towards the Okinawa Problem ; 194-5 - 1965* by A. Watanabe.
Okinawa, which was captured by American forces
in the last stages of the Second World War, was after
the Japanese surrender placed under the control of the
United States.
Drastic changes which occurred in the
Par Past in the following years, especially the advent
of a hostile regime on the Chinese continent and the
outbreak of the Korean war, made the United States develop
Okinawa into her most important military base to cope
with this new situation.
Thus under the Japanese Peace
Treaty (1952) it was decided that Okinawa together with
other islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago should remain
under American control.
At he Peace Conference, however, the United States
explicitly recognized Japan's 'residual sovereignty'.
Since then the United States has increasingly made it
clear that she will eventually return Okinawa to Japan
when the military situation permits.
She has, hov/ever,
steadfastly rejected all suggestions that she should return
the island at an earlier date or that she should in the
meantime give Japan a share in any aspect of its administration
for fear of losing the freedom of her military forces to
act in and from there.
Not surprisingly, with the passage
of time, the ambiguity of the present and future status
of Okinawa has become more and more irritating both to
the Japanese people and to Okinawa's 900,000 inhabitants
who are asserting themselves as Japanese.
among the Japanese over the existing status of Okinawa
which appears, in the eyes of many Japanese, little
short of an American colony.
There seems no doubt
about the existence in Japan of a fundamental consensus
which calls for the earliest possible return of Okinawa
to Japanese control.
It is a great paradox, however,
that a political issue for which national consensus is
easily attained — the return of Okinawa to Japan —
is inextricably entangled with another over which the
nation's opinion is sharply divided — the defense
relations with the United States.
A logical consequence
of this situation is that a clear-cut solution to the
Okinawa problem could not be achieved without entailing
a drastic change in the structure of the U.S.-Japan
alliance.
This poses a difficult question to the Japanese
Government.
For the Okinawa problem the Japanese public
calls for a decisive change while for the defence policy
it would react very reluctantly to any proposal for a
radical departure from the existing arrangements.
The
Japanese Government also meets a very strong reluctance
on the part of the United States to make substantial
concessions regarding the political status of Okinawa.
Although the United States recently agreed to extend
however, leaders of the both countries are successful
in removing this source of friction within the not too
distant future, the relations between the United States
and Japan may be seriously affected by Japanese resentment
arising out of the Okinawa issue.
In this thesis I have tried to shed light on the
development of Japanese attitudes towards the Okinawa
Department of International Relations at
the Australian National University.
1945-1965
b y
A k i o W a t anab e
A thesis s u b m i t t e d for the d e g r e e of D o c t o r of
VOLUME I TEXT
PR EFAC E i i i
I NTRODUCTI ON v
PART I
CHAPTER I T h e G e n e s i s o f t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m : F r o m S u r r e n d e r t o t h e P e a c e T r e a t y w i t h J a p a n
(1 9 4 5- 5 2) . 1
CHAPTER 2 T h e E v o l u t i o n o f t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m : F r o m t h e J a p a n e s e P e a c e T r e a t y t o t h e S e t t l e m e n t
o f t h e M i l i t a r y L a n d I s s u e ( 1 9 5 2 - 5 8 ) . 2 1 CHAPTER 3 T h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m i n J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n
P o l i c y : 1 9 5 8- 6 5. 37
PART I I
CHAPTER 4 T h e R o l e o f O f f i c i a l D e c i s i o n M a k e r s i n
t h e M a k i n g o f J a p a n e s e O k i n a w a P o l i c y » 6 1 CHAPTER 5 T h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m i n t h e J a p a n e s e D i e t . 8 2 CHAPTER 6 P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s o n t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m
(1 9 4 5-5 5) . 107
CHAPTER 7 P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s o n t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m
(1 9 5 6- 6 5) . 1 2 4
CHAPTER 8 I n d i v i d u a l s a n d G r o u p s . 1.48
CHAPTER 9 T h e P r e s s a n d P u b l i c O p i n i o n i n J a p a n o n
t h e O k i n a w a P r o b l e m . 1 7 2
CONCLUSION 1 9 6
VOLUME :I I N O T E S , A P P E N D I C E S , AND BI BL IOGRAPHY 1 . NOTES
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 1
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 11
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 1 8
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6
43
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
57
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8
72
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 9
81
NOTES FOR CONCLUSION
91
2. APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
Election Results of the Okinawan
Legislative Assembly. 93
APPE N D I X II List of Somuchokan in S u ccessive Cabinets 9^
APPENDIX III Opinion Polls on
the Okinawan Issue
95PREFACE
This thesis was written in the Department of
International Relations of the School of Pacific Studies
in the Australian National University between I963 and
1966.
My primary thanks go to my supervisor, Mr D.C.S.
Sissons, for his constant encouragement and constructive
criticism.
I am also indebted to Dr G. Modelski who
shared the supervision of the thesis especially in its
initial stage, and to Dr J.A.A. Stockwin who helped me
in many ways particularly with the English language.
There are many other people to whom I owe a great deal
either for their creative suggestions or for their help
in removing the Japanese flavour from my English style.
The collection of material for this thesis was
greatly facilitated by a number of people who were kind
enough to spare me their time and supply information.
I
should like to mention, in particular, the following,
whom I met in Tokyo: Furuya Torn, Deputy to the Director-
General of the Sorifu;
Ötake Tamichika, Head of the
Bureau in charge of the Special Areas (fokubetsu Chiiki
Renraku Jimukyoku) in the Sorifu;
Yoshida Shien,
Secretary of the Nampo Doho Engokai;
Fuchigami Fusataro,
a former Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal
Democratic Party) and former Governor for Okinawa
Prefecture; Tabata Kanemitsu, Member of the House of
Councillors (Democratic Socialist Party); Inamura Toshio,
Central Staff member of the Japan Socialist Party;
in Nah.a: Nakamura Teruaki, Member of the Okinawa
Legisltaive Assembly (conservative); Asato Tsumichiyo,
Chairman of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party and
Member of the Okinawa Legislative Assembly; Miyara
Kansai, Chief-Secretary of the Okinawa Socialist Party;
Senaga Kamejiro, Secretary-General of the Okinawa People’s
Party; Yara Chobyo, Chairman of the Okinawa Teachers’
Association; and Uesato Angi,
a personal friend who
assisted me in establishing the necessary contacts.
