• No results found

Japanese attitudes towards the Okinawa problem : 1945-1965

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2019

Share "Japanese attitudes towards the Okinawa problem : 1945-1965"

Copied!
215
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

towards the Okinawa Problem ; 194-5 - 1965* by A. Watanabe.

Okinawa, which was captured by American forces

in the last stages of the Second World War, was after

the Japanese surrender placed under the control of the

United States.

Drastic changes which occurred in the

Par Past in the following years, especially the advent

of a hostile regime on the Chinese continent and the

outbreak of the Korean war, made the United States develop

Okinawa into her most important military base to cope

with this new situation.

Thus under the Japanese Peace

Treaty (1952) it was decided that Okinawa together with

other islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago should remain

under American control.

At he Peace Conference, however, the United States

explicitly recognized Japan's 'residual sovereignty'.

Since then the United States has increasingly made it

clear that she will eventually return Okinawa to Japan

when the military situation permits.

She has, hov/ever,

steadfastly rejected all suggestions that she should return

the island at an earlier date or that she should in the

meantime give Japan a share in any aspect of its administration

for fear of losing the freedom of her military forces to

act in and from there.

Not surprisingly, with the passage

of time, the ambiguity of the present and future status

of Okinawa has become more and more irritating both to

the Japanese people and to Okinawa's 900,000 inhabitants

who are asserting themselves as Japanese.

(2)

among the Japanese over the existing status of Okinawa

which appears, in the eyes of many Japanese, little

short of an American colony.

There seems no doubt

about the existence in Japan of a fundamental consensus

which calls for the earliest possible return of Okinawa

to Japanese control.

It is a great paradox, however,

that a political issue for which national consensus is

easily attained — the return of Okinawa to Japan —

is inextricably entangled with another over which the

nation's opinion is sharply divided — the defense

relations with the United States.

A logical consequence

of this situation is that a clear-cut solution to the

Okinawa problem could not be achieved without entailing

a drastic change in the structure of the U.S.-Japan

alliance.

This poses a difficult question to the Japanese

Government.

For the Okinawa problem the Japanese public

calls for a decisive change while for the defence policy

it would react very reluctantly to any proposal for a

radical departure from the existing arrangements.

The

Japanese Government also meets a very strong reluctance

on the part of the United States to make substantial

concessions regarding the political status of Okinawa.

Although the United States recently agreed to extend

(3)

however, leaders of the both countries are successful

in removing this source of friction within the not too

distant future, the relations between the United States

and Japan may be seriously affected by Japanese resentment

arising out of the Okinawa issue.

In this thesis I have tried to shed light on the

development of Japanese attitudes towards the Okinawa

(4)

Department of International Relations at

the Australian National University.

(5)

1945-1965

b y

A k i o W a t anab e

A thesis s u b m i t t e d for the d e g r e e of D o c t o r of

(6)

VOLUME I TEXT

PR EFAC E i i i

I NTRODUCTI ON v

PART I

CHAPTER I T h e G e n e s i s o f t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m : F r o m S u r r e n d e r t o t h e P e a c e T r e a t y w i t h J a p a n

(1 9 4 5- 5 2) . 1

CHAPTER 2 T h e E v o l u t i o n o f t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m : F r o m t h e J a p a n e s e P e a c e T r e a t y t o t h e S e t t l e m e n t

o f t h e M i l i t a r y L a n d I s s u e ( 1 9 5 2 - 5 8 ) . 2 1 CHAPTER 3 T h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m i n J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n

P o l i c y : 1 9 5 8- 6 5. 37

PART I I

CHAPTER 4 T h e R o l e o f O f f i c i a l D e c i s i o n M a k e r s i n

t h e M a k i n g o f J a p a n e s e O k i n a w a P o l i c y » 6 1 CHAPTER 5 T h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m i n t h e J a p a n e s e D i e t . 8 2 CHAPTER 6 P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s o n t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m

(1 9 4 5-5 5) . 107

CHAPTER 7 P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s o n t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m

(1 9 5 6- 6 5) . 1 2 4

CHAPTER 8 I n d i v i d u a l s a n d G r o u p s . 1.48

CHAPTER 9 T h e P r e s s a n d P u b l i c O p i n i o n i n J a p a n o n

t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m . 1 7 2

CONCLUSION 1 9 6

VOLUME :I I N O T E S , A P P E N D I C E S , AND BI BL IOGRAPHY 1 . NOTES

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 1

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 11

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 1 8

(7)

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

43

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

57

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8

72

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 9

81

NOTES FOR CONCLUSION

91

2. APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Election Results of the Okinawan

Legislative Assembly. 93

APPE N D I X II List of Somuchokan in S u ccessive Cabinets 9^

APPENDIX III Opinion Polls on

the Okinawan Issue

95

(8)

PREFACE

This thesis was written in the Department of

International Relations of the School of Pacific Studies

in the Australian National University between I963 and

1966.

My primary thanks go to my supervisor, Mr D.C.S.

Sissons, for his constant encouragement and constructive

criticism.

I am also indebted to Dr G. Modelski who

shared the supervision of the thesis especially in its

initial stage, and to Dr J.A.A. Stockwin who helped me

in many ways particularly with the English language.

There are many other people to whom I owe a great deal

either for their creative suggestions or for their help

in removing the Japanese flavour from my English style.

The collection of material for this thesis was

greatly facilitated by a number of people who were kind

enough to spare me their time and supply information.

I

should like to mention, in particular, the following,

whom I met in Tokyo: Furuya Torn, Deputy to the Director-

General of the Sorifu;

Ötake Tamichika, Head of the

Bureau in charge of the Special Areas (fokubetsu Chiiki

Renraku Jimukyoku) in the Sorifu;

Yoshida Shien,

Secretary of the Nampo Doho Engokai;

Fuchigami Fusataro,

a former Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal

Democratic Party) and former Governor for Okinawa

Prefecture; Tabata Kanemitsu, Member of the House of

Councillors (Democratic Socialist Party); Inamura Toshio,

Central Staff member of the Japan Socialist Party;

(9)

in Nah.a: Nakamura Teruaki, Member of the Okinawa

Legisltaive Assembly (conservative); Asato Tsumichiyo,

Chairman of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party and

Member of the Okinawa Legislative Assembly; Miyara

Kansai, Chief-Secretary of the Okinawa Socialist Party;

Senaga Kamejiro, Secretary-General of the Okinawa People’s

Party; Yara Chobyo, Chairman of the Okinawa Teachers’

Association; and Uesato Angi,

a personal friend who

assisted me in establishing the necessary contacts.

