Beyond Beliefs
Beyond Beliefs:
A philosophical examination
of anomalous phenomena and explanation theory
by
Hannah Blanch Jenkins, BA(Hons), MA(Hons)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Tasmania
Candidate's declaration
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis. To the best of my knowledge and belief the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.
Signed ..
...
t-=,
/II/�-::,.Authority of access
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to both of my supervisors at the University of Tasmania School of Philosophy who provided invaluable advice and guidance. I am especially grateful that they were able to see some merit in the study of psi which, to some, is a controversial subject. Not all institutions, Schools or academics have proven able to view the subject matter as objectively.
More specifically, thank you to Dr James Chase, primary supervisor, who patiently helped to refine the content, argument and structure of the thesis; and Professor Jeff Malpas, secondary supervisor, who provided crucial understanding of the project from the early stages. Any conclusions drawn, errors or omissions are, of course, my own.
I am grateful also to the Head of School, Dr Marcelo Stamm, whose mentorship and advice, especially in the final stages of thesis completion, was essential.
Thanks are due also to Dr Jurgen Keil who, though now retired, has found the time to encourage the study of psi at a postgraduate level in both psychology and philosophy. I appreciate the concern he has shown and support he has given.
Thank you to the School of Philosophy—staff and fellow post grads—for helping to make the process of writing a dissertation an enjoyable one. I acknowledge too the financial assistance in the form of a three-year scholarship from the University of Tasmania; it helped considerably and enabled completion. To my friends—Anthony Fletcher, David Moltow, Eliza Goddard, Jaimie Potts, Joel Stafford, Lachlan Mclaine, Mike Williams, Rebecca Lang, Sarah Lightfoot, Tasman Fleming, Tessa Saunders and Tim Martain—eternal gratitude for bearing with me and for your well chosen words of wisdom at just the right moments.
Abstract
This thesis argues that the dominant assessment of the anomalous phenomena associated with psi requires re-evaluation, as hidden beliefs and explanatory assumptions about the body of evidence underlie the mainstream philosophical arguments regarding psi.
A re-evaluation of pertinent issues with reference to contemporary explanatory concerns is therefore undertaken.
The current state of discussion about psi is outlined. It is shown that there is tension between the apparent evidence for the phenomena and lack of a tenable explanation for the phenomena. The mainstream arguments in philosophy, which ascribe fraud as an explanation for psi, are critiqued. In generic form the arguments are shown to be a problematic inference to the best explanation. It is argued that if the assessment of the phenomena is to be a legitimate inference to the best explanation the outline of the evidence, the compilation of hypotheses and the process by which the 'best' is selected requires re-assessment. The process of re-evaluation is carried out in the rest of the thesis.
The re-examination starts with an outline of the three types of evidence for psi. The discussion regarding potential explanation of the body of evidence for psi is shown to be similar to another problem in philosophy—the hard problem of consciousness.
.The competing hypotheses are then divided into comparable-options in relation to psi theory: the Skeptic hypothesis, the Small Change Natural hypothesis, the Big Change Natural hypothesis and the Supernatural hypothesis. The unresolved debate about psi is thus transformed into a 'psi hypotheses discussion' which allows for more productive discourse regarding possible explanations of the phenomena.
An argument is made that changing explanatory schemes have historically accounted for psi phenomena and it is shown that one of the hypotheses, the Supernatural hypothesis, is untenable. The remaining three hypotheses are examined in more detail in the second part of the thesis.
A recent discussion between scientists and a philosopher regarding the potential to develop psi theory is used to show that when competing hypotheses for psi are debated, the contrary approaches to the data represent different research traditions. It is concluded that explanatory considerations regarding the various hypotheses require reassessment.
It is shown that an outdated explanatory system (the covering law model) has most likely influenced the mainstream assessment of psi phenomena and that this assessment has informed the dominant Skeptic hypothesis. However, because covering law model has been superseded by new theories of scientific explanation, an argument is made that a reassessment of the competing hypotheses is warranted.
An examination of the competing psi hypotheses in the light of three major contemporary explanation theories (causal, pragmatic and unificatory) is therefore undertaken. It is argued that the anomalous nature of psi usually prejudices the manner in which the explananda are presented. The psi explananda are therefore recast in terms acceptable to the contemporary explanation theories. Each competing psi hypothesis provides a possible explanation to the psi explananda. Then a comparison of the explanations is carried out using the precepts of each contemporary explanation theory as a guide to making an assessment of the competing explanations.
It is concluded that it is important the three psi hypotheses continue to be explored in relation to progress in science, psi theory and issues of explanation in science. The main achievement of the thesis is to provide a new platform for productive dialogue between the competing hypotheses with explanatory concerns upfront.
Tab
le
of
contents
Introduction 1
0.1 What exactlyis psi? 2 0.2 Use of the word psi 5 0.3 Status of apparent psi events . 6
0.4 The psi debate . 7
0.5 Structure of Beyond Beliefs 9
Part I 12
Chapter 1 Terraincognita 14 1.1 Psi argumentsin mainstream philosophy 15 1.1.1 Explanation byfraud (EFA) argument 15 1.1.2 Modern Miracle Arguments (MMA) 22 1.1.3 Summary —explanatoryissues & questionable certainties 33 1.2 Psi arguments as pre-emptiveinferences to the best explanation(PIBE) 34 1.2.1 Inferencetothe Best Explanation 34 1.2.2 Pre-emptive Inferencetothe Best Explanation 38 1.2.3 MMA and EFA and PIBE 41 1.2.4 Summary of critique of mainstream psi arguments 42
Chapter 2 Evidence 45
2.1 Three-stage re-analysis of psi 45
2.2 Body of evidence 48
2.2.1 Historic 53
2.2.2 Anecdotal 55
2.2.3 Controlled experimental evidence 64 2.3 Response to the evidence 77 2.4 Compilation of hypotheses 78 2.4.1 The hard problem of consciousness—a similar philosophical problem 79
2.4.2 Psi theory 81
2.4.3 Psi hypotheses discussion 87
Chapter'3 Shifting Sands 91
3.1 Historic account 92
3.1.1 Twotransitions 93 3.1.2 Supportforthe historic account 96 3.1.3 Scope of science and psi phenomena 99 3.2 Arguments against the Supernatural hypothesis 101 3.2.1 Naturalism and psi 101
3.2.2 Everyday psi 103
3.2.3 Dramatic psi 106
3.2.4 The argumentfromreligious experience 108 3.2.5 Experimental psi andthe Supernatural hypothesis 110 3.3 Application of the supernatural assessment on the psi hypotheses discussion 112
3.3.1 Hardcore skepticism andthe'Supernatural hypothesis 113
Part II 116
Chapter 4Boundless sea 117
4.1 Theimportance of the development of psi theory 118 4.2 Example of contemporary discussion about psi 119 4.2.1 Theradio discussionin context 119
4.2.2 The setting 121
4.2.3 The psychologist andthe cognitive scientist 122 4.2.4 The philosopher 123 4.2.5 Discussion of competing hypotheses 125 4.3 Research traditions , 128
4.3.1 Researchtraditions andtheradio discussion 129 4.3.2 Comparingresearchtraditions 131 4.3.3 Summary ofradio discussion 133
Chapter 5Explanation 134
5.1 The Skeptic hypothesis 135 5.2 The coveringlaw model 137 5.2.1 Outline ofthe deductive nomological(DN) argument structure 138 5.2.2 The'received view' 141 5.3 Lawless psi and the coveringlaw model 141 5.3.1 Psi and vitalism 142 5.3.2 A note on psi andlaws 144 5.4 Psi publications and the'received view' 144
5.4.1 Psi publications 145 5.4.2 Mainstream discussion of psi 146 5.5 Consequences for psi theory 150
5.5.1 The Skeptic hypothesis priorto 1948 151 5.5.2 Skeptic hypothesis post 1948 152 5.4.3 Psiresearchinthe 1970s, 80s and onwards 155 5.6 A case for reassessment 159
Chapter 6Terra Firma 161 6.1 Review of IRE process 162
6.2 Problemsforthe coveringlaw model 164 6.2.1 The problem ofirrelevance 164 6.2.2 The problem of asymmetry 165 6.2.3 The problem oflaws 167 6.3 Psi and scientific explanation 169 6.3.1 Psi andlaws of nature 170 6.3.2 Anomalous phenomena and scientific explanation 171 6.4 Psi explananda recast 175 6.4.1 Psi explananda posed asinterrogative statements 175 6.4.2 Psi questions and hypotheses 179 6.5 Psi explananda and contemporary explanation theories 181
6.5.1 Pragmatic explanationtheory 181 6.5.2 Causation explanationtheory 184 6.5.3 Unificationtheory 185 6.5.4 Psi hypotheses and explanationtheories 187 6.5.5 Summary of explanationtheories and competing psi hypotheses 196
Conclusion 200
Bibliography 204
Appendix I 216
Glossary 219
Charts and grids
IBEthree-stage chart 48 (10,1 63)
Psi hypotheses 89
Historic account 100
Publications and coveringlaw model of explanation 149 Psi explananda asinterrogative statements 178
Psi Q&A grid 180
Foreword
The study of psi in philosophy is controversial. Psi is often invisible in philosophical discussion because the plausibility of the evidence for psi is dismissed out of hand. However, there is a long and interesting history of rigorous investigation of psi and there are obvious consequences for philosophical topics if the evidence for psi is ever considered established. Unfortunately, the extensive literature which discusses the elusive phenomena is rarely represented in philosophical discussion. The study of psi retains a maligned status in mainstream academia today.