I am further indebted to the Okinawa Shiryo Senta
(Director: Nakano Yoshio) where I located a great deal of
useful materials on the subject.
Some Okinawan scholars
helped me either through their writings in various
journals or by personal correspondence.
Among them are
Professors Higa Mikio and Miyasato Seigen in the University
of the Ryukyus.
Had it not been for the assistance of these and
others, I should not have been able to complete this
thesis, my first work written in English. Needless to
say, however, the responsibility of any deficiency rests
entirely upon me.
Canberra
August 19660
INTRODUCTION
The Okinawa problem is a matter of concern to many
who are seriously interested in comtemporary Japan.
A
good deal has already been written on this subject
particularly in Japanese. The bibliography at the end
of this thesis, although not exhaustive, gives some
indication of its extent.
Most of the literature on
Okinawa is, however, of a polemical rather than
analytical nature. As a result, there is a lack of
detached and comprehensive treatments of the subject
except for some works written by jurists.
In fact,
hardly any analytical study has been made on one
particular aspect of the problem - the formation of
Japanese attitudes towards Okinawa and their bearing on
relations between the United States and Japan.
This research has been designed to make a
contribution to the study of international conflicts.
The Okinawa problem is not a major conflict likely to
lead to armed hostilities between states.
It has never
assumed a particularly serious character. Neither side
of the dispute has ever thought of recourse to arms, and
is not likely to do so in the future.
But, as an author
of a study of a similar type of conflict - that between
France and Germany over the Saar after World War II -
has pointed out, the renunciation of violence and the
rejection of recourse to armed force do not in themselves
abolish either the social contradictions or the
this fashion that Okinawa poses problems to political
leaders of the countries concerned and to students of
international politics.
It is not hard to delineate the problem in terms
of international factors affecting it. The number of the
entities invo lved is very limi ted £
Japan, the United
States and Okinawa.
In spite of efforts of some elements
to 1
internationalize1
the issue, so far the United States
and Japan have been successful in limiting the problem
to themselves alone.
Outsiders ~ national or international
can intervene only indirectly, by attempting to influence
’insiders’
in their relations with each other.
In spite
of the possibility that the Soviet Union could make a
considerable impact on Japanese opinion in Okinawa by
making use of their own 5
territorial question* in
relation to Japan, it has so far not done so.
So long as
bad relations between the United States and China
persist, there is unlikely to be any fundamental change
in the international contours of the problem.
Thus the
matter depends almost entirely on the development of
relations between the two allies, and especially on
attitudes of various forces at work in Japan towards
her relations with the United States.
Despite the existence in Japan of a fundamental
consensus which calls for the earliest possible
return of Okinawa to Japan, there are different shades
of opinion on the Okinawa problem corresponding to the
spectrum of attitudes concerning the alliance with the
United States.
Japanese attitudes towards Okinawa must
To summarize the contents of this thesis, Part One
consists of three chapters describing the sequence of
important events over the past two decades„
The main
topics treated are:
the formulation of the present status
of Okinawa in the Japanese peace-settlement with
particular reference to Japan’s ’residual sovereignty’
(chapter l); the unfolding of the Okinawa land issue and
its effects on U.S.-Japan relations (chapter 2); and the
development of a U.S.-Japan ’partnership’
over Okinawa
(chapter 3)•
The next six chapters (comprising Part Two) are
devoted to a cross-sectional analysis of various forces
at work in Japan.
Roles taken by Government officials
(chapter
4
) ; the parliament (chapter5
) ;political parties
(chapters 6 and 7); non-governmental groups and
individuals (chapter 8); and the press (chapter 9) are
analysed in detail.
The following conventions are observed in this
thesis;
1)
Japanese personal names are written in the original
order, i.e. with the surname first and the given
name second.
2)
Names of bodies, official or non-official, are
used in the original form, followed, on their first
appearance in the text,
by their English
translation.
E.g. the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan), the 0kinawajin Rem.tnei (the
Japa n e s e geographical names are given in their
original form. Thus, for example, Chishima, K a r a f u t o , O g a s a w a r a instead of the Kuriles, Sakhalin, ,
the Bonins, 'The Ryukyus Islands' and 'Okinawa' are u s e d in this thesis interchangeably although in a strict sense the former is used to designate the whole islands of the Archipelago while the latter refers to the m ain island in it.
In citing Japanese material, romanization of
original titles is given without adding an Engl i s h
translation. W h e n citing minutes of the Japanese
Diet, the following conventions are used: S h u giin K a i g i r o k u and Sangiin K a i g i r o k u are
abbreviated to SHU KG R and SAN KGR respectively. In
case of committee proceedings the name of the
relevant committee is added after SHU or SAN . In
b o t h cases roman figures indicate the n umber of session, and arabic figures the n umber of meetings in that session. E.g. SHU K G R , X, 2, stands for Shugiin K a i g i r o ku, 10th session, N o . 2; and SAN Y O S A N , XII, 3s stands for Sangiin Yo s a n i n k a g i r o k u , 12th s e s s i o n , N o .3 °
C H A P T E R 1
The G e n e s i s o f the O k i n a w a P r o b l em:
F r o m S u r r e n d e r to the P e ac e T r e a t y w i t h J a p a n (1945-52) The m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n a f f e c t i n g the p r e s e n t s t a t u s of O k i n a w a w a s the c o n c l u s i o n of the P e a c e T r e a t y w i t h J a p a n ( s i g n e d in S e p t e m b e r 1951 and c o m i n g into
eff e c t in A p r i l 1952). A r t i c l e 3 of the T r e a t y reads: J a p a n w i l l c o n c u r in a n y p r o p o s a l o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s to p l a c e u n d e r its
t r u s t e e s h i p system, w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s as the sole a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y , N a n s e i S h o t o s o u t h of 29 d e g r e e n o r t h l a t i t u d e (i n c l u d i n g the R y u k y u I s l a n d s and the D a i t o I s l a n d s ) , N a m p o S h o t o s o u t h of S o f u G a n ( i n c l u d i n g the B o n i n Islan d s , R o s a r i o I s l a n d an d the V o l c a n o Is l a n d s ) a n d P a r e c e V e l a and M a r c u s Island. P e n d i n g the mailing of s u c h a p r o p o s a l and a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n thereon, the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l h a v e the r i gh t to e x e r c i s e all an d an y p o w e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , l e g i s l a t i o n and
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r the t e r r i t o r y an d i n h a b i t a n t s of these islands, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s .
