to political and security problems. In the economic field also the inauguration of the European Economic Community has made a
deep impact throughout the world and its influence is felt in the other continents as well. Partly as a result of a defensive reaction to the European Common Market, and partly because of the example of regional economic co-operation which it gives, the countries of Latin America have launched two schemes of regional economic integration and the United Nations' economic commissions for Africa and Asia are discussing ways and means to bring about regional economic arrangements in their respective areas.
Since intergovernmental co-operation in any field involves confrontation of national interests and political organisation, move ments for economic regionalism attract the attention of the students of political studies. For this reason the politics of economic co-operation
Soon fater the second world war India emerged as the most significant Asian actor on the world stage, with a keen desire to give a lead to Asia and to bring other Asian countries closer together politically as well as economically. Of the international organisations
in Asia, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) has the largest membership and is mainly concerned with promotion of economic co-operation both among its members as v/ell as
with other countries of the world. Many Indian nationals occupy key
positions in the ECAFE Secretariat. All these factors make a study of the interaction of ECAFE and India in the realm of intra-Asian economic
co-operation, particularly within the wider context of politics of
economic co-operation in Asia, worth pursuing. Beginning with an account of India’s desire to play a leading role in Asia, the study traces
India’s contribution in the origin, politics of membership, and
organisational growth of ECAFE and discusses her role in the Commission on matters of regional economic co-operation. It is intended to find out to what extent both India and ECAFE have used each other and with what results in their political strategy and tactics in the field of intra-Asian economic co-operation. As the study is concerned with
politics of economic co-operation under the auspices of ECAFE and India's role therein, the former has been given more space than the latter.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I INDIA AND ASIA: INDIAN INITIATIVES AND EXPERIENCES 1
OUTSIDE ECAFE.
Aspirations for the leadership of Asia 1
The Asian Relations Conference 1947* 7
The Bandung Conference, 1955» 12
The Shirala Conference, 1955» 16
An appraisal. 20
II ORIGIN OP ECAFE 2
6
Trends towards institutionalised international
economic co-operation.
26
The League of Nations and the United Nations. 27
The problem of the reconstruction of devastated
areas.
31
The birth of the United Nations regional economic
Commissions. 32
India’s role. 42
III POLITICS OF MEMBERSHIP 44
The Original members. 44
Associate membership for non-self-goveming
territories in the region. 46
Associate membership for the non-United Nations
members.
56
Full membership for the non-United Nations members.
63
Admission of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. 68
Regional membership for Australia and New Zealand,
and Admission to Western Samoa. 72
Representation of China, Korea and Vietnam.
76
IV EVOLVING SCOPE OF ECAFE’s ACTIVITIES
85
Terms of reference of the Commission.
85
ECAFE's role in the United Nations economic
assistance to the developing countries. 94
V MACHINERY OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - 1
THE COMMISSION AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES 107
The Commission. 107
The subsidiary bodies. Ill
Chapter Page
The Commission as a forum for national
propaganda, announcement of policy innovations, ventilation of grievances against other
countries, and propagation of economic
ideologies. 124
India's Contribution to ECAFE's Organisation. 131
VI MACHINERY OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - II
THE SECRETARIAT , 137
Internal Organisation and functions. 139
The Office of the Executive Secretary. 141
The Divisions of the Secretariat. 142
Geographical Distribution of Staff. 145
Factors Influencing Staffing Policy. 150
Budget. 156
Integrity and Independence of the Secretariat. 158
VII STRENGTHENING THE COMISSION AND ITS WORKING METHODS 165
Relations with other Organisations 166
ECAFE Matters in National Administrations 167
Limitations on Freedom of Research. 169
Implimentation of Commission Recommendations 176
Changing Techniques of Dealings with Members. l8l
Minimising the Influence of Non-Regional Members. 183
VIII POLITICS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - I
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SPECIFIC FIELDS. 188
Intra-Regional Trade. 188
Intra-Regional Trade-Promotion Talks. 192
The Asian Highway. 198
The Mekong River Basin Development Project. 203
IX POLITICS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - II
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 227
Early Discussions on Regional Integration. 229
Lokanathan's Aide Memoire on Regional Economic
Integration, 1955* 231
Discussions on Regional Planning 1957-9» 236
The Bangkok Resolution on Regional Economic
Co-operation i9 6 0. 239
Aftermath of the Bangkok Resolution. 247
The Conference of Asian Economic Planners, 1961. 250
A Proposal for an Organisation of Asian Economic
Co-operation (OAEC). 254
Chapter Page
The Special ECAFE Conference on Asian Economic
Co-operation (Dec.1963)» 262
The Obstacles to Regional Economic Co-operation
and Integration, Limitations on India’s initiative. 267
X CONCLUSION 279
Appendices:
Appendix A : ECAFE's Terms of Reference and Rules
of Procedure. 290
Appendix B : List of Persons Interviewed. 311
Bibliography: 314
Tables
1 Growth of ECAFE Membership. 75
2 ECAFE Annual Session and their Chairmen. 110
3 Size and Leaders of Delegations at ECAFE Annual
Sessions. 127
4 ECAFE Secretariat: Distribution of Staff by
Nationality. 148
5 Mekong Project. 209
Charts
1 ECAFE in the Family of United Nations ("facing page ) 107
2 The Commission and its Subsidiaries. 116
3 ECAFE Secretariat. 140
Maps
1 ECAFE Region and Membership frontis piece
2 The Asian Highway. 201
Abbreviations:
ASA Association of Southeast Asia
BTAO Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations
GAOR Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ECAPE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECAPE, S.R. Summary Records of ECAPE
ECE Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC, O.R. Official Record of the United Nations Economic and
Social Council
EPTA Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
PAO Pood and Agriculture Organisation
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITU International Telecommunications Union
NG O ‘s Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD Organisation for European Co-operation and Development
TAA Technical Assistance Administration
TAB Technical Assistance Board
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
UNRRA
WMO
WHO
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
World Meteorological Organisation
INDIA AND ASIA1
INDIAN INITIATIVES AND EXPERIENCES OUTSIDE ECAFB
The e n lig h te n e d In d ia n s in g e n e r a l , and th e p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l
le a d e r s o f th e s t r u g g l e f o r independence i n p a r t i c u l a r , were always
c o n sc io u s o f I n d i a ’ s s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n i n A sia . They looked hack to th e
days o f I n d i a 's g lo r io u s p a s t , d a tin g 1 hack from tim es im m em orial, when h e r
c u l t u r a l and o th e r in f lu e n c e s s p re a d th ro u g h o u t th e c o n tin e n t, and hoped
t h a t th e y m ight r e i n s t a t e t h e i r c o u n tr y ’s s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n in A sia once
th e B r i t i s h d e p a r te d . As n a tio n a lis m b re e d s a se n se o f m is sio n , i t i s no
wonder t h a t In d ia n n a t i o n a l i s t s were imhued w ith th e s p i r i t o f h e lp in g
freedom f i g h t e r s e lse w h e re in S o u th e a st A sia and d e m o n stra tin g t h e i r le a d e r
s h ip i n A s ia . The f a c t t h a t th e In d ia n N a tio n a l C ongress was th e b e s t
o rg a n is e d n a t i o n a l i s t movement on th e c o n tin e n t from which a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t s
drew i n s p i r a t i o n was an en co u rag in g f a c t o r in th e s i t u a t i o n .