I became interested in the academic study of psi during my undergraduate years at the University of Sydney, where I was fortunate enough to happen across a considerable stash of psi literature which piqued my interest in the subject matter. Due to the Dewey Decimal cataloguing system in the infamous Fisher Stacks, a substantial collection of parapsychology texts were situated right next to the philosophy of mind books that were required reading at the time.
As I dipped into this heretofore unmentioned subject matter I became aware that there was much more to the investigation of psi than was recognised in most mainstream philosophy. The works were intriguing, rigorous and worldly and the discussions lively and philosophical—I was enticed into the world of psi theory. At the same time I came to realise how invisible the subject matter was outside the small world of psi theoreticians and researchers; that psi doesn't exist is almost a mantra in contemporary philosophy of mind.
This thesis is not an attempt to change the minds of those who maintain that psi should not be investigated in philosophy because it is implausible, nor does make an epistemic defence of the evidence against charges of fraud or flaky methodology. The dominant mainstream Skeptic hypothesis remains at the end of the thesis as one of two other explanatory avenues to explore. Instead, this thesis is an investigation of the explanatory issues that inform assessment of the anomalous phenomena. The aim is to provide a platform for more general philosophical discourse regarding psi. I hope that it becomes clear there is much to discuss.
Beyond
Be
l
ie
fs
:
Introduct
ion
Lurking deep withintheidea of explanationis arudimentary appealtorationality.
Char
les
F
.
Adams
Thisthesisis concerned with anomalous phenomena and explanationtheory. The focus will be particularly on anomalous communication and anomalous action at a distance, otherwise known astelepathy and psychokinesis respectively. Thesetwointriguing phenomena are often referredto underthe umbrella word 'psi' (pronounced'sigh'). The mainstream assessment of psiin academiaisto ascribe fraud or fluky resultsto account forthe phenomena. Despitethis a small but persistent group of researchers continuestoinvestigatethe phenomena as genuine. They maintainthat fraud cannot account forthe data and have developed varioustheoriesto explainthe phenomena. Thetwo approaches are unreconciled and a Catch 22 has developed. If fraud or fluke can't account forthe phenomena then some othertheory must be employed, however,the mainstream will not accept psi untilitis explained; but psiis unlikelyto be explained untilitis incorporatedinto moreinclusive scientific problem-solving. Thereistherefore atension betweenthe apparent evidence for psi andlack of atenable explanation forthe phenomena.
I will partially resolvethis problem by showingthatthe mainstream assessment of psiis first and foremost representative ofbeliefs about psi rather than an examination of possibleexplanations ofthe phenomena. Itis hoped thatthe ensuing discussiontakesthe debatebeyond beliefs—hencethetitle—by addressingthetension caused by psi phenomena with regardto pertinentissues in explanationtheory fromthe philosophy of science.
First I give a brief overview of psi and definethe various components before clarifyingthe nomenclature usedinthisthesis. Then I outlinethe psi debate before sketching outthe structure ofthethesis.
0
.1
What
exac
t
ly
is
ps
i?
For millennia, psi events have been widely accepted as part ofthe human
experience across many cultures. Thereis alengthyliterature onthe performance of psi feats witnessed by credible people, and sincethe 1920slaboratories
in university departments have replicatedthe phenomenato some extent. Consequentlythere has been a continued build up of historic, anecdotal and laboratory evidence for both anomalous communication and anomalous action at a distance.'
The wordsthat describethe phenomena covered by psi have changed over time and new words have been coined astheories aboutthe phenomena developed. Thereis discussion amongst currenttheorists regardingthe best way of defining and naming psi andthe various effects associated with apparent evidence forthe phenomena. Thisthesisis a philosophical (ratherthan psychological) discussion of psi, and Itherefore drawin part onthe work ofthe philosopher Stephen E. Braude as a guideto:definitions and usage. Braudeis a philosopher who has.scontributed significantlyto discussion of psi and related philosophicalissues. I also usethe bookA Glossary ofterms usedin Parapsychology by Michael Thalbourne as a standard for general definitions.
Psiis otherwise known astelepathy and psychokinesis. The formeris anomalous communication andthelatter anomalous action at a distance. Psiis commonly brokenintothe following elements:
Psi
Anomalouscommunication (extra-sensory perception - ESP)
---
Anomalous action at a distance (psychokinesis - PK)
Telepathy Clairvoyance Precognition Retrocognition (time-displaced psi)
I outlinethe body of evidence for psiin Chapter 2 where examples ofthe historic, anecdotal and experimental evidence are provided.
I definethetwotypes of anomalous phenomenathat constitutes psi, ESP (andits three subcategories) and PK below.
Anomalous action at a distance— psychokinesis- PK
Anomalous action at a distanceisthoughtto occur when matteris affected by a person without any known force or mechanism. Theterm psychokinesis,
sometimes also known astelekinesis,is usedto describe an eventthat appearsto fallintothis category. I will usethe formerterm, whichis often abbreviatedto 'PK'. Thetarget of PK can be an object outside someone's body or substances withinthe person's own body. To encompass both ofthese aspects of
psychokinesisitis defined by Braude as:
the causalinfluence of an organism on aregion r ofthe physical world without any known sort of physicalinteraction betweenthe organism's body and r. _ (Braude 1986, p220)
Importantly, PKis defined by whatitis not;if something occursthatcannotbe explained mechanistically by reductionto any ofthe four known forcesthen an instance of psychokinesisisthoughtto have occurred.
Inthe psiliterature examples of evidence for PK are given on boththe large, everyday macro scale andthe micro quantumlevel. Onthe macro scale PK is gvidenced by spontaneous cases such asthosein poltergeistincidentsin which objects appearto move without any known means. Onthe microlevel anomalous action at a distanceis measured by, forinstance,the decay of an atom. I present more concrete examplesin Chapter 2.