T h e r i g h t s g i v e n to J a p a n u n d e r the p r o v i s i o n of this a r t i c l e is g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d to as 'residual sov e r e i g n t y ' s i n c e that is the t e r m u s e d at the Sa n
F r a n c i s c o P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e b y D u lles, the c h i e f a r c h i t e c t of the Treaty, a l t h o u g h the text of the T r e a t y does not
2 i n c l u d e such an e x p r e s s i o n .
h a n d to a r a t h e r o p t i m i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n a m o n g the J a p a n e s e p e o p l e for a r a p i d i m p r o v e m e n t of s t ate o f a f f a i r s
c o n c e r n i n g O k i n a w a in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h futu r e b e t t e r m e n t of U . S . -Japan r e l a t i o n s . It caused, on the o t h e r hand, a c o n s i d e r a b l e a n x i e t y in J a p a n ov e r the A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n on O k i n a w a . A t a n y rate the d e c i s i o n m a d e on O k i n a w a at San F r a n c i s c o m 1951 c o n s t i t u t e d not the end but the
s t a r t i n g point of the h i s t o r y of the O k i n a w a d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n J a p a n and the U n i t e d Sta t e s .
T h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r w i l l a t t em p t to shed light on s o m e p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g to this d e c i s i o n t h r o u g h m a k i n g a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the m a i n e v e n t s l e a d i n g to that decis i o n . I n a t t e m p t i n g to do so, one s u f f e r s f r o m a d e a r t h of
p r i m a r y s o u r c e s e s p e c i a l l y c o n c e r n i n g the d i p l o m a t i c p r o c e s s e s . W i t h this in view, ho w e v e r , the f o l l o w i n g a c c o u n t s u f f i c i e n t for the p r e s e n t p u r p o s e sets f o r t h the e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r s w h i c h led to the O k i n a w a d e c i s i o n in 1951 .
N e e d l e s s to say, the O k i n a w a q u e s t i o n o r i g i n a t e d
d i r e c t l y fr o m J a p a n ’s defe a t in W o r l d W a r II. D i s p o s i t i o n of O k i n a w a w a s one o f the topics d i s c u s s e d b y w a r - t i m e l e a d e r s in r e l a t i o n to the 'Pacific p r o b l e m ’ .
At C a i r o in late 1 9 ^ 3 3 P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t r a i s e d the O k i n a w a q u e s t i o n b e f o r e G e n e r ä l i s s i m o C h i a n g , a s k i n g m o r e than once d u r i n g the c o n v e r s a t i o n w h e t h e r C h i n a had
After
having discussions also with Stalin at Teheran,
Roosevelt reported to the Pacific War Council that Stalin
was familiar
with the history of the Ryukyu Islands and
that he was in
complete agreement that they belong to
4
China and should
be returned to her.
No further
record has been found of reference to the
future status of
Okinawa at any other conferences of war
time Allied leaders.
Neither was there any specific
mention of the
island either in the Cairo or Potsdam
Declarations or
in the secret agreement at Yalta.
All
this indicates
that the Allied Powers did not come to a
final conclusion
regarding the future status of Okinawa,
although they
were sympathetic to the Chinese interests
5
in the
Ryukyus on historical grounds.
The
immediate course of action was determined by
military rather
than political considerations.
With the
short (short
for the present standards) range of naval
and air striking
forces, the United States had to take
recourse in
a strategy of 'island hopping’,
by which the
front line
could gradually be pushed forward closer to
the ultimate
goal - the Japanese mainland.
Okinawa was
chosen to be
the last of these stepping stones for that
purpose.
Okinawa fell into the hands of the American
forces after
almost three months of fierce fighting which
claimed the
lives of 12,500 American and 110,000 Japanese.
On the captured
islands
theAmericans constructed base-
facilities
for B-29 operations on the island of Okinawa
and another
base for Very Long Range fighter escorts on
Ieshima, a
tiny island adjacent to Okinawa.
It was not
Okinawa-based B - 2 9 's carried out their first (and last) offensive
7
m i s sion against the Japanese homeland,
The very fact that the Americans captured Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus during the W a r added some new factors to the subsequent development of their
attitudes towards the islands.
In the first place, it contributed to the formation, or s t r e n g t h e n i n g, of the opinion among the mili t a r y
planners (particularly of the Navy) that the U n i t e d States should take outright p o ssession of the outl y i n g Japanese islands (including the Ryukyus) together w ith her former mandated territories in the Pacific as part of a far-
flung n e t work of ’strategic strong p o i n t s ’ of the United States. The great loss of life which occurred in seizing
the islands, the large amount spent on developing base facilities and the b elief that the inhabitants concerned desired to live under the American flag were advanced as
g
justification for this action.