I am further indebted to the Okinawa Shiryo Senta

(Director: Nakano Yoshio) where I located a great deal of

useful materials on the subject.

Some Okinawan scholars

helped me either through their writings in various

journals or by personal correspondence.

Among them are

Professors Higa Mikio and Miyasato Seigen in the University

of the Ryukyus.

Had it not been for the assistance of these and

others, I should not have been able to complete this

thesis, my first work written in English. Needless to

say, however, the responsibility of any deficiency rests

entirely upon me.

Canberra

August 19660

(10)

INTRODUCTION

The Okinawa problem is a matter of concern to many

who are seriously interested in comtemporary Japan.

A

good deal has already been written on this subject

particularly in Japanese. The bibliography at the end

of this thesis, although not exhaustive, gives some

indication of its extent.

Most of the literature on

Okinawa is, however, of a polemical rather than

analytical nature. As a result, there is a lack of

detached and comprehensive treatments of the subject

except for some works written by jurists.

In fact,

hardly any analytical study has been made on one

particular aspect of the problem - the formation of

Japanese attitudes towards Okinawa and their bearing on

relations between the United States and Japan.

This research has been designed to make a

contribution to the study of international conflicts.

The Okinawa problem is not a major conflict likely to

lead to armed hostilities between states.

It has never

assumed a particularly serious character. Neither side

of the dispute has ever thought of recourse to arms, and

is not likely to do so in the future.

But, as an author

of a study of a similar type of conflict - that between

France and Germany over the Saar after World War II -

has pointed out, the renunciation of violence and the

rejection of recourse to armed force do not in themselves

abolish either the social contradictions or the

(11)

this fashion that Okinawa poses problems to political

leaders of the countries concerned and to students of

international politics.

It is not hard to delineate the problem in terms

of international factors affecting it. The number of the

entities invo lved is very limi ted £

Japan, the United

States and Okinawa.

In spite of efforts of some elements

to 1

internationalize1

the issue, so far the United States

and Japan have been successful in limiting the problem

to themselves alone.

Outsiders ~ national or international

can intervene only indirectly, by attempting to influence

’insiders’

in their relations with each other.

In spite

of the possibility that the Soviet Union could make a

considerable impact on Japanese opinion in Okinawa by

making use of their own 5

territorial question* in

relation to Japan, it has so far not done so.

So long as

bad relations between the United States and China

persist, there is unlikely to be any fundamental change

in the international contours of the problem.

Thus the

matter depends almost entirely on the development of

relations between the two allies, and especially on

attitudes of various forces at work in Japan towards

her relations with the United States.

Despite the existence in Japan of a fundamental

consensus which calls for the earliest possible

return of Okinawa to Japan, there are different shades

of opinion on the Okinawa problem corresponding to the

spectrum of attitudes concerning the alliance with the

United States.

Japanese attitudes towards Okinawa must

(12)

To summarize the contents of this thesis, Part One

consists of three chapters describing the sequence of

important events over the past two decades„

The main

topics treated are:

the formulation of the present status

of Okinawa in the Japanese peace-settlement with

particular reference to Japan’s ’residual sovereignty’

(chapter l); the unfolding of the Okinawa land issue and

its effects on U.S.-Japan relations (chapter 2); and the

development of a U.S.-Japan ’partnership’

over Okinawa

(chapter 3)•

The next six chapters (comprising Part Two) are

devoted to a cross-sectional analysis of various forces

at work in Japan.

Roles taken by Government officials

(chapter

4

) ; the parliament (chapter

5

) ;

political parties

(chapters 6 and 7); non-governmental groups and

individuals (chapter 8); and the press (chapter 9) are

analysed in detail.

The following conventions are observed in this

thesis;

1)

Japanese personal names are written in the original

order, i.e. with the surname first and the given

name second.

2)

Names of bodies, official or non-official, are

used in the original form, followed, on their first

appearance in the text,

by their English

translation.

E.g. the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Japan), the 0kinawajin Rem.tnei (the

(13)

Japa n e s e geographical names are given in their

original form. Thus, for example, Chishima, K a r a f u t o , O g a s a w a r a instead of the Kuriles, Sakhalin, ,

the Bonins, 'The Ryukyus Islands' and 'Okinawa' are u s e d in this thesis interchangeably although in a strict sense the former is used to designate the whole islands of the Archipelago while the latter refers to the m ain island in it.

In citing Japanese material, romanization of

original titles is given without adding an Engl i s h

translation. W h e n citing minutes of the Japanese

Diet, the following conventions are used: S h u giin K a i g i r o k u and Sangiin K a i g i r o k u are

abbreviated to SHU KG R and SAN KGR respectively. In

case of committee proceedings the name of the

relevant committee is added after SHU or SAN . In

b o t h cases roman figures indicate the n umber of session, and arabic figures the n umber of meetings in that session. E.g. SHU K G R , X, 2, stands for Shugiin K a i g i r o ku, 10th session, N o . 2; and SAN Y O S A N , XII, 3s stands for Sangiin Yo s a n i n k a g i r o k u , 12th s e s s i o n , N o .3 °

(14)

C H A P T E R 1

The G e n e s i s o f the O k i n a w a P r o b l em:

F r o m S u r r e n d e r to the P e ac e T r e a t y w i t h J a p a n (1945-52) The m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n a f f e c t i n g the p r e s e n t s t a t u s of O k i n a w a w a s the c o n c l u s i o n of the P e a c e T r e a t y w i t h J a p a n ( s i g n e d in S e p t e m b e r 1951 and c o m i n g into

eff e c t in A p r i l 1952). A r t i c l e 3 of the T r e a t y reads: J a p a n w i l l c o n c u r in a n y p r o p o s a l o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s to p l a c e u n d e r its

t r u s t e e s h i p system, w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s as the sole a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y , N a n s e i S h o t o s o u t h of 29 d e g r e e n o r t h l a t i t u d e (i n c l u d i n g the R y u k y u I s l a n d s and the D a i t o I s l a n d s ) , N a m p o S h o t o s o u t h of S o f u G a n ( i n c l u d i n g the B o n i n Islan d s , R o s a r i o I s l a n d an d the V o l c a n o Is l a n d s ) a n d P a r e c e V e l a and M a r c u s Island. P e n d i n g the mailing of s u c h a p r o p o s a l and a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n thereon, the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l h a v e the r i gh t to e x e r c i s e all an d an y p o w e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , l e g i s l a t i o n and

j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r the t e r r i t o r y an d i n h a b i t a n t s of these islands, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s .