Anomalous communication— ESP- telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition
Anomalous communicationis similarly defined negatively asthe acquisition of information about a person or eventinthe past, present or futurewithoutthe use of the ordinary five senses (taste,touch, sight, hearing or smell). Theterm
extrasensory perception (abbreviatedto ESP)is often usedto coverthethree forms of anomalous communication covered bythisterm. They are:
Telepathy
Clairvoyance
Precognition/retrocognition
Information gained about another mind or minds without the use of the ordinary five senses. Information gained about an inanimate object or event without the use of the five senses.
Information about a person or event in the past (retrocognition),or future (precognition)without the use of the ordinary five senses.
Allthreetypes of ESPinvolve anomalous communication. Theinformationis obtained either from another person, asinthe case oftelepathy, or from an object, asinthe case of clairvoyance. Precognition and retrocognition are botht ime-displacedinstances of eithertelepathy or clairvoyance, I refer mainlyto
precognitioninthisthesis asitisthis form of psi-displaced psithat features more prominentlyintheliterature. There are also more sophisticated discussions ofthe nature of ESP andits subsidiary categories differentiate between anomalous cognition and anomalousinteraction (Braude 1979). Itis also difficultto differentiateinstances oftelepathy and clairvoyance experimentally, which has caused:onetheorist, J.B. Rhine,to encouragethe use oftheterm GESP (standing for General ESP)in orderto account for general anomalousinformation
acquisition. Specific examples of allthree categories of ESP will be givenin more detailin Chapter 2.
Psi researchers
The descriptions of people who are activelyinvolvedin psi research are also specifictothe psiliterature, soitis worth noting howthey will be usedinthis thesis. In psi-orientedliterature, proponents ofthe'fraud hypothesis' (sometimes also referredto asthe'Null hypothesis') are referredto as'skeptics'. Academics who actively research psi are often called'parapsychologists'. However, because some academics who study psi are not psychologists and because some
commentators on psi research are not academics and mayinclude skeptics, I prefer theterm'psi researcher'to describe a person who has undertakeninformed
researchinto psi, regardless oftheir view.
Parapsychologists are usually not skeptics (why would anyone study a phenomenathatthey didn't believe existed?) and skeptics rarely undertake
scientificinvestigation of psi (for a similar reason), but skeptical parapsychologists do exist. They are sometimes called'debunkers' asthey often undertaketo
publicly critiquethe work of non-skeptical parapsychologists. In such fortuns sometimesthese commentators are dividedinto'believers' and'skeptics'.
Debunkers belonginthelatter category andthosethat continueto research psi as a genuinely anomalous phenomenathe former. Invective betweenthetwo
approaches can sometimes be fierce andtheterms'believer' and'skeptic' or 'debunker' havetaken on a certain negative connotation depending on one's point of view.2 Although overall I preferto usetheterm psi researcher (orifthe writeris not a researcher as suchthen'psi commentator') sometimes context requires a differentiation betweenthe various approachesto psi. In suchinstances I preferthe termspro-psi andanti-psi to differentiatethese points of view ratherthan
'believer' or'skeptic' which can containinsinuationsthat are notintendedinthis thesis.
0
.2
Use
o
f
the
word
ps
i
The word psi encounters some usage problems. Itis an abstract word whichis not well-known outside ofthe psiliterature. Norisit readily easyto pronounce without knowledge aboutits etymology. Forinstance, some people mistakenly pronounceitpea-ess-eye whenthey first encounterthe word. Confusinglyitis sometimes capitalised (PSI) and can be mistaken for pounds per squareinch or quantumtheory referencesto PSI. However,there does not seemto be any reason to revert backtothe olderterms for anomalous events andthe word psiis certainly shorter andless cumbersomein comparisonto more archaicterminology. I
therefore continue withthetradition of using psi as an unassumingtermto representthe notionthat an experiment or experience has registered an anomalous eventindicative of ESP or PKthat apparently cannot be explainedthrough normal means.
2 I have been witnessto suchinvective betweenthe'believers' and'debunkers' of high academic status when I was a participantin aninternational parapsychology email discussionlist. Thelist eventually devolved duetothelist host's fears oflibel charges (PRF 1998).
The word'psi'is not new,itisthe firstletter ofthe word'psyche'in Greek. However,its useto describe what was once called psychic phenomenais relatively recent.'Psi' was proposed for useinthe area of psychical research by B.P.
Wiesner and R.H. Thoulessin 1942to replace words such as'psychic' or'psychic functioning'. It was coinedin orderto avoid assumptions about what psi might be whenlittleis actually known aboutits exact nature, orifit exists at all. It was hopedthat, being more semantically neutralthan previousterminology, any assumptions regardingthe nature ofthe anomalous phenomena would be avoided. Thus, further unbiasedinvestigation ofthe phenomena couldthentake place (Thouless 1972, p2; Thalbourne 1982, p56-57).
As a part of speech,the word'psi' can be used byitself as a noun which referstothe apparent evidence forthe anomalous phenomena previously described as'psychic phenomena','psychic functioning' and'psychic abilities'. Psi can also In used as an adjectiveto describesthe anomalous nature ofthe apparent events or
effectsthat are displayed when anomalous communication or anomalous action at - a distanceisthoughtto have occurred (Braude 2003, pxv).. I adheretothe
conventional use ofthe wordinthisthesis.
0
.3
Status
of
apparent
ps
i
events
Thisthesis assumesthatthereislittle familiarity withthe body of evidence for psi in mainstream philosophy. The evidenceistherefore outlinedin some detailin Chapter 2 whereitis shownthatthe body of evidence for psiis convincing enough to warrant examination. The phenomena are not easily explained awayin normal terms, however,thereis no dominanttheorythat has successfully accounted for the events. Accordinglythe events can be best described as ostensibly paranormal. Thatis,they are currently unexplained, but not necessarily unexplainable (Braude 1979, p244). It willtherefore be assumed forthe purposes ofthisthesisthatthere is a putative body of evidence for psi whichis comprised of evidence for what are most appropriately calledapparent psi effectsorapparent psi events.Inorderto keepthe ensuing discussion of psi as semantically clean as possible I will not append'ostensible' or'putative' or'apparent' before each mention of psi, psi
event or psi effect. These qualifications should be understood asimplicit when psi is discussedinthisthesis.
0
.4
The
ps
i
deba
te
The psi debateisthe main concern ofthisthesis andisits starting point. A small but persistent community of researchersthinkthatthe evidence for psiis worth investigating andthat some kind of new, as yet undiscovered, explanationis required forthe anomalous phenomena. This contrasts withthe mainstream understanding of psi, whichisto explainthe evidence as either fraudulent, producedthrough flukes of coincidence, flaky experimental methodology orthe product of self-deluded scientists. Currentlythe debateis at a deadlock.
Discussion between well-informedinterested parties has not resolvedthe issue. Thisis evidenced by a 2003 publication of a special edition of the Journal for Consciousness Studies entitled'Psi Wars'. Inthisissue various anti and pro psi
proponents make cleartheir contemporary assessment ofthe state of play ofthe ' evidence for psi phenomena. Inthe paper'Givethe null hypothesis a chance'
James E. Alcock, a skeptical parapsychologist, concludesthat
Thus,the search for psi will go on for alongtimeto come, for I canthink of nothingthat would ever persuadethose who pursueitthatthe Null hypothesisis probablytrue. Yet, as this search goes on,those of us who are sceptics should applaud and supportthe approach taken by parapsychologists who have contributedtothis Special Issue—not because we agree withtheir conclusions, for we shall continueto scrutinize and, when appropriate, find fault withtheir methodology and challengetheirinterpretationsbut becausethey 'share our beliefinthe power ofthe scientific methodto revealtruthin nature. I do marvel
attheirtenacity, however, fortheylabourin search of psi despite alack ofthe evidentiary and other rewardsthat are earned by mainstream scientistsintheir research... I continue to believethat parapsychologyis, at bottom, motivated by beliefin search of data, rather than datain search of explanation. Itisthe beliefinthelarger view of human personality and existencethanis accordedto human beings by modern sciencethat keeps
parapsychology engagedintheir search. Because ofthis belief, parapsychologists never really givethe Null hypothesis a chance. (Alcock 2003, p49)
In contrast, another paperinthe sameissue by Simon Sherwood and Chris A. Roe entitled'A review of dream ESP studies conducted sincethe Maimonides dream ESP programme' concludesthat:
Our review has shownthat dream ESP remains a promising,if somewhat neglected, area for parapsychological research. Combined effect sizes for both Maimonides and post-Maimonides studies suggestthatjudges may be ableto correctlyidentifytarget materials more oftenthan would be expected by chance using dream mentation. Thereis evidence of conceptual replication within both sets of studies, althoughthis
seems to be concentrated within certain research teams... We hope that this review will help re-awaken interest in this neglected but promising paradigm.