The military demands for a complete A m e r i c a n
sovereignty over the ex-Japanese mandated islands clashed with the position taken by the State Department that such an action would be incompatible with the principle of n o n territorial aggrandizement that the Allied Powers solemnly declared in war-time documents. The latter contended that an exclusive A m erican trusteeship would a d equately protect American interests in these islands. A compromise was reached between the two views by creating a peculiar institution of strategic trusteeship for the former
9
A similar pattern of opinion conflict seemed to
exist between the American m i l i t a r y authorities who w a n t e d to see the R y u k y u Islands placed under, if not full
A m e r i c a n sovereignty, at least a trusteeship w ith the U n i t e d States as the sole administering power, and those who did not see w h y other members of the Un i t e d Nations,
es p e c i a l l y China, should be excluded from taking part in the m a c h i n e r y of administration in O k i n a w a . ^
The Okinawa question could be further complicated by the problem of Chishima. Some Congressmen suggested that Chis h i m a might be placed under a joint trusteeship of the Un i t e d Nations if any of the Pacific islands
conquered by the U n i t e d States - especially O k i nawa - were to be treated in a similar w a y . ^ (The public was not informed at that time of the secret agreement reached at Y a l t a b e t w e e n Roosevelt and Stalin in w h i c h the former prom i s e d to support the Soviet Union's claim to C h i s h i m a and the southern half of Karafuto at a future peace
conf erenc e .)
The A m e r i c a n n e g o tiators chose to seek Soviet support for the A m e r i c a n proposal to the Un i t e d Nations Secu r i t y Council for placing the ex-Japanese mandated islands und e r an exclusive A merican trusteeship in exchange for
r e a f f i r m i n g the promise made by Roosevelt at Yal t a concerning the C h i s h i m a problem. It was decided that disposition of
12 O k i n a w a should be p o s tponed until a formal peace treaty.
w a r f a r e , the A m e r i c a n s t r e a t e d the O k i n a w a n s as b e i n g of a d i f f e r e n t s t o c k a n d c u l t u r e from the J a p a n e s e an d as h a v i n g b e e n e c o n o m i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y e x p l o i t e d b y
13
the latter. A l t h o u g h so far no e v i d e n c e ha s b e e n f o u n d to s h o w that the A m e r i c a n s m a d e s y s t e m a t i c e f f o r t s to e l e v a t e this p o l i c y of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n the
O k i n a w a n s and the J a p a n e s e into a m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d p o l i c y of e n c o u r a g i n g p o l i t i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e of O k i n a w a f r o m an
' i m p e r i a l ’ Japan, this line of t h i n k i n g h a d u n m i s t a k a b l e e f f e c t s u p o n the p o l i t i c a l r e - o r i e n t a t i o n of O k i n a w a in
l4
the p o s t - w a r per i o d .B y r i ght of c o n q u e s t a n d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the terms 15
of s u r r e n d e r of the J a p a n e s e f o r c e s in the R y u k y u s , the p o w e r of c o n t r o l o v e r the f o r m e r J a p a n e s e i s l a n d s s o u t h of 30 d e g r e e n o r t h l a t i t u d e (which i n c l u d e O k i n a w a an d A m a m i - O s h i m a ) w a s a s s u m e d b y the U n i t e d S t a t e s forces.
A f t e r an i n i t i a l s h o r t p e r i o d of d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r b e t w e e n the N a v y (to w h i c h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the O k i n a w a G r o u p or O k i n a w a G u n t o w a s a s s i g n e d ) a n d the A r m y ( w h i c h
c o n t r o l l e d the o t h e r t h r e e groups of Miyako, Y a e y a m a a n d A m a m i ) , the t a s k of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the w h o l e a r e a w a s
a s s i g n e d to the U.S. N a v y an d c o n s e q u e n t l y t r a n s f e r r e d to the U.S. Army.
A n i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t o f the p o l i c y of A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s is that a c l e a r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w a s m a d e
b e t w e e n J a p a n p r o p e r and the R y u k y u I s l a n d s w i t h the d i v i d i n g line set at l a t i t u d e 30 d e g r e e north. T h i s w a s f o r m a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y a S C A P ( S u p r e m e C o m m a n d fo r A l l i e d
17
administrative convenience and not to be interpreted as an indication of A l l i e d policy r e l a t i n g to the ultimate
18
d i s p o s i t i o n of the islands, it entailed a few consequences of significant practical import. First, Okinawa was placed u n d e r the sole control of the U n i t e d States, whereas the rest of Japan was, at least in a formal sense, under the A l l i e d control. This meant that the Un i t e d States was not
responsible in O k i n a w a to the All i e d m a c h i n e r y of Japanese O c c u p a t i o n such as the Far E a s tern Commission or the
19
A l l i e d Council for Japan. Secondly, while po l i c y was conducted through the Japanese Government in the mainland, O k i nawa was controlled directly and exclusively by the A m e r i c a n m i litary government. All kinds of c o m m u nication be t w e e n Okinawa and the rest of Japan were cut off or
20
strictly controlled by the U n i t e d States. In short Okinawa was treated for every purpose as if it were a
21
foreign country like K o rea or Taiwan. All this
contributed to the exclusive influence of the U n i t e d States in Okinawa and to the resulting post-war developments
b e t ween Okinawa and the Japanese homeland.
The fundamental pattern of international relations in the Far East in whi c h the Okin a w a problem was placed r e mained u n c h a n g e d until 19^9. While the A l l i e d hostility towards Japan still lingered, a new growing cleavage among the A l l i e d Powers was already big enough for defying all efforts to reach an agreement for an early conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. The advent of a Communist regime in Peking and the o u tbreak of the K o r e a n War, however, changed d r a s t i c a l l y the whole situation.
that of a chief enemy to the world at large to that of a prospective ally for the West led by the U n i t e d States. This situation requ i r e d the U n i t e d States to make a fresh approach to the problem of Okinawa, too.
Out of various possibilities relating to the status of Okinawa in the early post-war period - ranging from an outright annexation b y the Un i t e d States, an exclusive A m e r i c a n trusteeship, some kind of international control with China as one of the important participants to
independence - only the plan for placing Okinawa under a trusteeship with the U n i t e d States as the sole a d m i n istering authority survived the tremendous transformation of the
Far E a s t e r n political scene. It was along this line that S e c r e t a r y of State A c h e s o n in his famous speech on American policy for A s i a in early 1950 disclosed A m e r i c a ’s intention to propose sole U.S. trusteeship for Okinawa whi c h he
regarded as an important link of A m e rica's defence line 22
along the periphery of the Asiatic Continent.