B.G. T i l a k , th e g r e a t e s t n a t i o n a l i s t le a d e r o f h is day, w rote to
Clem enceau, th e P r e s id e n t o f th e P a r i s Peace C onference (1919)> t h a t I n d ia
must have a v o ic e in th e peace s e t t l e m e n t s , rem in d in g him t h a t I n d i a , w ith
h e r v a s t a r e a s , r e s o u r c e s and p o p u la tio n , 'may w e ll a s p ir e to he a le a d in g
power i n A sia , i f n o t i n th e w o rld ' and co u ld he ' a p o w erfu l stew a rd o f
T
The word A sia has been u sed in t h i s s tu d y in i t s common g e o g ra p h ic a l se n se h u t e x clu d in g 1 S o v ie t and Arab A s ia .
the League of Nations in the East'. Indian philosophers and scholars of
the reputation of Rabindranath Tagore and Swami Vivekanand visited several
Asian countries during the 1920s to arouse ’Asian Spirit' among their
people. From time to time, during the same period, suggestions for an
Asian Federation were mooted by eminent political personalities such as
C.R. Das, Srinivas Iyengar and Dr M.A. Ansari - all one-time Presidents of
the Congress Party. It was generally believed by the Indian leaders that
the exit of Britain from India would herald the end of European domination
over Asia and India’s pivotal position, together with her cultural
influences from Ceylon to the Mekong delta, should facilitate an Asian
2
Federation, presumably India-based. The Congress Party actually adopted
a motion in 1928 for the creation of a Pan-Asian Federation in which India
should be 'the leader of a renascent Asia’.^ The notion of India being
the pivot of a regional defence organisation for the Indian ocean area has
been central to the writings of well-known author and diplomat, K.M.
Panikkar.^ The All-India Congress Committee, a central body of the Congress
Party, put such thoughts on record in 1946 when it expressed the view that
1
C.F. Andrews and G. Mukerji, The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India, London, 1938,
p.271-2
N.N. Mitra, ed., Indian Quarterly Register, Calcutta, 1926,
vol.II, pp.305-6; ibid., 1927» vol.II, p.374*
3
Ibid., 1928, vol.II, p.357*
4
'India and the countries of Southeast Asia must hang together and work together *.
As a matter of fact, in the late 1940s the Indian Press and public opinion tended to assume that, as China was busy in her civil war and the defeated Japan would take some time to recover, leadership of the rest of
Asia had fallen on India. Jawaharlal Nehru expressed the feelings of this generation of leaders when he wrote:
I remember when I first read a detailed history of Southeast Asia, how amazed I was and how excited I became. New panoramas opemtout before me, new perspectives of history and new
conceptions of India's past. Trade and Commerce, Cambodia and Angkor, Srivijaya and Majapahit suddenly rose out of the void, took living shape, vibrant with that instinctive feeling which makes the past touch the present.2
In view of such a background, it is not surprising that a conscious ness of India's leadership status seems to have permeated the thinking of the policy makers of independent India. Although the central theme of the Indian foreign policy, i. e . , non-aligment with powers on either side in the Cold War, is basically the product of Nehru's mind,^ the Asia policy
1
N.N.
Mitra, e d . , The Indian Annual Register, 1946, vol.II,p.104; also cited in Werner Levi, Free India in A s i a , Minneapolis, 1952, p.36.