(Sherwood and Roe 2003, p106)
There is obviously apparently little agreement amongst those who debate the topic within the parapsychology literature. The question that concerns me is: how can there be two such disparate views regarding the same body of evidence? There appears to be an unbreachable divide between those who consider the evidence for psi plausibly indicates a genuinely anomalous phenomenon and those who
maintain that these people are self-deluded or mistaken. Reasoned discussion between the two parties, as represented in joint publications such as those quoted above, does not appear to be able to resolve the differences one way or the other.
In general there seems to be a resignation that the various proponents must just 'agree to disagree' as to what to make of the evidence. However, I think the
lack of resolution to the dispute is harmful to both parties. If anti-psi proponents are correct then psi researchers are wasting time and money investigating a phenomenon that doesn't exist; if the pro-psi proponents are correct then mainstream science and philosophy is missing out on investigating new
phenomena that are intriguing and, though anomalous, have the potential to impact significantly on contemporary theories of mind, time and causation.
The situation in the philosophical literature mirrors the debate in
parapsychology. For instance Stephen E. Braude, a philosopher who has made a significant contribution to psi research, argues convincingly for the legitimacy of the evidence for psi in two of his earlier books: ESP and Psychokinesis: A
Philosophical Examination (1979) and The Limits of Influence: Psychokinesis and the Philosophy of Science (1986). And he has more recently published another book Immortal Remains (2003) in which he draws on his earlier work to maintain that in response to the question "Do human beings have psychic (psi) abilities (ESP or PK)?...we can confidently answer "yes" (Braude 2003, p2). He goes on to justify this answer and comments that it did not come easily, rather:
...researchers faced imposing and interesting problems concerning the nature and reliability of human testimony, and subtle and technical puzzles about randomness and probability. They've also had to confront a recalcitrant and incredibly annoying problem: namely, that if psychic abilities exist, then by their very nature they could elude all conventional experimental controls. (Braude 2003, p2)
The account he gives ofthe state of psi researchisinformed and reasonable. Accordingto Braudeitis apparentthat,though difficultto cometoterms with,the evidence (both anecdotal andto aless degree experimental)is convincing. The philosophicalissuesthat are raised bythe evidence havethe potentialtoimpact on theories of mind, causation,time and survivalist research. However, as I showin much more detailinthe first chapter,the mainstream philosophical understanding of psi continuesto propoundthatthereis nothingto discuss because,itis asserted, fraud can reasonably account forthe phenomena. Theinspiration forthisthesis stems fromthe desireto understand howto resolvethe apparently unbridgeable gap betweenthe mainstream view andthe psi-oriented philosophicalliterature, which advocatesthatthe body of evidence for psiis reasonablyindicative of evidence for genuine anomalous events.
Ithinkthatitis morethan a matter of an epistemic assessment ofthe body of evidence for psi. Ifthe debate were so easily resolvedtheissue would not continueto be problematictoday. Instead I maintainthatthe situation will remain unresolved untilthe backgroundissuesthatinformthe various stances are
examined. I amtherefore concerned with boththe representation of psiin mainstream philosophy as well asthe workthat has been undertakeninthe ps i-orientedliterature. I draw on both duringthe course ofthisthesisto cometo a better understanding of howto closethe gap betweenthese disparate views.
0
.5
Structure
of
Beyond
Be
l
ie
fs
Inthisthesistheinitial assessmentis groundedin philosophy by starting with an analysis ofthe dominant philosophical arguments regarding psi. In Chapter 1the arguments are outlined and critiqued. Itis shownthat conservative explanatory considerationsillicitlyinformthe arguments;the arguments are also shownto be pre-emptiveinferencestothe best explanation.
A caseis made for athree-stage re-analysisinthe form of a revised Inferencetothe Best Explanation, whichis subsequently undertakeninthe remainder ofthethesis. The following chartindicatesthe stagesinthethesis wherethe re-evaluationtake place:
IBE stage Section Brief content summary of thesis
Stage 1- E Evidence
Stage 2- {H1 ,...,H} Compilation
2.2 Outline of evidence andtheory, discussissue oftestimony 2.6 Compilethe hypotheses based
on cunent psitheory and comparisontothe hard pioblem of consciousness
Stage 3- Fln Process of selection Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Discuss background beliefs, presentthe historic account Discuss competing hypotheses Discuss dominant hypothesis Compare remaining hypotheses
Inmore detail,the content ofthe chapters flows as follows:
Part I — Chapters 1-3
Part I setsthe scene forthe discussionin Part II and groundsthetopicin philosophy.
Ch. 1 Terra Incognita
Ch 2 Evidence and Theory
Ch 3 Shifting Sands
The mainstream philosophy arguments are analysed and critiqued. Itis shownthatthe arguments areinformed by explanatory assumptions. The resultisthat'unknown territory'is opened up becausethe evidence for psi cannot now be automatically ascribedto fraud. An argumentis made for a 3-stage re-analysis ofthe situation.
The evidence andtheory are presented.
The hypotheses are compiled andthe psi debateis recouched asthe'psi hypotheses discussion. The history ofthe explanation of psiis examined,
the historic accountis presented and an argumentis made againstthe Supernatural hypothesis.
Part II — Chapters 4-6
Part II continuesthe discussion of psi using contemporaryissuesin philosophy of scienceto help understand howto developthe discourse betweenthe remaining competing hypotheses (the Skeptic hypothesis andthetwo psi realist hypotheses).
Ch 4 Boundless Sea
Ch 5 Explanation
Ch 6 Terra Firma
The remaining hypotheses are examined using a contemporary example — the analysis reveals that competing research traditions inform the contemporary discussion.
Explanation issues that inform the research traditions are examined and a caseis made that an out-moded explanation theory (the covering law model) still informs the
mainstream assessment of psi.
The psi explananda are recast and the competing
hypotheses examined using relevant issues in contemporary explanation theory. The new territory is sketched out using contemporary explanation theory. The thesis concludes leaving the philosophical discussion regarding psi on firmer explanatory ground.
A more detailed summary of Part I follows before Chapter 1 commences a critique ofthe mainstream arguments for psi. 3
3Ihave appended a glossary of terms especially relevant to this thesis. It includes definitions for psi phenomena and related issues that have been covered in this chapter.
Par
t
I
:
Chapters
1-3
Oh, you should never ever doubt what nobodyis sure about. Willy Wonka
The main aim of Part Iisto setthe scene for a discussion of psi hypothesesin Part II in relationto explanatoryissuesin philosophy of science. The conceitthat runs throughthethesisistotakethe reader on ajourney fromthe Terra Incognita in Chapter 1—the unknown explanatoryterritorythatis revealed after a critique ofthe mainstream assessment of psi—tothe more grounded Terra Firma in Chapter 6. The chaptersin between explorethe explanatoryissuesthat are relevantto psi as new explanatoryterritoryis mapped out.