W i t h the new strategic plan for Asia, the Uni t e d States began to make fresh efforts for c o n s olidating her mil i t a r y position on Okinawa. As early as in mid-19^9 the Amer i c a n military authorities, appar e n t l y anticipating a Communist victory in China and the momentous changes such a victory would entail, succeeded in gaining from Congress an appropriation of fifty m i l l i o n U.S. dollars for
building up m i l i t a r y installations of a permanent nature 23
on Okinawa. The construction work for that purpose actually began in early 1 9 5 0 with a participation of
2 k
One of their purposes was to assess the importance of Okinawan bases in relation to the possible change of status of A m e r i c a n forces stationed on the Japanese
main l a n d with the conclusion of a peace treaty. In spite of division of opinion about the place of Japanese bases in the p o s t - t r e a t y A m e r i c a n strategy in the Far East, they all agreed as to the great importance of Okinawan b a s e s .^
Measures were also taken in this period to reogranize
the governmental structure for Okinawa. U n d e r a
directive of General M a c A rthur in late 1950? a United States Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) was created w i t h the C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f of the Far East (located in Tokyo) as G o v e r n o r of the R yukyu Islands.
Day-to - d a y operation of the administration was discharged by the C o mmanding General of the R y u k y u Command (RYCOM) who held the additional post of Dep u t y Governor and was assisted by a n e w l y - c r e a t e d Civil Admini s t r a t o r who was also appointed from among A r m y officers at the rank of G e n e r a l .^
Besides these Americ a n - h e l d offices an indigenous Provisional Central Government of the R yukyu Islands was brought into b e ing on 1 April 1951* E x a c t l y one year later this was d e v e loped into a Government of the Ry u k y u Islands (GRl) headed by a Chief Executive who was
appointed by the Americans from among local leaders. Its legislative b r anch consisted of 31 locally elected m e m b e r s .^
in A p r i l 1950, u n d e r t o o k the task of d r a f t i n g and
n e g o t i a t i n g a p e a c e t r e a t y w i t h Japan. A l t h o u g h i n f o r m a t i o n at ou r d i s p o s a l is not e n o u g h for m a k i n g a c o m p a r i s o n
b e t w e e n v a r i o u s p e a c e d r a f t s p r e p a r e d b y S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c i a l s s i n c e the e nd of the W a r c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r
p r o v i s i o n s for Okinawa, it is k n o w n that in D u l l e s ’ f i r s t m e m o r a n d u m on J a p a n ( w r i t t e n on 6 June 1950) J a p a n wa s r e q u i r e d to a c c e p t a n y d e c i s i o n of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s w h i c h e x t e n d e d the t r u s t e e s h i p s y s t e m to all or p a r t of
the R y u k y u and B o n i n Islands. In a d o c u m e n t ( c a l l e d S e v e n - P o i n t M e m o r a n d u m ) w h i c h D u l l e s p r e p a r e d a f t e r his
f i r s t v i s i t to T o k y o , J a p a n w a s r e q u i r e d , h o w e v e r , to 'agree to U n i t e d N a t i o n s t r u s t e e s h i p , w i t h the U n i t e d
S t a t e s as a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y , of the R y u k y u a n d B o n i n .
29
I s l a n d s . 1 I n m a k i n g this m o d i f i c a t i o n , D u l l e s w a s
p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e d b y the o p i n i o n of the m i l i t a r y l e a de r s w h o s e i n s p e c t i o n tour to J a p a n and K o r e a c o i n c i d e d w i t h that of D u l l e s in m i d- 1 9 5 0 .
T h e a t t i t u d e s of the J a p a n e s e to the T r e a t y w e r e no less i m p o r t a n t than those w i t h the A l l i e s e v e n t h o u g h J a p a n w a s not a p a r t i c i p a n t in the t r e a t y m a k i n g in the
30
o r d i n a r y sense. T h u s D u l l e s v i s i t e d T o k y o a g a i n in J a n u a r y 1951 w i t h the S e v e n - P o i n t M e m o r a n d u m .
In the e a r l y p o s t - w a r period, the J a p a n e s e g a v e little u t t e r a n c e , (be it r e s p o n s i b l e or i r r e s p o n s i b l e ) , on the
31
p r o b l e m of O k i n a w a . T h e f i rst pub l i c u t t e r a n c e b y J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s on the O k i n a w a p r o b l e m w a s v o i c e d b y
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r A s h i d a (of the K a t a y a m a c o a l i t i o n c a b i n e t of the S o c i a l i s t and D e m o c r a t i c Pa r t i e s ) w h o told a
were doubtful of the applicability of the territorial
provisions in the Potsdam Declaration to Okinawa and part
of Chishima (perhaps referring to the Kurile Islands
south of Kunashiri),
adding that although Okinawa was of
no economic importance to Japan national sentiment made
32
her seek the return of the island»
This statement was
only to cause adverse reactions from abroad as well as
33
from the leftist groups within the society.
Such being
the case, Gaimusho experts had at this point little hope
34
of recovering Chishima and Okinawa.
The situation had changed, however, by the time of
Dulles' second visit to Tokyo in early 1951*
Now Japan
could expect her opinion to be heard on various matters
such as Okinawa.
In the period from late 1950 to early
1951j
quite a few Members of the Diet openly expressed
their desire for the return of Okinawa and Ogasawara.
This feeling was most articulately expressed by nationalist-
oriented conservative politicians (particularly in the
Democratic Party),
who were echoed by the Socialists and,
to a lesser extent, by some members of the Liberal
(Government) Party.