2
J.L. Nehru, The Discovery of India, London, 1951? p#179* 3
It has been argued that 'it would be inadvisable to extend the identification of Prime Minister and policy to the point of believing that, if the Prime Minister were changed, there v;ould also be a marked change in the policy1 23 (J.D.B. Miller), The Commonwealth the World, London, 1950> p.144)* One nan differ from such a conclusion on the ground that non-alignment was first conceived by Nehru alone and his party and the country at large fully accepted this approach only when
has n o t been d i s t i n c t i v e l y h is own as th e p re c e d in g acco u n t o f I n d i a ’s
a s p i r a t i o n s i n A sia show s. T h is i s , how ever, not to d is c o u n t th e stam p o f
h is p e r s o n a l i t y on th e way A sia p o lic y has been fo r m u la te d , i n t e r p r e t e d and
e x e c u te d . As a m a tte r o f f a c t , o f a l l h i s c o lle a g u e s and a d v is o r s , he
a lo n e , w ith a deep u n d e rs ta n d in g o f human h i s t o r y , has been most a c u te ly
c o n sc io u s o f th e emergence o f I n d i a i n w orld a f f a i r s as som ething o f a
m ajor consequence in w orld h i s t o r y . He h as made no s e c r e t o f i t . I n h i s
own t y p i c a l way, on s e v e r a l o c c a s io n s , he has e x p re sse d th e view t h a t I n d i a ,
no t b ecau se o f any am b itio n s o f h e r s , b u t b ecau se o f g eo g rap h y , h i s t o r y
*1
and so many o th e r f a c t o r s sh o u ld p la y an im p o rta n t p a r t in A sia . At
tim es he has abandoned h is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c m o d eratio n and h as b o ld ly
a s s e r t e d t h a t I n d i a must co u n t in w o rld a f f a i r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y A sian
a f f a i r s :
Look a t th e Map. I f you have to c o n s id e r any q u e s tio n a f f e c t i n g
th e M iddle E a s t, I n d ia i n e v i t a b l y comes in to th e p i c t u r e . I f
you have to c o n s id e r any q u e s tio n c o n ce rn in g S o u th e a s t A s ia ,
you can n o t do so w ith o u t I n d i a . So a ls o w ith th e F ar E a s t . . . .
And w h atev er r e g io n you may have i n m ind, th e im p o rtan ce o f I n d ia can n o t be ig n o r e d .2
f n .3» p.2 ( c o n t 'd )
i t b ro u g h t d iv id e n d s i n term s o f r i s i n g p r e s t i g e o f I n d i a in th e W orld.
The way no re a lig n m e n t was shaken to i t s fo u n d a tio n in l a t e 1962 "by
d e t e r i o r a t i n g r e l a t i o n s w ith China g iv e s some e v id en c e t h a t th e p o lic y may be abandoned by N e h ru 's s u c c e s s o rs in th e C ongress P a r ty .
1
J . L . N ehru, I n d i a 's F o re ig n P o lic y : S e le c te d Speeches
1946-61,
New D e lh i, 1961, pp.21-3«
2
I b i d . , p .2 2 ; N ehru, Independence and A f t e r , D e lh i, 1949> p*231> M i l l e r ,
o p . c i t . , p p . 14 5 -6 . So much so t h a t i n one o f h i s sp ee c h es d u rin g h is
American to u r i n 1949 he b l u n t l y s a i d : 'I n d i a 's r o l e o f le a d e r s h ip may
n o t be so welcome to o t h e r s . . . . But i t i s som ething we can n o t e sc a p e . We
can n o t escap e th e v a r io u s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t a r i s e o u t o f o u r geography
and h i s t o r y * . N ehru, I n s id e Am erica : A Voyage o f D is c o v e ry , New D e lh i,
1950> PP-54-5
and109;
c i t e d in M ichael B reache r , Nehru; A P o l i t i c a lIt should be noted here that the choice of the Asoka emblem as the official seal of independent India and the revival of the Buddhist historical sites have not been merely attempts at romantic evocation of a golden past but also symbolic gestures with a desire to attract
Buddhist Asian neighbours closer to India and a fresh reminder to them
of her leading position in this part of the world.
It is not merely a romantic desire to be the leader of Asia that has induced India to play an active role in the affairs relating to this area. One of her basic interests, as conceived by the present policy-makers, is
the strengthening of the economic foundations of democracy, which demands preservation of international peace in the world at large and in Asia
in particular. That explains India’s anxiety to restrict the area of conflict or help resolving crises such as Korea
(l95l)>
Indo-China(1954)
and the Laotian crises ever since
1955»
For reasons of space, it is not intended to go into details of India's policy in these matters. It should suffice to say that she has striven to keep Asia as far away as possiblefrom the Cold War.
In the economic sphere India is interested in the affairs of her neighbours. The Indian economy was brought into intimate contact with the economies of Southeast Asia during the British regime as the country served as a base of operations in the expansion of the British Empire in Asia. The ECAFE region occupies third place, next to Europe and the United States, in India’s trade and it is only here that her exports
from Europe and the United States). During 1957-61 for instance, India’s
imports from Europe, the United States and the ECAFE region constituted
47> 22 and 18 per cent respectively of her total imports. For the same
period, her exports to these regions constituted
17
*8
, 18 and 24 per centrespectively of her total exports. With the emergence of regional
economic arrangements in Europe and elsewhere it is to South and Southeast
Asia where India has to look to increasing markets for her growing
industries.
There are, therefore, important political, economic and cultural
reasons behind India’s efforts for a leadership position in Asia. In order
to achieve this, she has to represent not only her own interests but also
the wider interests of a resurgent Asia. A salient element of Indian
foreign policy, therefore, has been the recovery of Asia's place in the
world. ’’One of the major questions of the day” , Nehru was never tired of
repeating with a deep seated urge, ’’was- the readjustment of relations
2
between Asia and Europe" which had gone in favour of the latter by virtue
of her political and economic domination of the former. The United
Nations, where India has organised the largest group - the Afro-Asian
Group - and where she tends to speak as a representative of Asia, becomes
a device through which the balance of world politics - long held by the
Western great powers - can be redressed, if only partially, in favour of
1
U . N . , Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (l96l). New York,
1963, p.322.
2
the hitherto voiceless world of underpriviledged nations of Asia and
i
Africa.
Asia's rightful place in the community of nations cannot be secured unless the Asians themselves collectively struggle to achieve it
following the principle that strength lies in unity. India has not only agitated for this, but has also taken positive steps to consolidate a sense of Asian solidarity vaguely present in the minds of articulate Asian leaders ever since the Japanese raised the slogan 'Asia for Asians'
in the late 1920s. Following is a brief account of some of India's major initiatives for intra-Asian co-operation, particularly in its
economic aspects.
The Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi (March 1947)
The idea of an Asian conference for the understanding of Asia's problems and the promotion of co-operation among Asian peoples was first suggested by Jawaharlal Nehru in a special interview to the correspondent of the Hindu, a Madras daily, on 25 December 1945» A few months later, on his return from a tour of Southeast Asia in March, 1946, he announced
that the desire for holding an Asian conference had been expressed to him
2
by the nationalist leaders in the countries he visited. Encouraged by
T
For an extended discussion on this point see Ross N. Berkes and M.S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations, Stanford 1958) pp.30-33«
2
him, the unofficial Indian Council of Y/orld Affairs convened the first
Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947? four months prior to the attainment of Indian independence.
Twentyeight Asian countries, including eight Soviet Asian republics and Egypt, participated in the Conference. As this was the first
conference, the organisers proceeded with caution and intended nothing
more than providing an occasion to meet and forge common links for
further co-operation in future. Being unofficial in nature, the partici
pants in the Conference were representatives of cultural associations and, in some cases, nationalist movements. The governments were invited to
send observers. Great care was taken to avoid controversial issues and for this reason a secretariat suggestion to include defence and security
questions on the agenda of the Conference was rejected by the organising committee, headed by Nehru. The subjects ultimately discussed by the Conference were freedom movements, economic development, migration and racial problems, cultural problems and w omen’s problems.
During the Conference, the Indian delegation tried its best to avoid the impression that India had any ambitions in regard to the leadership
of emerging Asia. In his inaugural speech Nehru took pains to stress that it so happened that India convened the Conference, but the idea of
1
such a conference had arisen simultaneously 'in the minds and many countries of A s i a ’. Nevertheless, it was he who set the tone of the
Conference in the direction of Asian solidarity by passionately urging the peoples of Asia 'to meet together, to hold together and to advance
together'. There is no denying the fact that the delegates shared his emotions of meeting as 'old friends long parted' (due to European rule) and the discussions revealed large areas of agreement on issues such as
colonialism, raising of living standards, uplifting of the status of women and a general desire for closer contacts among Asians. Above all the convening of the Conference in itself was a great achievement.
These consoling words, however, cannot hide the fact that the
outcome of the Conference was not satisfactory from the point of view of India. In spite of the great circumspection and care observed by the host
delegation and the emotional fervour of Asian solidarity, the first Asian conference could not prevent the latent inter-Asian suspicions from
coming to the fore. The Chinese delegation kept it no secret that China was evidently opposed to any attempt by India to secure implicitly, or
2
explicitly, some recognition of her leadership in Asia. The delegate of Burma 3poke, with an abvious reference to the Indians and the Chinese, of economic domination by private investors from neighbouring countries and
T
Asian Relations, op.cit., p.21.
2
demanded some k in d o f a ss u ra n c e t h a t th e 'p a r e n t country* o f th e s e
po w erfu l economic i n t e r e s t s would n o t back them . M alayans spoke o f b o th
C hinese and In d ia n economic p e n e t r a t i o n th ro u g h th e s e m in o r itie s in t h e i r
co u n try and a C eylonese d e le g a te e x p re ss e d f e a r s o f 'econom ic and
dem ographic ag g ressio n * from I n d ia . Most o f th e s m a lle r c o u n tr ie s were
a p p re h e n siv e a t th e th o u g h t o f a fo rm al A sian U nion, su g g e ste d i n some
q u a r t e r s , as t h a t m ight mean th e end o f t h e i r freedom b e fo re th e y have
2
e n jo y ed i t and t h e i r u ltim a te a b s o r p tio n i n th e b ig g e r n e ig h b o u rs . A f te r
an i n i t i a l h e s i t a t i o n , th e C onference a g reed to e s t a b l i s h an A sian
R e la tio n s O r g a n is a tio n , w ith b ra n c h es i n each c o u n tr y , to c o n tin u e th e
work o f th e C o n feren ce. A P r o v is io n a l G en eral C o u n c il, w ith t h i r t y members
was a p p o in te d to convene f u r t h e r c o n fe re n c e s . The n e x t c o n fe re n c e , how ever,
c o u ld no t meet in China in 1949 as sc h e d u le d , b e ca u se o f p o l i t i c a l
developm ents in t h a t c o u n try , no r d id th e p ro p o se d ^ R e la tio n s O rg a n is a tio n
m a t e r i a l i z e . The P r o v is io n a l G en eral C ouncil c e a se d to f u n c tio n a f t e r
e l e c t i n g Nehru as i t s p r e s i d e n t . I n d i a had a f o r e t a s t e o f some o f th e
problem s in th e way o f f u r t h e r i n g A sian s o l i d a r i t y and c o - o p e r a tio n .
I n s p i t e o f t h i s i n i t i a l e x p e r ie n c e , which was n o t f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y ,
I n d i a c o n tin u e d to look f o r fa v o u ra b le o p p o r t u n i t i e s to b r in g th e A sian
c o u n tr ie s to g e t h e r . In J a n u a ry 1949» sh e convened an e ig h te e n n a tio n
1
A sian R e l a t i o n s , o p . c i t . , pp*T7> 92 and 126. 2
As one Burmese pu t i t : * I t was t e r r i b l e to be r u l e d by a
W estern power, b u t i t was even more so to be r u le d by an A sian
( in c lu d in g A u s t r a l i a and New Z ealan d ) o f f i c i a l c o n fe re n c e to m o b iliz e
s u p p o rt f o r th e In d o n e s ia n R ep u b lic f i g h t i n g a war o f independence a g a in s t
th e N e th e r la n d s . The c o n fe re n c e , as l a t e r e v e n ts p ro v e d , was a su c c e ss
b u t no p ro g re s s co u ld be made tow ards e s t a b l i s h i n g a perm anent m achinery
f o r i n t r a - A s i a n c o n s u lt a tio n and c o - o p e r a tio n as few c o u n tr ie s were
i n t e r e s t e d in is s u e s o t h e r th a n o p p o sin g c o lo n ia lis m .