Chapter 1 commences with a critique ofthe philosophical arguments for psi which I show are problematic on a number of counts: failureto considerthe evidence; inappropriateinvocation of explanatory conservatism; and failureto acknowledge relevant background beliefs. I also showthatthere has been a failureto recognisethe structure andlogic ofthe arguments as Inferencestothe Best Explanation. I usethe latter pointto arguethatif an assessment of psiisto be alegitimate Inferencetothe Best Explanation,thenthe outline ofthe evidence,the compilation of hypotheses and process by whichthe'loveliest'is selected require re-analysis.
The firsttwo ofthesetasks are undertakenin Chapter 2in which I outlinethe threetypes of evidence for psi. Theoriesthat have been proposedto account forthe phenomena are also summarised. Ithen re-analysethe psi debateinterms of a similar discussionin philosophy:the hard problem of consciousness. Four psi hypotheses are identified:the skeptic hypothesis,the supernatural hypotheses; andtwo realist accounts. The psi debateisthus recouched as a'psi hypotheses discussion', which allows for more productive philosophical discussion of psi and related explanatory issues.
In Chapter 3, I examine some ofthe background beliefsthat haveinformedthe mainstream assessment of psi. In particular I show how changing explanatory
schemes have historically accounted for psi phenomena as supernatural. I make a case againstthe supernatural hypothesis onthe basisthat most ofthe phenomena exhibited are mundane.
4,1
By
the
end
o
f
Pa
r
t
I
the
re
a
re
the
re
fo
re
th
ree
compe
t
ing
hypo
the
se
s
:
the
skep
t
ic
hypo
the
s
is
;
and
two
p
s
i
rea
l
is
t
hypo
these
s
.
The
compe
t
ing
s
tance
s
fo
rm
the
focu
s
fo
r
the
d
iscuss
ion
in
Pa
r
t
I
I
o
f
the
the
s
is
whe
re
fu
r
the
r
exp
lana
to
ry
i
ssues
a
re
dea
l
t
w
i
th
in
mo
re
de
ta
i
l
.
Chap
te
r
1
:
Terra
incogn
ita
Faced, accordingly, with a paucity of solidfact-let alonelaws-in parapsychology, one whotriesto discussits philosophicalimplications cannot helpfeelingthat heis standing on spongy ground. Perhapsit/s most appropriatetoregardthoseimplications neither as philosophicaltruths or probabilities nor as philosophical proposals, but as philosophical questions.
James
M
.O
.
Whea
t
ley
This chapter examinesthe dominant argumentsin philosophy which deal with psi phenomena. These arethe Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA) andthe Humean-based Modern Miracle Argument (MMA). The former focuses onthe Australian philosopher Keith Campbell's version andthelatter onthe case made by George Price in 1955. The arguments representthe most comprehensive examples of philosophical assessment of psiin relatively contemporary mainstream philosophy. Theirimpact on the mainstream philosophical assessment of psi has been profound and yetthereis little discussion aboutthe argumentsthemselvesinthat forum.
Firstly, I critiquethe arguments separately: I detailissues about explanatory conservatismthatinformthe Explanation by Fraud Argument; and I showthe Modern Miracle Argumentis problematic and requires an update. Secondly,thetwo forms of argument are consideredtogetherin a generic form, and an argumentis madethatthe argument for psi as best explained by fraud fallsto an overarching criticism:itis an illegitimate, Pre-emptive Inferencetothe Best Explanation (PIBE). Theterm PIBEis subsequently defined and described.
Two conclusions are drawn fromthe analysis ofthe mainstream psi
arguments: firstlyitis concludedthat a more complex approachto understanding psi is warranted; and secondlythe analysisis usedto flagtheissues of explanation and background belief,that areimportanttothe development of a more sophisticated analysis of psi phenomena. Chapter 1thus setsthe Scene forthe analysis of psi and related explanationissues, whichisthen undertaken duringthe course ofthethesis. The exploration of explanatoryissuesthat ensuesin following chapters helps to resolvethetension betweenthe apparent body of evidence for psi andthe current lack of atenable explanation forthe phenomena, whichis atthe core ofthe psi debate andtherefore of central concerntothisthesis.
1
.1
Ps
i
arguments
in
ma
instream
ph
i
losophy
Arguments about psi phenomena are rarely made explicitin contemporary
philosophy. Instead,itis assumedthat although potentially relevantto philosophical issues,thereis no evidence for psi and accordingly, further discussion of psi should not be undertaken4. As a result psiis ofteninvisiblein mainstream philosophical discourse. I showin Chapter 2thatthereis a significant body of evidence for psithat does require an assessment. Itis curious howthe gap betweenthe mainstream
assessment of psi and body of evidence has occurred, henceitisimportantto analyse the mainstream argumentsin philosophythat have given risetothe notionthatthereis no evidence forthe phenomena. I suggestthat behindthe assertionlietwo main
arguments which show howthis conclusion was reached. They areimportant because they arethe dominant argumentsin philosophy and have had an ongoing effect onthe mainstream assessment of psi phenomena. I show boththe Explanation by Fraud (EFA) and Modern Miracle Argument (MMA) suffer from similar problems dueto assumptions aboutthe explanation of psi. I critiquethe structure, set up and
conclusions of boththe arguments separately starting withthe Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA)inthe subsection below.
1.1.1 Explanation byfraud(EFA) argument
The EFA assertsthat psi phenomena are most rationally explained asthe product of deliberate fraud or self-delusion. The argument has been most clearly put forward by the Australian philosopher Keith Campbell, whois concerned withthe evidence for psi as part of a discussion ofthe mind/body problem publishedin his book Body and Mind. He writes:
the Mind-Body problem requires forits solution ajudgement on parapsychology, and thatinturn raises general questionsin philosophy, andin particular epistemology (Campbell 1984, p95)
4 Forinstance,the following quoteistaken from a generaltext book on philosophy of mind: ...Ifthere were such Ipsil phenomena,then existing physicaltheory would certainly appearto be inadequate. Butthereis no evidence of such phenomena (or so most current philosophers of mind assume). Moreover, evenifthere were,itis unclear howit would bear uponthe explanation of vast amounts of perfectly normal human and animal behaviour when such evidence seems evenlesslikely to arise. (Rey, 1997, p72)
Hethen goes onto saythat:
We must confrontthe problem of how evidence can have weight, andthis raisesthe question of fraud. The problem of fraudisthat we know men can, and do, cheat and dissemble, but we do not knowthatthey have paranormal capacities. Onthe contrary, the great weight of our fully attested knowledge of man's origin and constitution makes paranormal capacities extremely unlikely. So for any resultin psychical research which can be explained either by appealto paranormal powers or bythe hypothesis of fraud, the explanation by fraudisthe more rational one.
(Campbell 1984, pp94-95)
And finallythat:
Only repeatability can eliminatethe hypothesis of fraud. Ifthe subject can repeat, or nearly repeat, his paranormal feat for anybody, at any suitabletime,in any suitable place, under conditions which anyindependent experimenteris freeto vary at will, with assistants whomthe experimenter can choose,then fraud can be excluded as an
explanation ofthe events. (Campbell 1984, p96)
In point form,the argument runs as follows:
PROBLEM: SET UP
PREMISE 1. PREMISE 2
CONCLUSION CAVEAT
When presented withthe evidence for psi
'we must confrontthe problem of how evidence can have weight.'
'we knowthat people can and do cheat and dissemble.'
'we do not knowthatthey have paranormal capacities' (in fact paranormal capacities are extremely unlikely).
the'explanation by fraudisthe more rational one.' unlessthe repeatability problemis addressed.