In spite of a remarkable degree of
silence of the Japanese press on the matter, this seemed
to be the prevailing feeling among all sections of the
Japanese society, with a seemingly strange exception of
35
A n o t e s u b m i t t e d b y the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t to D u l l e s on 30 J a n u a r y 1951 s t a t e d in r e l a t i o n to O k i n a w a as
f o l l o w s :
(a) It w o u l d be m o s t d e s i r a b l e for the U n i t e d S t a t e s to r e f r a i n h e r s e l f f r o m c a r r y i n g out the t r u s t e e s h i p
p r o p o s a l for O k i n a w a and O g a s a w a r a f o r the sake of an e n d u r i n g f r i e n d s h i p b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s an d Japan;
(b) J a p a n w o u l d be p r e p a r e d to o f f e r t h ese i s l a n d s for A m e r i c a ' s free us e fo r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s in full a p p r e c i a t i o n of h e r i n t e r e s t s in them;
(c) I n case, h o w e v e r , the i s l a n d s be i n e v i t a b l y b r o u g h t into t r u s t e e s h i p , J a p a n w o u l d ho p e to b e c o m e a
joint t r u st e e f o r them. S h e also w o u l d w a n t it e x p r e s s e d that the i s l a n d s w o u l d be e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n e d to J a p a n w h e n e v e r the m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y for k e e p i n g t h e m u n d e r
s u c h a s y st e m c e a s e d to e x i s t .^
One of G a i m u s h o o f fi c i a l s who h e l p e d Y o s h i d a in these n e g o t i a t i o n s h a s g i v e n an a c c o u n t that D u l l e s l o o k e d
u n m i s t a k a b l y d i s p l e a s e d w h e n the J a p a n e s e v i e w s w e r e e x p r e s s e d , r e f u s i n g to c o n d u c t a n y f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s
37 a b ou t this t o p i c d u r i n g the c o n f e r e n c e at the time.
It seems, h o we v e r , that D u l l e s w a s i m p r e s s e d b y the o p i n i o n e x p r e s s e d b y the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t as w e l l as b y a l m o s t all l e a d i n g f i g u r e s w h o m he m et to d i s c u s s the p r o b l e m of a p e a c e t r ea t y d u r i n g his stay in T o k y o at this t i m e , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y he w a s led to the r e a l i s a t i o n
O Q
that the m a t t e r n e e d e d r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
T h e r e s u l t of r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f the O k i n a w a c l a u s e b y D u l l e s wa s e m b o d i e d in an A m e r i c a n d r a f t w h i c h wa s
to Yoshida when Dulles flew to Tokyo in April 1931*
Putting aside minor differences in style, the provision
for Okinawa therein was almost identical with the relevant
part of the final Treaty.
A new aspect in it was that,
while the Seven-Point Memorandum simply envisaged an
exclusive American trusteeship, the March draft included
an additional provision that the United States would have
right to exercise all power over Okinawa until a proposal
for such a system was actually made and carried into
effect.
It was also significant, the negotiators thought,
that the draft did not specifically provide for
detachment of Okinawa and Ogasawara from Japanese
39
sovereignty.
These facts gave the Japanese negotiators
the expectancy of the possibility that the United States
would not dare to take an action to implement the
trusteeship clause for the islands and that they would
40
be eventually returned to Japan.
This point in the American version survived the
subsequent adjustments with the British delegate who
originally required Japan to renounce sovereignty over
4l
these islands.
A draft Japanese Peace Treaty which
came out of the Anglo-American agreement and which was to
be incorporated in the final Treaty only after the minor
verbal modifications was officially made public on
12July
42
1951
.Public response to the Okinawa clause in the disclosed
draft treaty was considerably unfavourable, particularly
so in Amami-Oshima where disappointed people began to
43
Japanese leaders were anxious to get the U n i t e d States permis s i o n to explain to the general public in a more
express w a y the purpose of the provision of Article
3
> c o n s i d e r i n g that the obscurity of the clauses was to some44
extent responsible for that adverse public response. A h i g h - r a n k i n g official (who was beli e v e d to be Iguchi, Permanent Se c r e t a r y for Foreign Affairs and a r i g h t - h a n d man of Yoshida) d i s c l o s e d the Government v i e w that the pros p e c t i v e treaty w o u l d not require Japan to renounce her sovereignty in Ok i n a w a and Ogasawara and therefore
s overeignty in these islands would rest w i t h Japan even if they should be placed under a U.N. trusteeship for a certain period of time. This was, he added, one of the
43
positive results of their negotiations w i t h Dulles. He also told the press that the Japanese G o vernment hadr eason to expect that a trusteeship agreement for the islands, if any, w o uld be one w ith a specified term after the expiration of w h i c h they should be restored to full Japanese sovereignty. He also r e vealed the fact that negotia t i o n s were in progress w i t h the U n i t e d States
s e e k i n g that no tariff barriers should be erected be t w e e n
46
these island areas and the Japanese homeland.
It remains open to question as to w h e ther these
statements were made w i t h prior u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Un i t e d
47
States. T h e y were, however, endorsed to a large extent by Prime Mini s t e r Y o s h i d a who pointed out in his
explanatory speech before the Diet that the T r e a t y simply prov i d e d that Jap a n would concur in any proposal of the U n i t e d States to the U n i t e d Nations for placing these
that the Treaty was so flexible on this matter that there
was much room left to hope that reasonable arrangements
would be worked out in regard to the civil status of the
inhabitants involved and their trade and other
48
communications with the Japanese homeland»
Through these statements the Japanese Government
tried to clarify two points: (l) the significance that
the Treaty did not require Japan to renounce her
sovereignty in Okinawa and Ogasawara, and (
2) the
reasonable assumption that Japan would be able to have
some voice in working out of arrangements concerning
socio-economic relations of these islands with the
Japanese mainland»
The first of these two points was
endorsed by Dulles at San Francisco in September 1951>
where he said that Article 3 of the Treaty would permit
Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it
possible for the islands to be brought into trusteeship
49
system with the United States as administering authority.
The British delegate (Kenneth Younger) also confirmed
this, saying that ’the treaty does not remove these (i.e.
50
Okinawa and Ogasawara) from Japanese sovereignty.'