T h e r i g h t s g i v e n to J a p a n u n d e r the p r o v i s i o n of this a r t i c l e is g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d to as 'residual sov e r e i g n t y ' s i n c e that is the t e r m u s e d at the Sa n

F r a n c i s c o P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e b y D u lles, the c h i e f a r c h i t e c t of the Treaty, a l t h o u g h the text of the T r e a t y does not

2 i n c l u d e such an e x p r e s s i o n .

(15)

h a n d to a r a t h e r o p t i m i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n a m o n g the J a p a n e s e p e o p l e for a r a p i d i m p r o v e m e n t of s t ate o f a f f a i r s

c o n c e r n i n g O k i n a w a in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h futu r e b e t t e r m e n t of U . S . -Japan r e l a t i o n s . It caused, on the o t h e r hand, a c o n s i d e r a b l e a n x i e t y in J a p a n ov e r the A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n on O k i n a w a . A t a n y rate the d e c i s i o n m a d e on O k i n a w a at San F r a n c i s c o m 1951 c o n s t i t u t e d not the end but the

s t a r t i n g point of the h i s t o r y of the O k i n a w a d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n J a p a n and the U n i t e d Sta t e s .

T h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r w i l l a t t em p t to shed light on s o m e p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g to this d e c i s i o n t h r o u g h m a k i n g a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the m a i n e v e n t s l e a d i n g to that decis i o n . I n a t t e m p t i n g to do so, one s u f f e r s f r o m a d e a r t h of

p r i m a r y s o u r c e s e s p e c i a l l y c o n c e r n i n g the d i p l o m a t i c p r o c e s s e s . W i t h this in view, ho w e v e r , the f o l l o w i n g a c c o u n t s u f f i c i e n t for the p r e s e n t p u r p o s e sets f o r t h the e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r s w h i c h led to the O k i n a w a d e c i s i o n in 1951 .

N e e d l e s s to say, the O k i n a w a q u e s t i o n o r i g i n a t e d

d i r e c t l y fr o m J a p a n ’s defe a t in W o r l d W a r II. D i s p o s i t i o n of O k i n a w a w a s one o f the topics d i s c u s s e d b y w a r - t i m e l e a d e r s in r e l a t i o n to the 'Pacific p r o b l e m ’ .

At C a i r o in late 1 9 ^ 3 3 P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t r a i s e d the O k i n a w a q u e s t i o n b e f o r e G e n e r ä l i s s i m o C h i a n g , a s k i n g m o r e than once d u r i n g the c o n v e r s a t i o n w h e t h e r C h i n a had

(16)

After

having discussions also with Stalin at Teheran,

Roosevelt reported to the Pacific War Council that Stalin

was familiar

with the history of the Ryukyu Islands and

that he was in

complete agreement that they belong to

4

China and should

be returned to her.

No further

record has been found of reference to the

future status of

Okinawa at any other conferences of war­

time Allied leaders.

Neither was there any specific

mention of the

island either in the Cairo or Potsdam

Declarations or

in the secret agreement at Yalta.

All

this indicates

that the Allied Powers did not come to a

final conclusion

regarding the future status of Okinawa,

although they

were sympathetic to the Chinese interests

5

in the

Ryukyus on historical grounds.

The

immediate course of action was determined by

military rather

than political considerations.

With the

short (short

for the present standards) range of naval

and air striking

forces, the United States had to take

recourse in

a strategy of 'island hopping’,

by which the

front line

could gradually be pushed forward closer to

the ultimate

goal - the Japanese mainland.

Okinawa was

chosen to be

the last of these stepping stones for that

purpose.

Okinawa fell into the hands of the American

forces after

almost three months of fierce fighting which

claimed the

lives of 12,500 American and 110,000 Japanese.

On the captured

islands

the

Americans constructed base-

facilities

for B-29 operations on the island of Okinawa

and another

base for Very Long Range fighter escorts on

Ieshima, a

tiny island adjacent to Okinawa.

It was not

(17)

Okinawa-based B - 2 9 's carried out their first (and last) offensive

7

m i s sion against the Japanese homeland,

The very fact that the Americans captured Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus during the W a r added some new factors to the subsequent development of their

attitudes towards the islands.

In the first place, it contributed to the formation, or s t r e n g t h e n i n g, of the opinion among the mili t a r y

planners (particularly of the Navy) that the U n i t e d States should take outright p o ssession of the outl y i n g Japanese islands (including the Ryukyus) together w ith her former mandated territories in the Pacific as part of a far-

flung n e t work of ’strategic strong p o i n t s ’ of the United States. The great loss of life which occurred in seizing

the islands, the large amount spent on developing base facilities and the b elief that the inhabitants concerned desired to live under the American flag were advanced as

g

justification for this action.

The military demands for a complete A m e r i c a n

sovereignty over the ex-Japanese mandated islands clashed with the position taken by the State Department that such an action would be incompatible with the principle of n o n ­ territorial aggrandizement that the Allied Powers solemnly declared in war-time documents. The latter contended that an exclusive A m erican trusteeship would a d equately protect American interests in these islands. A compromise was reached between the two views by creating a peculiar institution of strategic trusteeship for the former

9

(18)

A similar pattern of opinion conflict seemed to

exist between the American m i l i t a r y authorities who w a n t e d to see the R y u k y u Islands placed under, if not full

A m e r i c a n sovereignty, at least a trusteeship w ith the U n i t e d States as the sole administering power, and those who did not see w h y other members of the Un i t e d Nations,

es p e c i a l l y China, should be excluded from taking part in the m a c h i n e r y of administration in O k i n a w a . ^

The Okinawa question could be further complicated by the problem of Chishima. Some Congressmen suggested that Chis h i m a might be placed under a joint trusteeship of the Un i t e d Nations if any of the Pacific islands

conquered by the U n i t e d States - especially O k i nawa - were to be treated in a similar w a y . ^ (The public was not informed at that time of the secret agreement reached at Y a l t a b e t w e e n Roosevelt and Stalin in w h i c h the former prom i s e d to support the Soviet Union's claim to C h i s h i m a and the southern half of Karafuto at a future peace

conf erenc e .)