I have called Campbell's argumentthe Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA) because ofits concluding statement:'the explanation by fraudisthe more rational one'. At first glance,itis reminiscent of Hume's miracle argument. Thatis, one must choose between somethingthatisthoughtto contravenethelaws of nature (highly improbable or unlikely) and somethingthat one knows for sure (that peopletelllies) andtherefore one should questionthe source oftheimprobable events ratherthan believethe former occurred. Atthis stage ofthe analysis Itreat Campbell's version as a standalone argument because he does not make any referenceto Hume's work5.In
5 Asthe other argument I focus oninthis chapter, George Price's Modern Miracle Argument,
specifically referencesthe Humean argument I will deal withissues of concern regardingthe modern rendition of Hume's argumentinthe next section.
the following analysis ofthe EFA I showthatthere areimportantissues about explanatory conservatismthat guidethe set up and structure ofthe EFA argument which warrant furtherinvestigation of psi phenomenain relationto explanatory issues.
The EFA premises
Itis hardto quibble with either ofthe premises. We definitely knowthat people dolie and cheat and can be deluded unwittingly from our own personal experience. Itis also easyto confirmthat psiis considered unlikely by mainstream science. Mainstream dictionaries and encyclopaedias define psi as anomalousinthe strictest sense, and hence paranormal (Mautner 1996, p310, Blackburn 1994, p277)6. Therefore neither of the premises ofthe EFA argument are controversial statements. Insteaditisthe set up and structure ofthe argument which I will focus oninthis critique.
The EFA set up •
Itisthe set uptothe premisesthat givesthe first clue astothe hidden explanatory concernsthat might beinformingthe argument. Campbell says'We must confrontthe problem of how evidence can have weight' (Campbell 1984, pp94) whichindicates that he believesthatthe evidenceis significant enoughto warrant examination. But directly afterthis statement heintroducesthe premise which statesthat we know people cheat and dissemble. Such a manoeuvreis problematic becauseit suggeststhat betweenthe set up andthe first premiselie certain assumptions aboutthe evidence itself. The statementinthe first premiseis not an assessment ofthe actual weight of the evidence as promisedinthe set up ofthe argument. I suggestthatthere are other questionsthat could be asked and should be answered priortotheintroduction ofthe fraud premises. Forinstance Campbell could ask:
6 In fact one such definition fromthePenguin Dictionary of Psychologystarts off with a rather acerbic comment on parapsychology whichthey defined as a'more orless (withthe emphasis ontheless) accepted branch of psychology concerned with paranormal phenomena...' (Reber 1985, p5I7). The definition finishes up by advising want-to-be psi researchersto fundtheir research by using psychics to helpthem win at casinos andthe racetrack—an absurd proposition.
What evidenceisthere for psi? or,
Doesthe evidence for psi conformto current scientific standards?
There are also more complex questionsthat could reasonably be posed regardingthe weighing up of probabilitiesin regardto fraud:
When doesthe evidence for an anomalous phenomenon such as psi outweigh theimprobability ofit?
How do we make an empiricaljudgement on whatis considered anomalous phenomena?
How much cheating and dissembling can we reasonably postulatein orderto explainthe evidencein such a manner?
Campbell does not give any reason why heintroducesthe cheating and dissembling premise upfront without addressing any oftheissues regarding fraud and psi explicitly. Theintroduction ofthe first premise without discussionistherefore presumably based on assumptions regardingthe nature ofthe evidence for psi as• anomalous. The EFAisthen a circular argument based onthe formally defined nature ofthe phenomena ratherthan an assessment ofit per se.
Itisimportantto realisethe gravity of whatis being proposed whenitis suggestedthat fraud can account as a blanket explanation forthe entire body of evidence for psi. Theissue of fraud as an explanation for psiis well coveredin psi literature. Some 14 years priortothe first publication of Campbell's bookin1970it was notedthat for fraudto be a reasonable hypothesisto account forthe evidence one must'believethat all parapsychologists areliars and montebanks but such a
charge...' evenif applied'tothe dozens of university and other scientistsinvolved,is notlikelyto betaken seriously.' (Rhine 1956, pll) Thereis a body of evidence for psi7 which, although controversial, can be analysedinterms of scientific validity as any other evidenceisin science. A genuine weighting ofthe evidence for psiindicates thatthe situationis more complexthanthat whichis assumed by proponents ofthe Explanation by Fraud Argument.
7 Once again I remindthatifthe readeris unfamiliar with what constitutesthe body of evidence for psi itis set outin some detail atthe beginning of Chapter 2.
Psi has been studied using appropriate scientific methodsthat are acceptableto mainstream scientific processes8. The results are controversial because overallthe experimentsindicatethat psi effects occurinthelives of regular people andthey are confirmedto a certain extentin small scale replicationsinlaboratories. I suggestthat itis unreasonableto ascribe fraud as an explanation forthe phenomena withouttaking into account how much fraud must be requiredin orderto provide a satisfactory
explanation forthe phenomena.-The fraud hypothesis becomes absurd (notto mention potentiallylibellous) onceitis consideredjust how much fraud orlying or cheating or dissembling musttake placein order foritto be a reasonable assessment ofthe case in hand. Itis because arguments such asthe EFA assume fraud without explicit assessment ofthe evidencethat Ithinkthereis a deeper undercurrentinformingthe argument.
To underscorethis point further, I will now review a similar contemporary example wherethereis debate and discussion regarding evidence. Global warming has beenthetopic of much debate amongstthe scientific community and philosophers in recent years. Itis similartothe psi debate becausethere aretwo sidestothe debate: thosethat believe some scientific dataindicates human activityis causing global warming andthose who disagree withthis statement and yet draw onthe same body of evidence regardingthe climate. Thelatter are often referredto as'global warming skeptics' whichis alsoindicative of a similaritytothe psi debate.
The discussion regarding climate change has beenthe subject of philosophical investigation. Forinstance,in a paper called'Scientific basis forthe greenhouse effect' William R. Cline outlinesthe scientific evidence and analysesthe datataking into accountthe views of scientists who propose variousinterpretations ofthe ultimate cause ofthe current fluctuation ofthe earth'stemperature. Inthe end he concludesthat'it should be clear fromthis reviewthat many scientific uncertainties remain aboutthe greenhouse effect. However, uncertaintyis not necessarily grounds for policyinaction' (Cline 1991,,p916). The paperisindicativethat athorough assessment ofthe state ofthe global warming debate has been undertaken:the author performs an evaluation ofthe evidence available from scientificjournals; andthe
8Assessments of psiin relationto scientific method have been performed on an ongoing basis since
the controversy regarding modern day experiments first commenced. I mention some specific details in Chapter 5. For a recent summation ofthe history ofthe scientific study of psi andthe status ofthe evidence can be found, forinstance,in Adrian Parker's article'Does psi exist?'inthe Journal of Consciousness Studies' specialissue on psi: Psi Wars.
articlethen goes onto comparethe differentinterpretations of evidence; and finally, provides a summation ofthe situation. The weighing up ofthe evidence ofthe global warming debateis based on an analysis ofissues relevantto philosophy of science, such asthe problems of weighing up andthe problematic nature ofinterpreting datain relationtotheory development.
The examination ofthe global warming debateisin sharp contrasttothe EFA argument, which also requires a weighing up of disputed evidencein a field of scientificinquiry. Itis hardtoimaginethat a philosophical assessment ofthe climate change debate would,instead, mount a similar argumenttothe EFA. Forinstance,it would be considered rather absurdto contendthat'we knowthat people cheat and dissemble' and'we are unsureifthereis global warming' sotherefore'thereis no global warming.' And yetthatis exactly whatthe Explanation by Fraud Argument proposesis a reasonable response regardingthe evidentialissuesthatthe body of evidence for psi raises. Accordingtothe EFAthere need.be no discussion ofthe pertinentissuesin philosophy pertainingto an evaluation ofthe evidence for psi.