Regarding the second point, Japanese leaders
apparently expected, that in spite of the treaty provision
which granted the United States to do so,
she would not
need to exercise ’all and any powers of administration,
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitants of these islands’,
and she would allow Japan
to maintain a quasi-domestic relations with them,
forth. W h i l e the n e e d for the m a n i p u l a t i o n of the p u b l i c o p i n i o n m a d e them p r e s e n t a h o p e f u l p i c t u r e on this
m a t t e r , the J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s t h e m s e l v e s s e e m e d to be q u i t e o p t i m i s t i c at this mom e n t . ft m a y be s a i d this e x p e c t a t i o n w a s to some extent at l e ast b a s e d on r e a lity. F o r the A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n still r e m a i n e d f l u i d an d
f l e x i b l e on this m a t t e r . D u l l e s revea l e d , fo r example, in r e p l y to a q u e s t i o n in C o n g r e s s b e f o r e w h i c h the
t r e a t y wa s p l a c e d for r a t i f i c a t i o n , that ’there h a d b e e n no f i n a l c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of t h o u g h t w i t h i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t as to h ow to e x e r c i s e the r i g h t s and
p r i v i l e g e s g i v e n us b y A r t i c l e 3' > a d d i n g that a d e c i s i o n on this p o int w o u l d have to be m a d e in the light o f
v a r i o u s f a c t o r s - ’s e n t i m e n t a l and h i s t o r i c a l ' as w e l l as ’s t r a t e g i c ' . A t the same time h e e v e n s u g g e s t e d the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f not a p p l y i n g for t r u s t e e s h i p , p o i n t i n g out the fact that the U n i t e d S t a t e s wa s not o b l i g e d to do so
5
1
b y the Treaty.'
B e f o r e c o n c l u d i n g the p r e s e n t chapter, it m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e to see b r i e f l y w h a t p l a c e h a d b e e n g i v e n to O k i n a w a in v a r i o u s plans of pos fc-Peace T r e a t y s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h Japan. P l a i n l y speaking, O k i n a w a h a d b e e n i n v a r i a b l y r e g a r d e d as one of the p l a c e s w h e r e the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d m a i n t a i n its f o r c e s for some time, w h i l e t h ere h a d b e e n c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n and
v a c i l l a t i o n in the A m e r i c a n t h i n k i n g about the w i s d o m of h o l d i n g b a s e s in J a p a n a f t e r the c o n c l u s i o n of a p e a c e
d o u b t as far as A m e r i c a n b a s e s in O k i n a w a w e r e c o n c e r n e d e v e n a m o n g those w h o w e r e f a v o u r a b l y i n c l i n e d tow a r d s a
’n e u t r a l ' Japan» T h e s e people, as r e p r e s e n t e d b y G e n e r a l M a c A r t h u r , r e g a r d e d it as a n e c e s s a r y and w i s e a l t e r n a t i v e
to m a i n t a i n A m e r i c a n f o r c e s in O k i n a w a and some o t her o u t l y i n g ^ J a p a n e s e i s l a n d s in p r e f e r e n c e to a m o r e costly, in a p o l i t i c a l sense, p o l i c y of c o n t i n u i n g A m e r i c a n
o c c u p a t i o n of J a p a n for the p u r p o s e e i t h e r of k e e p i n g v i g i l a n c e over p o s t - T r e a t y J a pan so that no c h a u v i n i s t i c a t t e m p t to r e m i l i t a r i z e J a p a n w o u l d be s u c c e s s f u l , or of g u a r a n t e e i n g a d i s a r m e d J a p a n a g a i n s t a r m e d a t t a c k f r o m
52
o u t s i d e . It s e e m e d that J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s of the time w o u l d be p r e p a r e d to acce p t this scheme. In S e p t e m b e r
19^-7 A s h i d a . F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r of the K a t a y a m a C a b i n e t , put f o r w a r d a p r o p o s a l for the p o s t - P e a c e T r e a t y s e c u r i t y s y s t e m for J a p a n on the b a s i s of a u n i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . A l t h o u g h this f o r m e d a d e p a r t u r e
f r o m e a r l i e r t h i n k i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y the i d e a of c o l l e c t i v e g u a r a n t e e of J a p a n ' s s e c u r i t y b y p r i n c i p a l A l l i e d P o w e r s or the U n i t e d N a t i o n s as a w h o l e and, as
such, can be r e g a r d e d as an e m b r y o of the e v e n t u a l l y
i n s t i t u t e d U . S . - J a p a n S e c u r i t y T r e a t y ( s i g n e d in S e p t e m b e r 1951 a l o n g s i d e w i t h the P e a c e T r e a t y ) , there w a s an
i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n A s h i d a ’s p l a n and t h ose in l a t e r periods. U n d e r his plan, the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d k e e p its forces c l o s e to J a p a n but not in J a p a n a n d w o u l d m o v e t h e m only in ca s e of e m e r g e n c y to b a s e s in J a p a n
5
3
v 5^
1). It is n o t k n o w n w h a t a r e a w a s a c t u a l l y m e ant b y ’c l o s e to J a p a n 3 , but q u i t e l i k e l y A s h i d a wa s t h i n k i n g in terms of a g u a r a n t e e of J a p a n ' s s e c u r i t y b y A m e r i c a n f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d , a m o n g o t h e r areas, in O k i n a w a and O g a s a w a r a .