The A m e r i c a n n e g o tiators chose to seek Soviet support for the A m e r i c a n proposal to the Un i t e d Nations Secu r i t y Council for placing the ex-Japanese mandated islands und e r an exclusive A merican trusteeship in exchange for

r e a f f i r m i n g the promise made by Roosevelt at Yal t a concerning the C h i s h i m a problem. It was decided that disposition of

12 O k i n a w a should be p o s tponed until a formal peace treaty.

(19)

w a r f a r e , the A m e r i c a n s t r e a t e d the O k i n a w a n s as b e i n g of a d i f f e r e n t s t o c k a n d c u l t u r e from the J a p a n e s e an d as h a v i n g b e e n e c o n o m i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y e x p l o i t e d b y

13

the latter. A l t h o u g h so far no e v i d e n c e ha s b e e n f o u n d to s h o w that the A m e r i c a n s m a d e s y s t e m a t i c e f f o r t s to e l e v a t e this p o l i c y of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n the

O k i n a w a n s and the J a p a n e s e into a m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d p o l i c y of e n c o u r a g i n g p o l i t i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e of O k i n a w a f r o m an

' i m p e r i a l ’ Japan, this line of t h i n k i n g h a d u n m i s t a k a b l e e f f e c t s u p o n the p o l i t i c a l r e - o r i e n t a t i o n of O k i n a w a in

l4

the p o s t - w a r per i o d .

B y r i ght of c o n q u e s t a n d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the terms 15

of s u r r e n d e r of the J a p a n e s e f o r c e s in the R y u k y u s , the p o w e r of c o n t r o l o v e r the f o r m e r J a p a n e s e i s l a n d s s o u t h of 30 d e g r e e n o r t h l a t i t u d e (which i n c l u d e O k i n a w a an d A m a m i - O s h i m a ) w a s a s s u m e d b y the U n i t e d S t a t e s forces.

A f t e r an i n i t i a l s h o r t p e r i o d of d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r b e t w e e n the N a v y (to w h i c h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the O k i n a w a G r o u p or O k i n a w a G u n t o w a s a s s i g n e d ) a n d the A r m y ( w h i c h

c o n t r o l l e d the o t h e r t h r e e groups of Miyako, Y a e y a m a a n d A m a m i ) , the t a s k of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the w h o l e a r e a w a s

a s s i g n e d to the U.S. N a v y an d c o n s e q u e n t l y t r a n s f e r r e d to the U.S. Army.

A n i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t o f the p o l i c y of A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s is that a c l e a r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w a s m a d e

b e t w e e n J a p a n p r o p e r and the R y u k y u I s l a n d s w i t h the d i v i d i n g line set at l a t i t u d e 30 d e g r e e north. T h i s w a s f o r m a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y a S C A P ( S u p r e m e C o m m a n d fo r A l l i e d

17

(20)

administrative convenience and not to be interpreted as an indication of A l l i e d policy r e l a t i n g to the ultimate

18

d i s p o s i t i o n of the islands, it entailed a few consequences of significant practical import. First, Okinawa was placed u n d e r the sole control of the U n i t e d States, whereas the rest of Japan was, at least in a formal sense, under the A l l i e d control. This meant that the Un i t e d States was not

responsible in O k i n a w a to the All i e d m a c h i n e r y of Japanese O c c u p a t i o n such as the Far E a s tern Commission or the

19

A l l i e d Council for Japan. Secondly, while po l i c y was conducted through the Japanese Government in the mainland, O k i nawa was controlled directly and exclusively by the A m e r i c a n m i litary government. All kinds of c o m m u nication be t w e e n Okinawa and the rest of Japan were cut off or

20

strictly controlled by the U n i t e d States. In short Okinawa was treated for every purpose as if it were a

21

foreign country like K o rea or Taiwan. All this

contributed to the exclusive influence of the U n i t e d States in Okinawa and to the resulting post-war developments

b e t ween Okinawa and the Japanese homeland.

The fundamental pattern of international relations in the Far East in whi c h the Okin a w a problem was placed r e mained u n c h a n g e d until 19^9. While the A l l i e d hostility towards Japan still lingered, a new growing cleavage among the A l l i e d Powers was already big enough for defying all efforts to reach an agreement for an early conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. The advent of a Communist regime in Peking and the o u tbreak of the K o r e a n War, however, changed d r a s t i c a l l y the whole situation.

(21)

that of a chief enemy to the world at large to that of a prospective ally for the West led by the U n i t e d States. This situation requ i r e d the U n i t e d States to make a fresh approach to the problem of Okinawa, too.

Out of various possibilities relating to the status of Okinawa in the early post-war period - ranging from an outright annexation b y the Un i t e d States, an exclusive A m e r i c a n trusteeship, some kind of international control with China as one of the important participants to

independence - only the plan for placing Okinawa under a trusteeship with the U n i t e d States as the sole a d m i n istering authority survived the tremendous transformation of the

Far E a s t e r n political scene. It was along this line that S e c r e t a r y of State A c h e s o n in his famous speech on American policy for A s i a in early 1950 disclosed A m e r i c a ’s intention to propose sole U.S. trusteeship for Okinawa whi c h he

regarded as an important link of A m e rica's defence line 22

along the periphery of the Asiatic Continent.

W i t h the new strategic plan for Asia, the Uni t e d States began to make fresh efforts for c o n s olidating her mil i t a r y position on Okinawa. As early as in mid-19^9 the Amer i c a n military authorities, appar e n t l y anticipating a Communist victory in China and the momentous changes such a victory would entail, succeeded in gaining from Congress an appropriation of fifty m i l l i o n U.S. dollars for

building up m i l i t a r y installations of a permanent nature 23

on Okinawa. The construction work for that purpose actually began in early 1 9 5 0 with a participation of

2 k

(22)

One of their purposes was to assess the importance of Okinawan bases in relation to the possible change of status of A m e r i c a n forces stationed on the Japanese

main l a n d with the conclusion of a peace treaty. In spite of division of opinion about the place of Japanese bases in the p o s t - t r e a t y A m e r i c a n strategy in the Far East, they all agreed as to the great importance of Okinawan b a s e s .^

Measures were also taken in this period to reogranize

the governmental structure for Okinawa. U n d e r a

directive of General M a c A rthur in late 1950? a United States Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) was created w i t h the C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f of the Far East (located in Tokyo) as G o v e r n o r of the R yukyu Islands.