Despitethis problemthe Explanation by Fraud Argument has remained
dominant and accepted by mainstream philosophy asthe most rational response when itis requiredto make a decision aboutthe body of evidence for psi9. Butisit?I suggestthatitis not. No,there are beliefsthatinformthe set up ofthe premises ofthe argument regarding psithat are specifictothe phenomena and which are not reflected in other philosophicalinvestigations of contentious debatesin science. I explorethese beliefs furtherinthe section below.
Conservative explanatory concerns- En and
E
,
I arguethatthatthe set up ofthe premises ofthe Explanation by Fraud Argumentis informed by a predispositionto a conservative approachto explanationinthe sciences whichis problematic. Toillustratethis I suggestthat when mainstream philosophers consider psi,they are really making an assessment which chooses one oftwo possible outcomes:
9 Cotemporary mainstream philosophers often re-iteratethat'thereis no evidence for psi' evenifthey don't referencethe EFA specifically. I make more specific mention of some statementsin philosophy of mindthat maintainthis stancelaterinthethesis.
either
- psi cannot be explained currently as a natural phenomenonthereforethe fraud hypothesisisthe most rational
or
- psi does not fitinto current scientifictheory, but, giventhe apparent
evidence, some kind of explanationis required regardless ofthe ontological outcome
The Explanation by Fraud Argument assumesthe former, whichisindicative of a conservative explanatory approachto psi phenomena.powever, I showedthat philosophical discussion ofthe climate change debate used currenttheoryin
philosophy of scienceto make an assessment ofthe relevantissues. I contendthat psi isjust as worthy of considered analysis as any other discussion regarding evidencein the sciences. The evidence should be examined and weighedin relationto current issues of-explanation and measurement and broaderissues of scientific process and progress as part ofthe analysis.
Itis not possible atthis stageto determine whether E. or Eq,isthe mostrational assessment of psi. If,just say, E,,,istruethenthe conservative explanatory approachis not appropriate andthereforeless reasonablethanif E. weretrue. I arguetherefore that an assessment ofthe phenomena should be made whenthe comparison between the fraud hypothesis and other explanatory options aretakeninto consideration.
EFA conclusion
To sum up,thereis a greater puzzle regardingthe anomalous nature of a phenomenon for whichthereis substantial (if controversial) evidence. We do wantto be ableto differentiate betweenthetrulyimpossible (thatthe moonis made of green cheese for example) without writing offthe possible existence of ostensibly paranormal
phenomenainthe face of reasonable epistemic plausibility.
I arguethenthat ratherthaninvokethe fraud hypothesis up front we should. consider: Whenisit really more rationalto believethat fraud can account forthe body of evidence for psi ratherthan acceptthe possibilitythatthe evidence might be indicative of another, as yet unaccepted, method ofinteraction between humans and the world? Atthis pointintimethe psi debateindicatesthatthere are various
alternativestothe E„ outcome. The Explanation by Fraud Argument musttherefore be
considered as only one of other equally plausible assessments, which all require further refinement and discussion beforeit can become clear whichis reallythe most reasonable. I explore and examinethisissue furtherinthe following chapters: The theoriesthat have been developedto explain psi are exploredin Chapter 2; andthe anomalous nature of psiis exploredin an historic contextin Chapter 3. Finally an analysis ofthe Explanation by Fraud Argument, renamedthe skeptic hypothesis,is comparedto other possible hypotheses andis assessedin relationtoissuesin contemporary explanationtheoryin Chapter 6.
I have shownthat conservative explanatory assumptions have guidedthe set up ofthe EFA. Next I will discussthe other form of argument whichis dominantin theliterature,the Modern Miracle Argument (MMA). Then I will showthat boththe EFA andthe MMA suffer from more explanatory problems regarding Inferencetothe Best Explanation.
1.1.2 Modern Miracle Arguments (MMA)
As I mentioned earlier, Keith Campbell's Explanation by Fraud Argumentis reminiscent of Hume's miracle argument. Thereforeitis not surprisingthat philosophers have made a similar argument, butin direct reference backtothe Humean form ofthe argument. I have calledthesethe Modern Miracle Arguments ( WA).
, The first Modern Miracle Argument was presented by. George Price and publishedinScience in 1955. Another version was published 25 years afterthis by Anthony Flewin'Parapsychology: Science or pseudoscience?'. Price himself acknowledgesthatthe argument formis not new andlong predates even Hume's famous miracle version. He references a similar argumenttothe Greek writer Lucian (Price 1955, p360). Price's versionis more comprehensivethan Flew's, soit will be used asthe basis forthe analysis of Humean-style miracle arguments.1°
1° I make mention of Price's articlelaterinthethesis when,in Chapter 5, I showthatthetiming ofthe publication of Price's MMA argument coincides withthetimethe coveringlaw model of explanation became dominantin philosophy of science.
George Price's Modern Miracle Argument
In a paper called'Science andthe supernatural'II George Price statesthat after
reading Hume's'miracle argument' he'converted' from being an avid believerin ESP to a non-believer, or radical skeptic (Price 1955, p360). George Price wrotethatitis his:
opinion concerningthe findings ofthe parapsychologiststhat many ofthem are dependent on clerical and statistical errors and unintentional use of sensory clues, and that all extra chance results not so explicable are dependent on deliberate fraud or mildly abnormal mental conditions. (Price 1955, p360)
Furthertothis, Price formulates his argumentinthelight of Hume's miracle argument (more onthis shortly) and adopts a similar position with regarding psi phenomena. He showsthat psiisincompatible with current scientifictheory by accepting an analysis bythe philosopher C.D. Broad. He cites a paper first publishedin 1949in which Broad showedthatthe evidence for psi,if accepted as real, conflicts with Basic Limiting Principles (BLPs) which are fundamentalto scientific concepts of mind, space,time and causality (Price 1955, p360). To further supportthis assertion George Price also quotes J.B. Rhine (a psi researcher fromthe 1920s who famously brought the study of psiinto universitiesinthe USA) as sayingthat eventhose who are actively researching psi phenomena believethat'Nothingin allthe history of human thiought—heliocentrism, evolution, relativity—has been moretruly revolutionary or radically contradictoryto contemporarythoughtthanthe results oftheinvestigation of precognitive psi' (Rhinein Price 1955, p361).
Price acceptsthese analyses and consequently arguesthat parapsychology and 'modem science' areincompatible. In Humean style he whittles his choices downto either believingin something'truly revolutionary' and'radically contradictoryto contemporarythought' onthe one hand and onthe other, believinginthe occurrence of fraud and self-delusion. He opts forthelatter because'all our experience suggests thatit will be more profitable for usto assumethatthe old generalizations are still valid, andthatthe findings ofthe parapsychologists areto be explained onthe old, familiar basis of human error' (Price 1955, p361).
H The use of supernatural ratherthan paranormalinthetitleisinteresting andindicative oflack of agreementintheliterature regarding psi's explanatory status. Ideal withthisissue when I presentthe historic accountin Chapter 3.
So,in point form, for George Price:
PROBLEM When presented withthe evidence for psi, whichlooks at first glance convincing, we must rememberthat:
SET UP Psi effects areincompatible withthe nine'basic limiting principles' (supported by Broad's discussion of psi and BLPs and Soal's and Rhine's work). PREMISE 1 We must choose between believing something'truly
revolutionary' orthat fraud and self-delusion occur. PREMISE 2 Know for certainthat fraud and self-delusion do
OCCUL
CONCLUSION Thereforethereis nothing concretetothe evidence— evenifit appears asifthereis (asitinitially didto him).