As th e s m a lle r A sian c o u n tr ie s e n t e r t a i n e d m isg iv in g s ab o u t th e
In d ia n sp o n so red r e g i o n a l c o - o p e r a tio n arra n g em en t, so a ls o I n d ia was
s u s p ic io u s about any su ch arrangem ent i n s p i r e d by a non-A sian power.
When s u g g e s tio n s were made a t th e Commonwealth F o re ig n M in is te r s C o n feren ce,
Colombo, 1950» f o r a m utual economic a id scheme Nehru a t f i r s t was q u ite
r e l u c t a n t to a c c e p t i t . I n d i a , how ever, a g re ed to th e la u n ch in g o f th e
Colombo P la n when i t became c l e a r t h a t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n th e scheme
would no t le a d to h e r a tta ch m e n t w ith th e w e ste rn b lo c . She i s now an
im p o rta n t member o f th e Colombo P la n , b e in g th e l a r g e s t s i n g l e r e c i p i e n t
o f a id and th e l a r g e s t A sian donor o f te c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e to th e r e g io n a l
c o u n t r i e s . The Colombo P la n a s s o c i a t i o n has been a v a lu a b le means f o r
I n d i a , as f o r o t h e r s , f o r f u r t h e r in g c o - o p e r a tio n w ith A sian c o u n t r i e s .
But h e re a g a in , no s u c c e s s co u ld be ach iev ed tow ards developm ent o f a
m u l t i - l a t e r a l a rra n g e m e n t, and th e P la n rem ained l a r g e l y a s e t o f b i l a t e r a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , p r e c i s e l y b ecau se th e s m a lle r c o u n tr ie s d id no t want an
arran g em en t which m ight g iv e added ad v an tag e to t h e i r b ig g e r fe llo w members
such as I n d ia and J a p a n .
T
In view o f a la c k o f p o s i t i v e en th u siasm among h e r n eig h b o u rs f o r
In d ia -s p o n s o re d p r o j e c t s , I n d ia d id not a tte m p t any more c o n fe re n c e s
e n t i r e l y on h e r own a f t e r 1949» But sh e l e n t h e r s u p p o r t, o r even
i n d i r e c t l y i n i t i a t e d , some k in d o f g e t - t o g e t h e r o f s e l e c t e d A sian s t a t e s .
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t th e f i v e - n a t i o n (Burma, C eylon, I n d i a , In d o n e s ia
and P a k is ta n ) Colombo Powers m eetin g convened by Ceylon i n Colombo, in
A p r il 1954) had i t s o r i g i n i n a s u g g e s tio n made by C.C. D e s a i, th e n
In d ia n High Commissioner i n t h a t c o u n try , to Prim e M in is te r K o te law a la
2
f o r an A sian heads o f governm ents m e etin g . A lthough t h i s c o n fe re n c e had
economic c o - o p e r a tio n on i t s a g en d a, i t rem ained p re o c c u p ie d w ith th e main
A sian c r i s i s o f th e tim e - th e war i n In d o -C h in a .
The Bandung C o n fe re n ce , A p r il 1955
Bandung r e p r e s e n te d th e h ig h e s t w a ter mark o f I n d ia n le a d e r s h ip o f
new n a tio n s o f A sia and A f r i c a . But i t i s im p o rta n t to n o te t h a t t h i s
2 9 -n a tio n c o n fe re n c e was a t f i r s t su g g e ste d by th e In d o n e s ia n P rem ier
A li S a s tro m id jo jo and was s p o n so re d , n o t by a s i n g l e governm ent, b u t
j o i n t l y by f iv e Colombo Pow ers. Prom I n d i a ’s p o in t o f view t h i s was a
1
I n d i a , how ever, gave o n ly a lukewarm su p p o rt to th e Baguio C onference (May 1950) convened by th e P h i l ip p in e s to prom ote r e g io n a l economic
c o - o p e r a t io n . The c h i e f d e le g a te was a n o n - o f f i c i a l . The governm ent
d id no t lo o k w ith fa v o u r on an i n i t i a t i v e from a pro-A m erican c o u n try
su ch as th e P h i l i p p i n e s . The r e s o l u t i o n s o f th e C onference were n e v er
im plem ented by th e p a r t i c i p a t i n g governm ents. F or th e t e x t o f r e s o l u t io n s
s e e S .L . P o p la i, e d . , A sia and A f r ic a in th e Modern W orld, Bombay, 1955)
p p .198- 201.
2
b e t t e r te c h n iq u e o f a c h ie v in g in t r a - A s i a n c o - o p e r a tio n th a n ta k in g
i n i t i a t i v e s s in g ly .
Economic problem s o f th e c o u n tr ie s r e p r e s e n te d a t Bandung form ed an
im p o rta n t p a r t o f th e d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f th e C o n feren ce. A lthough I n d ia
made a s tro n g 1 p le a f o r economic c o - o p e r a tio n in th e A sia n -A fric a n re g io n
she d id n o t p re s s h e r p o in ts too f a r f o r f e a r o f b e in g re b u f f e d . P ro ce e d in g
c a u t i o u s l y , th e In d ia n d e le g a te on th e Economic Committee sounded o th e r
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on th e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f e s t a b l i s h i n g an A sia n -A fric a n
T e c h n ic a l C o -o p e ra tio n C ouncil ( s i m i l a r to th e Colombo P la n C o u n cil) f o r
m utual a id in th e f i e l d o f te c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e to av o id e x c e s siv e
dependence on th e o u ts id e pow ers. The p ro p o s a l d id no t a ro u se s a t i s f a c
to r y re sp o n se as most o f th e c o u n tr ie s th o u g h t t h a t c o n tin u e d s tr o n g
b i l a t e r a l lin k s w ith th e advanced c o u n tr ie s o f th e Y/est were i n t h e i r
b e s t i n t e r e s t s . I n d i a 's c l a r i f i c a t i o n s t h a t h e r p ro p o s a l was no t opposed
to h e lp from o u ts id e th e A s ia n -A fric a n re g io n d id n o t change th e views o f
c o u n tr ie s such as I r a q (u n d er K ing F a i z a l ) , th e P h i l i p p i n e s , Turkey and
Ceylon who th o u g h t t h a t th e e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l a id a rra n g e m e n ts, such
as th e U n ited N atio n s and th e Colombo P la n were s u f f i c i e n t f o r c o - o p e ra tio n
2
in t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . No recom m endation in t h i s r e s p e c t co u ld be made
to th e p le n a r y s e s s i o n o f th e C o n feren ce. As a m a tte r o f f a c t , th ey had
T
The H indu, M adras, 17 A p r i l , 1955* 2
l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n an o r g a n is a ti o n t h a t was bound to b e , as th e y b e lie v e d ,
dom inated by I n d ia and Ja p a n in view o f t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t y in te c h n i c a l
'know-how*.