Day-to - d a y operation of the administration was discharged by the C o mmanding General of the R y u k y u Command (RYCOM) who held the additional post of Dep u t y Governor and was assisted by a n e w l y - c r e a t e d Civil Admini s t r a t o r who was also appointed from among A r m y officers at the rank of G e n e r a l .^

Besides these Americ a n - h e l d offices an indigenous Provisional Central Government of the R yukyu Islands was brought into b e ing on 1 April 1951* E x a c t l y one year later this was d e v e loped into a Government of the Ry u k y u Islands (GRl) headed by a Chief Executive who was

appointed by the Americans from among local leaders. Its legislative b r anch consisted of 31 locally elected m e m b e r s .^

(23)

in A p r i l 1950, u n d e r t o o k the task of d r a f t i n g and

n e g o t i a t i n g a p e a c e t r e a t y w i t h Japan. A l t h o u g h i n f o r m a t i o n at ou r d i s p o s a l is not e n o u g h for m a k i n g a c o m p a r i s o n

b e t w e e n v a r i o u s p e a c e d r a f t s p r e p a r e d b y S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c i a l s s i n c e the e nd of the W a r c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r

p r o v i s i o n s for Okinawa, it is k n o w n that in D u l l e s ’ f i r s t m e m o r a n d u m on J a p a n ( w r i t t e n on 6 June 1950) J a p a n wa s r e q u i r e d to a c c e p t a n y d e c i s i o n of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w h i c h e x t e n d e d the t r u s t e e s h i p s y s t e m to all or p a r t of

the R y u k y u and B o n i n Islands. In a d o c u m e n t ( c a l l e d S e v e n - P o i n t M e m o r a n d u m ) w h i c h D u l l e s p r e p a r e d a f t e r his

f i r s t v i s i t to T o k y o , J a p a n w a s r e q u i r e d , h o w e v e r , to 'agree to U n i t e d N a t i o n s t r u s t e e s h i p , w i t h the U n i t e d

S t a t e s as a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y , of the R y u k y u a n d B o n i n .

29

I s l a n d s . 1 I n m a k i n g this m o d i f i c a t i o n , D u l l e s w a s

p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e d b y the o p i n i o n of the m i l i t a r y l e a de r s w h o s e i n s p e c t i o n tour to J a p a n and K o r e a c o i n c i d e d w i t h that of D u l l e s in m i d- 1 9 5 0 .

T h e a t t i t u d e s of the J a p a n e s e to the T r e a t y w e r e no less i m p o r t a n t than those w i t h the A l l i e s e v e n t h o u g h J a p a n w a s not a p a r t i c i p a n t in the t r e a t y m a k i n g in the

30

o r d i n a r y sense. T h u s D u l l e s v i s i t e d T o k y o a g a i n in J a n u a r y 1951 w i t h the S e v e n - P o i n t M e m o r a n d u m .

In the e a r l y p o s t - w a r period, the J a p a n e s e g a v e little u t t e r a n c e , (be it r e s p o n s i b l e or i r r e s p o n s i b l e ) , on the

31

p r o b l e m of O k i n a w a . T h e f i rst pub l i c u t t e r a n c e b y J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s on the O k i n a w a p r o b l e m w a s v o i c e d b y

F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r A s h i d a (of the K a t a y a m a c o a l i t i o n c a b i n e t of the S o c i a l i s t and D e m o c r a t i c Pa r t i e s ) w h o told a

(24)

were doubtful of the applicability of the territorial

provisions in the Potsdam Declaration to Okinawa and part

of Chishima (perhaps referring to the Kurile Islands

south of Kunashiri),

adding that although Okinawa was of

no economic importance to Japan national sentiment made

32

her seek the return of the island»

This statement was

only to cause adverse reactions from abroad as well as

33

from the leftist groups within the society.

Such being

the case, Gaimusho experts had at this point little hope

34

of recovering Chishima and Okinawa.

The situation had changed, however, by the time of

Dulles' second visit to Tokyo in early 1951*

Now Japan

could expect her opinion to be heard on various matters

such as Okinawa.

In the period from late 1950 to early

1951j

quite a few Members of the Diet openly expressed

their desire for the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara.

This feeling was most articulately expressed by nationalist-

oriented conservative politicians (particularly in the

Democratic Party),

who were echoed by the Socialists and,

to a lesser extent, by some members of the Liberal

(Government) Party.

In spite of a remarkable degree of

silence of the Japanese press on the matter, this seemed

to be the prevailing feeling among all sections of the

Japanese society, with a seemingly strange exception of

35

(25)

A n o t e s u b m i t t e d b y the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t to D u l l e s on 30 J a n u a r y 1951 s t a t e d in r e l a t i o n to O k i n a w a as

f o l l o w s :

(a) It w o u l d be m o s t d e s i r a b l e for the U n i t e d S t a t e s to r e f r a i n h e r s e l f f r o m c a r r y i n g out the t r u s t e e s h i p

p r o p o s a l for O k i n a w a and O g a s a w a r a f o r the sake of an e n d u r i n g f r i e n d s h i p b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s an d Japan;

(b) J a p a n w o u l d be p r e p a r e d to o f f e r t h ese i s l a n d s for A m e r i c a ' s free us e fo r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s in full a p p r e c i a t i o n of h e r i n t e r e s t s in them;

(c) I n case, h o w e v e r , the i s l a n d s be i n e v i t a b l y b r o u g h t into t r u s t e e s h i p , J a p a n w o u l d ho p e to b e c o m e a

joint t r u st e e f o r them. S h e also w o u l d w a n t it e x p r e s s e d that the i s l a n d s w o u l d be e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n e d to J a p a n w h e n e v e r the m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y for k e e p i n g t h e m u n d e r

s u c h a s y st e m c e a s e d to e x i s t .^

One of G a i m u s h o o f fi c i a l s who h e l p e d Y o s h i d a in these n e g o t i a t i o n s h a s g i v e n an a c c o u n t that D u l l e s l o o k e d

u n m i s t a k a b l y d i s p l e a s e d w h e n the J a p a n e s e v i e w s w e r e e x p r e s s e d , r e f u s i n g to c o n d u c t a n y f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s

37 a b ou t this t o p i c d u r i n g the c o n f e r e n c e at the time.

It seems, h o we v e r , that D u l l e s w a s i m p r e s s e d b y the o p i n i o n e x p r e s s e d b y the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t as w e l l as b y a l m o s t all l e a d i n g f i g u r e s w h o m he m et to d i s c u s s the p r o b l e m of a p e a c e t r ea t y d u r i n g his stay in T o k y o at this t i m e , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y he w a s led to the r e a l i s a t i o n

O Q

that the m a t t e r n e e d e d r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

T h e r e s u l t of r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f the O k i n a w a c l a u s e b y D u l l e s wa s e m b o d i e d in an A m e r i c a n d r a f t w h i c h wa s

(26)

to Yoshida when Dulles flew to Tokyo in April 1931*

Putting aside minor differences in style, the provision

for Okinawa therein was almost identical with the relevant

part of the final Treaty.

A new aspect in it was that,

while the Seven-Point Memorandum simply envisaged an

exclusive American trusteeship, the March draft included

an additional provision that the United States would have

right to exercise all power over Okinawa until a proposal

for such a system was actually made and carried into

effect.