This stance has become known asthe'Hume= Skeptic' position duetothe Humean foundation of a modern argument which advocates skepticism regarding psi
phenomena. The MMA will now be discussed andtheissues pertinenttothe psi debateteased out. Price's argument will be comparedto Hume's original miracle argument. Thenthe responseto Price's argument put forward by Paul Meehl and Michael Scrivenis discussed. Finally, I showthat some of Broad's Basic Limiting Principles do not currently hold anditis arguedthatthe use of unchanging certainties in orderto formulate a responseto psiis problematic.'
The MMA and Hume's miracle argument
Inthis section I compare Hume's miracle argument with Price's modern version. I showthat becausetheyinvolved different forms oftestimony, psi cannot be substituted for miracles andthatitis problematicto rely on alist of unchanging certainties.
Inthe original miracle argument Hume statesthat'a miracleis a violation of thelaws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has establishedthese laws,the proof against a miracle, fromthe very nature ofthe fact,is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly beimagined' (Hume 1817, p114). He uses this reasoningto developthe'general maxim':'Notestimonyis sufficientto establish
a miracle, unlessthetestimony be of such a kindthatits falsehood would be more miraculousthanthe fact whichit endeavoursto establish; and eveninthat casethere is a mutual destruction' (Hume 1817, p115). So for Hume, when confronted with eventsthat appearto contravenethelaws of nature (so-called miracles)itis sensible to believethey arethe product of fraud or delusion ratherthan entertainthe possibility that a genuine supernatural event occurred. Hume goes onto give us an example of how his'everlasting check' for should be employed, Hume warns
when anyonetells me,that he saw a dead man restoredtolife, Iimmediately consider with myself, whetherit be more probably,thatthis person should either deceive or be deceived, orthatthe fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weighthe one miracle againstthe other; and accordingtothe superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always rejectthe greater miracle. Ifthe falsehood of histestimony would be more miraculous,thanthe event which he relates;then, and nottillthen, can he pretendto command my belief or opinion.(Hume 1817, pp115-116)
The power ofthis argumentis substantial, forit makes a casethat no matter what testimony oneis provided withitis forever doubtfulthat a miracle did actually occur.
In George Price's rendition ofthe argument, psiis substituted for miracles, Basic Limiting Principles forlaws of nature, and a similar conclusionis drawn when faced withthe choice betweenthe perceived certainty ofthe Basic Limiting Principles andthe unknown nature of psi. Itis evidentthatthe formulation of Price's argument adheres strictlytothe original Hiunean miracle argument.
I do not wantto delveintothe controversy surroundingthe assessment of Hume's original miracle argument, as a review ofthisliteratureis far beyondthe scope ofthisthesis, but I will mention brieflythe analysis performed bythe
philosopher Terence Penelhum whois both a Humean expert and, unusually, aware of the modern renditions ofthe argument pertinentto psi. Penelhum maintainsthat:
Parapsychological evidence challenges firmly entrenched assumptions. Those who doubtthese assumptions may welcomethis evidence, and choosetoignorethe power of Hume's argumentthat allthe experiencethat has caused usto makethem weighs against thetestimony on whichthe evidence rests. Ithinkthisis anirresponsible attitude. But those onthe other side who are unwillingto entertainthe possibilitythatthere are more thingsin heaven and earththan our assumptions permit usto believein, haveto stare downthe high quality of some ofthetestimony, andinsistit must always be dueto error or fraud. Ithinkthislookslike foolishness also. (Penelhum 2003, online)
Penelhum advocates an open-minded approachto parapsychological evidence, one that allows forthe possibilitythatthe evidence has been fraudulently produced but one which also questions whether or not scienceis ableto deal withthe apparent phenomenaindicative of psi effects. He concludesthat:
A rational mind (Hume's wise person) should not moveto resolvethe conflicttoo hastily. Itis essentialinthe first placeto be surethatthe quality ofthetestimony meets the highest standards possible. Itis also necessaryto consider very carefully whetherthe scientific knowledge we already have may perhaps showthat evenifthe phenomena are genuine,they can be accommodated withinthelaws of nature as we understandthem. If they cannot,the pressureto uncover fraud or errorinthetestimony will grow, and althoughthis pressureis often offensive and duetoinertia or bigotry,itis still healthy. (Penelhum 2003, online)
He bases his conclusion on an analysis ofthe Humean version ofthe argument as he acceptsthat because miracles and psi both contravenelaws of nature and require testimonial evidencethe modern versionislegitimate. Penelhumthinksthat Hume's 'general argument requires usto recognisethatthere might be situationsin which a 'proof from prior experience collides with a'proof fromimpeccabletestimony' (Penelhum 2003, online). Andinthe case of psithis stateis potentially obtainable, whereasinthe case of miraclesitistheoretical only.
However, Ithinkthatthereis a stronger caseto be made againstthe modern interpretation ofthe Humean-style argument andthat substituting psi for miraclesis problematic becausethe strength ofthetestimonyis different. I will focus now on Price's argument andthe use ofthe miracle argument as atemplate for his psi version ofthe argument. I startthe analysis by questioning whether or notthisis alegitimate manoeuvre.
Miracles and psi are notinterchangeable
As noted briefly before, Humelimited his discussionto weighingtiptestimonial evidence and more pertinentlytestimonial evidencethat was reported by witnesses of eventsthat had happened eitherinthe past (such as biblical miracles) orin far off places (Penelhum 2003, online). The evidence for psi, evenin George Price'stime,is more complex andinvolves morethan historical humantestimonial evidence. Thereis historicaltestimony for evidence for psi, butthere are also bothlaboratory evidence, whichis a body of experimentsthat have yielded small but significant results, along with continued reports of spontaneous psi on alarger scalethat have been collected into catalogues of anecdotes (examples of which will be presentedin Chapter 2).
a psychological study which undertakes analysis of ESP betweentwins. The firstis based on personal experience and recollection ofthat experience. The memory could be faulty or faded or perhapstheinitial assessment ofthe situation, from a child's perspective,too credulous. In contrast, a psychological study of ESP betweentwins would be undertaken withinthe bounds of accepted psychology methodology and scientific practice. The paperthat providedthe details ofthe experiments would also be evaluated and discussedin scientific peer-reviewedjournals.
Price does not differentiate betweenthe different forms of evidencethatthe body of psiliterature contain (historic, anecdotal as well as experimental). And although all forms of evidence aretestimonialto some degreethere are significant differences between historictestimony and scientifictestimonythat should betaken into account when analysingthe body of evidence for psi. Itherefore arguethat unless Priceistolimit his assessment of psito historicaltestimony of evidencethen psi cannot be automatically substituted for miraclesin his revised modem version of Hume's miracle argument. (I discuss furtherthe difference between scientific, anecdotal and historictestimonyin Chapter 2).
The Meehl and Scriven challenge
Price's 1955 paper elicited a response from prominent psi researchers andtheorists. I will coverthese responsesin more detaillaterinthethesis as I wantto focus onthe structure ofthe argumentinthis early chapter where I am.laying,the foundations for the discussionthat follows. I willtherefore concentrate on a reply regardingthe philosophical content ofthe argument whichis most pertinenttothe analysis atthis stage ofthethesis. It was written by Paul Meehl andthe philosopher Michael Scriven who were mentionedin Price'sinitial paper.
Meehl and Scriven claimthatto maintain Price's argumentthere aretwo pointsthat must hold:that psiisincompatible with modern science; andthat modern scienceis complete and correct. If either ofthese cannot be upheld,they maintain, thenthe argumentisleft without a basis forthe conclusionthat all evidence for psi must have been obtainedthrough fraudulent or mistaken means (Meehl & Scriven
1956, p 14). There are not many (if any) people who would be preparedto contend that modern scienceis complete and correct. Therefore,they believed,thatthey had invalidated Price's argument by refuting atleast one ofthe premises.'In our view'