A nother im p o rta n t economic m a tte r in w hich I n d ia was a c t i v e l y
i n t e r e s t e d was prom otion o f i n t r a - r e g i o n a l t r a d e . In t h i s a tte m p t she was
s t r o n g l y backed by Ja p a n who em phasized th e need f o r s e r io u s e f f o r t s to
move from b i l a t e r a l to m u l t i l a t e r a l tr a d e and payment arra n g em en ts. As
e x p e c te d , th e move to in duce th e c o u n tr ie s p r e s e n t a t Bandung to in c r e a s e
t h e i r tr a d e w ith each o th e r was re g a rd e d as advantageous to J a p a n and
I n d i a o n ly and, t h e r e f o r e , th e o th e r s r e f u s e d to o b l i g e . U ltim a te ly th e
C o n feren ce, w h ile re c o g n iz in g th e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f r e g i o n a l economic
c o - o p e r a tio n , a ls o em phasized th e need f o r tr a d e and economic c o - o p e ra tio n
w ith c o u n tr ie s o u ts id e th e r e g io n .
The C onference a ls o co u ld n o t make any w o rth w h ile p ro g re s s on a
Burmese p ro p o s a l f o r a perm anent s e c r e t a r i a t and a C o n s u lta tiv e Committee
to c o n tin u e th e work o f th e C o n feren ce. P a k is ta n in p a r t i c u l a r view ed
su ch s u g g e s tio n s as ad v an tag eo u s to I n d ia and opposed them s a y in g t h a t
f u l l e s t u se o f th e e x i s t i n g o r g a n is a ti o n s i n th e r e g io n , i . e . , U n ited
N a tio n s b o d ie s and th e Colombo P la n , was y e t to be made.
As a m a tte r o f f a c t , many d e le g a tio n s had l i t t l e en th u siasm f o r t a l k s
on A fro -A sian economic r e g io n a lis m i n want o f m utual p o l i t i c a l u n d e rs ta n d in g
and i n view o f th e n e c e s s ity o f c lo s e economic r e l a t i o n s w ith th e advanced
I b i d . , p p .246-9*
outside countries. They took pains to emphasize their eagerness to continue
close economic ties with non-regional countries. The final communique
made it abundantly clear:
The proposal with regard to economic co-operation within the participating countries do not preclude the desirability or need for co-operation with countries outside the region.... There should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to
further their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not
intended to form a regional bloc.''
These sentences contained a statement of major political significance.
Bandung made it unmistakably clear that the conflict among Cold War rivals
had more to do with mutual relations of Asian states than geographical
contiguity, common economic aspirations and a romantic sense of Asian
solidarity. That there has been no other such meeting is itself a comment
on the achievements of much publicised Bandung. More eloquent is the fact
that non-alignment, and not Asian-Africanism, was the basis of the
Belgrade Conference of September 1961. The Indian coolness to the
suggestions for a second Bandung conference had been a sufficient indication
of her un-rewarding experience with such initiatives. The other interesting
reason for her preference for a conference of non-aligned states is her
desire to exclude Peking and Karachi from such a get-together which is
impossible in a Bandung type Afro-Asian conference. Even then, she could
not keep aloof when such a conference is being convened by other countries.
1
R e c e n tly sh e has su cceed ed i n p e rs u a d in g A fro -A sian c o u n tr ie s t h a t th e
c o n fe re n c e o f th e n o n -a lig n e d s t a t e s sh o u ld be convened l a t e in 19^4
and th e A fro -A sian m eetin g sh o u ld be pu t o f f f o r 1965»
The Shim la C o n feren ce, May 1955
A sian s u s p ic io n s tow ards s u g g e s tio n s f o r c l o s e r r e g i o n a l economic
c o - o p e r a tio n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f th e y came from an A sian c o u n try i t s e l f ,
was a ls o d e m o n strated s t i l l more b l u n t l y a t a c o n fe re n c e i n Shim la ( I n d ia )
in May 1955 (o n ly two weeks a f t e r th e Bandung). P r e s id e n t E is e n h o w e rs
message to th e C ongress in A p r il 1955 in c lu d e d a p ro p o s a l to s e t a s id e
$200 m i l l i o n , in a d d i t i o n to r e g u l a r b i l a t e r a l a id programmes, f o r th e
c r e a t i o n o f a P r e s i d e n t 's Fund f o r A sian Economic Development to prom ote
r e g io n a l economic developm ent and f o s t e r c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s among th e
c o u n tr ie s o f th e 'a r c o f F ree A s i a '.