It was also significant, the negotiators thought,

that the draft did not specifically provide for

detachment of Okinawa and Ogasawara from Japanese

39

sovereignty.

These facts gave the Japanese negotiators

the expectancy of the possibility that the United States

would not dare to take an action to implement the

trusteeship clause for the islands and that they would

40

be eventually returned to Japan.

This point in the American version survived the

subsequent adjustments with the British delegate who

originally required Japan to renounce sovereignty over

4l

these islands.

A draft Japanese Peace Treaty which

came out of the Anglo-American agreement and which was to

be incorporated in the final Treaty only after the minor

verbal modifications was officially made public on

12

July

42

1951

.

Public response to the Okinawa clause in the disclosed

draft treaty was considerably unfavourable, particularly

so in Amami-Oshima where disappointed people began to

43

(27)

Japanese leaders were anxious to get the U n i t e d States permis s i o n to explain to the general public in a more

express w a y the purpose of the provision of Article

3

> c o n s i d e r i n g that the obscurity of the clauses was to some

44

extent responsible for that adverse public response. A h i g h - r a n k i n g official (who was beli e v e d to be Iguchi, Permanent Se c r e t a r y for Foreign Affairs and a r i g h t - h a n d man of Yoshida) d i s c l o s e d the Government v i e w that the pros p e c t i v e treaty w o u l d not require Japan to renounce her sovereignty in Ok i n a w a and Ogasawara and therefore

s overeignty in these islands would rest w i t h Japan even if they should be placed under a U.N. trusteeship for a certain period of time. This was, he added, one of the

43

positive results of their negotiations w i t h Dulles. He also told the press that the Japanese G o vernment had

r eason to expect that a trusteeship agreement for the islands, if any, w o uld be one w ith a specified term after the expiration of w h i c h they should be restored to full Japanese sovereignty. He also r e vealed the fact that negotia t i o n s were in progress w i t h the U n i t e d States

s e e k i n g that no tariff barriers should be erected be t w e e n

46

these island areas and the Japanese homeland.

It remains open to question as to w h e ther these

statements were made w i t h prior u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Un i t e d

47

States. T h e y were, however, endorsed to a large extent by Prime Mini s t e r Y o s h i d a who pointed out in his

explanatory speech before the Diet that the T r e a t y simply prov i d e d that Jap a n would concur in any proposal of the U n i t e d States to the U n i t e d Nations for placing these

(28)

that the Treaty was so flexible on this matter that there

was much room left to hope that reasonable arrangements

would be worked out in regard to the civil status of the

inhabitants involved and their trade and other

48

communications with the Japanese homeland»

Through these statements the Japanese Government

tried to clarify two points: (l) the significance that

the Treaty did not require Japan to renounce her

sovereignty in Okinawa and Ogasawara, and (

2

) the

reasonable assumption that Japan would be able to have

some voice in working out of arrangements concerning

socio-economic relations of these islands with the

Japanese mainland»

The first of these two points was

endorsed by Dulles at San Francisco in September 1951>

where he said that Article 3 of the Treaty would permit

Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it

possible for the islands to be brought into trusteeship

49

system with the United States as administering authority.

The British delegate (Kenneth Younger) also confirmed

this, saying that ’the treaty does not remove these (i.e.

50

Okinawa and Ogasawara) from Japanese sovereignty.'

Regarding the second point, Japanese leaders

apparently expected, that in spite of the treaty provision

which granted the United States to do so,

she would not

need to exercise ’all and any powers of administration,

legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and

inhabitants of these islands’,

and she would allow Japan

to maintain a quasi-domestic relations with them,

(29)

forth. W h i l e the n e e d for the m a n i p u l a t i o n of the p u b l i c o p i n i o n m a d e them p r e s e n t a h o p e f u l p i c t u r e on this

m a t t e r , the J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s t h e m s e l v e s s e e m e d to be q u i t e o p t i m i s t i c at this mom e n t . ft m a y be s a i d this e x p e c t a t i o n w a s to some extent at l e ast b a s e d on r e a lity. F o r the A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n still r e m a i n e d f l u i d an d

f l e x i b l e on this m a t t e r . D u l l e s revea l e d , fo r example, in r e p l y to a q u e s t i o n in C o n g r e s s b e f o r e w h i c h the

t r e a t y wa s p l a c e d for r a t i f i c a t i o n , that ’there h a d b e e n no f i n a l c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of t h o u g h t w i t h i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t as to h ow to e x e r c i s e the r i g h t s and

p r i v i l e g e s g i v e n us b y A r t i c l e 3' > a d d i n g that a d e c i s i o n on this p o int w o u l d have to be m a d e in the light o f

v a r i o u s f a c t o r s - ’s e n t i m e n t a l and h i s t o r i c a l ' as w e l l as ’s t r a t e g i c ' . A t the same time h e e v e n s u g g e s t e d the

p o s s i b i l i t y o f not a p p l y i n g for t r u s t e e s h i p , p o i n t i n g out the fact that the U n i t e d S t a t e s wa s not o b l i g e d to do so

5

1

b y the Treaty.'

B e f o r e c o n c l u d i n g the p r e s e n t chapter, it m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e to see b r i e f l y w h a t p l a c e h a d b e e n g i v e n to O k i n a w a in v a r i o u s plans of pos fc-Peace T r e a t y s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h Japan. P l a i n l y speaking, O k i n a w a h a d b e e n i n v a r i a b l y r e g a r d e d as one of the p l a c e s w h e r e the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d m a i n t a i n its f o r c e s for some time, w h i l e t h ere h a d b e e n c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n and

v a c i l l a t i o n in the A m e r i c a n t h i n k i n g about the w i s d o m of h o l d i n g b a s e s in J a p a n a f t e r the c o n c l u s i o n of a p e a c e

(30)

d o u b t as far as A m e r i c a n b a s e s in O k i n a w a w e r e c o n c e r n e d e v e n a m o n g those w h o w e r e f a v o u r a b l y i n c l i n e d tow a r d s a

’n e u t r a l ' Japan» T h e s e people, as r e p r e s e n t e d b y G e n e r a l M a c A r t h u r , r e g a r d e d it as a n e c e s s a r y and w i s e a l t e r n a t i v e

to m a i n t a i n A m e r i c a n f o r c e s in O k i n a w a and some o t her o u t l y i n g ^ J a p a n e s e i s l a n d s in p r e f e r e n c e to a m o r e costly, in a p o l i t i c a l sense, p o l i c y of c o n t i n u i n g A m e r i c a n

o c c u p a t i o n of J a p a n for the p u r p o s e e i t h e r of k e e p i n g v i g i l a n c e over p o s t - T r e a t y J a pan so that no c h a u v i n i s t i c a t t e m p t to r e m i l i t a r i z e J a p a n w o u l d be s u c c e s s f u l , or of g u a r a n t e e i n g a d i s a r m e d J a p a n a g a i n s t a r m e d a t t a c k f r o m