W h e n b o t h J a p a n e s e a n d A m e r i c a n l e a d e r s d e c i d e d to take a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e of a c t i o n and to c o n c l u d e a k i n d o f b a s e r i g h t s a g r e e m e n t , t h e r e b y g r a n t i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s the r i g h t to d i s p o s e v a r i o u s f a c i l i t i e s on
J a p a n e s e soil f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s , some m i g h t w e l l h a v e t h o u g h t that the r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e of O k i n a w a in the A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g y in the F a r E a s t h a d s o m e w h a t d e c l i n e d
and, a c c o r d i n g l y , the A m e r i c a n s m i ght l o o s e n their
55
c o n t r o l of O k in a w a , R e a l i t y failed, h o w ever, to m e e t t h eir e x p e c t a t i o n , an d J a p a n e s e n e g o t i a t o r s ha d to r e a l i z e h o w firm the A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y ' s s t a n d on O k i n a w a was. In s p ite of the f a c t that the U n i t e d S t a t e s o b t a i n e d free a c c e s s to J a p a n e s e b a s e s b y the n e w l y e s t a b l i s h e d treaty, O k i n a w a w a s g i v e n s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e for v a r i o u s reasons. A p p a r e n t l y , one of t h o s e r e a s o n s wa s a still s t r o n g
concern, p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g some B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h c o u n t r i e s in the P a ci f i c , ov e r the r e v i v a l of J a p a n e s e
5
6
m i l i t a r i s m . A n o t h e r reason, a l t h o u g h not o p e n l y stated, w a s that the U.S. m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s w a n t e d to h o l d on
to Okinawa, so to speak, as an i n s u r a n c e in case the b a s e s in J a p a n w e r e lost. I n other words, in the l i g h t of the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of J a p a n ’s f u t u r e course, it w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y , t h e y thought, f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s
to secu r e s pecial p r i v i l e g e s in O k i n a w a so that the
cha n g e in J a p a n e s e p o li t i c s and J a p a n ’s r e l a t i o n s w i t h
57
the U n i t e d S t ates,
In short t h r o u g h o u t the d i s c u s s i o n about the post-P e a c e T r e a t y s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m of Japan., it s e e m e d a
f o r e g o n e c o n c l u s i o n that the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d r e t a i n O k i n a w a u n d e r a s p e c i a l legal f r a m e w o r k i r r e s p e c t i v e of J a p a n s p l a c e in the A l l i a n c e system, As we h a v e a l r e a d y
seen, the ’r e s i d u a l s o v e r e i g n t y : p r o v i s i o n w a s the s o l u t i o n g iven b y D u l l e s to m e e t this n e c e s s i t y ,
T h e g r ea t e s t p e c u l i a r i t y of A r t i c l e 3 of the J a p a n e s e P e ac e T r e a t y lay in the fact that it d i d not come to a n y c o n c r e t e d e c i s i o n over the s t a t u s of O k i n a w a but p o s t p o n e d a d e c i s i o n to an u n d e t e r m i n e d da t e in the
future» It d i d not give a n y i n d i c a t i o n s o f h o w long b e f o r e a final d e c i s i o n s h o u l d be m a d e an d in w h a t w a y an end s h o u l d be put to the t r a n s i t o r y s i t u a t i o n » T h i s i n d e c i s i v e n e s s an d o b s c u r i t y w a s the r e s u l t of the d e s i r e s of the l e ad e r s on b o t h s i d e s to a v o i d b r i n g i n g the
f o l l o w i n g two f a c t o r s into conflict: (l) the w i s h of the A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y for a free us e of the islan d s ; and (2) n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s of the J a p a n e s e p e o p l e for
r e s t o r i n g an d r e t a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c an d s e n t i m e n t a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of O k i n a w a w i t h the J a p a n e s e c o m m unity»
W h a t w e r e the gains a n d losses a c c r u i n g to both sides f r o m the c o m p r o m i s e r e a c h e d ? F r o m the A m e r i c a n side,
this c o m p r o m i s e w a s n e c e s s a r y for the d i p l o m a t i c
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of w i n n i n g the f a v o u r o f a c o u n t r y w h i c h t h e y n o w sought as an a l l y in their s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union» T h e y w e r e s u c c e s s f u l in s e c u r i n g the
wor d s , t h e y m a i n t a i n e d the v e s t e d r i g h t s d e r i v e d from the conqu e s t , a l t h o u g h t h e s e r i g h t s s u f f e r e d f r o m a s o m e w h a t s h ak y l egal f r a m e w o r k for a l e n g t h y p e r i o d of o c c u p a t i o n » ^
To Japan, it w a s a gain, too, in the sense that she s u c c e s s f u l l y p r e v e n t e d a d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n f r o m b e i n g m a d e u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h w e r e not yet f a v o u r a b l e e n o u g h f o r her» T h e fact s till r e m a i n e d , h o w e v e r , that the J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s s a c r i f i c e d the
i n t e r e s t s of the p e o p l e in O k i n a w a (who w e r e a s s e r t i n g t h e m s e l v e s to be c o m p a t r i o t s of the J a p a n e s e people) for the n a t i o n ' s e a r l y a n d p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t e a s y r e c o v e r y to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l society.
C H A P T E R 2
The E v o l u t i o n of the O k i n a w a Problem:
F r o m the J a p a n e s e_P eace T r e a t y to the S e t t l e m e n t of the M i l i t a r y L a n d I s s u e (1952-58)
A t the time of the c o n c l u s i o n of the J a p a n e s e P e a c e T r e a t y , o ne c o u l d s p e c u l a t e on two p o s s i b l e c o u r s e s of
the f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t of the O k i n a w a p r o b l e m . T he f irst p o s s i b i l i t y w a s that there w o u l d be a f a v o u r a b l e c h a n g e in the s t a t u s of O k i n a w a w h e n the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s
b e t w e e n J a p a n and the U n i t e d S t a t e s w e r e f u r t h e r i m p r o v e d . I n o t h e r words, r e c o v e r y of J a p a n ’s e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h
a n d the c o n s e q u e n t i n c r e a s e of h e r m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e w o u l d e n a b l e h e r to n e g o t i a t e o v e r O k i n a w a w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s on m o r e f a v o u r a b l e terms. Ti m e o n l y w o u l d h e l p the two c o u n t r i e s to w o r k out a s o l u t i o n a c c e p t a b l e to t h e m both.
The o t he r p o s s i b i l i t y w a s that i m p r o v e m e n t o f J a p a n ' s s t a t u s in r e l a t i o n to the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y f a c i l i t a t e a s o l u t i o n of the O k i n a w a probl e m . O n the c o n t r a r y , the A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y m i g h t m o r e and m o r e s t u b b o r n l y a d he r e to the sta t u s quo c o n c e r n i n g O k i n a w a as J a p a n w o u l d h a v e m o r e v o i c e in o p e r a t i o n of
the U . S . - J a p a n a l l i a n c e system.
A s m e n t i o n e d in the p r e v i o u s chapter, J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s w e r e t h i n k i n g l a r g e l y in terms of the first c o u r s e whif.e m a n y A m e r i c a n s w e r e e n v i s a g i n g the second.