The U n ited S t a t e s l e t i t be known, so t h a t th e p ro p o s a l m ight n o t be
s u s p e c t , t h a t th e i n i t i a t i v e f o r a m u l t i l a t e r a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f th e
pro p o sed fund s h o u ld come from an A sian s t a t e and t h a t th e A sians th em selv es
d e v is e p r o j e c t s , presum ably o f r e g i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , f o r th e e f f i c i e n t
u t i l i s a t i o n o f th e fu n d . Prom pted by H arold S ta s s e n o f th e U.S.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o -o p e ra tio n A d m in is tra tio n - th e man b e h in d th e id e a - I n d ia
is s u e d i n v i t a t i o n s to Burma, Cambodia, C eylon, In d o n e s ia , J a p a n , L aos, N ep al,
T
The D epartm ent o f S t a t e B u l l e t i n , v o l.3 2 , n o .827, 21 May 1955> P*854*
The C ongress l a t e r re d u c ed i t to $100 m i l l i o n . See a ls o R u sse l F i f i e l d ,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam (South), Malaya, Singapore
and British Borneo (all Asian members of the Colombo Plan) to discuss the use of the proposed fund at a conference at Shimla (India’s summer capital)
in May 1955» The three main items on the agenda of the Shimla Conference were: utilization of special allocations for the development of intra-regional trade, the setting up of a machinery to provide credit to enable Asian nations to tide over short term balance of payment difficulties, and the creation of a small permanent secretariat for the Colombo Plan to administer American aid under the Plan.^
Both India and the United States were utterly disappointed by the
response of the Asian countries concerned. Burma did not accept the invitation saying that she was not a recipient of American aid. More convincing was the objection of Ceylon: why should India interpose her self between her and the United States. All others accepted the invitation,
but the level of representation was not very high - an indication of their indifference to the proposals - and the conference failed to agree on any single important item on the agenda. In its final communique the
conference not only rejected the proposal for an intermediary regional organisation and a permanent secretariat for the Colombo Plan but also forcefully demanded that the aid programmes should continue to remain bilateral:
The H indu, Madras, 9 May 1955*
In the present stage of economic development of the Asian region and having regard to the order of additional funds likely to he available, there would he no advantage in having an intermediary regional organisation and that the national programmes of the countries concerned may continue to he bilateral as at present and strengthened as far as
possible.1
The United States proposals had made it possible for the Asian
members of the Colombo Plan to approve a multilateral system of allocation
of American aid that might have gone a long way in the direction of
regional economic integration and thereby their efficient, speedy and
wasteless economic development. It is surprising why these countries, who
in the United Nations and elsewhere complain about political pressures
attendant on bilateral aid and demand multilateral arrangements, rejected
the multilateral approach embodied in the Shimla Conference proposals.
It was not the order of magnitude of foreign aid expected to be
available in the near future that induced the Asian countries to reject
a regaional approach to their problems of economic development (as the
communique makes us believe). One reason for such attitude lies in a
general feeling that since most of them had not yet been able to develop
full scale national economic plans, they were far from ready economically
for planning on a regional basis. Another probable reason may be the
failure of the U.S. State Department to back Stassen strongly, thus
creating the impression of being indifferent to the scheme. One may also
T
The Hindu and the New York Ti m e s , 14 May 1955* Also in Higgins
add that India omitted to consult the countries concerned adequately
beforehand. The real reason, however, lies in the small nations’ fear
of domination by India and Japan. Pakistan would not allow any Indian initiative to remain unchallenged. Others were apprehensive that their interests would be submerged in a regional scheme involving these two countries with economic positions far stronger than their own. It is also worth noting that at that time India’s per capita share of American
economic aid was far less than any other Asian country.-* They perhaps realised that their slice of the cake would depend entirely on the number of mouths waiting to eat it and in that way India would claim to receive, in view of its population, a proportionately larger share, than was the case heretofore, in a regional programme at the expense of others. As one delegate frankly said:
Right now, when we talk of aid, we talk directly with Washington. We d o n ’t want to create the possibility of having to go through
a third party and being told some day our needs must be subordinated to greater Asian good.2
There have been no official Indian initiatives for regional economic co-operation after the Shimla Conference. The Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has, however, recently set up an Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Co-operation in New Delhi and, occasionally, convenes exploratory trade conferences of private business men from Asia and Africa.
_
William Henderson, ’The Development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia', International Organisation, vol.IX, no.4> (Nov.1955)> p.473*
2
An Appraisal
Conscious of her special geographical and historical position in
Asia, India has aspired and striven for leadership in Asia. In effect this
has meant the pursuit of policies aimed at removal or curtailment of non-
Asian influences from Asia, the promotion of a sense of Asian solidarity
and the talcing of initiatives for intra-Asian co-operation.
Indian appeals, or for that matter anybody’s appeals, to the sentiment
of Asian solidarity were heeded only in so far as they aimed at a common
struggle to remove western colonialism. But once it came to laying the
bases of a programme of intra-Asian co-operation, political or economic,
Asian solidarity was found wanting. This should not, however, lead one
to jump to the conclusion, as one scholar seems to have done, that Asian
solidarity is devoid of common spiritual roots and that 'a consciousness
of common spirituality’ was introduced as an ’afterthought' to dignify
solidarity (originated by a common resistance against western domination).
It is true that the sentiment of Asian solidarity is not strong enough to
enable the Asian countries to rise above mutual inhibitions, suspicions and
fears. It is also true that its limitations are obvious from its failure
to find expression in form of concrete regional institutions. Neverthe
less, it remains a real sentiment reviving a memory of their ancient
contracts. The fact that very often appeals are made to this sentiment -
by Japanese, by Indians, by Chinese and Indonesians in turn and the fact
Levi, op.cit., p*43«
t h a t i t c o n tin u e s to be a u s e f u l in s tru m e n t f o r a n a tio n w ith a m b itio n s
o f le a d e r s h i p , i n d i c a t e t h a t A sian s o l i d a r i t y has some p o s i t i v e - common
s p i r i t u a l - r o o ts and i s not m erely a n e g a tiv e r e a c t i o n to w e ste rn
d o m in a tio n .