52

o u t s i d e . It s e e m e d that J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s of the time w o u l d be p r e p a r e d to acce p t this scheme. In S e p t e m b e r

19^-7 A s h i d a . F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r of the K a t a y a m a C a b i n e t , put f o r w a r d a p r o p o s a l for the p o s t - P e a c e T r e a t y s e c u r i t y s y s t e m for J a p a n on the b a s i s of a u n i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . A l t h o u g h this f o r m e d a d e p a r t u r e

f r o m e a r l i e r t h i n k i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y the i d e a of c o l l e c t i v e g u a r a n t e e of J a p a n ' s s e c u r i t y b y p r i n c i p a l A l l i e d P o w e r s or the U n i t e d N a t i o n s as a w h o l e and, as

such, can be r e g a r d e d as an e m b r y o of the e v e n t u a l l y

i n s t i t u t e d U . S . - J a p a n S e c u r i t y T r e a t y ( s i g n e d in S e p t e m b e r 1951 a l o n g s i d e w i t h the P e a c e T r e a t y ) , there w a s an

i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n A s h i d a ’s p l a n and t h ose in l a t e r periods. U n d e r his plan, the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d k e e p its forces c l o s e to J a p a n but not in J a p a n a n d w o u l d m o v e t h e m only in ca s e of e m e r g e n c y to b a s e s in J a p a n

5

3

(31)

v 5^

1). It is n o t k n o w n w h a t a r e a w a s a c t u a l l y m e ant b y ’c l o s e to J a p a n 3 , but q u i t e l i k e l y A s h i d a wa s t h i n k i n g in terms of a g u a r a n t e e of J a p a n ' s s e c u r i t y b y A m e r i c a n f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d , a m o n g o t h e r areas, in O k i n a w a and O g a s a w a r a .

W h e n b o t h J a p a n e s e a n d A m e r i c a n l e a d e r s d e c i d e d to take a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e of a c t i o n and to c o n c l u d e a k i n d o f b a s e r i g h t s a g r e e m e n t , t h e r e b y g r a n t i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s the r i g h t to d i s p o s e v a r i o u s f a c i l i t i e s on

J a p a n e s e soil f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s , some m i g h t w e l l h a v e t h o u g h t that the r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e of O k i n a w a in the A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g y in the F a r E a s t h a d s o m e w h a t d e c l i n e d

and, a c c o r d i n g l y , the A m e r i c a n s m i ght l o o s e n their

55

c o n t r o l of O k in a w a , R e a l i t y failed, h o w ever, to m e e t t h eir e x p e c t a t i o n , an d J a p a n e s e n e g o t i a t o r s ha d to r e a l i z e h o w firm the A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y ' s s t a n d on O k i n a w a was. In s p ite of the f a c t that the U n i t e d S t a t e s o b t a i n e d free a c c e s s to J a p a n e s e b a s e s b y the n e w l y e s t a b l i s h e d treaty, O k i n a w a w a s g i v e n s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e for v a r i o u s reasons. A p p a r e n t l y , one of t h o s e r e a s o n s wa s a still s t r o n g

concern, p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g some B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h c o u n t r i e s in the P a ci f i c , ov e r the r e v i v a l of J a p a n e s e

5

6

m i l i t a r i s m . A n o t h e r reason, a l t h o u g h not o p e n l y stated, w a s that the U.S. m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s w a n t e d to h o l d on

to Okinawa, so to speak, as an i n s u r a n c e in case the b a s e s in J a p a n w e r e lost. I n other words, in the l i g h t of the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of J a p a n ’s f u t u r e course, it w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y , t h e y thought, f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s

to secu r e s pecial p r i v i l e g e s in O k i n a w a so that the

(32)

cha n g e in J a p a n e s e p o li t i c s and J a p a n ’s r e l a t i o n s w i t h

57

the U n i t e d S t ates,

In short t h r o u g h o u t the d i s c u s s i o n about the post-P e a c e T r e a t y s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m of Japan., it s e e m e d a

f o r e g o n e c o n c l u s i o n that the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d r e t a i n O k i n a w a u n d e r a s p e c i a l legal f r a m e w o r k i r r e s p e c t i v e of J a p a n s p l a c e in the A l l i a n c e system, As we h a v e a l r e a d y

seen, the ’r e s i d u a l s o v e r e i g n t y : p r o v i s i o n w a s the s o l u t i o n g iven b y D u l l e s to m e e t this n e c e s s i t y ,

T h e g r ea t e s t p e c u l i a r i t y of A r t i c l e 3 of the J a p a n e s e P e ac e T r e a t y lay in the fact that it d i d not come to a n y c o n c r e t e d e c i s i o n over the s t a t u s of O k i n a w a but p o s t p o n e d a d e c i s i o n to an u n d e t e r m i n e d da t e in the

future» It d i d not give a n y i n d i c a t i o n s o f h o w long b e f o r e a final d e c i s i o n s h o u l d be m a d e an d in w h a t w a y an end s h o u l d be put to the t r a n s i t o r y s i t u a t i o n » T h i s i n d e c i s i v e n e s s an d o b s c u r i t y w a s the r e s u l t of the d e s i r e s of the l e ad e r s on b o t h s i d e s to a v o i d b r i n g i n g the

f o l l o w i n g two f a c t o r s into conflict: (l) the w i s h of the A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y for a free us e of the islan d s ; and (2) n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s of the J a p a n e s e p e o p l e for

r e s t o r i n g an d r e t a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c an d s e n t i m e n t a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of O k i n a w a w i t h the J a p a n e s e c o m m unity»

W h a t w e r e the gains a n d losses a c c r u i n g to both sides f r o m the c o m p r o m i s e r e a c h e d ? F r o m the A m e r i c a n side,

this c o m p r o m i s e w a s n e c e s s a r y for the d i p l o m a t i c

c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of w i n n i n g the f a v o u r o f a c o u n t r y w h i c h t h e y n o w sought as an a l l y in their s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union» T h e y w e r e s u c c e s s f u l in s e c u r i n g the

(33)

wor d s , t h e y m a i n t a i n e d the v e s t e d r i g h t s d e r i v e d from the conqu e s t , a l t h o u g h t h e s e r i g h t s s u f f e r e d f r o m a s o m e w h a t s h ak y l egal f r a m e w o r k for a l e n g t h y p e r i o d of o c c u p a t i o n » ^

To Japan, it w a s a gain, too, in the sense that she s u c c e s s f u l l y p r e v e n t e d a d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n f r o m b e i n g m a d e u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h w e r e not yet f a v o u r a b l e e n o u g h f o r her» T h e fact s till r e m a i n e d , h o w e v e r , that the J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s s a c r i f i c e d the

i n t e r e s t s of the p e o p l e in O k i n a w a (who w e r e a s s e r t i n g t h e m s e l v e s to be c o m p a t r i o t s of the J a p a n e s e people) for the n a t i o n ' s e a r l y a n d p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t e a s y r e c o v e r y to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l society.

(34)

C H A P T E R 2

The E v o l u t i o n of the O k i n a w a Problem:

F r o m the J a p a n e s e_P eace T r e a t y to the S e t t l e m e n t of the M i l i t a r y L a n d I s s u e (1952-58)

A t the time of the c o n c l u s i o n of the J a p a n e s e P e a c e T r e a t y , o ne c o u l d s p e c u l a t e on two p o s s i b l e c o u r s e s of

the f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t of the O k i n a w a p r o b l e m . T he f irst p o s s i b i l i t y w a s that there w o u l d be a f a v o u r a b l e c h a n g e in the s t a t u s of O k i n a w a w h e n the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s

b e t w e e n J a p a n and the U n i t e d S t a t e s w e r e f u r t h e r i m p r o v e d . I n o t h e r words, r e c o v e r y of J a p a n ’s e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h

a n d the c o n s e q u e n t i n c r e a s e of h e r m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e w o u l d e n a b l e h e r to n e g o t i a t e o v e r O k i n a w a w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s on m o r e f a v o u r a b l e terms. Ti m e o n l y w o u l d h e l p the two c o u n t r i e s to w o r k out a s o l u t i o n a c c e p t a b l e to t h e m both.

The o t he r p o s s i b i l i t y w a s that i m p r o v e m e n t o f J a p a n ' s s t a t u s in r e l a t i o n to the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d n o t

n e c e s s a r i l y f a c i l i t a t e a s o l u t i o n of the O k i n a w a probl e m . O n the c o n t r a r y , the A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y m i g h t m o r e and m o r e s t u b b o r n l y a d he r e to the sta t u s quo c o n c e r n i n g O k i n a w a as J a p a n w o u l d h a v e m o r e v o i c e in o p e r a t i o n of

the U . S . - J a p a n a l l i a n c e system.

A s m e n t i o n e d in the p r e v i o u s chapter, J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s w e r e t h i n k i n g l a r g e l y in terms of the first c o u r s e whif.e m a n y A m e r i c a n s w e r e e n v i s a g i n g the second.

(35)

ready to take a considerably lenient attitude towards

Japan's special relations with Okinawa»

On the occasion

of the inauguration of the Government of the Ryukyu

Islands (GR!) which took place shortly before the coming

into force of the Peace Treaty, General Ridgway, the then

Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, gave an outline of post­

treaty policy in Okinawa in his message, which included

the following points:

(i)

the Ryukyu Islands would be separated in

political terms from Japan for a certain period of time

under the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

This political

separation would not, however, entail severance of time-

honoured cultural and economic ties between the Ryukyus

and Japan,

(ii)

relations between them would be restricted

only to such an extent as justifiable from necessary

considerations for military security,

(iii)

it would be the policy of the United States

to remove unnecessary restrictions on travels, communication

and trades between the Ryukyus and Japan, and

(iv)

restoration of cultural and educational as well

as economic ties of the Ryukyus with Japan which had been

interrupted by the last war should be encouraged.^

A similar liberal tone was recognized in the American

policy concerning 'self-government’

of Okinawa.

Chief

Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands emphasized in his

speech made on the same occasion that the U.S. policy in

Okinawa would aim at the establishment of a freely elected

government based on democratic principles because, he

(36)

be, a government run by an appointed official would not

match a popular government from the viewpoint of welfare

for the people.

He referred more specifically to the

newly established Ryukyu Legislative Assembly as an

important step in that direction and that the goal would

be achieved by taking another step, namely, by the conduct

of a popular election for the head of the executive

branch of the GRI„^

On diplomatic level negotiations for the ’Note

Concerning Trade and Financial Arrangements between

[Japanesej Mainland and Nansei Shoto’

provided a

test-case of the American policy dealing with the mutual

relation between the Ryukyus and Japan.

The matter was

originated by GRI officials in charge of trade and

industry with the intention of establishing special (i.e.

quasi-domestic) relations between Japan and Okinawa in

the fields of trade and financial arrangements so that

Okinawa would be treated on more favourable terms than

other countries in regard to custom duties and quota

3

system of imported goods and so on.

Although strictly

speaking, GRI is not empowered to conduct diplomatic

negotiations with any countries including Japan, the

American authorities gave consent that the parties to the

negotiations for this particular matter should be the

Japanese Government and the GRI.

Thus for the first time

since the war an official contact was made between the

5

Figure

Table 2Breakdown_of Japan’s Economic Assistance
Table 1: Pattern of Decision-making for Okinawa
Table 4 :Number of Speakers and Minute« taken by tltem on the
Table 5«Participants in the Okinawa Debate bv Party Affiliation
+4

References

Related documents

The reason higher financing requirements improve the reallocation of capital is that, because of limited pledgeability, medium firms do not voluntarily liquidate their projects

in water-damaged buildings [5,6], it was of interest to char- acterise a randomly selected, morphologically heterogene- ous group of 11 strains di¡ering in biological activity [11^

Marie Laure Suites (Self Catering) Self Catering 14 Mr. Richard Naya Mahe Belombre 2516591 info@marielauresuites.com 61 Metcalfe Villas Self Catering 6 Ms Loulou Metcalfe

• The development of a model named the image based feature space (IBFS) model for linking image regions or segments with text labels, as well as for automatic image

Common Project specific Management Documents (i.e. Project Execution Plan, Project Quality Plan, Project HSSE Plan, Project Engineering Plan, Project Construction Plan, …) are

Sachin Dubey1, Reena Rani2, Saroj Kumari3, Neelam Sharma," VLSI Implementation Of Fast Addition Using Quaternary Signed Digit Number System", IEEE International

Online community: A group of people using social media tools and sites on the Internet OpenID: Is a single sign-on system that allows Internet users to log on to many different.

Recall that due to a local nature of approximations provided by linearized mod- els, a TPWL model will adequately approximate a response of the initial nonlinear system to a