In any c a s e , A sian s o l i d a r i t y i s not an end i n i t s e l f b u t a means to
s e c u re A s i a 's r i g h t f u l p la c e (a s c o n ce iv e d by th e A sian governm ents o f th e
day) in th e w o rld and to f a c i l i t a t e i n tr a - A s ia n c o - o p e r a tio n . I t b e in g s o ,
th e s o l i d a r i t y may, on o c c a s io n , c la s h w ith s u b s t a n t i a l n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t s
o f th e in d i v i d u a l A sian c o u n t r i e s . A ro m a n tic se n se o f s o l i d a r i t y i s n o t
enough to p ro v id e s u f f i c i e n t fo u n d a tio n f o r f a r - r e a c h i n g c o - o p e r a tio n
among s t a t e s ; i t has to be s t r o n g ly backed by m ajor n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s .
I t i s th e l a t t e r t h a t i s la c k in g in A s ia . The s m a lle r c o u n tr ie s f e a r t h a t
th ey would c o n tin u e to rem ain u n d e r-d e v elo p ed and t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
would be submerged in any r e g io n a l economic c o - o p e r a tio n scheme in v o lv in g
g ia n ts l i k e I n d i a o r J a p a n o r C hina. M oreover, slo g a n s f o r u n r e s t r i c t e d
movement o f c a p i t a l , goods and s e r v i c e s a re o f t e n re m in is c e n t o f d a rk days
in th e c o l o n i a l p e r io d . T his le a d s to p o l i c i e s o f economic s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y and grow th o f c o m p e titiv e economies in A sia .
The s lo g a n f o r A sian s o l i d a r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f is s u e d by a b ig
c o u n try , has an e v i l c o n n o ta tio n i n t h a t i t s u f f e r s from i t s o n e -tim e
a s s o c i a t i o n w ith th e G r e a te r E a s t A sia c o - p r o s p e r ity s p h e re - th e New O rder
in A sia lau n ch ed by th e Jap a n e se m i l i t a r i s t s in th e 1930s. As e a r l y as
1927> and t h a t seems s t i l l t r u e , a prom inent F i l i p i n o p o l i t i c i a n e x p re ss e d
'The Wolf and the Lambs in Asiatic Monroeism' with these words:
We small peoples of Asia...detest the idea that other Orientals may afterwards do to us what the Occidentals
did before. The domination of Asiatics by Occidentals
is no more odious than that of Asiatics by Asiatics.1
India's efforts, pronounced or not, for leadership of Asia, thus
have ominous undertones in view of Southeast Asian sensitivity to renewed
domination. Her repeated insistence on the cultural debt this region
owes to her has often been an irritant. The presence of Indian minorities
in this area has only added to the difficulties. Indian money lenders,
particularly Sikhs, Pathans and Chettiars, have been notorious for their
sharp practice. The feeling of revulsion against their medieval credit
practices prevalent in Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Ceylon and Indonesia
has been so strong that, when reinforced by the hatred of the exploiting
alien, it has all the ingredients of psychological dynamite.
There have been some minor psychological problems too which India
could not help. Early in her statehood she acquired, under Nehru's
leadership, a position of prestige in world affairs which became a matter
of jealousy among her neighbours. Moreover, aspirants for leadership of
Asia are to be found in practically every country. Nehru, Aung San (Burma)
Pridi (Thailand), Sukarno (Indonesia), Tungku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia),
Quirino and Macapagal (Philippines) - all have taken some kind of
initiatives at one time or another for intra-Asian co-operation and each
_
w i l l pay a t t e n t i o n to a p ro p o s a l o n ly i f he o r h i s c o u n try g e ts th e
r e s u l t a n t c r e d i t .
For le a d e r s h ip one needs n o t o n ly a s p i r a t i o n s and m o tiv a tio n s b eh in d
i t , b u t a ls o a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a r o l e , r e s o u r c e s and a fo llo w in g . As
d is c u s s e d e a r l i e r , i n th e c a se o f I n d i a a l l th e s e f a c t o r s have been p r e s e n t
to a c e r t a i n d e g re e a lth o u g h n o t e n t i r e l y f r e e from l i m i t a t i o n s . U nlike
J a p a n , which w an ted , amont o t h e r s , a s e c u re c o l o n i a l m arket f o r h e r
m a n u fa c tu re s , I n d i a 's m o tiv a tio n s f o r le a d e r s h ip o f A sia were m ainly a
p o l i t i c a l d e s i r e to a t t a i n a p la c e o f p r e s t i g e in th e w o rld , a lth o u g h
economic i n t e r e s t s were n o t a l t o g e t h e r m is s in g . Her emergence as an
in d ep en d en t power c o in c id e d w ith th e d e c li n e o f J a p a n , China and th e
European powers in th e a r e a and a le a d e r s h ip r o l e was e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e .
As re g a rd s re s o u rc e s f o r su ch a r o l e , she had to h e r c r e d i t h e r
g e o g ra p h ic a l, h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l p o s i t i o n , a d ip lo m a tic s e r v i c e second
to none i n A s ia , and an i n s p i r i n g le a d e r in J a w a h a r la l Nehru. I t was no t
s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t c o u n tr ie s su ch as Burma, Cambodia, C eylon,
In d o n e s ia and N ephal s i g n i f i e d , in a s e n s e , t h e i r a c c e p ta n c e o f I n d i a 's
le a d e r s h ip by fo llo w in g th e p o lic y o f n o n -alig n m en t w ith Cold War power
b lo c s .
The o p p o r tu n ity f o r I n d ia n i n i t i a t i v e w as, how ever, s h o r t - l i v e d .
Her e f f o r t s to b u ild a s t r u c t u r e o f s o l i d a r i t y among h e r a c tu a l and
p r o s p e c tiv e fo llo w e rs soon became shrouded w ith c o m p le x itie s and s e r io u s
d i f f i c u l t i e s . The demands o f A sian s o l i d a r i t y , A sia n -A fric a n s o l i d a r i t y